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     Summary (English) 
The classification of entities, and the meaning of “tax transparency”, in United Kingdom tax law 
 
This thesis is broken down as follows: 
1. Following an introduction (including research questions), the first chapter explores the main 
UK tax law definitions of those legal persons which are relevant for direct tax purposes. In 
particular, it explores the law, practice and tax authority guidance (such as it is) for 
classifying entities formed outside the UK.  In so doing, it considers in detail the distinction 
between a “partnership” and a “company” for UK tax purposes, and the problems this 
raises.  Finally, it offers a critique of the relevant law, practice and administrative guidance. 
2. The second chapter considers the UK criteria for defining certain kinds of trust for UK tax 
purposes, including non-UK entities with trust-like characteristics such as foundations. It 
then considers to what extent the UK direct tax regime treats trusts and similar non-UK 
arrangements as “transparent”.  It also analyses the different kinds of “transparency” which 
may apply in relation to such trusts and arrangements for UK direct tax purposes. Finally, it 
critiques the relevant UK law and practice and makes some proposals for reform.  
3. The third chapter begins with a more general discussion of what “transparency” may mean 
in the context of taxation (not just direct taxation) and taking into account the new 
“transparent entities” provision in Article 1(2) of the OECD Model 2017, and the related 
OECD Commentary. It concludes that there is no single concept of “transparency” for tax 
purposes (a conclusion already foreshadowed in the first two chapters) and that it may 
legitimately mean different things in different contexts. This conclusion paves the way for a 
detailed analysis of the varying degrees to which “transparency” is a relevant concept in 
relation to UK taxes which are not taxes on income and gain (notably Inheritance Tax, VAT 
and Stamp Duty Land Tax).  Historically, there has been very little analysis of these issues y 
commentators. Again, the chapter critiques the relevant UK rules and makes reform 
proposals.  
4. The fourth chapter explores the concept of tax “transparency” and entity classification of 
issues as they relate to double tax treaties and EU law. It begins with a survey of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the new Article 1(2) of the OECD Model 2017.  It then goes on 
to discuss how, from limited beginnings, UK treaty policy has attempted to tackle these 
issues since the 1980’s in its treaties relating to income and gain. It notes how the UK has 
been something of a follower, rather than a leader in this regard (see in particular the UK’s 
last two treaties with the US and the latest UK treaty with France).  The chapter then 
explores a number of areas where UK double tax treaties still raise problems of entity 
classification which are not addressed by rules resembling Article 1(2) of the OECD Model 
2017 (e.g. some of the issues surrounding the Employment Income Article). Suggestions are 
made for improvements. The largely unaddressed problems of entity classification and tax 
“transparency” in the UK’s estate and gift tax treaties are also considered. Lastly Chapter 4 
considers the impact of EU law on questions of “entity classification” and “tax 
transparency”.  It concludes that in some respects the UK tax rules for classifying non-UK 
entities are not compliant with EU law.  
5. The fifth chapter compares and contrasts the UK tax rules for classifying entities with the 






is more akin to that of the UK).  It seeks to pinpoint strengths and weaknesses of both the US 
and Dutch approach, when compared to the UK.  
6. The last chapter begins by exploring why issues of entity classification and tax 
“transparency” matter when building a mature tax system, and not just in relation to the 
taxation of income and gain. This picks up themes discussed in the Introduction. It then sets 
out the answers to the research questions posed at the outset.  It ends by proposing some 
more general reforms of the existing UK rules on entity classification and tax “transparency”, 
taking into account changes identified in earlier chapters, as well as economic changes in 
recent decades.  A number of alternative approaches to reform are recommended, some 
being less radical than others.  One of the less radical approaches would involve partial 










De classificatie van entiteiten en de betekenis van “fiscale transparantie” in het belastingrecht van het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk 
 
Het proefschrift hierboven is als volgt opgebouwd: 
1. Na een introductie (inclusief onderzoeksvragen), verkent het eerste hoofdstuk de definities 
van rechtspersonen die van belang zijn voor de directe belastingen. In het bijzonder wordt 
ingegaan op de wetgeving, praktijk en het beleid (met al zijn gebreken) betreffende de 
classificatie van entiteiten die buiten het VK tot stand zijn gekomen. Hierbij wordt in detail 
het onderscheid tussen een "partnership" en een "bedrijf" voor Britse belastingdoeleinden 
besproken, en de problemen die hieruit voortkomen. Ten slotte worden de relevante 
wetgeving, de praktijk en het geldende beleid kritisch bezien. 
2. Het tweede hoofdstuk gaat in op de criteria voor het definiëren van bepaalde soorten trusts 
voor Britse belastingdoeleinden, inclusief niet-Britse entiteiten met trust-achtige 
kenmerken, zoals stichtingen. Vervolgens wordt besproken in hoeverre het directe 
belastingregime trusts en vergelijkbare niet-Britse organisaties als "transparant" aanmerkt. 
Ook worden de verschillende soorten van "transparantie" geanalyseerd die voor Britse 
directe belastingdoeleinden van toepassing kunnen zijn met betrekking tot dergelijke trusts 
en organisaties. Ten slotte worden de relevante Britse wetgeving en praktijk kritisch bezien 
en worden enkele voorstellen gedaan voor hervorming. 
3. Het derde hoofdstuk begint met een meer algemene discussie van wat "transparantie" kan 
betekenen in de context van belastingheffing (niet slechts directe belastingheffing), waarbij 
acht wordt geslagen op de nieuwe "transparante entiteiten" bepaling van artikel 1(2) van 
het OESO-Modelverdrag 2017 en het gerelateerde OESO Commentaar. Geconcludeerd 
wordt dat er niet één concept is van "transparantie" voor belastingdoeleinden (een 
conclusie die de eerste twee hoofdstukken al deden vermoeden) en dat het woord legitiem 
verschillende betekenissen kan hebben in verschillende contexten. Deze conclusie maakt de 
weg vrij voor een gedetailleerde analyse van de verschillende maten waarin "transparantie" 
van relevantie is voor de belastingen van het VK die niet belastingen op inkomsten zijn (in 
het bijzonder de erfbelasting, omzetbelasting en het zegelrecht). Deze kwesties zijn in het 
verleden maar in weinig literatuurbronnen besproken. Wederom worden de relevante 
regels van het VK kritisch bezien en worden in dit hoofdstuk voorstellen gedaan voor 
hervorming. 
4. Het vierde hoofdstuk verkent het concept van fiscale "transparantie" en de classificatie van 
entiteiten in de context van belastingverdragen en het EU-recht. Het hoofdstuk begint met 
een overzicht van de sterktes en zwaktes van het nieuwe artikel 1(2) van het OESO-
Modelverdrag 2017. Vervolgens wordt besproken hoe het verdragsbeleid van het VK, vanuit 
een gelimiteerd beginstadium, sinds de jaren '80 heeft getracht om deze kwesties aan te 
pakken in belastingverdragen met betrekking tot belastingen naar het inkomen. Hierbij 
wordt opgemerkt dat het VK meer een volger dan een leider is geweest in dit verband (zie in 
het bijzonder de laatste twee verdragen van het VK met de VS en het laatste met Frankrijk). 
Het hoofdstuk gaat daarna in op een aantal gebieden waarin belastingverdragen gesloten 






nog niet worden gedekt door regels lijkende op artikel 1(2) OESO-Modelverdrag 2017 
(bijvoorbeeld sommige kwesties betreffende het inkomsten uit arbeid artikel). Er worden 
suggesties gemaakt voor verbetering. De meestal onbesproken gelaten problemen 
betreffende de classificatie van entiteiten en fiscale "transparantie" in de erf- en 
schenkbelastingverdragen gesloten door het VK worden ook besproken. Ten slotte gaat 
hoofdstuk 4 in op de impact van het EU-recht op vraagstukken inzake de "classificatie van 
entiteiten" en "fiscale transparantie". Geconcludeerd wordt dat in sommige opzichten de 
belastingregels van het VK voor de classificatie van niet-Britse entiteiten niet in 
overeenstemming zijn met het Unierecht. 
5. Het vijfde hoofdstuk vergelijkt en contrasteert de belastingregels van het VK betreffende de 
classificatie van entiteiten met de (zeer verschillende) benadering van de federale 
inkomstenbelasting van de VS, evenals de Nederlandse benadering (die meer overeenkomt 
met de benadering van het VK). Het hoofdstuk beoogt vast te stellen wat de sterktes en 
zwaktes zijn van zowel de Amerikaanse als de Nederlandse benadering in vergelijking met 
het VK. 
6. Het laatste hoofdstuk verkent allereerst waarom kwesties betreffende de classificatie van 
entiteiten en fiscale "transparantie" van belang zijn bij het bouwen van een volwassen 
belastingstelsel, en niet slechts in relatie tot de belastingheffing van inkomsten. Hierbij 
worden thema's opgepakt die in de introductie zijn ter sprake zijn gekomen. Vervolgens 
wordt een antwoord geformuleerd op de eerder gestelde onderzoeksvragen. Het hoofdstuk 
eindigt met een aantal algemene hervormingsmogelijkheden voor de bestaande regels van 
het VK over de classificatie van entiteiten en fiscale "transparantie", waarbij de 
veranderingen die geïdentificeerd zijn in eerdere hoofdstukken worden meegenomen, 
evenals economische veranderingen in de afgelopen decennia. Een aantal alternatieve 
benaderingen tot hervorming worden aanbevolen, sommige minder radicaal dan anderen. 
Eén van de minder radicale benaderingen zou een gedeeltelijke overname van de 
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1.1 This thesis analyses how UK tax law identifies and defines taxable persons, other than natural     
persons (i.e. individuals). This process of identification and definition is henceforth referred to as 
"entity classification". A key question which forms part of this process is whether a legal person is a 
"company" or a "partnership" for UK tax purposes. This is mainly because "companies" are taxable 
persons in their own right whereas "partnerships" are not, at least for the purposes of taxing their 
own income and gains.1  
 
"Entity classification" is not limited to identifying and defining only those persons who are potentially 
taxable in the UK, because they have the necessary physical link to the UK.  It may also consist of 
identifying and defining persons outside the UK who have no such link. This is because other UK 
taxpayers may have relevant connections with such entities (e.g. a UK-resident person owning shares 
in a US corporation). In order to tax that other UK taxpayer correctly in respect of those connections, 
it is essential to understand what entity that taxpayer has a relevant connection with. Is it a company, 
a partnership, a trust, a simple contract or a co-ownership arrangement falling short of partnership or 




1.2 Entity classification raises the important related question of whether a particular entity is "tax 
transparent" and if so, what precisely this means in a given context. Entities which are not "tax 
transparent" are typically referred to as "opaque". The answer to the transparency question often has 
a major impact on the UK taxation of the entity itself and of those with an interest in it. This is 
especially true when taxing interest holders in respect of income and capital gains which they derive 
from the entity.  
 
"Tax transparency" is not a technical term.  Rather it is, in particular, non-technical shorthand for 
situations where (i) an entity (e.g. a partnership or trust) is not a primary taxpayer in its own right in 
respect of income and gains2; and (ii) its members/those with a relevant interest in it are taxed on 
distributed and undistributed income and gain as if each such person were directly interested in the 
entity's underlying assets and revenues3. However, as will become clearer, “tax transparency” is not a 
concept limited to taxing an entity’s income and gains.  
 
                                                          
1 This difference is a fairly modern one. Until the nineteenth century, "companies" were not taxable persons in 
their own right although tax could be collected from them on account of tax ultimately due by their members: 
see John F. Avery Jones: “Defining and Taxing Companies 1799 to 1965”. Chapter 1. Studies in the History of Tax 
Law Volume 5. ed. John Tiley. Oxford, Hart Publishing 2012.   
2 It may still have liabilities to account for and collect tax on behalf of others e.g. operating the UK payroll 
withholding system known as PAYE ("Pay As You Earn") on the earnings of directors and employees. 
3 See 6.5.1 for a contrast between this idea of "tax transparency" and the concept of "tax translucency" which 






Typically, "partnerships" are regarded under UK tax law as "tax transparent" in the sense described 
above. Hence it is essential to define a “partnership”. However, entities other than partnerships can 
be "tax transparent". In the UK, this is true of some trusts. This is discussed further in 4.2 and 4.3. It is 
also typically true of those contractual joint ventures and co-ownership arrangements which fall short 
of being "partnerships". Therefore, an arrangement or entity can be "tax transparent" without 
necessarily being a "partnership".  
 
Even if an arrangement is "tax transparent", the precise mechanics for achieving this may vary. Suffice 
it to say at this stage that the rules differ between taxes. Hence "tax transparency" for income tax 
purposes differs from "tax transparency" for capital gains tax purposes. Moreover, and crucially, a "tax 
transparent" entity is rarely, if ever, a "nothing" for tax purposes. It is likely to have enduring 
significance when taxing those connected with it, even if the members of the entity are taxed as if 
they were directly interested in its underlying income and gains. The enduring structural significance 
of a “transparent” entity and its implications are discussed further in subsequent Chapters, not least 
in relation to whether certain corporate affiliation tests can be met by “tracing” ownership through a 
“transparent” entity.   
 
In a globalised economy, questions of entity classification and tax transparency have become more 
common. In the UK, this has been especially true when UK taxpayers have claimed double taxation 
relief for non-UK income tax, when they invest in non-UK arrangements or entities. There has been 
major litigation twice in the last twenty-five years on whether UK investors in non-UK arrangements 
can treat them as "transparent" in order to claim a UK credit for non-UK tax on the underlying income 
from the arrangement. This litigation is discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
When defining "tax transparency", one needs to take account of other rules which impute 
undistributed income and gain from a UK or non-UK entity or arrangement to a UK-taxable person. 
That person will have a relevant, defined connection with the arrangement e.g. a shareholder in a 
company or the settlor of a trust. These rules tend to be broadly-drafted anti-avoidance rules which 
limit deferral of UK tax on income and gains by accumulating them within the entity or arrangement. 
Good examples are the "controlled foreign company" rules4; the "transfer of assets abroad" rules5; 
and the income and capital gains tax "settlement" rules6. The effect of these rules is often similar to 
tax transparency but is not quite the same concept.  Hence they are not discussed in detail in this 
thesis. In particular, such rules are structured so that income or gain of an entity or arrangement is 
not usually attributed to a person outside the UK tax charge so as to make it non-taxable7.  To do so 
would defeat their anti-deferral purpose whereas such issues tend to be irrelevant when dealing with 
more classic examples of “tax transparency”. Such attribution rules are also asymmetrical: income 
                                                          
4 Part 9A Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 (“TIOPA”). 
5 Part 13 Chapter 2 Income Tax Act 2007 (“ITA”). 
6 Part 5 Chapter 5 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 (“ITTOIA”); and Sections 77 – 98A Taxation 
of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (“TCGA”). 
7 See Becker v Wright 42 TC 591, a decision on an earlier version of the income tax “settlement” rules, but which 
is now reflected in Section 648(1) and (2) ITTOIA. UK-source income can be attributed under the income tax 
“settlement” rules to a non-UK-resident: see IRC v Countess of Kenmare 37 TC 383 and also HMRC Trusts 
Settlements and Estates Manual TSEM10310 (accessed 15 June 2020). As one commentator rightly points out, 
attribution of UK-source income from UK-resident trustees to a non-UK-resident settlor may reduce the UK tax 
charge: the charge on a non-UK-resident is often limited to (any) tax deducted (or treated as deducted) at 
source at 20% only: see Sections 810-828 ITA and Mark Brabazon: “International Taxation of Trust Income – 






and gain may be attributed to the relevant UK taxpayer but underlying losses of the entity or 
arrangement are almost never attributed in this way. By contrast, a taxpayer with a relevant interest 
in a partnership, some kinds of trust and most simple co-ownership arrangements should be taxed as 
if it owned a proportionate slice of the entity's underlying revenues and assets, and bore any losses 
accordingly. In short, there should be no asymmetry of the kind mentioned above, when dealing with 




1.3 This thesis aims to shed light on an area of UK tax law which, while highly theoretical in some 
respects, has very important practical implications, especially in a globalised economy. Furthermore, 
this area has been relatively neglected by the UK legislature and courts.  
 
With this aim in mind, the thesis addresses the following overarching question:  How does the UK 
classify entities for tax purposes and, consequently, when and how does it regard an entity as being 
tax “transparent”?  Is the UK’s approach to entity classification satisfactory, especially taking into 
account its double taxation treaties and EU law? Is an alternative approach to be preferred?   
 
In addressing the main question, the thesis considers a number of subsidiary questions: 
 
(i) Why is it important to classify entities for UK tax purposes? 
(ii) How does the UK do this, especially in relation to companies, partnerships and trusts? 
(iii) What is the connection between classifying entities and “tax transparency”? 
(iv) What does “tax transparency” mean in UK tax law?  Does it have more than one 
meaning? 
(v) How do UK double tax treaties address entity classification and tax transparency issues, 
especially when the UK and its treaty partners classify an entity in different ways? 
(vi) Is the UK approach to entity classification affected by EU law? 
(vii) Is the approach of other jurisdictions (in particular, the United States and the 
Netherlands) to these issues instructive? 
(viii) What are the weaknesses in current UK thinking on “tax transparency” and entity 
classification?  How can it be improved? 
 
In addition to a concluding Chapter, the thesis has five substantive Chapters.  The first considers the 
existing UK rules for defining taxable entities, other than trusts. In particular, it discusses the judicial 
decisions to date and the strengths and weaknesses of those rules. The second Chapter considers the 
existing UK rules for defining trusts and the extent to which they are “transparent” when taxing their 
income and gains in the UK. The third Chapter further explores what “transparency” means, and 
considers how this concept affects UK taxes which do not relate to income and gains (e.g. VAT, stamp 
duty).  The fourth Chapter considers how effectively entity classification and tax transparency issues 
have been addressed in UK tax treaties, taking account in particular of OECD developments over the 
last twenty-five years. This Chapter also considers whether UK law and practice in this area is 
                                                          
8 Some of the anti-deferral rules referred to above do not even impute underlying income as such but create a 
standalone "sui generis" UK tax charge whose quantum is measured by reference to elements of the underlying 
income of the entity. For example, this seems to be the case with the UK "controlled foreign company" rules: 






compatible with EU law. The fifth substantive Chapter compares and contrasts the UK approach with 
that of the USA and the Netherlands. There are three supporting Appendices. The law is stated as at 
mid-July 2020.  
 
 
The current UK approach to classifying entities and establishing whether they are “transparent” 
  
2.1 The UK treats an individual as taxable on income and gains in his or her own right9. However, 
complications immediately emerge when identifying a "company" i.e. the type of entity subject to UK 
corporation tax on its income and gains so long as (i) it is not acting in a "fiduciary or representative" 
capacity10; and (ii) it is UK-resident or it is trading as a dealer in or developer of UK land or it is trading 
through a UK "permanent establishment"11.  
 
2.2 The key (and highly problematic) definition of a "company" for the purposes of the UK corporation 
tax charge is in Section 1121 Corporation Tax Act 2010 (“CTA 2010”), which is based on predecessor 
wording in Section 832 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (“ICTA 1988”). Section 1121 is an 
exhaustive definition.  It reads: 
 
"(1) In the Corporation Tax Acts, 'company' means any body corporate or unincorporated 
association, but does not include a partnership, a co-ownership scheme (as defined by Section 
235A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000), a local authority or a local authority 
association. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) needs to be read with Section 617 (under which the trustees of an authorised 
unit trust are treated for certain purposes as a UK resident company).”  
 
2.3 The special UK tax treatment of an "authorised unit trust" (a trust-based form of regulated 
collective investment scheme) is discussed further at 4.3.6.2. Co-ownership schemes are another 
form of “tax transparent” collective investment vehicle. Both these entities are specialised, limited 
exceptions to the general rule in Section 1121. A "local authority" is a UK local government 
administrative unit and a "local authority association" is a formalised group of such bodies. They have 
no great significance for the purposes of this analysis. All these entities are specific exceptions to the 
general definition of "company" in Section 1121. This definition has three key elements: it includes a 
"body corporate" and an "unincorporated association" but excludes any entity which is a 
"partnership". 
 
2.4 There is a similar definition of “company” for capital gains tax purposes in Section 288(1) TCGA. 
This by contrast is non-exhaustive. It reads as follows: 
 
                                                          
9 Although an individual can be taxable on income and gain differently, depending on the capacity in which that 
individual is acting: on his or her own account, as a trustee or as an executor or administrator of a deceased 
person’s estate.  
10 Sections 3 and 6 Corporation Tax Act 2009 (“CTA 2009”). 






“’Company includes any body corporate or unincorporated association but does not include a 
partnership, and shall be construed in accordance with Section 99”.12 
 
The next step is to analyse the three elements mentioned above. Before doing so, it should be added 
that the concept of an “entity” does appear in UK tax legislation. It is clearly not limited to a corporate 
body but is otherwise undefined. Furthermore, its use is fairly peripheral e.g. the definitions of 
“generally accepted accounting practice” in Section 997 ITA and Section 1127 CTA 2010, as well as the 
(now repealed) Section 340 TIOPA.  
 
2.5 “Unincorporated association” 
 
An "unincorporated association" is, for corporation tax purposes, usually regarded as a contractually-
based (not trust-based) entity which, according to dicta in the Court of Appeal, lacks legal personality 
and which exists for non-business purposes.  As Lawton LJ put it in the Court of Appeal in Conservative 
and Unionist Central Office v Burrell13 : 
 
“I infer that by ‘unincorporated association’ in this context [i.e. the statutory predecessor of 
Section 1121(1) CTA 2010] Parliament meant two or more persons bound together for one or 
more common purposes, not being business purposes, [emphasis added] by mutual undertakings  
each having mutual duties and obligations, in an organisation which has rules which identify in 
whom control of it and its funds rests and on what terms and which can be joined or left at will. 
The bond of union between the members of an unincorporated association has to be contractual 
[emphasis added].”  
 
A good example of such an organisation is that type of club which is not a separate legal person but 
an aggregation of members based on a contract; formed to provide its members with the benefits of 
club membership and simply aiming to cover costs by raising membership fees14. Of course, some 
clubs take the form of a "body corporate", a concept which is discussed further in 2.6.   
 
"Unincorporated associations" are in practice rather rare beasts for tax purposes (and for corporation 
tax in particular). Historically, this was not always so. Until it became much easier in the mid-
nineteenth century to incorporate a company by registration and the Bubble Act of 1720 was 
repealed, many so-called “companies” which did have business purposes were in fact unincorporated 
                                                          
12 Section 99 treats a unit trust scheme as a company with issued share capital for capital gains tax purposes, 
although this is now subject to Section 103D TCGA: see 4.3.6.2.2.  The definition in Section 288(1) applies 
“unless the context otherwise requires”. An example of where the context does otherwise require is Section 
170(9) TCGA.  This defines a “company” more narrowly for the purposes of determining the make-up of a 
corporate group, when taxing chargeable gains. Section 170(1) is not considered in further detail but does 
include a “company” (other than a UK limited liability “partnership”), whether incorporated within or outside 
the UK.   
13 [1982] 2 All ER 1 at 4b 
14 In Blackpool Marton Rotary Club v Martin 62 TC 686, a rotary club argued that it was a partnership subject to 
income tax, and not an “unincorporated association” subject to corporation tax. Hoffmann J (as he then was) 
disagreed, stating: “The members of a club are not individually entitled to share in any profits which may arise 
from its activities. Their entitlement is to whatever privileges are conferred on them by the rules, and no more. 
Equally, they are under no liability to share in the losses of the club. Their liability is to pay the subscriptions and 
whatever other dues they may be responsible for under the rules, but nothing more. Those are vital distinctions 






associations: in effect, a form of partnership with a large and fluctuating body of members and whose 
business property was held on trust for those members. Hence they were often referred to as “deed 
of settlement companies”.  The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 prohibited the formation of new 
unincorporated bodies with more than 25 members (this was reduced to 20 from 1856)15. The 1844 
Act did not, however, apply to existing bodies. From 1857, such “deed of settlement companies” with 
more than 20 members could carry on a trade or business.  However, each member was severally 
liable for the debts of the organisation without a right of contribution from the other members.  This 
incentivised such organisations to incorporate under the 1844 Act16.  
 
The UK tax authorities (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or “HMRC”) do not agree with the 
statement of Lawton LJ cited above.  While their view has yet to be retested in litigation, they regard 
Lawton LJ’s statement as not strictly necessary for the decision in Burrell, which is correct. They also 
regard it as defining “unincorporated associations” too narrowly, not least because historically, 
“unincorporated associations” have existed for a business purposes. In their published guidance17, 
they state that “[t]here is no reason why an unincorporated body should not have trading or business 
objects, or carry on significant commercial activities”18.  In particular, the UK tax authorities regard 
some forms of joint venture which fall short of being a partnership as nevertheless being 
“unincorporated associations” for UK tax purposes.  However, they clearly do not regard all such joint 
ventures as being “unincorporated associations” and it is very unclear where the dividing line falls19.  
 
Similar doubts have been raised about the dicta of Lawton LJ in the Burrell case in wider academic 
circles20. Harris explores the origins of the definition of “company” for corporation tax purposes which 
is now in Section 1121(1) CTA 2010.  A number of formulations (including other entities in addition to 
“bodies corporate”) had been used over the century prior to the 1965 introduction of corporation tax.  
Furthermore, in their (non-public) Notes on Amendments to Clauses in the 1965 Finance Bill, the then 
Inland Revenue (HMRC’s predecessor) indicated that “unincorporated association” was intended to 
cover any “grouping [other than a partnership] of individuals in any form which has some 
                                                          
15 This provision of the 1844 Act eventually became Section 716(1) Companies Act 1985, which was finally  
repealed by the Regulatory Reform (Removal of 20 Member Limit in Partnerships, etc) Order 2002 SI 2002 No 
3203. It had already ceased to apply to professional partnerships. For an example of an early form of unit trust 
which did not fall foul of this restriction on the number of members, see Smith v Anderson 15 ChD 247.  
16 For further discussion, see “John F. Avery Jones CBE: Defining and Taxing Companies 1799 to 1965” in J. Tiley 
ed. “Studies in the History of Tax Law” op. cit. 28; and paragraphs 1-3 of Gower: Principles of Modern Company 
Law (10th edition - 2016).   
17 Company Taxation Manual CTM41305 www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/company-taxation-
manual/ctm41305 (accessed 15 May 2020).  For similar views expressed in a purely personal capacity, see Victor 
Baker: “Conservative and Unionist Central Office v Burrell (1981) A Case of Hidden Significance” Chapter 12, 
“Landmark Cases in Revenue Law” ed: John Snape and Dominic de Cogan. Hart Publishing 2019, at page 267. 
18 Nor do they think that the tie between the members of such an association need amount to a legally 
enforceable contract.  However, they consider that there must be an organisation of persons with an 
identifiable membership bound together for a common purpose by identifiable rules; and the organisation must 
be distinct from those persons who would be regarded as its members. That organisation must not be some 
other form of association recognised in law e.g. a body corporate or a partnership.  Nor will it include trustees 
whose duties are fiduciary and who in any case are not subject to corporation tax on profits accruing in a 
fiduciary capacity: see Section 6(1) CTA 2009.   
19 See Part F of Victor Baker op. cit. 
20 See Peter Harris: “Company, Person, Body of Persons, Entity: What’s the Difference and Why?” [2011] BTR 






recognisable existence for tax purposes apart from its individual members”.  Or, to quote Harris, “the 
broadest possible range of ‘bodies’ from political to religious to educational to commercial”21.   
 
In the author’s view, this expansive reading of “unincorporated association” (with the related 
uncertainties regarding its scope) is exactly what Lawton LJ was seeking to avoid when deciding what 
bodies pay corporation tax, even though his formulation undoubtedly jarred with the broader earlier 
idea of an “unincorporated association”22. In essence, Lawton LJ was saying that, for corporation tax 
liability purposes, unincorporated arrangements for business purposes should either be regarded as 
partnerships (and hence outside corporation tax altogether but taxable at partner level) or, if they 
were not partnerships, subject to direct taxation only at the level of the participants themselves. In 
particular, such arrangements (e.g. co-ownership of commercial property or other joint ventures 
falling short of partnership) should not be separate taxable entities (i.e. “companies”) for corporation 
tax purposes.  
 
This is in fact a highly practical approach (although - see 7.2.2 - very different from the approach 
taken for US Federal income tax). Otherwise a contractual joint venture falling short of partnership 
could well be subject to corporation tax as an “opaque” entity.  This would have very unwelcome 
consequences for parties who have, for example, entered into a non-partnership business venture 
where they share certain costs but not profits.   
 
A set of barristers’ chambers is a good example of such a joint venture. Each member of chambers 
only shares chambers costs (e.g. rent) but otherwise operates as a sole trader and would expect to be 
taxed as such on his/her profits as they arise.  Similarly, a member of chambers would expect to claim 
relief for any losses from practising as a sole trader, especially in the early years.  This would be the 
expected and long-established tax outcome even though there is a formal legal business relationship 
between members of chambers.  Moreover, each typically has a recognisable, and often prestigious, 
brand distinct from its individual members from time to time.  
   
Treating such an arrangement as an “unincorporated association” for tax purposes entails two levels 
of taxation (corporation tax at entity level and then income tax at member level on a subsequent 
profit distribution)23. This would not reflect the underlying commercial reality and expectation of the 
participants, who are only a fairly loosely integrated group of sole traders.  It could also be a worse tax 
outcome than in a full partnership where the partners alone (and not the partnership entity) are 
directly taxed on their shares of partnership income and gains; and can claim relief in respect of 
underlying partnership losses.  Lawton LJ’s formulation preserves broad parity in this respect between 
partnerships and unincorporated commercial joint ventures falling short of partnership.  In effect, he 
                                                          
21 To some extent, as Harris indicates, Inland Revenue thinking may have been inspired by the short-lived 1952-
3 Excess Profits Levy. This covered “unincorporated societies”, a concept believed to include, in particular, 
unincorporated building societies; and trustees carrying on a business (other than for individual beneficiaries).  
22 As is noted in Part H of Victor Baker op. cit., there are other non-tax contexts in which modern UK statutes 
indicate that an unincorporated association can carry on a trade or business, with or without a view to profit: 
see Section 1161 Companies Act 2006.  This no doubt reflects thinking inherited from early nineteenth century 
company law and the era of “deed of settlement” companies.  Similarly, Section 1173(1) Companies Act 2006 
appears to treat a partnership as one particular form of unincorporated association. This is not of course the 
approach of Section 1121(1) CTA 2010.  
23 Since the abolition of dividend “tax credits” from April 2016, there is little scope for a UK-resident individual 
member of a “company” to obtain relief for entity level corporation tax when computing its income tax liability 






treats both arrangements as taxable only at the level of their members. Furthermore, his formulation 
avoids losses of such a joint venture becoming trapped within it and unusable by its members.  
Trapped losses would result if that venture were subject to corporation tax as a “company”24, on the 
basis that it was an “unincorporated association”25.  
 
The HMRC interpretation of “unincorporated association” makes more sense in other contexts where 
the question at issue is not what entities are subject to corporation tax.  In particular, the tax 
legislation contains other references to an “unincorporated association” in contexts far removed from 
whether an entity is liable to corporation tax.  For example, Chapter 8 Part 2 Income Tax (Earnings 
and Pensions) Act 2003 (“ITEPA 2003”) sets out situations in which workers who are made available to 
clients by “intermediaries” can be taxed as employees, even if they would not be regarded as 
employees on general legal principles.  The result is that the “intermediary” can be required to 
operate PAYE, as well as accounting for UK National Insurance (i.e. social security) contributions.   
 
Section 51 ITEPA 2003 makes clear that a “company” can be an “intermediary” for these purposes.  
Section 61(1) defines a “company” exhaustively as “a body corporate or unincorporated association, 
and does not include a partnership [which is treated as an “intermediary” separately under Section 52 
ITEPA 2003]”.  On the face of it, the definition of a “company” in Section 61(1) closely resembles 
Section 1121(1) CTA 2010.  Yet in relation to Chapter 8 Part 2 ITEPA 2003, there is no reason not to 
treat as an “unincorporated association” a commercial joint venture which falls short of partnership.  
This avoids creating a major loophole in the definition of “intermediary”.   
 
There are even places in the corporation tax legislation where it may be appropriate to apply 
something akin to HMRC’s broader interpretation of “unincorporated association”.  These again 
involve cases where the key question is not what entities are subject to corporation tax.  A good 
example is the definition, for corporation tax purposes, of when persons are “connected”, in Sections 
1122 and 1123 CTA 2010.  This definition turns in part on the meaning of “company”.  Section 1123(1) 
separately defines “company” for the purposes of Sections 1122-326.  In particular, it states that 
“’company’ includes [emphasis added] any body corporate or unincorporated association, but does 
not include a partnership [partnerships being dealt with elsewhere in Sections 1122-3]”.  Therefore, 
the definition of “company” for the purposes of Sections 1122-3 is not exhaustive, unlike Section 
1121(1), which uses the word “means”, not “includes”.  Consequently, there is scope to treat an 
                                                          
24 Even if the members of the unincorporated joint venture were themselves corporation tax payers, 
“consortium relief” would not enable them to access the losses of the venture if the latter were taxable as a 
“company”.  In particular that “company” would lack “ordinary share capital” and therefore would not be a 
“company owned by a consortium”: see Section 153 CTA 2010. 
25 Since Burrell, there have been major changes to the corporation tax computation rules (e.g. the loan 
relationship, derivative contract and intangible fixed asset rules in Parts 5-8 CTA 2009).  Hence the bases for 
computing taxable profit for income tax and corporation tax have diverged greatly since 1982. Therefore the 
interpretation of “unincorporated association” favoured by HMRC would mean that a very different basis of tax 
computation would apply to a partnership of individuals, compared to an unincorporated commercial joint 
venture between individuals which fell short of being a partnership. This divergence is hard to justify because 
the two situations may in reality be very similar. Lawton LJ’s restrictive definition of “unincorporated 
association” largely sidesteps this difficulty.  






unincorporated commercial joint venture falling short of partnership as being a “company” (if not an 
“unincorporated association”), when determining whether persons are “connected”27.  
 
Lawton LJ in Burrell was focussing directly on whether the Conservative Party was a “company” 
subject to corporation tax on its investment income.  The somewhat rough-and –ready line he drew 
leads to a sensible outcome.  However, in other contexts in which the tax legislation uses the term 
“unincorporated association”, a broader meaning28 than that proposed by him may well be 
appropriate29.  
 
2.6  A “body corporate” 
 
2.6.1  A "body corporate" is a separate legal person clearly distinct from its members (if any) which is 
capable of acquiring rights and incurring obligations and which typically comes into being because of a 
publicised state-sanctioned act of creation. Incorporation by registration under company formation 
legislation (e.g. the UK Companies Act 2006) is the most common method of such creation. However, 
it is far from unique. For example, many such legal persons have been incorporated in the UK by Royal 
Charter or private act of parliament e.g. the East India Company as well as canal and railway 
companies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 30  
 
For these purposes, an "act of creation" must be a legally-recognised and publicised step by a 
government-sanctioned body whereby a new legal person is brought into being and notified to third 
parties as such. A simple contract between the members of a legal person is not enough, even if that 
may be a necessary precondition before the act of creation can occur. Hence under modern UK 
company registration procedure, the founding member or members of a company must submit a 
signed memorandum and articles of association to the Registrar of Companies. However, the new 
legal person only comes into being when the Registrar accepts those documents and formally admits 
the company to the public Register of Companies.  
 
For UK corporate and tax purposes, a "body corporate" need not always have more than one 
member. For example, in UK company law, a single shareholder suffices for a private limited 
company. A "body corporate" need not have a business purpose: many UK charities take the form of 
UK private companies limited by guarantee and a number of non-profit-making clubs are structured 
as "bodies corporate". The example of a company limited by guarantee shows that members' 
interests in a body corporate do not necessarily take the form of transferable shares representing 
paid-in capital (although of course they often do). Lastly, for UK corporate and tax purposes, 
                                                          
27 In this respect, the definition of “connected persons” for income tax purposes is identical: see Sections 993-4 
ITA, and in particular Section 994(1). 
28 More in line with Inland Revenue thinking at the time of the Finance Bill 1965. 
29 In such other contexts, the legislation has in some cases moved away altogether from the “unincorporated 
association” concept, which helps avoid confusion.  A good example is the definition of “securities” in ITEPA 
2003 for the purposes of taxing employment-related securities.  The first limb of that definition, in Section 
420(1)(a), refers to “shares in any body corporate (wherever incorporated) or in in any unincorporated body 
[emphasis added] constituted under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom”. 
30 There are also strong arguments (see Gerald F. Montagu: “Is a Foreign State a Body Corporate?” [2001] 
British Tax Review 421) that a non-UK state is a form of "body corporate", although in such cases it may not 
always be possible to identify a clear publicised act of creation e.g. when a new state (e.g. the USSR) emerges 
from the chaos of revolution and civil war.  Not that that is fatal because the same probably applies to 






membership of a "body corporate" need not carry with it limited liability (although of course limited 
liability is commonplace). Specifically, UK company law expressly permits the incorporation of a 
private unlimited company31. Its members (of whom there must be at least two) have potentially 
unlimited liability to make good any excess of liabilities over assets if the company goes into 
liquidation. However, the members are not directly liable to the company's creditors. Even if they 
must make good any shortfall, the company's obligations are its alone. This is consistent with it being 
an entirely separate legal person from its members (unlike, for example, a Scottish partnership which 
is also a separate legal person, but whose partners can be sued as guarantors of the partnership’s 
obligations by partnership creditors, as discussed further in 2.10.3 and 2.10.4 below).  
 
2.6.2  The UK courts can be expected to treat as a "body corporate", and hence a "company", for UK 
taxation purposes any legal person brought into being by an official publicised step under the law of 
one of the constituent parts of the United Kingdom or another jurisdiction, so long as the underlying 
law indicates expressly or by necessary implication that  the new legal entity, as well as being a 
separate legal person, is also a "body corporate" whose identity, assets, liabilities and activities are 
clearly distinct from those of its members (if any). This will not always be the case. In the words of one 
recent commentator, “Incorporation has an ancient heritage and remains a difficult and diffuse 
concept that is not congruent with ‘legal personality’”32.  It will be necessary to look at the rules 
bringing the separate legal person into being to decide if it is to be elevated to the status of a “body 
corporate” or, as one judge put it, there is a “manifest intention to incorporate”33. In Maclaine 
Watson & Co Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry and related appeals34, the House of Lords ruled 
that the UK had by statutory instrument treated the International Tin Council as a separate legal 
person with the legal capacities of a body corporate without it actually being a UK domestic body 
corporate. As Lord Oliver, giving the main judgment, put it, at page 547: 
 
“…..the effect of the grant of the legal capacities of a body corporate was that in United Kingdom 
law the [International Tin Council], though not formally incorporated, was invested with a legal 
personality distinct from its members….” 
 
He went on to point out that there were good reasons for conferring separate legal personality 
without creating a UK domestic corporation. In particular, the members of the International Tin 
Council were sovereign states which would be reluctant to submit the internal workings of the entity 
to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the member states and to subject the entity to a domestic 
winding-up jurisdiction35.   
 
                                                          
31 Section 3(4) Companies Act 2006.  An unlimited liability company can be either a company with share capital 
or a company whose members do not hold share capital but provide a guarantee to the company instead.  
32 See Victor Baker op. cit. at page 287.  
33 Atkin LJ in Mackenzie-Kennedy v Air Council [1927] 2 KB 517 at 534, citing Littledale J in Conservators of the 
River Tone v Ash (1829) 10 B&C 349.  On the facts Atkin LJ found out that there was no such intention.  
34 [1989] 3 All ER 523 
35 For further discussion of the Maclaine Watson decision, see the decision of the House of Lords in Arab 
Monetary Fund v Hashim and others (No 3) [1991] 1 All ER 871.  For an earlier and more domestic example of a 
court recognising the existence of a separate legal person with “an existence apart from its members”, which 
was nevertheless not a “body corporate”, see the decision of the majority of the House of Lords in Bonsor v 
Musicians’ Union [1955] 3 All ER 518.  This case related to a registered trade union which was being sued by a 






It has also been argued that a “body corporate” must have “perpetual succession” i.e. prior to it being 
wound up, its membership can change without affecting its continued existence, rights and 
liabilities36. As discussed in 2.9.7 below, it is not clear that “perpetual succession”, as so defined, is 
confined to entities which are “bodies corporate”. 
 
2.7  UK LLPs and EEIGs 
 
On occasion, an entity which is a “body corporate” will nevertheless be excluded from chargeability to 
UK corporation tax, whatever its territorial connections with the UK. In particular, the Limited Liability 
Partnerships Act 2000 sets out the procedure for creating, and the structure of the entity known as a 
"UK LLP". The 2000 Act explicitly describes the UK LLP as a "body corporate". This is to maximise the 
chances of members’ limited liability being respected in non-UK jurisdictions. However, Section 863 
ITTOIA, Section 1273 CTA 2009 and Section 59A TCGA explicitly treat a UK LLP as a "partnership" 
where it carries on a trade, profession or business “with a view to profit”.  Therefore, its income and 
capital gains are taxed in the hands of its members, rather than the UK LLP itself, and those members 
are typically treated as partners in a partnership rather than mere members or employees of a body 
corporate37. In effect, a UK LLP is, unusually, a form of company typically taxed on a “lookthrough” 
basis for UK tax purposes, very much along the same lines as a partnership.  A rough analogy is the so-
called S corporation in the US which is further discussed in 7.2.4.1, although the S corporation regime 
is triggered by a formal taxpayer election, whereas the “lookthrough” treatment of a UK LLP is more 
or less automatic. Furthermore, the “lookthrough” taxation regime applying to a S corporation is not 
identical to the “lookthrough” regime applying to a partnership for US tax purposes38.  
                                                          
36 See The Conservators of the River Tone v Ash (1829) 10 B&C 349, cited by Atkin LJ in Mackenzie-Kennedy v Air 
Council [1927] 2 KB 517. Neither of these cases discusses “perpetual succession” in detail. See also Gerald F. 
Montagu op cit. where the author’s “fundamental use” test for whether an entity is a “body corporate” requires 
that the entity have “perpetual succession”. 
37 The UK LLP is not to be treated as a partnership for certain other tax purposes e.g. VAT, stamp duty and 
stamp duty reserve tax. There are special transparency rules for partnerships (including UK LLPs) in relation to 
Stamp Duty Land Tax: see in particular Schedule 15 Finance Act 2003 which is discussed at 5.7.2 to 5.7.7. Where 
a UK LLP ceases to carry on a trade, profession or business “with a view to profit”, it continues to be taxed as a 
partnership if the cessation is only temporary or during a winding-up following a permanent cessation if the 
latter is not taking place for tax avoidance reasons and the winding-up period is not “unreasonably prolonged”.  
If a liquidator of the UK LLP is appointed or the court makes a winding-up order (or non-UK equivalent), then the 
LLP will cease to be taxed as a partnership.  The extent of the transparency required in respect of UK LLPs by 
Section 863 ITTOIA was considered by the First-Tier Tribunal in Bayonet Ventures LLP and another v HMRC 
[2018] UKFTT 262 (TC).  In that case, the judge (following the Court of Appeal in Peter Vaines v HMRC [2018] STC 
297) said that Section 863 does not disregard the LLP altogether and treat all its activities as carried on directly 
by its members, whether or not jointly and severally.  It simply assimilates the position of LLP members to that 
of partners in a non-LLP partnership.  Recently, the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) ruled that 
Section 863(2) also treats a UK LLP as a partnership, and not a company, for the purposes of the return filing, tax 
enquiry and appeal procedures in TMA. Those procedures should be followed even if the eventual result of the 
enquiry and any appeal is that the LLP is not carrying on a business, etc “with a view to profit” so that it should 
be taxed as a company, not a partnership: see HMRC v Inverclyde Property Renovation LLP and 
Clackmannanshire Regeneration LLP [2020] UKUT 161 (TCC).  For restrictions on using losses of a LLP and on the 
reliefs available to pension funds investing in a “property investment LLP”, see John Snape: “Corporate Income 
Tax Subjects in the United Kingdom” in Chapter 33, “Corporate Income Tax Subjects” ed. Daniel Gutmann. 
Volume 12, EATLP International Tax Series. IBFD (2013).  
38 The UK Office of Tax Simplification (“OTS”) has considered the idea of introducing, for UK tax purposes, a 







Another older example of a body corporate being carved out of the UK corporation tax regime is the 
European Economic Interest Grouping (“EEIG”). EEIGs are an EU legal conception, being largely 
modelled on the French “groupement d’interet economique” (which HMRC apparently regard as 
being “transparent” anyway for UK tax purposes, according to the list mentioned in 2.14.3).  EEIGs are 
created pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 (hereafter “the 1985 Regulation”) which has 
direct effect in Member States. In the UK, that Regulation is supplemented procedurally by the 
European Economic interest Grouping Regulations 1989 SI 1989/638 (as amended) (hereafter “the 
1989 Regulations”).  EEIGs are permitted to engage in certain ancillary economic activities e.g. 
research. In particular, Article 3(1) of the 1985 Regulation states that the purpose of a EEIG is to 
facilitate or develop the economic activities of its members and to improve or increase the results of 
those activities. Its purpose (unlike a UK LLP) must not be to make profits for itself, although its 
activities may still generate profit from time to time.    
 
EEIGs are formed by their members entering into a contract which is then registered (in the UK with 
the Registrar of Companies): Articles 1(1) and 6.  There must be at least two members from different 
EU/European Economic Area Member States. Article 1(2) confers full legal capacity on a EEIG but 
Article 1(3) provides that each Member State has a choice whether to regard a EEIG as having legal 
personality. To a UK lawyer, this is a strange distinction because one would regard legal personality as 
the inevitable result of the EEIG having full legal capacity.  However, this is not the case in some civil 
law jurisdictions (notably Germany) where the fact that the EEIG members are liable for the entity’s 
debts means that the entity itself cannot have full legal personality in that jurisdiction, even though it 
has full legal capacity39.   
 
In some but not all Member States, EEIGs are not just legal persons but in fact are formed as bodies 
corporate. The UK is one of these: see Regulation 3 of the 1989 Regulations.  EEIG members have 
unlimited joint and several liability for the debts of the EEIG (Article 24 of the 1985 Regulation), like 
Scottish partners (although the latter are, strictly speaking, secondarily liable after the partnership).  
An EEIG member’s liability can extend to debts taken on by the EEIG before a person became a 
member. 
 
Article 40 of the 1985 Regulation states simply that “the profit or losses resulting from the activities of 
a grouping shall be taxable only in the hands of its members”.  In other words, it must be treated as 
“transparent” for the purposes of taxing its income and gains and allowing relief for any losses, 
although not for the purposes of other taxes (notably VAT and PAYE). Article 40 gives no further detail 
of how direct tax “transparency” is to be achieved. In particular, can any UK “permanent 
establishment” of a EEIG formed outside the UK be treated as that of the EEIG members so as to 
                                                          
November 2016, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/564577/Lo
okthrough_paper_-_final.pdf (accessed October 2018), it decided not to recommend such a change, because it 
would make the current tax system more complex.  In particular, to avoid such a regime imposing income tax (at 
higher rates) on companies which fund investment from retained after-tax profit, a “lookthrough” regime would 
need to be optional.  That in turn would require taxpayers to obtain advice about whether to elect for such 
treatment.  Moreover, those electing would only do so to save tax. The need for a separate “lookthrough” 
regime for UK companies is in any case not easy to justify, because a UK LLP is a body corporate which is 
generally taxed as a partnership anyway.   
39 For further detail, see John F. Avery Jones and others “Characterisation of Other States’ Partnerships for 






subject them to UK tax without full treaty protection?  Moreover, Article 40 says nothing about the 
tax treatment of members if they assign their interests, as they can do under Article 22.  Is such an 
assignment to be treated as a part-disposal of underlying EEIG assets or is the EEIG interest to be 
treated as a separate asset (and if so, what kind of asset)?  
 
UK legislation further develops the transparency provided for in Article 40 of the 1985 Regulation. 
Sections 842 ITA 2007, 990 CTA 2010 and 285A TCGA all ensure that, for UK direct tax purposes, 
income and gain of a EEIG, wherever formed, is taxed at the level of the EEIG members and not at 
EEIG level.  To achieve this, the EEIG is treated as the agent of its members or, if it carries on a trade 
or profession, as a partnership.  
 
Section 285A(1) Rule 5 TCGA 1992 also treats the interests of EEIG members as being shares in the 
underlying EEIG assets, rather than as a separate asset. Those shares are usually determined by 
reference to a member’s share of any EEIG profits under the contract which sets up the EEIG. This 
appears to go beyond what Article 40 strictly prescribes. It may suit a taxpayer to argue that an EEIG 
interest should in fact be treated as a separate asset from the underlying EEIG assets, despite the UK 
legislation.  However, the courts may well not be receptive: the preamble of the 1985 Regulation 
states that while profits or losses from the activities of the EEIG should be taxable only in the hands of 
its members, “it is understood that otherwise national laws apply, [emphasis added] particularly as 
regards the apportionment of profits, tax procedures and any obligations imposed by national tax 
law”.  This implies that each Member State has discretion when working out precisely how to give 
effect to Article 4040.    
 
2.8  Despite the exceptions in 2.7, it seems clear that for UK corporation tax purposes, the following 
types of company formed by registration under the UK Companies Act 2006 will in all cases be "bodies 
corporate" within Section 1121 CTA 2010: private companies limited by shares or guarantee; private 
unlimited companies; and public companies limited by shares (there being no scope for a public 
company to be limited by guarantee or unlimited).  There is no scope for such entities to elect out of 
corporation tax. 
 
Of course this leaves the much harder question of which non-UK entities will be “companies” within 
Section 1121 CTA 2010. It also leaves the related question of what entities are “partnerships”, and 




2.9.1 A key question remains what constitutes a "partnership" because Section 1121 CTA 2010 
excludes a "partnership" from the definition of a "company”, as does Section 288(1) TCGA 199241.  
                                                          
40 Section 285A TCGA is, if anything, a clearer “lookthrough” rule than the normal capital gains tax 
“lookthrough” rule applying to partnerships under Section 59 TCGA. For fuller discussions of the UK tax 
treatment of a EEIG, see C.J. Wales, “European Economic Interest Groupings: Finance Act 1990” [1990] BTR 335; 
and Tarlochan Lall: “Taxation and the European Economic Interest Grouping” [1993] BTR 134.  There have been 
significant changes in the relevant UK tax law since both these articles were written but they are still useful 
analyses.    
41 This exclusion can be read as indicating that, absent the exclusion, certain types of "body corporate" or 
"unincorporated association" can be "partnerships". The authors of Avery Jones: Partnerships op. cit. at page 







The classic English law definition of a partnership is in Section 1(1) Partnership Act 1890 (“the 1890 
Act”). This defines partnership as the relationship between persons (plural) carrying on "a business in 
common with a view of profit". The 1890 Act applies to the entire United Kingdom and it consolidated 
much (but not all) of the existing common law of partnership at the time it was enacted. 
 
This 1890 Act definition seems to have consistently informed (and indeed over-informed) judicial 
thinking on the meaning of a "partnership" for tax purposes, especially when considering whether 
non-UK entities are partnerships.  
 
Because a partnership is a collaboration "with a view of profit", "partnership" and "unincorporated 
association" are usually mutually exclusive in English law (at least if one accepts the thinking of 
Lawton LJ: see 2.5). Furthermore, there can be no overlap between a "partnership" and a "body 
corporate" if (as is quite possible) the latter has only one member: Section 1 1890 Act requires at 
least two members of a partnership. In any case, Section 1(2) states (again, presumably to avoid any 
residual doubt) that the relation between the members of a UK-incorporated company is not a 
partnership. Equally, if a "body corporate" exists to pursue non-profit-making activity, it cannot be a 
"partnership” as so defined. 
 
This leaves the question of what distinguishes a "body corporate" from a "partnership" if the relevant 
entity (which may be non-UK) has at least two members and pursues profit-making activity.  
 
2.9.2 The answer to this question has become harder because the substantive difference between a 
"body corporate" and a "partnership" has become much narrower. Many modern "partnerships", 
especially in professional and financial services, are hard to distinguish from private limited 
companies in the way they are structured and run. A number of specific comments can be made. 
 
2.9.3 Limited liability  
 
                                                          
“companies”. However, Scottish partnerships have not generally been regarded as “bodies corporate”, notably 
for the purposes of Section 1173(1)(b) Companies Act 2006 and despite exceptions such as the Sheriff Court 
decision on the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 in Douglas v Phoenix Motors 1970 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 57 (Tayside): see 
Paul Sutton and Jane McCormick ”Scottish Limited Partnerships” Tax Journal, Issue 916, 26. The view that 
Scottish partnerships are not “bodies corporate” was common ground recently in Baillie Gifford & Co v HMRC 
[2019] UKFTT 410 (TC), where HMRC in particular argued, at paragraph 64, that a Scottish partnership did not 
have all the attributes needed to be a “body corporate”, for the purposes of the pre-Finance Act 2019 VAT 
grouping rules. According to Victor Baker, in “Conservative and Unionist Central Office v Burrell (1981))” op.cit. 
at page 276, the exclusion of partnerships from the otherwise wide-ranging definition of “company” in Section 
1121 CTA 2010 was “to avoid doubt”.  He refers to the Finance Bill 1965 notes on what became Section 46(5) 
Finance Act 1965.  This is the statutory ancestor of Section 1121. The author agrees with Victor Baker. In 
particular, as a general legal matter, the concept of a “partnership” is meant to be distinct from that of a “body 
corporate”: not only does the latter have legal personality but its identity, assets, liabilities and activities are 
clearly distinct from those of its members in a way which is not the case in relation to a partnership, whether or 
not a legal person. Similarly, the author believes that Section 1(2) Partnership Act 1890 was included to avoid 
doubt, by stating that the members of a UK-incorporated company do not thereby form a partnership. If Section 
1(2) meant anything more, then presumably non-UK-incorporated companies would be partnerships which was 
presumably not intended: see Peter Harris: “Corporate Tax Law: Structure, Policy and Practice” (Cambridge 
University Press – 2013) at page 30. The substantive distinction between a body corporate and a partnership is 






Limited versus unlimited liability of an entity's members cannot be a conclusive differentiating factor. 
UK company law has long permitted the creation of private unlimited liability companies, which are 
clearly a "body corporate" for tax purposes. The indirect nature of the unlimited liability of a member 
of such a company has already been discussed at 2.6.1. Partners in a classic English or Scottish law 
general partnership have unlimited joint liability for partnership debts, which is owed directly to the 
creditors of the partnership. In the case of Scottish partners, their liability is as guarantors of the 
obligations of the partnership, which has legal personality. However, such unlimited liability 
partnerships are increasingly rare.  
 
As already discussed, UK LLPs, despite their name, are in fact a form of body corporate and hence 
their members’ limited liability is not directly relevant to that of partners in a true partnership. 
However, it has long been possible, under the Limited Partnerships Act 1907, for a new or pre-existing 
partnership to register itself as a limited partnership with the UK Registrar of Companies. If it does so, 
then liability is limited (with caveats) to the extent of partners' capital contributions, for those 
partners who do not participate in the management of the partnership42. There must be at least one 
general partner in such a limited partnership, with unlimited liability for partnership debts. The 
general partner manages the limited partnership and is often a purpose-formed, lowly-capitalised UK 
private limited company. The partners who have limited liability owe that liability directly to the 
creditors of the limited partnership, unlike the shareholders in an unlimited company.  
 
Looking further afield, there are a number of non-UK entities styling themselves as "limited liability 
partnerships" which are treated by HMRC as partnerships for UK tax purposes. The liability of their 
members for the debts of the entity is generally limited to the member's capital contribution even if 
the member takes part in the entity's management43.  
 
US law firms operating in the UK are a good example of such limited liability partnerships. Unlike UK 
LLPs, these are not "bodies corporate" benefiting from a special UK tax status. Rather they are non-UK 
"limited liability partnerships" (typically formed in Delaware or New York) which usually have separate 
legal personality yet regard themselves as partnerships for UK tax purposes on general principles. This 
point of view is broadly accepted by HMRC.  This is so despite Section 301(1) of the US Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act typically making each partner an agent of the partnership entity, rather than 
                                                          
42 The 1907 Act was amended in 2017 to make it even easier to use a limited partnership as a vehicle for tax-
transparent venture capital investment funds.  It has been used extensively for this purpose since the 1980’s. In 
particular, the revised 1907 Act now permits (see Section 8D) the designation of a limited partnership as a 
“private fund limited partnership” (or “PFLP”) if the partnership agreement is in writing and the partnership is a 
“collective investment scheme” for regulatory purposes. The meaning of “collective investment scheme” is 
discussed in 4.6.1. A limited partner in a PFLP is not required to make a capital contribution, unlike a limited 
partner in a 1907 Act limited partnership which is not a PFLP.  The liability of a PFLP limited partner is 
nevertheless limited by the partnership property available to the general partner(s) to meet the debts and 
obligations of the limited partnership. Section 4(3A) allows a limited partner in a PFLP to withdraw any capital 
contribution it makes from the limited partnership without compromising its limited liability. This option is not 
available to a limited partner in a non-PFLP, although an equivalent effect can be achieved if most of a limited 
partner’s capital contribution takes (as it usually does) the form of a loan. For PFLPs, a new Section 6A contains 
a non-exhaustive list of specific activities which a limited partner may undertake without being regarded as 
taking part in firm management and thereby compromising its limited liability. This list of permitted activities 
part-clarifies a grey area in limited partnership law.  
43 This limitation does not necessarily apply if there is a direct default of the member e.g. liability on its part to a 






of each of the other partners (as is the case in an English law partnership – which lacks legal 
personality - and, possibly, a Scottish law partnership)44. 
 
Hence the limited liability of partners in a partnership is now well-established, even if such partners 
take part in partnership management.  
 
2.9.4. Transferability of interests 
 
The free transferability of membership interests cannot be an entirely conclusive difference between 
a "body corporate" and a "partnership". It is true that, without the consent of the other partners, a 
partnership interest typically cannot be transferred so as to confer full partner status on the 
transferee. Absent such consent, the transferee has at most the right to the economic fruits of the 
partnership interest and must accept the account of profits agreed to by the partners. It has no right 
to vote as a partner or to take part in firm management or to inspect the partnership books45.  
 
However, the articles of association of private companies typically place very severe restrictions 
indeed on the transferability of members' interests. These restrictions are typically enforceable by the 
directors of the company. They are often reinforced with further restrictions directly enforceable 
among the members themselves and set out in a confidential shareholders' agreement. All these 
private company transfer restrictions are likely to be at least as strict as those applying to interests in 
partnerships. They may well prevent a transfer of even the economic benefits of a shareholding. 
 
While a partner may be unable unilaterally to transfer the right to full partnership status to a 
purported transferee of its interest, the would-be transferor remains a full partner with rights as such 
e.g. to vote on management issues. In a private company, the would-be transferor of a company 
share can be in no better position than the proposed transferee, because its shares only entitle it to 
an ownership interest in the company but not to take part in management. However, this difference 
has nothing to do with the transferability of its interest.  Rather it reflects the formal split between 
ownership and management which is a more obvious feature of a "body corporate" than of a 
partnership, even though most partners in large modern partnerships have little real say in 
management matters. 
 
2.9.5. Legal personality and members’ entitlement to profits 
 
Legal personality is not necessarily a key difference between a "body corporate" and a "partnership". 
A "body corporate" is of course by definition a legal person, and moreover a legal person distinct from 
its members, with full capacity to acquire rights and incur obligations on its own behalf, thanks to its 
incorporation. A UK LLP is simply a type of "body corporate", with a special tax status.  
 
By contrast, an English law partnership is an aggregate rather than an entity: it has no legal 
personality distinct from that of the partners.  This lack of legal personality does not mean that the 
                                                          
44 See paragraph 6.10, and the corresponding footnote 8, of the 2003 Joint Report on Partnership Law of the 
English and Scottish Law Commissions (Law Com 283; Scottish Law Com 192) (hereafter “the Law 
Commission”).www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/publications/reports/2000-9.   
45 See Section 31 1890 Act. However, Section 6(5)(b) Limited Partnerships Act 1907 provides that “A limited 
partner may, with the consent of the general partners, assign his share in the partnership, and upon such an 






partnership is a “nothing”. In particular, English law recognises the concept of "partnership 
property"46. Such property (which is not always easy to identify in practice) is segregated from the 
personal property of the partners, even though the partnership is not a legal person. It must be held 
and applied exclusively for the purposes of the partnership and in accordance with the partnership 
agreement. English law’s “aggregate” approach to partnership applies whether or not the partnership 
is limited under the 1907 Act. An English law partnership is a contract under which each partner is 
both principal and agent for the other partners when acting in the usual course of partnership 
business47. Hence the partners carry on the required “business in common” together directly.  
Together they directly co-own the “partnership property” in the manner provided for in the 
partnership agreement and the 1890 Act (including the rules regarding “partnership property”).   
 
By contrast, a Scottish partnership (limited or otherwise) does have separate legal personality per se 
even though it too is formed purely by contract48. Section 4(2) of the 1890 Act clearly indicates that a 
Scottish partnership is typically regarded as a "partnership" for the purposes of that Act49.   
 
The nature of a Scottish partnership has been explored in tax litigation. Major v Brodie50 is discussed 
in detail below.  Scottish partnerships were further explored in Memec (see 2.13) and Anson (see 
2.15). Their legal personality probably does not give rise to “perpetual succession”51, although it is 
sufficient to enable the Scottish firm to be the debtor or creditor (but probably not the employer) of 
one of its partners. It also appears that the partners together with the Scottish firm carry on the 
required "business in common", although there is debate (see 2.9.6) whether the partners do so 
purely as agents of the partnership entity (the view of the Law Commission) or as both such agents 
and as principals in their own right. Scottish partners are concurrently liable, jointly and severally, 
with the partnership itself, for partnership debts (effectively acting as guarantors). The Scottish 
partnership is not a nominee or trustee for the partners. Hence it can own partnership property and 
so there is less need in Scots law for the “partnership property” concept because partnership assets 
are not commingled with the personal assets of a partner.  Overall, the legal personality of a Scottish 
firm is a less absolute form of legal personality52 than that present in a "body corporate". The latter is 
                                                          
46 As defined in Section 20 of the 1890 Act.   
47 Section 5 of the 1890 Act. 
48 See dicta of Lord President Cooper giving the leading judgment in Mair v Wood 1948 SC 83.  
49 Section 1216(1) Companies Act 2006 also seems comfortable, by implication, that partnerships (Scottish or 
otherwise) can have legal personality. It reads “This section applies where a partnership constituted under the 
law of (a) England and Wales, (b) Northern Ireland, or (c) any other country or territory in which a partnership is 
not a legal person   [emphasis added] is…..appointed as statutory auditor of an audited person”   
50 [1998] STC 491 
51 Paragraph 2.8 of the Law Commission op. cit. states that “There is serious doubt as to whether the legal 
personality of a Scottish partnership can continue on a change in the composition of the partnership”. No 
conclusive answer has been reached about whether a partner can nevertheless be the employee of a Scottish 
partnership, given its separate legal personality: see Allison v Allison’s Trustees (1904) 6 F 496 and Fife County 
Council v The Minister of National Insurance 1947 SC 629.  A member of an English partnership cannot be its 
employee, because such a partnership is not a legal person and the same person cannot be both employer and 
employee; and also because a partner is a “co-adventurer not an employee”: see Lord Carnwath in Clyde & Co v 
Bates van Winkelhof  [2014] 1 WLR 2047 at paragraph 59. 
52 Similar issues appear to arise in Canada in relation to partnerships (“societes de personnes”) created under 
Quebec law.  This differs from the law of the English-speaking provinces and is of course derived from pre-1789 
French law. Views differ about whether such partnerships are fully-fledged legal persons or merely exhibit 






a distinct "legal person" entirely separate from its members from time to time. Hence it, not they, 
carries on its activities, acquires rights and incurs direct liabilities to creditors, even if it is an unlimited 
company.  The members of a company have no interest in the assets of a company nor in its 
underlying profits as they arise.  The same is apparently not the case with a Scottish partnership, 
although there is some debate about the degree of separateness which exists between the 
partnership entity (which is not a nominee or trustee) and the partners53.  This is an important 
reminder that the concept of legal personality may contain different gradations of such personality.  
That exhibited by a Scottish partnership is not the same as the legal personality of a “body corporate” 
incorporated under Scottish law.  
 
As Peter Gibson LJ said in the Court of Appeal in Memec v IRC [1998] STC 754 at page 765: 
 
"Even a Scottish partner has an (indirect) interest in the profits of the partnership as they accrue as 
well as in the assets of the partnership. In a real sense the profits and assets are the profits and 
assets of the partners, the firm, their collective alter ego54, merely receiving those profits and 
holding those assets for the partners who are the firm. They are jointly and severally liable for the 
firm's debts". 
 
In the Court of Appeal in Anson v IRC [2013] STC 557, Arden LJ (as she then was and also not a Scottish 
lawyer) stated: 
 
"It would be unusual but not impossible for an entity with a separate legal personality, such as a 
company, to be tax transparent for English law purposes. One example would be the Scottish 
partnership where the partnership is a separate legal entity and holds the assets of the business, 
but the partners have an [indirect] interest in the assets and carry on business in common: this has 
been held by this court [in Memec] to be tax transparent".  
 
Peter Gibson LJ in particular refers to Scottish partners having an indirect interest in partnership 
profits "as they accrue". A member of a company has no such interest in company profits which 
belong to the company alone as they accrue. Instead it must await a company resolution to distribute, 
at which time the member acquires a right to a separate income stream: dividends.  
 
This right of a member to underlying profits as they arise is, in this author’s view, a key difference for 
UK tax purposes between a “body corporate” and a partnership, even where the latter has separate 
legal personality (as in Scotland). Put another way, a litmus test of a “business in common” within 
                                                          
Classification and the Meaning of ‘Corporation’/’Societe’ in the Income Tax Act” (2009) Canadian Tax Journal 
Vol. 57, No 4, 800 and especially at 894 and 902. 
53 The Law Commission note (in paragraph 2.25 of their final report op.cit.) that the separate personality of a 
Scottish partnership prevents any partner suing for damage to partnership property or having an insurable 
interest in such property.  However, a partner joining a Scottish partnership is not liable for debts of the 
partnership before he joined the firm because (despite its separate personality) those debts are the debts of 
other partners: see Avery Jones: Partnerships op.cit. [2002] BTR 375 at 405. 
54 The “alter ego” comment in particular needs to be treated with caution.  It is not the observation of a Scottish 
lawyer and should not be read as meaning that a Scottish partnership holds partnership assets on trust for the 
partners.  In the Supreme Court in Anson v HMRC [2015] STC 1777, discussed at 2.15.5, Lord Reed (a 
distinguished Scottish judge) observed that a partner in a Scottish partnership has an incorporeal movable right 
(i.e. a partnership share) but no direct proprietary interest in partnership assets. This is consistent with the view 






Section 1(1) of the 1890 Act is now the putative partners’ right to profits as they arise55, and not 
always the mutual agency of the partners, unlimited joint liability for partnership debts or a partner’s 
proprietary interest in the assets of the partnership.  This is also a more reliable criterion for 
determining whether entities formed outside the UK are “partnerships” for the purposes of Section 
1121 CTA 2010. Section 1121’s reference to a “partnership” is presumably not limited to UK entities 
and hence this concept should not be applied to non-UK entities in a manner which is unduly 
beholden to the peculiarities of English partnership law (under which partnerships are not legal 
persons but are contracts based on mutual agency).  These points will be revisited in 2.15.  
 
The previous paragraph should not be read as meaning that entitlement to profits as they arise is the 
only litmus test of whether an entity is a partnership. Especially in relation to English law-type 
partnerships conducting an active business, rather than investment limited partnerships, it may be 
possible to conclude that there is a “business in common” within Section 1(1) of the 1890 Act, and 
that a member is a partner even where that person only has an entitlement to a fixed sum regardless 
of the profits of the business.56 
 
The separate legal personality of a Scottish partnership reflects the French civil law influence in 
Scottish law, in particular as it existed prior to the 1707 Act of Union57. In other jurisdictions (notably 
those influenced by civil law), entities regarded as partnerships often have legal personality (or at 
least, as in Germany, the full legal capacity consistent with what English law would regard as separate 
legal personality). As discussed later (see for example, 3.8), the legal personality of civil law 
partnerships is closely linked to the concept of agency in civil law jurisdictions. This differs from 
English and Scottish law, especially regarding the ability of an agent to bind an undisclosed principal. 
                                                          
55 The 1890 Act codifies the existing law of partnership, which is not displaced by the 1890 Act unless 
inconsistent with it: see Section 46 of the 1890 Act. A number of pre-1890 cases suggest that a partnership is 
primarily defined by the right of members to share in profits: see Holme v Hammond (1872) LR 7 Ex 218 at 234; 
and Pooley v Driver (1877) 5 Ch 458 at 473-6.  In Holme v Hammond, Martin B (at pp 228-9) and Cleasby B (at p 
234) indicated that the entitlement to profits must be accompanied by a voluntary contribution to capital of the 
putative partnership (although not all partnerships in fact require capital). In Pooley v Driver, Sir George Jessel 
MR relied on the criterion of profit entitlement in concluding that a so-called profit-linked loan in fact created a 
relationship of “dormant and active partners” between the lender and the borrower (who was actively carrying 
on the business which was being funded).  The lender was effectively a limited partner but the case of course 
predated the Limited Partnerships Act 1970. To somewhat similar effect was Lindsay Woodward & Hiscox v IRC 
18 TC 43 at 58, although in that case the factual basis for concluding that there was a partnership, rather than a 
loan carrying a profit-linked return, was more marginal.  
56 See the Court of Appeal in Tiffin v Lester Aldridge LLP [2012] IRLR 391. This concerned Section 4(4) Limited 
Liability Partnerships Act 2000 and the employment rights of a “fixed share partner” in a law firm which was a 
UK LLP. The individual in fact had a share of profits. Rimer LJ, giving the sole reasoned judgment, nevertheless 
considered (at paragraphs 19-24) earlier authorities on the 1890 Act, all of which appear to have related to 
English law professional services general partnerships.  He concluded that, while an entitlement to profits was a 
prerequisite of partner status prior to the 1890 Act (see the cases in the previous footnote), all that was needed 
after the 1890 Act was an overall aim to make a profit coupled with a “business in common” i.e. a business 
where each putative partner is the agent of the others for all acts done in the course of the business. In such 
cases, a person could be a partner even if only entitled to a fixed sum. While this decision greatly expands the 
universe of possible partnerships, it only seems to do so where the relevant partnership law follows the English 
law mutual agency model (e.g. Canada) and partners are not effectively excluded from acting as agents of the 
other partners (as would be normal in a limited partnership). In any case, for tax purposes, the importance of 
entitlement to profits as an identifier of partnership seems to live on: see the case mentioned in fn 14.  
57 In Mair v Wood supra, Lord President Cooper traced back to the seventeenth century the separate legal 







Most partnerships formed under state law in the USA have separate legal personality (although, 
interestingly, Delaware offers some scope to opt out of this separate personality58).  This legal 
personality reflects a conscious choice taken, in the US Revised Uniform Partnership legislation, to 
accentuate the “entity theory” of partnership, not least to avoid legal problems which could 
otherwise arise from membership changes creating a “new” partnership59.  Therefore, in the US 
context, legal personality goes hand in hand (unlike Scottish law) with a form of perpetual succession 
for partnerships.   
 
To summarise, the presence or absence of legal personality is not a key difference between a "body 
corporate" and a "partnership", but the quality of that separate personality may be highly relevant, 
especially if it affects whether members are entitled to the entity’s profits as they arise. The Scottish 
partnership illustrates how partners can be entitled to profits as they arise even if the separate 
personality of the firm means that it, not the partners, beneficially owns the partnership’s assets. 
Assets (a property law concept) and profits (an accounting concept) are two different things, as will 
be further discussed in relation to Anson in 2.15.  
   
2.9.6  Major v Brodie 
 
At this point, it is convenient to consider Major v Brodie [1998] STC 491. This was a successful 
taxpayer appeal in the English High Court against a decision by the UK tax authorities to deny two 
individuals an income tax deduction for interest paid by them on business loans. The two individuals 
were partners in a Scottish general partnership A. Partnership A then became a partner, with an 
unrelated individual, in another Scottish general partnership, B. It was agreed that the two Scottish 
partnerships were separate legal persons. Therefore, it was possible for A to be a partner in B. The 
key question was whether B was carrying on its business of farming alone (being a separate entity) or 
whether A was also carrying on that business because it was a partner of B. The UK tax authorities 
argued that only B was carrying on the farming business because of its separate entity status. 
Therefore, the tiered partnership structure meant that no relief was available because the interest 
was being paid by partners in partnership A, which was not doing any relevant farming. 
 
The court rejected this argument and found for the taxpayer. Distinguished experts opined on 
Scottish partnership law and what the separate personality of a Scottish partnership entailed. The 
lowest court, the Special Commissioner of Income Tax, in particular preferred the testimony of the 
expert acting for the taxpayer (Professor Murray) and found that the business of partnership B was 
being carried on both by the partnership entity itself and, crucially, by its partners which of course 
included partnership A.  
                                                          
58 6 Delaware Chapter 15-201(a) provides: “A partnership is a separate legal entity which is an entity distinct 
from its partners unless otherwise provided in a statement of partnership existence or a statement of 
qualification and in a partnership agreement.”  There seems to be no explicit facility to opt out of separate legal 
personality in the case of a Delaware limited partnership: see S. 17-201(b) Delaware Revised Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act, although the contrary is suggested at part 98.26.1 in James Kessler QC “Taxation of Non-
Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries” 2019-20” 18th edition.  One commentator has queried whether 15-201(a), 
if invoked, would in fact be effective to deny a Delaware general partnership legal personality: see Kimberly 
Blanchard: “The Tax Significance of Legal Personality: a US View”. New York University School of Law, Spring 
2015 Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance at pages 51-2.  
59 See Gerald Montagu: “Anson and Entity Classification Revisited in Light of Brexit: can an LLC Constitute a 







When classifying entities for UK tax purposes, Scottish partnerships are an example of how, even 
under the laws of the United Kingdom, an entity with legal personality is not automatically a “body 
corporate”.  However, Scottish partnerships are in a somewhat different position to putative 
"partnerships" with separate legal personality formed outside the UK. In particular, the 1890 Act 
clearly applies to the entire UK and makes clear that the concept of partnership in that Act applies to 
partnerships formed under Scottish law60. Section 1(1) of the 1890 Act of course defines partnership 
as "the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view of 
profit".  
 
Section 4 then provides: 
 
"(1) Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are for the purposes of this Act 
called collectively a firm, and the name under which their business is carried on is called the firm-
name. 
(2) In Scotland a firm is a legal person distinct from the partners of whom it is composed [emphasis 
added]". 
 
Section 5 provides: 
 
"Every partner is an agent of the firm and his other partners [emphasis added] for the purpose of 
the business of the partnership; and the acts of every partner who does any act for carrying on in 
the usual way business of the kind carried on by the firm of which he is a member bind the firm 
and his partners....." 
 
Section 46 finally provides: 
 
"The rules of equity and of common law applicable to partnership shall continue in force except so 
far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act".  
 
All of these rules apart from Section 4(2) are meant to apply across the UK. The court in Major v 
Brodie was mindful of that. It was also keen to ensure that the tax rules on interest relief should be 
applied to produce a uniform outcome as between England and Wales on the one hand, and Scotland 
on the other, despite differences in partnership law and in particular the separate legal personality of 
a Scottish partnership.  This approach reflects the earlier decision of the House of Lords in R v General 
Commissioners of Income Tax for the City of London, ex parte Gibbs61.  That was a decision regarding 
rules (now superseded) on computing English partnership profits in a taxable period where the 
makeup of the partnership changed.  Three judges in the House of Lords (in particular Viscount Simon 
L.C.) made comments about how taxing statutes applicable to both England and Scotland should be 
applied, despite differences between the English and Scottish law of partnership.  Those comments 
                                                          
60 Even though the bill giving rise to the 1890 Act was in existence for fifteen years, apparently the provisions 
regarding Scottish partnerships were inserted by the draftsman, Sir Frederick Pollock, at the eleventh hour, at 
the instigation of Lord Watson. For further information in this regard, see paragraph 6.6 and footnote 5 of the 
Law Commission op. cit.  






were not strictly necessary for the decision but their thrust is clear, as is evident from the judgment of 
Viscount Simon L.C62:  
 
“So far as English law is concerned, it is indisputable that a partnership firm is not a single person, 
though a different view obtains in Scotland, and in construing a taxing Statute which applies in 
England and Scotland alike, it is desirable to adopt a construction of statutory words which avoids 
differences of interpretation of a technical character such as are calculated to produce inequalities 
in taxation as between citizens of the two countries”.63  
 
Bearing all this in mind, the court in Major v Brodie preferred the expert testimony for the taxpayer. It 
ruled that while a Scottish partnership entity owns the assets of that partnership beneficially, both the 
entity (in that case, B) and its partners carry on the partnership business. This creates the necessary 
"business in common" required by Section 1(1) and is consistent with Section 5 of the 1890 Act. Both 
of these Sections apply UK-wide64.  
 
It is not easy to analogise from the tax treatment of a Scottish partnership when classifying a non-UK 
putative "partnership", even if both have separate legal personality. Not only is a Scottish partnership 
an amalgam of civil and common law influences but also the special factors prompting the court to 
treat it as within Section 1(1) of the 1890 Act do not apply to a non-UK “partnership”.  In particular, 
there is no equivalent for such non-UK "partnerships" of Section 4(2) of the 1890 Act. Ex parte Gibbs65 
is equally inapplicable66.   
 
Furthermore, a Scottish partnership's legal personality has a different quality to the full juristic 
personality of a body corporate, as was made clear in the expert evidence in the Brodie case. For 
example, the partners are directly entitled to the firm’s profits and are liable for its debts along with 
the firm itself. In effect they act as guarantors (unlike the shareholders of a UK unlimited company 
who cannot be sued directly by company creditors). Furthermore, a Scottish partnership probably 
                                                          
62 24 TC 221 at 243-4. 
63 He went on to cite Lord Halsbury L.C. and Lord Watson in Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income 
Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531, at 548 and 557.  
64 The findings of the English court as to Scottish partnership law are not Scottish legal precedent but merely 
findings of fact regarding the law of another jurisdiction (Scotland) based on contested expert evidence. In 
particular, Professor Murray disagreed with Professor Gretton, the expert appointed by the UK tax authorities.  
There was a similar clash of expert opinion on Scottish partnerships during the oral hearings before the 
Supreme Court in Anson v HMRC [2015] STC 1777.  In that case, both sides were invited to make submissions on 
the nature of a Scottish partnership, because the taxpayer had sought to analogise between the legal 
personality of a Scottish partnership and that of a Delaware limited liability company.  The taxpayer (unlike in 
Major v Brodie) argued that a partner in a Scottish partnership was only an agent of the partnership, which 
(being a separate legal person) was the sole principal carrying on the partnership business.  Taxpayer counsel 
also argued that Section 5 of the 1890 Act effectively did not apply in Scotland to the extent it made a partner 
agent for fellow partners, rather than the firm. Scottish counsel for HMRC argued the opposite i.e. that a 
partner in a Scottish partnership was both a principal and an agent of the Scottish firm, for the purposes of 
carrying on that firm’s business. The position of the taxpayer that a partner is only an agent of a Scottish 
partnership finds some support in paragraph 2.11, page 8 of the Law Commission op.cit. but is inconsistent with 
Major v Brodie.  There is no further discussion of these points in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Anson. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the staff of the UK Supreme Court when accessing the 
archived recordings of the oral argument before the Supreme Court in Anson.   
65 24 TC 221. 
66 Somewhat similar arguments are made in Angelo Nikolakakis: “Anson v HMRC: sour grapes and maple syrup – 






lacks perpetual succession.  Whether these are characteristics of other non-UK "partnerships" with 
separate personality will depend on the facts and especially the relevant non-UK law. 
 
Nevertheless, a Scottish partnership is a home-grown entity where, despite the separate legal 
personality of the partnership, partners are entitled to profits as they arise.  This is important because 
that entitlement, which is fully respected for UK tax purposes, does not stem from partners having a 
proprietary interest in the Scottish partnership and its assets. Scots law, unlike English law, does not 
have any concept of equitable proprietary rights.  It simply divides rights between rights “in rem” and 
contractual rights.  As was pointed out in oral argument before the Supreme Court in Anson v  HMRC 
[2015] STC 1777 and in the judgment of Lord Reed67, the rights of a partner in a Scottish partnership 
are a “ius crediti” or incorporeal movable right, rather than a right in rem68.  Other entities in other 
jurisdictions which purport to be partnerships may have similar characteristics: see 2.14.   
 
2.9.7. The relevance of “perpetual succession” when defining a “body corporate” has already been 
discussed in 2.6.  Assuming an entity lacking “perpetual succession” cannot be a “body corporate”, 
does the presence of “perpetual succession” prevent an entity from being a “partnership” for UK tax 
purposes? It is not clear why this should be so69, in which case the presence or absence of “perpetual 
succession” should not be a key demarcation between a “body corporate” and a “partnership”.  This 
is especially true bearing in mind that so many modern UK partnerships are now UK LLPs which are a 
form of body corporate enjoying special UK tax treatment.  Hence they automatically exhibit 
“perpetual succession”.  There would therefore be a strange and discriminatory asymmetry if 
“perpetual succession” in respect of a non-UK entity (e.g. a UK LLP) meant that it could never be 
treated as a partnership for UK tax purposes.  This would be especially strange because it can be 
largely a matter of legal drafting whether an entity exhibits “perpetual succession”70.  
 
Of course the idea of “perpetual succession” lends itself readily to an entity with a large and 
fluctuating membership and a centralised management.  Such entities are often “bodies corporate”.  
However, this is not necessarily so. The discussion in 2.10 centres on a French “partnership” entity 
which nevertheless has “perpetual succession” unless agreed to the contrary. 
 
2.9.8. Public recognition 
 
Another perceived fault line between a “body corporate” and a “partnership” is that the former is 
brought into being by an official public step (e.g. registration or a legislative act) whereas the latter is 
                                                          
67 See 2.15 below. 
68 Although Section 20 of the 1890 Act, which deals with partnership property, may give Scottish partners, like 
English partners, additional statutory rights to ensure that partnership property is held and applied in 
accordance with the partnership agreement.  However, it is still the Scottish partnership itself which owns that 
property, unlike an English partnership.   
69 In paragraph 3.16 of their final report, the Law Commission op. cit. recommended that all English law 
partnerships should in future be legal entities with a presumption of their continuity on a change of partners.  
They regarded this as remedying a major flaw in the 1890 Act, which provides no such continuity. They did not 
regard such a change as preventing an entity being a partnership.  Indeed such a change in partnership law 
would better match commercial reality (third parties generally contract with a major partnership as it exists 
from time to time and pay little heed to changes in membership). It would also align English law with the US 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994. The Law Commission’s proposal has yet to be turned into law. 
70 See in this regard the discussion at 478-484 in Montagu: “Anson and Entity Classification revisited in light of 






essentially a creature of contract, with little or no overlay in the form of public official approval.  
While this may reflect the way in which companies and partnerships are formed in the UK, there is no 
necessary reason why this should be so in other jurisdictions.   Again, the example of the entity 
discussed in 2.10 is instructive.   
 
Overall, it is increasingly difficult to find clear substantive differences between a partnership and a 
“body corporate”.  However, the best available distinguishing feature is whether members can claim a 
legal entitlement to underlying profits of the entity as they arise, even if this entitlement is only 
contractual71. If they can do so, this highlights a degree of member involvement and interest in the 
entity’s underlying business which differs from the classic split between management and members 
in a “body corporate” and is consistent with the “business in common” concept in Section 1(1) of the 
1890 Act72. With that provisional conclusion in mind73, the next step is to review the case law which 
has attempted to classify various non-UK entities (leaving trusts aside for the time being) and in 
particular to determine if they are “tax-transparent”.   
 
The Case Law on entity classification pre-Anson 
 
2.10  Dreyfus 
 
2.10.1 In the late 1920's, the Court of Appeal heard the case of Dreyfus v IRC 74.  This was of course no 
relation to the infamous case which convulsed France at the start of the twentieth century. Rather it 
involved the UK income taxation of the grain trading activities of a French "societe en nom 
commandite" or "SNC" based in Paris but carrying on business, inter alia, in the UK. The SNC had two 
                                                          
71 The author has seen statements by leading counsel that entitlement to profits as they arise cannot be the 
litmus test of whether an organisation is fiscally transparent because partners in a Scottish partnership do not 
have “that kind of property” in firm profits. However, those statements seem to misunderstand the nature of a 
Scottish partnership and in particular Sections 4(2) and 5 of the Partnership Act 1890. The same counsel went 
on to say that the key criterion determining “transparency” is the ability of members to remove profits from the 
organisation without any other person restricting that ability.  The author has concerns with this statement. 
“Profit” is a notional accounting concept, not a property law concept.  It is an abstract accounting measure of 
the health of a business.  Profit may or may not be backed by actual assets e.g. cash. Therefore, what is meant 
by “removing profits”, given that profits are not a legal asset which can be owned?  Apparently, “removing 
profits” is not the same as an entitlement to profits. In that case, is it referring to distributions of assets to 
members in respect of profits (e.g. “drawings” in a partnership)?  If so, it would be odd for transparency to 
hinge on an automatic entitlement to such distributions: any business organisation (including a partnership) will 
wish to restrict such distributions from time to time, in order to manage cashflow prudently.    
72 There is still an element of unreality about drawing such fundamental distinctions on the basis of whether 
members are entitled to underlying profits as they arise.  This entitlement may be largely a legal and drafting 
fiction, and not only when the entity has separate legal personality (in which case the entitlement is purely 
contractual).   Given the tight and secretive management of modern partnerships, including wide discretion 
exercised by management to adjust profit shares and retain cash, the idea that partners are entitled to profits as 
they arise is in many cases more theoretical than real.  This has implications which will be discussed below.  
73 There was oblique legislative support for this conclusion in the definition of “corporate entity” in the (now 
repealed) “worldwide debt cap” rules in Part 7 TIOPA.  Section 340 defined a “corporate entity” as a UK or non-
UK “body corporate” or any other entity meeting conditions A and B.  Condition A was that those with an interest 
in the entity must hold “shares in the entity, or interests corresponding to shares”. Condition B was that the 
profit entitlement of each person with an interest in the entity “depends upon a decision that is taken by the 
entity or members of the entity, and is taken after the period in which profits arise”. Part 7 was repealed to 
make way for the more stringent corporate interest restriction rules in Part 10 TIOPA.   






members, the Dreyfus brothers, who also managed it. They were non-UK-resident. The case related 
to the pre-corporation tax era. Hence the SNC was subject to UK income tax on its UK trading profits. 
It had paid this tax. The question was whether the Dreyfus brothers could also be assessed to 
"supertax" on their putative shares of the profits of the SNC.  "Supertax" was a predecessor of the 
higher rates of UK income tax and was payable only by "individuals". The UK tax authorities argued 
that the Dreyfus brothers were assessable to supertax because they were partners in a partnership 
i.e. the SNC. Then as now, partnerships were "transparent" for the purposes of taxing their income 
(although the mechanics of assessment were somewhat different). Hence an individual partner paid 
supertax on his or her share of the underlying income of the partnership, whether or not that income 
was distributed. The Dreyfus brothers successfully appealed against the supertax assessment on the 
basis that the SNC was not a partnership for UK tax purposes. The Court of Appeal agreed with them 
although it did not definitively decide what kind of entity the SNC in fact was. There are hints in the 
judgments that it was a type of "body corporate" but nothing definitive and it was not necessary to 
decide this point.  
 
2.10.2 Dreyfus is so far the only significant UK tax case in which entity classification and "tax 
transparency" issues have been considered in the context of inbound UK investment. It also illustrates 
the approach of the UK courts when classifying non-UK entities, which differs from their approach 
when classifying UK entities. The non-UK tax treatment of the entity is not relevant.  The nature of 
that entity is to be ascertained by reference to the non-UK law under which it is formed and the 
specific facts of the case, including any documentation constituting the entity. Therefore, the process 
of classifying non-UK entities and resolving “transparency” questions is very fact-sensitive. Evidence of 
the relevant non-UK law will often be crucial. Ascertaining that non-UK law is regarded as a finding of 
fact by the court, which may require evidence from suitably qualified experts.  Once the entity’s 
nature has been worked out, one classifies it for UK tax purposes by seeking analogies with relevant 
UK entities. In short, the UK uses a “resemblance” approach to classify non-UK entities.  
 
2.10.3 In the light of the expert evidence, the Court regarded the SNC as too structurally dissimilar 
from an English law partnership for it to be a "partnership" for UK tax purposes.  Hence the members 
of the SNC were not partners and no supertax was payable. Particular points were as follows: 
 
(a) The SNC entity did not come into being simply because its members agreed to form it, unlike an 
English or Scottish partnership. Rather the entity came into being by virtue of a process of public 
registration. This was very different to the process of forming a partnership in the UK. 
 
(b) Once formed, the SNC entity was not in any sense the nominee or "alter ego" of its members. It 
and not its members carried on the business (unlike an English or, arguably, a Scottish partnership). 
So there was no "business in common". The new entity owned the assets and earned the income of 
the business.  It incurred the liabilities in its own name and for itself alone. In short, its legal 
personality separate from its members was more absolute than that of a Scottish partnership, 
although members of the SNC could be directly liable for its debts to creditors if the entity itself failed 
to satisfy those debts. In that limited sense, the members' liability was more akin to that of partners in 
a Scottish partnership than to shareholders in a UK unlimited company. 
 
(c) Members of the SNC had no automatic entitlement to its profits as they arose, unlike partners in 






entitlement to profit could crystallise. In that sense, the member's position was similar to that of a 
shareholder in a company. 
 
(d) Members were not agents for each other, as in an English partnership. At best, they were agents 
of the SNC entity itself. This fourth point ignores the fact that in a Scottish partnership (a separate 
entity), partners are also agents of the entity and arguably not of each other (see, inter alia, the 
expert evidence of Professor Gretton in Major v Brodie75). A Scottish partnership is nevertheless a 
"partnership" for UK tax purposes, although (see 2.9.6), the status of a Scottish partnership is 
somewhat “sui generis”. 
2.10.4  The following extracts from the two fully-reasoned judgments are illuminating. 
 
Lord Hanworth MR stated76:  
 
".....we must respect the foreign entity properly established, because it is not a mere matter of the 
'lex fori'; it is a matter of the status which an entity brings over here with it. Now this being the 
case, how can it be said that in respect of this trade......it can be dealt with as the individual profits 
or individual trade of the two partners, when we are told in plain and clear words that the 'societe' 
does not owe its existence to the combination of the parties, that it is a legal person distinct from 
the individuals of which it is composed? ....it seems to me quite plain .....that [the profits] are being 
earned for the 'societe' or the French entity, and not for these men, and that these men .......’are 
not entitled to, and would not know what was their interest in the business over here unless and 
until that declaration had been made', according to the resolutions of which we have a translation 
in the case. ......We have to recognise that it is not the business of these persons, they are not the 
persons who are carrying on the trade, and there is not merely an imaginary, but a legally 
constituted entity which is carrying on the business [emphasis added]".  
 
Lawrence LJ said77: 
 
"Without going through all the findings [of fact] in the case, I would point out one or two which to 
my mind really decide this case, the first being this, that on complying with certain formalities, 
which, as I understand it, consisted of depositing a document with the Registrar of the Commercial 
and Civil Court and publishing a notice in the paper, an entity, to use a neutral term, springs into 
existence, and that entity is one which owns the property of the [SNC], and which incurs the liability 
in respect of the debts of the concern, and which has the sole right to receive the earnings of the 
concern, and has the control of the distribution of the profits. Added to that, it is plain on the 
findings that a member of that entity is not an agent for the others in carrying on the business of the 
concern [emphasis added]. Without going into other findings...., those facts alone seem to me to 
be wholly inconsistent with the notion of a partnership as existing in this country, and that being 
the only question to be decided in the case, I think that is all that need be said. It is quite true that 
the position of persons who are members of such a Society as this may be likened more or less to 
that of shareholders in a limited or unlimited company in England, and also more or less to the 
position of partners in a partnership firm. But whatever be their position, they are not.....partners 
within the meaning of the Income Tax Acts".  
                                                          
75 [1998] STC 491 
76 14 TC 560 at 577 







Lawrence LJ clearly saw some parallels between the position of a SNC member and the position of a 
shareholder in a UK unlimited company. The judgments at no point referred explicitly to Scottish 
partnerships78. However, as mentioned above, there appeared to be significant differences between 
the legal nature of this SNC and that of a Scottish partnership, even though both were separate legal 
persons. 
 
2.10.5 A number of further comments need to be made about Dreyfus. 
 
First, it has barely been discussed in subsequent cases. This may have something to do with the fact 
that (as we shall see) those cases mainly revolved around "transparency" questions in the context of 
outbound investment from the UK, where the narrow question at stake did not require the court to 
fully address whether an entity was a “partnership”.  
 
Second, in deciding whether the SNC was a "partnership" or not, the judges very much worked from 
an English law paradigm of what a partnership is and how it is formed. Yet for UK tax purposes, there 
is no reason why the concept of "partnership" should be limited to entities formed under the laws of 
the UK. Hence the Court of Appeal’s approach seems much too parochial. Other jurisdictions, 
especially civil law jurisdictions such as France, have different legal cultures and constructs. The legal 
form and formation procedure of a "partnership" under French law may therefore differ significantly 
from the UK equivalent. A less parochial approach underlies the Supreme Court decision in Anson, 
which is discussed in 2.15.  
 
Interestingly, a less parochial application of UK tax concepts to non-UK legal structures was also 
recommended by the Court of Appeal a few years after Dreyfus in Ryall v The Dubois Company Ltd 79. 
In that case, the key question was whether a UK taxpayer could claim the favourable remittance basis 
of taxation on distributions to it as a member of a German GmbH (the German approximation of the 
UK private limited company). If its member's interest constituted "stocks" or "shares" in the GmbH, 
then the remittance basis was not available, under the law as it then stood. On the evidence, there 
were some notable differences between the concept of a "share" under UK company law and the 
rights and liabilities attaching to a member's interest in a GmbH. However, as Romer LJ said80: 
 
"Here it is quite plain that the words 'stocks' or 'shares' cannot be used in their ordinary meaning 
as the words are used in this country, because, under the Rule in question, they have to be used in 
connection with foreign companies and, therefore, it is a question of law as to what their meaning 
is81.”  
                                                          
78 Although Lord Hanworth MR may have had a Scottish partnership in mind when he alluded to an “imaginary” 
entity.  
79 16 TC 431 
80 16 TC 431 at 443. The end of this remark is a reminder that all UK entity classification and tax transparency 
questions boil down to the correct legal interpretation of whatever UK tax rule or concept is in play. In Dreyfus, 
the relevant concept was that of "partner". However, interpreting that rule or concept requires a full 
understanding of the relevant non-UK arrangement in the light of its governing law and, in the author’s view, 
taking full account of the role that the entity in question plays in its legal system of origin. 
81 Somewhat surprisingly, Ryall was not cited in the Special Commissioner’s decision in South Shore Mutual 
Insurance Co Ltd v Blair [1999] STC (SCD) 296.  In that case, the court ruled that so-called “founder members’ 







Third, the UK tax authorities do not follow Dreyfus and typically regard a SNC as "transparent" for UK 
tax purposes82. Apparently they believe that the expert evidence was flawed and that under French 
law, SNC members are entitled to profits as they arise. Hence (given the central question in Dreyfus), 
they regard the SNC as “analogous to a partnership” for UK tax purposes, despite the way in which a 
SNC is formed (by registration), the fuller nature of its legal personality, the lack of mutual agency and 
the manner in which it conducts its business83.  
 
Their views on the correctness of Dreyfus are consistent with the author’s views about the most 
important distinction between a “partnership” and a “body corporate” for UK tax purposes.  However, 
they are not easy to reconcile with HMRC’s refusal to grant a UK foreign tax credit in respect of a 
member’s interest in a Delaware LLC in Anson, discussed in 2.15. The LLC in question bore many of 
the same hallmarks as the SNC in Dreyfus, although the SNC members had direct liability for its 
obligations (unlike the members of the LLC, who had limited liability anyway). In this regard, 
paragraph 1673 of the old International Tax Handbook further muddies the waters because it later 
says: “We look for indicators as to whether the Association carries on the business itself or whether 
the participators do so jointly; and whether the profits accrue directly to the participators or whether 
they accrue to the association which then distributes them to the participators”. The first part of this 
quoted statement seems at odds with the earlier statement that the SNC in Dreyfus was “analogous 
to a partnership”, despite the Court of Appeal’s contrary decision.  In particular, that SNC did carry on 
the business itself and there was no mutual agency between its members: see 2.10.3(b) and (d). 
 
In any case, the UK tax status of a particular SNC will depend on its detailed structure, and especially 
on the detailed legal form of a member's interest in it. Those details may differ from SNC to SNC. In 
that sense, Dreyfus was a decision limited to its specific facts.  
 
                                                          
within what is now Section 1119 CTA 2010.  Therefore, they were not “ordinary share capital” for the purposes 
of creating a “group” for corporation tax purposes.  The company had been formed before the 1980 prohibition 
on companies limited by guarantee having a share capital.  It had nevertheless been formed without an explicit 
share capital and the court was not prepared to treat the “founder members’ deposits” as such. The latter had 
some features of capital but also had subordinated debt-like features and had not been subscribed pursuant to 
the company’s “memorandum of association”. Overall this decision (which is not a binding precedent) defines 
“ordinary share capital” quite conservatively, in a purely UK context and relying quite heavily on the formalities 
of UK company law.  Ryall sensibly suggests a different approach, especially when dealing with non-UK entities. 
That approach is now reflected in Section 259NE(4)(a) TIOPA, which defines a “partnership” as “includ[ing] an 
entity established under the law of a territory outside the United Kingdom of a similar character to a partnership 
[emphasis added]”. However, this definition only applies for the purposes of Part 6A TIOPA, i.e. the rules which 
counteract the UK tax benefits of certain hybrid mismatches. HMRC published guidance (International Tax 
Manual INTM550630, accessed 3 June 2020) states that “An entity regarded as transparent is not necessarily of 
a similar character to a UK partnership…..This subsection is intended to ensure that the treatment of non-UK 
partnerships, for Part 6A purposes, is consistent with the treatment of UK partnerships and not to extend the 
definition of partnership [emphasis added]”. The highlighted words are not entirely helpful and, in the author’s 
opinion, are wrong if they are meant to suggest that the approach in Ryall does not apply.   
82 This is stated in some detail at paragraph 1673 of the old International Tax Handbook (now archived) 
published by the UK tax authorities. The Canadian tax authorities take a similar position: see Angelo Nikolakakis 
op. cit. at 551 footnote 56.  
83 There are also indications from the case stated in Dreyfus (see 14 TC 560 at 564) that the death or legal 







Furthermore, as discussed in 2.14 below, HMRC have produced a list of criteria which they regard as 
relevant when deciding whether a non-UK entity is "transparent" or not. The ongoing status of that 
list is moot following the Supreme Court decision in Anson discussed in 2.15. However, if one applies 
that list to the facts in Dreyfus (and ignores HMRC's concerns mentioned above about expert 
evidence), it is hard to fault the Court of Appeal's conclusion84.  That may not amount to much 
because, as discussed in 2.14, the author has considerable doubts about the HMRC list.    
 
Fourthly, statements have been made in the past that Dreyfus is authority for the proposition that a 
non-UK entity with separate legal personality cannot be "transparent" for UK tax purposes. This not 
only ignores the existence of Scottish partnerships but is a huge oversimplification of the reasoning in 
Dreyfus.  This hinged on much more than the separate legal personality of the SNC.  
 
However, it remains an unsatisfactory case because the court never developed a full understanding of 
where a SNC fits into the French law of business organisations.  The forms which partnerships take 
under civil law systems largely reflect key differences between the law of agency under those systems 
compared to English law.  This is discussed in more detail in 3 below.  For present purposes, it suffices 
to say that under French law, a SNC is a “formal” partnership85 whose creation as a separate fully-
disclosed entity by registration is mainly a means of ensuring that the activities of partners bind the 
entire partnership. Under English law, this would not be necessary because the law of agency is 
different.  In other words, this registration procedure under French law is not about creating an entity 
where there is a rigid separation between the activities of the entity and those of its members. Hence 
analogising with the process of incorporating a UK body corporate seems faulty86.   
 
2.11  Oxnard 
 
2.11.1  The nature of a civil law partnership was further considered by the Court of Appeal in a non-
tax case, Oxnard Financing SA v Rahn and others 87. Dreyfus was not cited and the case considered a 
Swiss general partnership88, not a French SNC. 
 
                                                          
84 In this regard see the comments in "The English Dreyfus Case - categorisation of a French SNC for tax 
purposes in the UK". John F. Avery Jones CBE. Fiscalite et entreprise: politiques et pratiques. Melanges en 
l'honneur de Jean-Pierre Le Gall. Dalloz. Paris 2007 at 325.  
85 For further detail in this regard, see Avery Jones: Partnerships op. cit. [2002] BTR 375 at 380 fn 26, 381, 389 
and 394-6.  That article also makes clear the differences between civil law jurisdictions regarding the way in 
which “formal” partnerships are created and what form such a partnership ultimately takes. For example, a 
French “formal” partnership is regarded as having legal personality under French law.  This is not necessarily so 
as regards its German, Dutch or Swiss equivalents. The Dutch position is closer to the English law position 
(registration is a means of giving information to third parties about the entity but confers no status as such on a 
“vennootschop onder firma” or VOF, which lacks legal personality under Dutch law, although has extensive legal 
capacity – see 7.3.2). In Germany, a “formal” partnership can have full legal capacity but not legal personality (a 
distinction alien to common lawyers) if its members have liability for the entity’s debts.   
86 Although an incoming member of a SNC is liable for existing debts of the SNC, which is regarded as carrying 
on the business itself.  This differs from the position regarding an incoming Scottish partner or an incoming 
member of a Dutch VOF: see Avery Jones: Partnerships op. cit. [2002] BTR 375 at 405.   
87 [1998] 3 All ER 19. See also Robert Kent [1999] BTR 125.  
88 For further detail regarding such Swiss partnerships, see Avery Jones: Partnerships op. cit [2002] BTR 375 at 
381 fn 26, 394.  Apparently, as in Germany, a Swiss partnership can have legal capacity, but not legal 
personality, if its members can be directly liable for the entity’s debts, as they typically are. This distinction 






The underlying issue was the procedure for suing, in the English courts, the Swiss partnership and its 
members. If the entity were a corporation, then it would have been correct to sue the entity itself and 
not its members.  
 
Uncontested evidence of Swiss law was provided to the Court. On that basis, it concluded that the 
entity was a general partnership enjoying a high degree of legal personality enabling it to contract in 
its own name and to own assets. It was not however a corporation and consequently did not have 
legal personality under Swiss law, which (unlike English law) does not always treat an entity with full 
legal capacity as being a legal person. Creditor claims against the entity were primarily enforceable 
against the entity itself and its assets, with the partners having full direct liability to creditors but only 
on a secondary basis. This is similar to the position of Scottish partners. There was no consideration 
(unlike Dreyfus) of when and how the partners were entitled to the entity's underlying profits, nor the 
way in which it carried on business. 
 
In reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on an earlier Court of Appeal decision on litigation 
procedure in Von Hellfeld v Rechnitzer and Mayer Freres 89. That case did concern a French SNC and 
the Court in that case concluded on the basis of expert evidence that the SNC in question was a 
partnership. As Phillimore LJ stated at 754-5: 
 
"[The expert evidence is] not enough to shew - which is necessary for this purpose - that a societe 
en nom collectif is like a corporation in this respect, not merely that it has a separate persona, but 
that it has separate ownership of property and separate liability from the ownership or liability by or 
of the persons composing the aggregation". [Emphasis added]. 
 
Again there was no consideration (unlike Dreyfus) of when and if the SNC members were entitled to 
its underlying profits, nor of how the entity was formed or carried on business. The conclusion was of 
course the opposite of that in Dreyfus.  This highlights how much such cases turn on questions of fact 
and in particular the quality of the expert evidence on the relevant non-UK law.   
 
2.11.2  Not being tax cases, it is not clear how much weight can be placed on Oxnard and Von Hellfeld. 
Furthermore, details of the expert evidence were quite sparse, even though evidence of non-UK law 
was key. Nevertheless, both cases show that the UK courts have been willing to treat as partnerships 
non-UK entities with separate legal personality (or at least, in the case of a Swiss general partnership, 
the independent legal capacity which English lawyers, and other lawyers outside the German civil law 
tradition, would equate with separate legal personality). The courts in these cases also seemed to 
understand that it is important to evaluate what legal personality does and does not entail, in the 
precise circumstances. Interestingly, both entities concerned exhibited a degree of legal personality 
which was apparently more developed than that which exists in a Scottish partnership. In particular, 
the SNC carried on the relevant business.  However, as Phillimore LJ makes clear, there was not a 
sufficient distinction between the rights and liabilities of the entity, versus those of its members, to 
treat it as a body corporate, which is a special kind of legal person where there is a more absolute 
dividing line between the entity and its members.  
 
                                                          






In both these cases, the non-UK entities did not benefit from the special factors which have prompted 
the UK courts to stress that a Scottish partnership is a partnership within Section 1(1) of the 1890 Act 
(and hence for UK tax purposes). 
 
2.12 Memec v IRC 
 
2.12.1 In the late 1990's, the High Court and the Court of Appeal considered a major question of tax 
transparency in Memec plc v IRC 90. The question arose in relation to outbound investment by a UK-
resident company which owned German subsidiaries. In order to reduce the German corporation tax 
paid by its subsidiaries, the UK-resident company entered into a "stille Gesellschaft" (or "silent 
partnership”91) agreement with the German subholding company which directly owned the other 
German subsidiaries.  Under that agreement, the UK-resident company obtained the right to payment 
of 87.84% of the annual profits of the "silent partnership". In return, it paid a capital contribution to 
the German subholding company. 
 
2.12.2 In the High Court, Robert Walker J (as he then was) described a "silent partnership" as 
follows92:  
 
"The essential points are that the silent partner (stille Gesellschafter) makes a capital contribution 
to a commercial enterprise run by another person who is designated as the owner (Inhaber). The 
owner remains the owner of the business assets and of the income from those assets as it accrues. 
The silent partner has no proprietary interest in the assets but has a contractual right to payment 
of his share of the annual profits (if any) as shown by the partnership accounts, and can sue for 
damages in the event of any misappropriation. The owner runs the business, though the silent 
partner has access to information about it. The silent partner is not responsible for liabilities of the 
partnership beyond the amount of his contribution, but his share of any loss will be debited to his 
contribution and must be made good out of his share of the profits of later years before any share 
of profits is distributed to him. On termination of the partnership, the silent partner gets a return 
of his capital contribution, so far as it has not been lost. A silent partnership has no separate legal 
personality under German law. Its existence is often unknown to customers dealing with the 
owner".  
 
The "silent partnership" in Memec was 93 the more common type known as a "typical" silent 
partnership, created under Article 230 of the German Commercial Code94. A rarer variant also exists 
known as an "atypical" silent partnership.  This distinction between “typical” and “atypical” silent 
partnerships is a German tax law distinction, although it reflects certain commercial differences. In 
particular, under an “atypical” silent partnership, the silent partner may in addition be given a vote in 
partnership affairs and a share of goodwill95 or of appreciation in the assets of the partnership96.  The 
                                                          
90 [1996] STC 1336, followed by [1998] STC 754. 
91 “Gesellschaft” does not always mean “partnership” in German.  It can also mean “company” or “society”, in 
much the same way that in the past, English has used “company” to refer to both incorporated and 
unincorporated bodies.   
92 [1996] STC 1336 at 1345. 
93 See John F. Avery Jones “Memec plc v IRC” [1997] British Tax Review 188. 
94 See Avery Jones: Partnerships op. cit. [2002] BTR 375 at 381 fn 27.  
95 See Avery Jones: Partnerships op. cit. [2002] BTR 384 at fn 38.  
96 See “Hybrid Financing” Bureau Francis Lefebvre, Loyens & Volkmaars, Oppenhoff & Raedler (IBFD Publications 






nature of its interest more closely resembles that of a partner, while a “typical” silent partnership 
more closely resembles a profit-participating loan.  However such loans (“partiarische Darlehen”) are 
in fact a separate concept under German commercial law.  They are not created under Article 230 of 
the Commercial Code but are governed by Section 607 of the Civil Code.  Moreover, the lender does 
not participate in losses nor in the value of assets, unlike a silent partner97.  
 
The share of profits payable by the German subholding company in Memec to the UK-resident 
company was deductible within the German subgroup for German corporation tax purposes. It was 
not, however, deductible for the purposes of the separate German municipal "trade tax" on the 
subgroup's income. In order to ensure that the whole arrangement did not create additional UK 
corporation tax, it was important that a UK foreign tax credit for this "trade tax" was available to the 
UK-resident company. Otherwise, the German corporation tax saving would be neutralised by 
increased UK corporation tax98. 
 
2.12.3  A number of unsuccessful arguments were put forward to show that a UK foreign tax credit for 
the underlying "trade tax" was available. The first argument was that the "silent partnership" was 
"transparent" for UK tax purposes. If so, what the UK-resident company received from the "silent 
partnership" consisted of a share of the very dividend income received by its German subholding 
company from its own underlying German subsidiaries. If the UK-resident company was receiving a 
share of those dividends, it could claim a foreign tax credit for the "trade tax" on the German profits 
which funded those dividends.  It was therefore not strictly necessary to decide whether the “silent 
partnership” was a “partnership” for UK tax purposes, although if it was, then it would be easier to 
treat it as “transparent” because of how the UK taxes partnerships.  
 
2.12.4  The High Court 
 
In the High Court99, the judge noted the special circumstances of a Scottish partnership but stressed 
that the key issue was whether the "silent partnership" was a "transparent" arrangement and not 
whether it was a "partnership" within Section 1(1) of the 1890 Act. Even though the "silent 
partnership" lacked legal personality, it was not transparent because the "stille Gesellschafter" had no 
proprietary interest in the shares owned by the German subholding company nor in the dividends to 
which they gave rise. Therefore its right to a share of those dividends was a separate income source, 
and not dividends from the German subsidiaries.  
 
The judge went on to say100: 
 
"Transparency is normally associated with a situation where the ultimate recipient of the income 
in question has a beneficial interest in it from the start, and moreover the income is not 
transmuted at some intermediate stage by the need for trustees to exercise a discretion or by its 
being packaged so as to reach the ultimate recipient in the form of a fixed annuity".  
 
                                                          
97 See “Hybrid Financing” op. cit. at 4.5.2.1. 
98 The whole arrangement was a form of cross-border hybrid financing, the aim being that an additional tax 
deduction in Germany did not correspondingly increase the tax liability of the UK finance provider.  
99 For an extended discussion of the High Court decision, see John F. Avery Jones “Memec plc v IRC” [1997} 
British Tax Review 188.  






2.12.5 The Court of Appeal 
 
Unlike the High Court, the Court of Appeal focussed much more closely on whether the "silent 
partnership" fell within Section 1(1) of the 1890 Act and hence was "transparent" for UK tax purposes. 
The main judgment was given by Peter Gibson LJ. On the "transparency" point, he made the following 
remarks: 
 
"The relevant characteristics of an ordinary English partnership are these: (1) the partnership is not 
a legal entity; (2) the partners carry on the business of the partnership in common with a view to 
profit (see s1(1) of the Partnership Act 1890 (the 1890 Act)); (3) each does so both as principal and 
(see s 5 of the 1890 Act) as agent for each other, binding the firm and his partners in all matters 
within his authority; (4) every partner is liable jointly with the other partners for all debts and 
obligations of the firm (see s 9 of the 1890 Act); and (5) the partners own the business, having a 
beneficial interest, in the form of an undivided share in the partnership assets, including any 
profits of the business.  
 
A limited partnership differs relevantly only in the following respects: (a) characteristics (2) and (3) 
above are modified in that the limited partner takes no part in the management of the partnership 
business (see s 6(1) of the Limited Partnership Act 1907), the ordinary partners acting on his behalf 
as well as on their own behalf; and (b) the limited partner on entering the partnership is obliged to 
make a contribution of a sum or sums as capital or property of a stated amount and characteristic 
(4) above is modified in that the limited partner is only liable up to, but not beyond, the amount so 
contributed101....... 
 
[A] Scottish partnership differs in the following respects: (a) characteristic (1) above does not 
apply: the partnership is a legal entity distinct from the partners of whom it is composed, but an 
individual partner may be charged on a decree of diligence directed against the firm, and on 
payment [by that partner] of the firm's debts is entitled to pro rata relief from the firm and his 
other partners (see s 4(2) of the 1890 Act); (b) characteristic (3) above is also modified in that the 
partner is not a principal but is an agent of the firm and his partners102; (c) characteristic (4) above 
is modified in that the partner is not only jointly but also severally liable; (d) characteristic (5) 
above is modified in that the assets of the partnership are vested in the partnership legally and 
beneficially, the interest of each partner in the partnership property being described.....as 'a pro 
indiviso right in the stock or common fund vested in the partners, firstly for payment of the 
company debts and then for the partners themselves'......However, the partner has an interest 
which may be arrested (or seized) by his separate creditors, but only in the hands of the firm, and 
specific property of the partnership cannot be arrested by such creditors...... 
 
The justification for treating a Scottish partnership as transparent, though it may be less obvious 
because of the interposition of the partnership as a legal entity between the partners and the 
profits of the partnership, can be perceived in that in substance the position of the partners in 
                                                          
101 The rules on limited partner contributions have in fact been modified since 2017 in relation to so-called 
“PFLPs”: see 2.9.3.  
102 The expert evidence for the taxpayer in Major v Brodie [1998] STC 491 suggests that this point about the 
Scottish partner not being a principal is highly debateable. It was also doubted by Scottish counsel for HMRC 
before the Supreme Court in Anson v HMRC [2015] STC 1777, who had in fact appeared as junior counsel for the 






relation to the profits is the same as in an English partnership: those profits are earned by the 
partners carrying on business in common together103and are shared in the same way and the 
partners, whilst not directly owning the business and assets, indirectly do so and have an indirect 
interest in them which is capable of being arrested by the creditor of a partner. 
 
A silent partnership, whilst being similar to an English partnership in not being a separate legal 
entity, differs from both English and Scottish partnerships in a number of respects. [Robert Walker 
J] considered the decisive point to be the absence of any proprietary right, legal or equitable, 
enjoyed by [the UK-resident taxpayer] in the shares of the [German] subsidiaries or in the 
dividends accruing on those shares. That is certainly a strong point of distinction from an English 
partnership, though it is less obviously so in the case of a Scottish partnership. But even a Scottish 
partner has an (indirect) interest in the profits of the partnership as they accrue as well as in the 
assets of the partnership. In a real sense the profits and assets are the profits and assets of the 
partners, the firm, their collective alter ego, merely receiving those profits and holding those 
assets for the partners who are the firm104. They are jointly and severally liable for the firm's debts. 
In contrast, though a silent partner is indirectly interested in those profits, in that his entitlement 
to a share of the profits (or his obligation in respect of the losses) will be computed by reference to 
the profits of the owner at the end of the year, his interest is purely contractual. A clearer 
distinction is the point advanced by [counsel for the UK tax authorities] that, unlike in an English or 
Scottish partnership, in the silent partnership no business is carried on [by the UK-resident taxpayer 
and the German subholding company] in common with a view to profit [emphasis added]......The 
liabilities of the business are those of [the German subholding company] alone, though (the UK-
resident company) can be called on by [the German subholding company] to bear its share of 
losses computed at the end of the year to the extent of its capital contribution. To a third party, 
[the UK-resident taxpayer's] role in the silent partnership is irrelevant and may not be known 
[emphasis added]. 
 
The position of [the UK-resident taxpayer] seems to me to be that of a purchaser who, for a 
consideration consisting of the contribution of a capital sum and an undertaking to contribute to 
losses of the owner of a business up to the amount of the contribution, purchases a right to 
income of a fluctuating amount calculated as a share of the annual profits of the business. Neither 
in English or Scottish law would that leave [the UK-resident taxpayer] a partner with the German 
subholding company". 
 
2.12.6  A number of comments arise from these dicta:  
 
First, as in the High Court, Dreyfus was not discussed. However, the Court of Appeal was correct to 
focus more on the "partnership" issue than the High Court judge had done. If there were a 
"partnership" by UK standards, then income tax transparency should have followed whether or not 
the UK-resident taxpayer had a proprietary interest in the shares owned by the German subholding 
company and the dividends accruing on them. 
 
                                                          
103 This last point to some extent conflicts with the judge’s earlier comment that partners in a Scottish 
partnership are only agents of the firm, not principals. 
104 If this comment is meant to suggest that a Scottish partnership holds its assets as a trustee or nominee for its 
partners, then it is not correct, although dicta of Peter Gibson LJ earlier in the passage quoted suggest that this 






The Court went to some length to demonstrate the "interest" of the partners of both an English and 
Scottish partnership in the underlying partnership income and assets. This part of the Court's 
reasoning is less convincing, at least as it relates to Scottish partnerships. Furthermore, it is of limited 
relevance when dealing with a non-UK entity. As already discussed in relation to Major v Brodie105 the 
most obvious reasons for treating Scottish partnerships as tax-transparent "partnerships" are 
Scotland-specific: in particular, the definition of "firm" in Section 4(2) of the 1890 Act, together with 
the judicial desire to apply UK-wide tax legislation uniformly across the United Kingdom. As Major v 
Brodie illustrates, Scottish academic opinion is not uniform on whether a partner in a Scottish 
partnership is both a principal and an agent, rather than just an agent of the firm entity. It is therefore 
not easy to analogise from the example of Scottish partnerships when classifying non-UK entities 
which claim to be partnerships.  
 
Second, although the Court of Appeal was right to address more comprehensively the partnership 
issue in order to resolve the transparency question, their answer seems too parochial. Functionally, 
the "silent partnership" they were considering was quite similar to an English limited partnership 
formed under the Limited Partnerships Act 1907. In particular, it lacked legal personality; the silent 
partner took no part in management; and the silent partner’s effective liability was limited to its 
capital contribution, which it made in exchange for a predefined return measured directly by 
reference to the underlying income of the arrangement. The silent partnership was not identical to an 
English law limited partnership: the silent partner had no direct obligations to creditors of the 
underlying business and its identity may well not have been known to them. Nor was the silent 
partnership officially registered, unlike an English law limited partnership106.  
 
Germany has other forms of limited partnership such as the Kommanditgesellschaft ("KG") and the 
GmbH & Co KG107 or indeed the "atypical" variant of a silent partnership. These arguably bear an even 
closer resemblance to an English limited partnership than does a “typical” silent partnership. Yet that 
alone should not prevent a “typical” silent partnership from being classified for UK tax purposes as 
just another form of limited partnership, structured in a somewhat different way to its UK analogue 
because German civil law (and especially the civil law of agency) is different from the English common 
law108. A less insular approach to the meaning of "partnership" for entity classification purposes, with 
less emphasis on UK paradigms, would be consistent with Ryall v The DuBois Company Ltd 109.  Such 
an approach requires a closer examination of where a “silent partnership” fits into the range of 
German legal entities or arrangements. 
 
Third, since Memec, the relevant tax legislation has been amended to make even clearer that a 
"partnership" is normally treated as "transparent" for direct tax purposes. For income tax, Section 848 
ITTOIA 2005 states that "Unless otherwise indicated (whether expressly or by implication), a firm is 
                                                          
105 [1998] STC 491. 
106 There was presumably no need for such registration (whose sole purpose is to trigger the limited liability of 
limited partners in a limited partnership formed under the Limited Partnerships Act 1907).  Even without 
registration, the silent partner had no direct obligations to creditors of the underlying business anyway.  
107 This is a limited partnership where (as in most UK limited partnerships) the general partner is a purpose-
formed private company with limited net asset value of its own. German law even contains a hybrid entity 
comprising both partnership and company features called the Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien or KGaA.  The 
interests of limited, but not general, partners in a KGaA take the form of share capital. There is no clear UK 
analogue for a KGaA, which is taxed as a body corporate in Germany: see “Hybrid Financing” op. cit. at 4.6.1.  
108 For more on this, see 3.8 below. 






not to be regarded for income tax purposes as an entity separate and distinct from the partners"110. 
For corporation tax, Section 1258 CTA 2009 is effectively identical. Section 59 TCGA 1992 performs 
the same function for both capital gains tax and corporation tax on capital gains.  
 
Fourth, Memec prompted the UK tax authorities to publish for the first time a list of criteria which 
they regarded as key when classifying non-UK entities as "transparent" or not. That list is discussed in 
2.13. 
 
Fifth, Memec needs to be considered in the light of the Anson litigation: see 3.8 below.   
 
2.13 The HMRC List 
 
2.13.1  This list is now set out in HMRC's International Tax Manual111. It has no statutory force but 
purports to provide guidance on how to classify a non-UK entity as opaque or transparent, taking 
relevant judicial decisions into account. HMRC stress that the expressions "opaque" and "transparent" 
are not coterminous with "body corporate" and “partnership”. That is clear from Memec itself: the 
opaque "silent partnership" lacked legal personality so could not be a body corporate. Furthermore, 
as discussed in 4, certain trusts can be transparent for UK tax purposes: transparency is not limited to 
partnerships. 
 
The six items on the HMRC list are as follows: 
(i) Does the foreign entity have a legal existence separate from that of the persons who have an 
interest in it? 
(ii) Does the entity issue share capital or something else, which serves the same function as share 
capital? 
(iii) Is the business carried on by the entity itself or jointly by the persons who have an interest in it 
that is separate and distinct from the entity? 
(iv) Are the persons who have an interest in the entity entitled to share in its profits as they arise; or 
does the amount of profits to which they are entitled depend on a decision of the entity or its 
members, after the period in which the profits have arisen, to make a distribution of profits? 
(v) Who is responsible for debts incurred as a result of the carrying on of the business: the entity or 
the persons who have an interest in it? 
(vi) Do the assets used for carrying on the business belong beneficially to the entity or to the persons 
who have an interest in it? 
 
                                                          
110 This is the 2005 rewrite of Section 111 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988. Equivalent language was 
inserted as Section 111(1) of the 1988 Act, in 1994, on the switchover to income tax self-assessment. That 
switch led to separate income tax assessments on individual partners (rather than a joint assessment on all 
partners in the partnership name, which was provided for in Section 111, before it was revised in 1994). A 
partnership therefore became less “entity-like” for UK tax purposes when individual self-assessments replaced 
joint assessments: see paragraphs 24-7 of Henderson LJ’s judgment in Peter Vaines v HMRC [2018] STC 297, in 
which he stressed that in a partnership, there is a single business carried on by all the partners.  Despite the new 
and clearer statutory language, a partnership was regarded as “transparent”, for income and corporation tax 
purposes, before 1994.  Indeed, since the inception of income tax, the underlying partnership business (and not 
the partnership itself) has been regarded as the “source” of a partner’s income.   







All six items are apparently to be considered in the light of the non-UK commercial (but not tax) law 
governing the entity. No one item is conclusive although items (iii) and (iv) apparently carry particular 
weight.  
 
2.13.2  The ongoing status of this list112 is unclear following the Anson litigation, which is discussed at 
2.14. 
 
The phraseology of some items is curious and the questions posed are too binary. For example, the 
examples of Scottish partnerships and French SNCs show that there can be varying degrees of 
separateness between an entity with separate legal personality and its members: does item (i) 
adequately take account of this? Similar points can be made about items (iii), (v) and (vi). In relation to 
item (iii), Major v Brodie113 suggests that in some cases, both the separate entity and its members 
carry on the relevant business. It is not a question of "either or". Similarly, as was clear in both Major 
v Brodie114 and Oxnard v Rahn115, there can be cases where the debts of the separate entity are also 
the debts of its members (who may be primarily or secondarily liable to the entity's creditors). In 
relation to item (vi), the Court of Appeal in Memec said (hesitantly) that partners in a Scottish 
partnership have an "interest" in its underlying assets, but also recognised that those assets are 
beneficially owned by the partnership entity. It is not clear whether item (vi) reflects this possibility, 
which is likely to arise in the many jurisdictions (e.g. the states of the US) whose concept of 
partnership entails separate legal personality. 
 
Overall the list of transparency criteria seems too heavily influenced by the English common law 
conception of partnership, where there is no separate legal personality and the partners alone carry 
on the business and own its assets. This seems too restrictive for a list which is intended to guide the 
classification of non-UK entities. These are unlikely to align easily with such common law 
preconceptions, especially if they originate in countries where (as in the United States) “partnerships” 
routinely have legal personality or (as in Germany) a degree of legal capacity which English law would 
regard as tantamount to legal personality, even if local law does not. A good example of the 
restrictiveness of the HMRC criteria is the SNC in Dreyfus116. According to HMRC’s revised thinking, 
such an entity should be treated as "transparent" for UK tax purposes because the expert evidence 
was defective and the SNC members were in fact entitled to its profits as they arose: see item (iv) in 
the list. Even if one assumes that this is correct, a SNC remains an entity formed by registration which 
is distinct from its members; it rather than its members carries on its business and beneficially owns 
its assets; and it is responsible for its business debts even though its members can be liable for them 
concurrently. Hence only one item on the list (admittedly a stronger factor) clearly points towards the 
transparency of a SNC117. 
 
                                                          
112 The list is also discussed in Avery Jones: Partnerships op.cit. [2002] BTR 375 at 419-422 in which the authors 
regard the HMRC criteria as “not particularly successful when applied to civil law partnerships, especially those 
where legal capacity is not equated to legal personality”.   
113 [1998] STC 491.  
114 [1998} STC 491. 
115 [1998] 3 All ER 19. 
116 14 TC 560. 
117 As discussed in 2.9.5, item (iv) may also be of particular importance in distinguishing a “body corporate” from 






The list does not include other items which might indicate the existence of a body corporate (and 
hence opacity). For example, there is no reference to whether member liability is limited or whether 
the entity continues in existence regardless of changes in its membership ("perpetual succession"). 
Similarly, while item (ii) focusses on whether the entity has share capital118, there is no emphasis on 
the freedom to transfer that share capital119.  Hence it is hard to see the list as more than an 
incomplete series of pointers intended to assist a holistic enquiry. Furthermore, there is limited 
guidance on the relative weighting to be given to these pointers.  
 
2.13.3  HMRC have also published120 a list of entities whose status as transparent or opaque they have 
considered, but only when reviewing the UK tax treatment of members of such entities121. Again this 
list does not consider whether entities are bodies corporate or partnerships. Nor is any detail 
provided about the precise circumstances in which such entities were considered and the evidence of 
non-UK law used to reach the determination. This is presumably to protect taxpayer confidentiality 
but there is no reason why the list should not refer, on a case by case basis, to the general factors 
which guided HMRC to their conclusion. The equivalent Dutch list discussed in 7 is much more helpful 
in this regard.   
 
Hence this HMRC list should be treated with caution, especially as a number of the determinations 
are quite old. Furthermore, it needs updating to cover all the situations which HMRC have considered. 
A notable recent omission is a so-called “Guernsey LP Inc”, which HMRC have ruled (in 2010) to be 
transparent for the purposes of taxing its UK-resident member.  This vehicle has been used in 
investment fund structures and is a newer form of Guernsey limited partnership where the general 
partner can irrevocably elect, when the entity is formed, to treat it as a legal person under Guernsey 
law. Furthermore Guernsey law makes clear that such a limited partnership is not just a legal person 
but also a “body corporate” under local law: hence the “Inc” in its name.  It also appears to continue 
in existence, even if there is a change of partners i.e. there is perpetual succession.  These features 
differentiate it from a Scottish partnership and make HMRC’s ruling somewhat surprising. That ruling 
offers no insight on whether the relationship between member and entity is such that, despite legal 
personality and perpetual succession, the entity cannot be properly regarded as a body corporate for 
UK tax purposes.    
 
Not surprisingly, the list regards a silent partnership as opaque. Likewise a US limited liability 
company: hence the Anson litigation discussed in 2.14. More surprising is the readiness of HMRC to 
concede transparency in relation to civil law "partnership" entities, such as the SNC and the 
Groupement d'Interet Economique, which appear to have a more separate legal personality than 
Scottish partnerships, although their stance may well be linked to their revised thinking on Dreyfus. 
The HMRC approach is the same in relation to most partnerships and limited partnerships formed 
                                                          
118 At least one commentator regards this emphasis on the existence of share capital as outmoded, not least 
because under UK corporate law, it is now possible to create potentially “opaque” entities, such as UK LLPs, in 
which the members’ interests cannot be classified as share capital: see Montagu: “Anson and Entity 
Classification Revisited in Light of Brexit: can an LLC Constitute a ‘Body Corporate’?” op. cit. [2016] BTR page 469 
fn 16 and page 486. There does in any case seem to be considerable overlap between items (ii) and (iv) on the 
HMRC List. 
119 By contrast, this can be a relevant factor for the Dutch tax entity classification rules, just as it was under the 
pre-1997 US Federal entity classification rules. The latter also emphasised “continuity of life” (i.e. perpetual 
succession) and limited liability.  See 7 for a more extended discussion.  
120 In the International Manual at INTM180030 (accessed 4 June 2020). 






under the laws of the USA. These again almost always have legal personality and more clearly so than 
a Scottish partnership. By contrast, HMRC regard a Jersey limited liability partnership (which also has 
separate personality and carries on the partnership business) as opaque. This is presumably the 
determination which led to an unsuccessful taxpayer challenge, via judicial review, in R v IRC ex parte 
Bishopp 122. The judge in that case did not rule on the UK tax classification of the entity in question, 
even though he heard argument on the point123.  
 
2.13.4  There is a separate list of entities at paragraph 6.124 of the old 2001 Stamp Office Manual124. 
HMRC regard these entities as "bodies corporate" for the purposes of stamp duty group relief (see 
5.5.3) under Section 42 Finance Act 1930. "Body corporate" status of transferor and transferee (and 
of certain related parties) is a pre-requisite for such relief. The list contains entities which are also 
regarded as "opaque" on the list at INTM180030, such as the German Kommanditgesellschaft auf 
Aktien ("KGaA") and the US limited liability company ("LLC"). Interestingly, the entry on the Stamp 
Office list for Saudi Arabia states that "A company organised pursuant to the laws of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia has been accepted although it did not have perpetual succession"125. No further 
explanation is provided.   
 
Although not included in this list, HMRC have been known to treat a Delaware limited partnership as a 
“body corporate”, and hence the parent company of a group, for stamp duty group relief purposes.  
This author does not regard a Delaware limited partnership as a body corporate even if it has legal 
personality and even though a change in its membership does not lead to the entity being dissolved. 
In particular, the members’ interests in a Delaware limited partnership (unlike those of shareholders) 
are insufficiently separate from the entity’s own underlying income, assets and business, even if those 
members (like partners in a Scottish partnership) lack a proprietary interest in the entity’s underlying 
assets. The author similarly disagrees with those who have argued that a Delaware limited 
partnership is a “body corporate” for UK regulatory purposes (e.g. when applying the definition of an 
“open-ended investment company” in Section 236 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000).   
 
2.14  Anson v IRC 
 
2.14.1 The relevance of these lists now needs to be reconsidered in the light of the Anson litigation. 
This is the most significant UK tax litigation to date on questions of entity classification and tax-
transparency. It is also the first such case to reach the Supreme Court. It leaves a number of 
important questions unanswered.  
 
                                                          
122 [1999] STC 531.  
123 Apparently, the UK tax authorities argued that, if there was to be a “partnership” for UK tax purposes (i) 
putative partners must have joint and several liability for the entity’s business debts; (ii) there must be multiple 
principals acting for the entity; and (iii) a putative partner must have an interest in both the assets and the 
profits of the entity.  This thinking clings too closely to the English common law paradigm as does the UK tax 
authorities’ response to the Law Commission. The latter’s 2003 Report op.cit. indicates, at paragraph 6.7, that 
their proposal (that all UK partnerships should have separate legal personality) and that partners should simply 
be agents of this partnership entity was criticised by the UK tax authorities on the grounds that the mutual 
agency of partners was the pre-condition for a partnership being transparent for direct tax purposes.      
124 Which has not been updated for some years. 







The case involved an investment by Mr Anson, a UK-resident but non-UK-domiciled individual, in a 
Delaware limited liability company ("LLC") called Harbourvest, which carried on investment 
management business in the USA, and in Massachusetts in particular.  
 
The LLC did not elect (see 7) to be treated as a corporation for US Federal and state tax purposes. By 
default it was therefore classified as a partnership for US tax purposes and therefore not itself subject 
to US Federal or state income taxation. Instead its members were taxable at Federal and state level 
on income of the LLC allocated to them in accordance with a profit-sharing mechanism set out in the 
1997 LLC Operating Agreement. In short, they were taxed as partners on allocated income, whether 
or not distributed.  
 
Because Mr Anson was non-UK-domiciled and hence able to claim the "remittance basis" of UK 
income taxation, there was no question of the UK taxing his share of LLC income unless and until he 
"remitted" it to the UK. However, that is what he did. US tax on his allocated share of LLC income had 
been levied at an effective rate of 45%. He claimed that he was entitled to credit this in full against his 
UK tax liability of 40% on the remitted income. There would therefore be no further UK tax to pay. 
 
Credit for Federal income tax was claimed under the 1975 and (for later years) 2001 UK-US double tax 
treaties, as given effect in UK domestic law by Section 788 ICTA 1988126. Credit for state income tax 
was not available under the double tax treaties but was claimed as "unilateral relief" under Section 
790 ICTA 1988127.  
 
However, HMRC rejected all claims for credit on the basis that the sums remitted by Mr Anson were 
not the same income on which he had been taxed in the US. They were effectively dividends from a 
tax-opaque LLC and hence a taxable income “source” distinct from the underlying US profits of the 
LLC. An individual receiving such a dividend was not entitled to any UK credit for the non-UK tax on 
the foreign profit pool which funded that dividend. HMRC's position was consistent with their long-
held view (see 2.13) that a LLC was "opaque" for the purposes of taxing UK investors in such an 
entity128. The effect of HMRC's position was to create a substantial UK tax liability. On allocated US 
profits of 100, Mr Anson was liable for 45 of US Federal and state tax, leaving a post-tax amount of 55 
to remit to the UK. At then prevailing UK rates, that sum was taxable at 40%. Without a UK foreign tax 
credit, there would be a further 22 of UK tax to pay in addition to the 45 of US tax129.  
 
Mr Anson appealed the denial of a foreign tax credit to the First-Tier Tribunal on several grounds. The 
only relevant ground of appeal for present purposes was that a foreign tax credit was available 
because the LLC was in effect "transparent". For reasons of taxpayer anonymity, the case before the 
First-Tier Tribunal was reported as Swift v HMRC130.  
 
2.14.2  The First-Tier Tribunal 
                                                          
126 See now Sections 1-6 TIOPA. 
127 See now Sections 8-9 TIOPA.. 
128 By contrast, HMRC regard a Delaware limited liability partnership ("LLP") as "transparent" for such purposes. 
Presumably it was for this reason that Harbourvest subsequently converted into a Delaware LLP. The 
substantive differences between a Delaware LLC and a Delaware LLP are minimal: see 7.2.4.2. Hence both can 
be used largely interchangeably in the US. 
129 Ignoring Dollar: Sterling rate movements and possible timing differences. 







Detailed expert evidence of Delaware law was provided by both Mr Anson and HMRC. The tribunal 
considered this and also the detailed terms of the 1997 LLC Operating Agreement. The experts were 
asked a series of questions based on the six-item HMRC list discussed at 2.13 above. As already 
mentioned, that list makes no mention of whether members of an entity enjoy limited liability, 
whether they can freely transfer their interests or whether that entity exhibits “perpetual 
succession”. 
 
The Tribunal made the following findings of fact: 
 
(i) The LLC was a legal entity brought into existence by executing a certificate of formation with the 
Delaware Secretary of State and entering into a LLC agreement (in this case, the 1997 LLC Operating 
Agreement). That agreement was between the LLC members only: the entity was not a party to it.  
 
(ii) The LLC itself carried on its business and the business assets belonged beneficially to the LLC and 
not to its members. They (under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act -"the Delaware Act") had 
no interest in specific property of the LLC. Nor were they liable for the LLC's business debts for which 
it alone was liable131.  
 
(iii) In the case of this particular LLC, "the membership interest....is not similar to share capital but 
something more similar to partnership capital of an English partnership, the transfer of which requires 
the consent of all the partners but the economic benefits can be transferred without consent and 
without the transferee becoming a partner (s. 31 of the Partnership Act 1890). Normally a share in a 
UK company is transferable and needs to be registered and if there are restrictions on transfer these 
are that the consent of the directors (not all the other shareholders) is required." 
 
(iv) Crucially, members of this LLC had an interest in the profits of the LLC as they arose. The profits of 
the LLC did not "belong to the LLC in the first instance and then become the property of the members 
because there is no mechanism for any such change in ownership, analogous to the declaration of a 
dividend. It is true......that the assets representing those profits do belong to the LLC until the 
distribution is actually made but we do not consider that this means that the profits do not belong to 
the members: presumably the same is true for a Scots partnership. Conceptually, profits and assets 
are different [emphasis added] ....s18-503 of the [Delaware] Act.... does not contemplate that profits 
can belong to the LLC as they must always be allocated to the members". 
 
The tribunal further considered Article IV of the LLC Operating Agreement which set out the allocation 
mechanism. In particular each LLC member had a capital account to which capital contributions and 
income and expense allocations were credited and from which distributions were deducted. 
Allocations were to be made in conformity with Subchapter K of the US Internal Revenue Code. Each 
year's book income and expense was to be allocated to members' capital accounts. After making tax 
adjustments, Mr Anson's share of that net annual allocated amount was income for US Federal and 
state tax purposes.  
 
                                                          







Article V of the LLC Operating Agreement was regarded as providing for mandatory distribution of any 
excess on capital accounts within 75 days of the end of each calendar year, subject to cash being 
available and the need to create reserves or withhold amounts in respect of US tax. Given the effect 
of Article IV allocations in creating member income entitlements, Article V had little direct relevance. 
 
One area which the Tribunal did not address was whether the LLC had “perpetual succession” or 
“continuity of life”. In particular, it did not consider Section 18-801 (Dissolution) of the Delaware Act.  
Whether the LLC had “perpetual succession” seemed to depend on the detailed provisions of the LLC 
Operating Agreement covering dissolution, taken in conjunction with Section 18-801. No evidence 
was produced in this regard132.  
 
The Tribunal then turned to the legal issues. In the 1975 UK-US double tax treaty133, the key provision 
was Article 23(2)(a), which for present purposes read: 
 
"(2) Subject to the provisions of the law of the United Kingdom regarding the allowance as a credit 
against United Kingdom tax of tax payable in a territory outside the United Kingdom (as it may be 
amended from time to time without changing the general principle hereof) - 
 
(a) United States tax payable under the laws of the United States and in accordance with the 
present Convention, whether directly or by deduction, on profits or income from sources within 
the United States (excluding in the case of a dividend, tax payable in respect of the profits out of 
which the dividend is paid) shall be allowed as a credit against any United Kingdom tax computed by 
reference to the same profits or income by reference to which the United States tax is computed 
[emphasis added]." 
 
Article 24(4) of the 2001 treaty134 was worded very similarly. As for unilateral relief, Section 790(4) 
ICTA 1988 provided: 
 
"Credit for tax paid under the law of the territory outside the United Kingdom and computed by 
reference to income arising or any chargeable gain accruing in that territory shall be allowed 
against any United Kingdom income tax or corporation tax computed by reference to that income or 
gain [emphasis added]." 
 
The key issue was therefore whether Mr Anson's UK tax was "computed by reference to the same 
profits or income" by reference to which US tax was computed, or whether he was only taxable in the 
UK on the equivalent of a dividend. The Tribunal ruled for Mr Anson as follows: 
 
“[This LLC] stands somewhere between a Scots partnership and a UK company, having the 
partnership characteristics of the members being entitled to profits as they arise and owning an 
interest comparable to that of a partnership interest, and the corporate characteristics of carrying 
on its own business without liability on the members and there being some separation between 
Managing Members and other members falling short of the distinction between members and 
                                                          
132 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Gerald Montagu: “Anson and Entity Classification Revisited in Light of 
Brexit: can an LLC Constitute a “Body Corporate?” [2016] BTR 466 at 478-487.  
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directors. Since we have to put it on one side of that dividing line, we consider that it is on the 
partnership side particularly in relation to its income [emphasis added]” 
 
“The factor we are mainly concerned with.....is whether the profits belong to the members as they 
arise. We have concluded that this is the effect of the LLC Operating Agreement and the 
[Delaware] Act. Accordingly [Mr Anson] is taxed on the same income in both countries and is 
entitled to double taxation relief...." 
 
Of considerable interest is the comment which more or less states that the LLC in question is a type of 
partnership. This should be contrasted with Dreyfus135. In that case (which was not cited in Anson) the 
SNC was in some respects closer than the LLC to the partnership paradigm, not least because its 
members were directly liable to creditors for its debts. Yet the Court of Appeal ruled that it was not a 
partnership for UK tax purposes.  A key factor in reaching that conclusion was the finding in Dreyfus 
that SNC members were not entitled to its profits as they arose136.  
 
As mentioned above, the First-Tier Tribunal never addressed the question whether the LLC had 
perpetual succession.  It has been argued that, if this LLC had perpetual succession, then the decision 
should have gone against the taxpayer because the LLC would have been properly characterised as a 
company137.  It is far from clear that this factor should be decisive: the multiplicity of forms which 
“partnerships” can take; the different legal cultures in which they originate; and the practicalities of 
operating partnerships over time as a single business entity138, may well mean that such entities can 
exhibit perpetual succession, or something approaching it.  This should not per se lead to them being 
characterised as companies if, in particular, members are in fact entitled to underlying profits as they 
arise139.   
 
Even under English partnership law, limited partnerships may exhibit a degree of perpetual 
succession. Section 6(2) of the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 provides that “a limited partnership 
shall not be dissolved by the death or bankruptcy of a limited partner, and the lunacy of a limited 
partner shall not be a ground for dissolution of the partnership by the court unless the lunatic’s share 
cannot be otherwise ascertained or realised”.  
 
In paragraph 316 of the Law Commission op. cit., changes to English law were recommended such 
that English law partnerships would also be legal entities and would not (even in theory) dissolve 
                                                          
135 14 TC 560. 
136 This is of course the finding with which the UK tax authorities now disagree because they regard it as based 
on faulty expert evidence.  Hence, they now regard a SNC as “transparent” for UK tax purposes, and indeed as 
“analogous to a partnership”: see 2.10.5.  
137 See Gerald Montagu; “Anson and Entity Classification Revisited in Light of Brexit: can an LLC Constitute a 
‘Body Corporate’”?  op. cit.  
138 It is hard to imagine a large professional partnership being structured so that a change in membership, or the 
bankruptcy of a member, triggers a dissolution of the partnership. Even if it does so technically, this is most 
unlikely to have any enduring commercial significance: clients will deal, and intend to deal without interruption, 
with the partnership as it exists from time to time.  
139 Under the old pre-1997 US Federal entity classification rules, “continuity of life” (i.e. perpetual succession) 
was only one of four equally- weighted key corporate characteristics under the old “four-factor” test.  It alone 
was never conclusive when deciding whether an entity was a partnership or a corporation for US tax purposes.  






automatically on a change of partners.  There was no suggestion that such changes would make a 
partnership a body corporate. 
 
Finally, it appears that a French SNC often exhibits “perpetual succession”, even though HMRC now 
regard it as “transparent” for UK tax purposes140.  Why should an LLC be treated differently, especially 
now that so many UK “partnerships” are in fact UK LLPs which undoubtedly exhibit “perpetual 
succession”, because they are corporate bodies (although enjoying a special UK tax status)?  
 
2.14.3  The Upper Tribunal 
 
HMRC appealed to the Upper Tribunal where Mann J. found against the taxpayer141. In particular, he 
ruled that the First-Tier Tribunal had incorrectly determined that Mr Anson had a proprietary 
entitlement to the LLC profits. It was therefore open to him to reconsider the case afresh. He went on 
to rule that the LLC was not transparent and its members had no meaningful interest in its profits.  
 
The judge made the following comments in particular: 
 
"Like Robert Walker J [in Memec], a proprietary right in the underlying assets seems to me to be a 
crucial factor in the inquiry, and Mr Anson had none. I find it difficult to envisage any case of 
transparency where there is no such right, but whether or not that is possible, the absence in this 
case is fatal to the taxpayer's case. LLC owns everything. ......The interest of the members is not 
comparable to the interests of Scottish partners because they do not have an interest in the assets 
of the LLC. They certainly do not have a direct interest (statute provides that) and in my view there 
is no case for saying they have an indirect interest either, in the sense in which Peter Gibson LJ [in 
Memec] held that Scottish partners have such an interest in the assets of their partnership." 
 
2.14.4  The Court of Appeal 
 
Another appeal followed to the Court of Appeal which upheld the Upper Tribunal and ruled in favour 
of HMRC. The sole reasoned judgment was given by Arden LJ (as she then was)142. 
 
At the outset she made the following comment: "I propose to use the term 'tax transparent', in 
relation to UK tax, to describe the income of a member of an entity which is to be regarded as having 
the same source for the purposes of UK tax law as that of the entity from which it is derived. For this 
purpose, an entity includes a partnership or a trust which does not have a separate legal personality." 
 
She then ruled that Memec was authority for the following proposition: where the taxpayer becomes 
entitled to the profit of an entity because of some contractual arrangement to which he is a party, he 
must show that the contract is actually the source of the profit, rather than a mechanism to secure a 
right to a profit derived from another source, if he is to establish tax transparency. This will in general 
mean that he has to show a proprietary right to the underlying profits. It was accepted, as in the 
courts below, that the profits of an English partnership are the profits of its partners as the business is 
                                                          
140 See Gerald Montagu: “Anson and Entity Classification Revisited in Light of Brexit: can an LLC Constitute a 
‘Body Corporate’”? op. cit. at fn 80.  
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carried on by the partners as principals and agents for each other143. Arden LJ then made a number of 
further comments about the general need for a taxpayer to show a proprietary interest in order to 
demonstrate an entitlement to underlying profits of the entity as they arise144: 
 
"For these reasons, in order for a member of an entity to show that he was entitled to profits from 
the moment that the profit arose he will have to show that he has an interest in the assets to the 
value of the profit. This will necessarily be a proprietary interest. 
 
A partner in an English partnership has an equitable interest in the partnership assets and thus he 
will be able to show that he has a proprietary interest to the extent of his profit and share in the 
partnership. 
 
Likewise an income beneficiary under an interest in possession trust will be able to show an 
equitable interest in the income in question.  
 
[Counsel for HMRC] submits that it is impossible for the profits of a business to belong to a person 
other than the person carrying on the business. I agree that it is difficult to think of examples 
where this would be the case, save perhaps in one case. That is the case of an agency 
company.....But even in that example, the agency company may be little more than a nominee. 
 
In my judgment, it would be unusual but not impossible for an entity with a separate legal 
personality, such as a company, to be tax transparent for English law purposes. One example 
would be the Scottish partnership where the partnership is a separate legal entity and holds the 
assets of the business in common: this has been held by this court to be tax transparent and 
[Counsel for HMRC] assured the court that nothing in his submissions was intended to undermine 
that position."  
 
The Court then agreed145 with the Upper Tribunal that the First-Tier Tribunal had ruled erroneously 
that Harbourvest's profits belonged to its members in a proprietary sense. In fact they belonged to 
Harbourvest and the members' right to have profits allocated to their capital accounts represented a 
transfer of an entitlement to the profits, after Harbourvest had taken the sums which it needed (e.g. 
to create reserves or fund US withholding tax payments). Harbourvest was not analogous to a 
partnership: it had separate legal personality and unqualified ownership of its assets. Its members had 
no interest in those assets. The Court clearly did not accept the distinction drawn by the First-Tier 
Tribunal between an entitlement to profits (which need not be proprietary) and an entitlement to 
assets (which would necessarily be proprietary). 
 
The automatic allocation provisions in the LLC Operating Agreement merely avoided the need for a 
managing members' resolution before making an allocation of profit146. 
                                                          
143 Per Fox LJ in Padmore v IRC 62 TC 352. 
144 [2013] EWCA Civ 63 at paras 59-63. 
145 [2013] EWCA Civ 63 at paras 83-86. 
146 The Court also declined to hear late taxpayer submissions regarding the 2001 UK-US double tax 
treaty and based on an Exchange of Notes between the UK and the USA dated 24 July 2001. The Court 







2.14.5  The Supreme Court 
 
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was granted and judgment given in favour of the taxpayer in 
early July 2015. There was a single reasoned judgment given by Lord Reed147. The Supreme Court had 
convened a second hearing in spring 2015 which in particular considered the nature of a Scottish 
partnership, with submissions from Scottish counsel.  
 
Lord Reed noted the findings of the First-Tier Tribunal regarding the operation of Articles IV and V of 
the LLC Operating Agreement.  
 
He noted that Mr Justice Mann had stressed the need for LLC members to have a proprietary right in 
its underlying assets in order to claim a UK foreign tax credit, because otherwise, they lacked an 
entitlement to the LLC's profits.  
 
He then offered some support to the analogy drawn by the First-Tier Tribunal between the interest of 
a LLC member and that of a partner in a Scottish partnership. In particular he said148: 
 
"[The First-Tier Tribunal] ...based its conclusion that 'the profits belong as they arise to the 
members' not upon a confusion between profits and assets but upon the expert evidence as to the 
combined effect under Delaware law of sections 18-101(8) and 18-503 of the [Delaware] Act, 
which respectively defined a member's interest in an LLC as his share of profits and losses, and 
required the profits and losses to be allocated among the members in the manner provided in the 
LLC agreement, and article IV of the LLC agreement itself.....The natural reading of the [First-Tier 
Tribunal's] decision, in those circumstances, is that when it described the profits as belonging to the 
members it was referring to a right in personam rather than a right in rem [emphasis added].  
 
 
It would also be consistent with the comparison which the [First-Tier Tribunal] made between the 
LLC and a Scottish partnership. Although taxed in the same way as an English partnership....and 
having many points of similarity to an English partnership, a Scottish partnership differs in 
possessing separate legal personality. The partners do not, therefore, have any direct proprietary 
interest in any of the partnership assets (unless they happen to hold assets as trustees for the 
partnership). ....What the partners do own is a share of the partnership. That share is an 
incorporeal moveable right. .....Those rights are broadly analogous to those of a member of the 
LLC under the [Delaware] Act, as found by the [First-Tier Tribunal]. .....There are, of course, also 
some differences: in particular, the partners in a Scottish partnership, other than a limited 
partnership, have an unlimited liability for its debts, whereas the members of the LLC had no 
liability for its debts beyond their initial capital contributions, prior to their repayment. 
Nevertheless, given the points of similarity, the comparison made by the [First-Tier Tribunal] 
between the LLC and a Scottish partnership was understandable, and did not carry the implication 
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[of a member's proprietary interest in partnership assets] which Mann J supposed [emphasis 
added]." 
 
Lord Reed also queried the approach of the Court of Appeal. In particular, it was not clear that it had 
in fact followed Memec when it focussed on whether the taxpayer had a proprietary right to the 
profits of Harbourvest as they arose149. By contrast, in Memec itself150 the Court of Appeal "adopted 
....an approach151 to 'transparency' which involved analysing the characteristics of the partnership 
agreement under the governing foreign law, comparing those characteristics with the characteristics 
of paradigm examples of arrangements which were transparent (such as English and Scottish 
partnerships) or opaque (such as UK companies), and determining whether in the light of that 
comparison.....the foreign partnership was relevantly similar to the transparent or opaque UK entities. 
That was the approach followed by the [First-Tier Tribunal] in the present case." 
 
Overall Lord Reed expressed concern that the Court of Appeal's approach (unlike the First-Tier 
Tribunal) continued to confuse profits with assets. It also did not address the key foreign tax credit 
question whether the income taxed in one country was the same as the income taxed in another.152 
 
                                                          
149 An old House of Lords case not discussed in Anson, although mentioned in argument before the Supreme 
Court by counsel for the taxpayer, is Drummond v Collins 8 TC 525. That case supports the analysis of both the 
First-Tier Tribunal and the Supreme Court. In Drummond, on the facts as they had turned out, minor children 
were merely discretionary income beneficiaries of a US trust and their guardian received sums from the trustees 
on their behalf for their education and maintenance.  All the courts ruled that these payments were income 
which was UK-taxable because its source was a “foreign possession” (the US trust fund) and it had been 
remitted to the guardian in the UK. The House of Lords (in particular Lord Parker at pages 539-540 and Lord 
Wrenbury at page 541) made clear that income could be “sourced” from a “foreign possession”, and taxable as 
such, even though the taxpayer (the guardian) did not have a proprietary right to the “foreign possession” 
because the children were discretionary beneficiaries. As Lord Wrenbury put it at page 541: “It is, however, 
contended that the case is not within [Schedule D Case V] for that this is not a foreign possession. This 
argument….is that property e.g. income derived from assets in another country, is not a foreign possession 
unless the person taxed owns the corpus of the foreign possession. If this were true no life tenant or other 
person having a limited interest in property abroad would be assessable under [Schedule D Case V]. The test is 
not, I think, whether there is an absolute interest in a foreign possession, but whether there is such an interest in 
a foreign possession that the party assessed derives income from it [emphasis added]….The income is annual 
profits arising to a person residing in the United Kingdom from property situate elsewhere than in the United 
Kingdom.”  
150 [1998] STC 754. 
151 See para 45 of Lord Reed’s judgment. 
152 During the Supreme Court hearing, Mr Anson advanced his earlier argument that, in the light of the findings 
of fact of the First-Tier Tribunal and as a matter of UK tax law, he was liable to UK tax on his allocated share of 
the LLC's underlying trading profits, which was the same income that had been taxed in the USA. However, he 
also put forward a new argument: even if US tax was charged on the profits of Harbourvest but he was only 
liable to UK tax on distributions from those profits, nevertheless UK and US tax were in fact charged on "the 
same profits or income" for the purposes of the 1975 and 2001 double tax treaties. In short, the taxpayer was 
asking for a looser, less semantic interpretation of the words "the same profits or income", based on accepted 
purposive norms for interpreting double tax treaties rather than the more narrowly linguistic approach of UK 
domestic tax law. The Supreme Court dismissed this argument after considering the genesis of Article 23(2) of 
the 1975 UK-US double tax treaty. In particular, the taxpayer could not derive any comfort from the fact that 
Article 23(2)(a), not (b), contained the words "(excluding in the case of a dividend, tax payable in respect of the 
profits out of which the dividend is paid)". This new argument of the taxpayer had no direct bearing on the tax 






Lord Reed finally addressed the taxpayer's argument that, based on the evidence of Delaware law, the 
same profits were being taxed in both the UK and the USA. Memec153 was referred to although there 
was no detailed critique of that case. Rather it was noted that the question in Memec was: did the 
presence of the "silent partnership" mean that the UK taxpayer could be treated as receiving a share 
of the dividends paid by the German subsidiaries to the German subholding company?  If so, a UK 
foreign tax credit would be available for underlying trade tax on the profits of the German subsidiaries 
which were used to fund those dividends. This was a different question from the one in Anson about 
whether the same profits directly earned from the LLC’s activities were being directly taxed both in 
the UK and the USA.  
 
Lord Reed concluded that Mr Anson's UK tax liability was indeed being computed by reference to the 
same income as was taxed in the USA. He was therefore entitled to a UK foreign tax credit for the US 
tax liability, both at Federal and state level. In reaching this conclusion, Lord Reed stressed154 that: 
 
"....the rights of a member of the LLC were found to arise from the [Delaware] Act, combined with 
the LLC Agreement. ....that agreement was not a contract between the LLC and its members: the 
LLC was not a party to it, but was brought into being by it, on the terms set out in it and in the 
provisions of the [Delaware] Act. It was thus the constitutive document of the LLC. It was against 
that background that the [First-Tier Tribunal] made findings which contradict the premise that the 
profits belong to the LLC in the first instance and are then transferred by it to the members. Their 
conclusion, on the contrary, was that, under the law of Delaware, the members automatically 
became entitled to their share of the profits generated by the business carried on by the LLC as 
they arose prior to, and independently of, any subsequent distribution." 
 
Those findings were findings of fact because they were findings, based on expert evidence, as to the 
correct non-UK legal position. They were fully justified by the evidence of Delaware law. Furthermore, 
the First-Tier Tribunal had not made the error of concluding that the LLC members' profit entitlement 
was a proprietary right. Hence its findings in favour of the taxpayer were not open to challenge and a 
full UK foreign tax credit was available. 
 
2.14.6  HMRC response to Anson 
The HMRC response to the Supreme Court decision in Anson has been guarded, although it is believed 
that HMRC have major reservations about the accuracy of the findings in the First-Tier Tribunal about 
the nature of a member’s interest in a Delaware LLC. HMRC’s main published statement on Anson 
was on 25 September 2015, in Revenue and Customs Brief 15 (2015). The key comments were as 
follows: 
"Lord Reed delivered the unanimous judgment of the court and he made clear that he relied on 
the facts found by the FTT, in particular those regarding the rights of Mr Anson that arose from the 
Delaware LLC Act and LLC agreement. 
The FTT made findings that the profits of the LLC did not belong to the LLC in the first instance but 
the members became automatically entitled to their share of the profits as the profits arose and 
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before any distribution. The FTT also found that the interest of a member in the LLC was not 
similar to share capital.  
HMRC has after careful consideration concluded that the decision is specific to the facts found in 
the case. This means that where US LLCs have been treated as companies within a group structure 
HMRC will continue to treat the US LLCs as companies, and where a US LLC has itself been treated 
as carrying on a trade or business, HMRC will continue to treat the LLC as carrying on a trade or 
business.  
 
HMRC also proposes to continue its existing approach to determining whether a US LLC should be 
regarded as issuing share capital. Individuals claiming double tax relief and relying on the Anson v 
HMRC decision will be considered on a case by case basis." 
Apparently, HMRC have considered whether legislation should make clear that a LLC is always opaque 
for UK tax purposes. In any case, they correctly note that, like any other non-UK entity classification 
case, Anson turned heavily on findings of fact regarding the relevant non-UK law. As discussed further 
in 7.2.4.2, US LLCs are a very flexible vehicle and so much will turn on the governing agreement of a 
particular LLC, together with the limited liability company law of the relevant state in which it is 
formed. Almost all US states now have such a law and there is considerable convergence in their 
content. 
It cannot therefore be said that, on the basis of Anson, all LLCs can be regarded as "transparent" for 
the purposes of taxing their income in the UK. LLCs have been extensively used in cross-border 
corporate group structures (e.g. “tower” group financing structures) on the basis that they are 
companies and that their members’ interests are “ordinary share capital” for UK tax purposes. HMRC 
are clearly not minded to disturb such arrangements. Taxpayers may not want simply to rely on the 
25 September 2015 statement, which is insufficiently case-specific to be clearly legally binding on 
HMRC. A review and possible amendment of the relevant LLC documentation will be needed to 
ensure that, under the law of the relevant state, LLC members do not have an entitlement to profits 
as they arise but only have an entitlement to distributions as and when the LLC chooses to 
distribute155.  
The last point is linked to another key issue. If a LLC is to be respected as a company within a tax 
group for UK tax purposes, members' interests will need to be treated as "ordinary share capital" for 
UK tax purposes. Again, a well-advised taxpayer will want to look carefully at the structure of 
members' interests in the relevant LLC, bearing in mind the finding in Anson that the members' 
interests in Harbourvest were not akin to share capital.  
                                                          
155 Getting to this position is likely to require removal of any language in the LLC Agreement that creates capital 
accounts for members and automatically allocates income and expense to them.  Instead, the LLC Agreement 
should provide for members’ interests to take a form akin to paid-in share capital and for it to be clear that the 
entitlement to underlying profits lies with the LLC itself. Advice from local counsel will be needed to confirm 
that such modifications are fully effective under the relevant local law, and especially its LLC statute.  US tax 
advice will also be required if the LLC is being taxed as a partnership in the United States, not least because the 
capital account provisions in the LLC Agreement are likely to stem from the requirements of Subchapter K of the 






In Revenue & Customs Brief 87/09156, HMRC set out guidance (now archived) on when a member's 
interest in a company amounts to "ordinary share capital" for UK tax purposes. 
The following HMRC comments related to Delaware LLCs: 
"Section 18-702c of the Delaware Limited Liability Act provides that: 'Unless otherwise provided in 
a limited liability company agreement, a member's interest in a limited liability company may be 
evidenced by a certificate of limited liability company interest issued by the limited liability 
company.' 
If a DLLC issues 'shares' in this way and other factors relating to the company suggest that it has 
share capital [emphasis added] then we will accept that these 'shares' may be regarded as 
'ordinary share capital' .... 
It should be noted that not all DLLCs issue share certificates but they may still have 'ordinary share 
capital'. Regard must be had to the particular terms of the agreement by which the LLC has been 
created. ..... 
Other States within the United States of America have comparable legislation to Delaware. Where 
it can be shown that a particular State has legislation analogous to the Delaware legislation with 
which we are familiar, HMRC would expect to be able to provide advice in line with that for 
DLLCs." 
This guidance made clear that whether a Delaware LLC's member's interest amounts to "ordinary 
share capital" will depend very much on the nature of those interests under Delaware law. That point 
is simply reinforced by the findings of the First-Tier Tribunal in Anson. Issuing certificates of limited 
liability company interest may be a helpful indicator that LLC members' interests are "ordinary share 
capital" but is unlikely to be conclusive.  
3. The law following Anson 
 
3.1  In Anson, the most senior UK domestic court has for the first time since Garland v Archer-Shee 
(see 4.3.3.2) addressed a question of "tax transparency", and in relation to a non-UK entity with legal 
personality. More importantly, the Supreme Court decision shows a willingness to break away from a 
rather narrow common law perspective in addressing such questions, thereby echoing the approach 
of the Court of Appeal in Ryall v DuBois157. It is also consistent with the Court of Appeal decisions in 
Oxnard v Rahn158 and (much earlier) Von Hellfeld v Rechnitzer159, although none of these cases was 
cited. The UK corporation tax legislation applies to entities formed in other jurisdictions which are 
nevertheless UK-resident or which carry on a taxable UK trade (notably through a UK "permanent 
establishment") or which derive income from UK real estate. In deciding what non-UK entities are 
subject to UK corporation tax, one needs to bear in mind that the nature of a "body corporate" and a 
                                                          
156 Later set out in Appendix 11 of the Capital Gains Manual (now archived). See now Company Taxation Manual 
CTM00511 (accessed 5 June 2020), which is more terse, simply stating that a LLC organised under the law of a 
US state may issue transferable interests akin to share capital but they may not be evidenced by a certificate of 
interest.  The lack of a certificate does not prevent the members’ interests being “ordinary share capital” 
“provided (as would be expected to be the case) that the interests are clearly defined and recognisable as 
equity (ownership) interests in the entity”. See also the discussion of a “share” in 2.10.5.  
157 16 TC 431. 
158 [1998] 3 All ER 19. 






"partnership", and the method of forming either entity, may differ in other jurisdictions compared to 
the UK.160  
 
The underlying radicalism of Anson is therefore important, and some commentators have overlooked 
this. For example, the observation has been made that “Where an overseas entity has separate legal 
personality, as does an LLC, and under local law carries on the business itself, the starting point must 
be that it is not a partnership, as it is not the partners who are carrying on the business. And so it is a 
company. There is nothing in Anson to displace this view”161.  While one can agree on the starting 
point, what follows is hard to square with what Anson decided and indeed with HMRC’s revised 
position that the SNC in Dreyfus was “analogous to a partnership”. It also fails to shed light on what is 
meant by the partners “carrying on the entity’s business”. This concept cannot, in relation to non-UK 
entities, be narrowly tied to the English law partnership paradigm of mutual agency: see 3.2.   
 
3.2  "Transparency" was recognised in Anson for UK foreign tax credit purposes, even though the UK-
resident taxpayer was a member of an entity, a Delaware LLC, which was a separate legal person 
created by a statutory registration process; owning its own assets beneficially; incurring rights and 
liabilities as such; and itself (not its members) carrying on its business and being liable for its debts. In 
short, an entity which, from a UK perspective, looks more like a “body corporate” than does a Scottish 
partnership. It is true that much turned on the evidential findings of Delaware law. Nevertheless, the 
decision shakes off the shackles of tying "transparency" questions exclusively to whether the taxpayer 
had a formal proprietary interest, recognised by English law, in the underlying income and assets of 
the entity concerned. This was the approach of the Upper Tribunal and the Court of Appeal in Anson. 
It was also the approach of the High Court in Memec.162 Those courts were too wedded to the English 
law analysis of a partnership as an aggregation of members (the "partners") based on mutual 
agency163 and the law of trusts. This analysis of a partnership is by no means universal in countries 
influenced by common law e.g. US states such as Delaware where partnerships routinely have legal 
personality. It is also at odds with the definition of a formal partnership in most civil law countries, not 
least because of key differences in the law of agency164 and, perhaps, the lack of a concept of trusts 
with which to segregate partnership property from the personal assets of the partners.  This judicial 
mindset also explains some of the problems encountered by the lower courts in Anson and the courts 
in Memec when analysing Scottish partnerships165.  
                                                          
160 For further discussion of these issues, focussing on the nature of "partnership" in common law and civil law 
countries, see Avery Jones: Partnerships op. cit. [2002] British Tax Review 375. The authors conclude that, 
because of significant differences between the common law and civil law concepts of agency (and especially 
regarding when an undisclosed principal acting through an agent can be liable to a third party dealing with that 
agent), civil law partnerships have to be formed differently to achieve equivalent legal outcomes to the common 
law. Hence, in particular, the prevalence of partnership entities with legal personality such as the French SNC. 
For further discussion of these agency issues, see Zweigert & Koetz (translated by Tony Weir): An Introduction 
to Comparative Law (3rd edition), Clarendon Press, Oxford  at pages 431-441.   
161 See Philip Harle and Rupert Shiers: “Analysis: Anson, transparency and Brief 15/2015”. Tax Journal, Issue 
1281 at 9 (16 October 2015). 
162 [1996] STC 1336. 
163 See Section 5 of the 1890 Act. 
164 See Avery Jones: Partnerships op. cit. [2002] BTR 375. 
165 There is a school of thought, for the purposes of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, that Scottish 
limited partnerships are a form of "company" because of their separate legal personality. Consequently such 
partnerships have been inserted into some transaction structures to obtain regulatory exemptions for intra-
group advisory activities. One example of this appears to be item 10 in the Schedule to the Financial Services 







3.3  While the Supreme Court in Anson broke new ground, how much new ground is less clear. Much 
was made by the First-Tier Tribunal and the Supreme Court of the automatic allocation of income and 
expense of the LLC to its members under the LLC's governing agreement. This underpinned the 
members’ contractual entitlement to profits as they arose.  Hence it created a much closer 
relationship between members, and the LLC's underlying business operations, than that enjoyed by a 
shareholder in a company.  
 
Such an automatic allocation feature may be absent in non-UK entities treated as partnerships under 
their governing non-UK law166. Does that prevent the UK regarding them as “transparent”, especially 
in the light of Drummond v Collins? 
 
When considering how much new ground was broken in Anson, it is also important to remember that 
the court limited itself to answering the narrower question whether the taxpayer was taxable in the 
UK on the "same income" which had borne tax in the US. If so, a UK foreign tax credit was available. 
The Supreme Court did not definitively comment on whether the LLC itself was a "partnership" for UK 
tax purposes, but seemed sympathetic to comments in the First-Tier Tribunal that on balance it was a 
form of partnership. The author considers that, had it been required to do so, the Supreme Court 
would have regarded the LLC in Anson as a form of "limited partnership" for UK tax purposes. The 
alternative would have been to treat the LLC as a "body corporate" which was nevertheless 
"transparent" for certain UK tax purposes. This would be highly unusual and would create a major 
mismatch with UK bodies corporate. A domestic body corporate would never be "transparent" for UK 
tax purposes absent very specific deeming rules to the contrary (e.g. those regarding a UK LLP and a 
EEIG)167.  
                                                          
“Arrangements do not amount to a collective investment scheme [and hence do not require regulation] if each 
of the participants is a body corporate [emphasis added] in the same group as the operator”. This school of 
thought misunderstands the nature of a Scottish partnership:  Section 4(2) of the 1890 Act makes clear that a 
Scottish partnership has a separate legal personality but is still a partnership.  As for the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000, it simply defines a “body corporate” in Section 417(1) as including a body corporate 
constituted under the law of a non-UK jurisdiction.  A partnership does not appear to be included, not least 
because Section 417(1) contains a separate definition of “partnership” which simply includes a non-UK 
partnership.  
166 As already discussed, HMRC disagree with the expert evidence in Dreyfus v IRC 14 TC 560 that members of a 
French SNC are not entitled to profits as they arise.  However, when it comes to distributing realised profits of a 
SNC, a decision must be made by a SNC to make a proper distribution: see Cass. Com. 14/12/2010 No 09-72.267 
(No 1315 F-D) Ste Bar tabac Le Laguiolais c/ Gambetta, referred to in Avery Jones: “The English Dreyfus Case – 
categorisation of a French SNC for tax purposes in the UK” op. cit. This of course differs from an English or 
Scottish partnership where there is no restriction under the general law preventing a partnership paying out 
realised profits (although a prudent management will ensure that there is adequate cash to fund any 
distributions).  In any case, a restriction on distributing profit is not the same as a restriction on an entitlement 
to profit, so there is no necessary conflict here with HMRC’s revised position on Dreyfus. For other examples of 
civil law jurisdictions where an entity-level resolution may be needed to distribute profits, see Avery Jones: 
Partnerships op. cit. [2002] BTR 375 at 415.  
167  The UK rules implementing the 2009 EU Mergers Tax Directive (Directive 2009/133/EC) envisage that some 
companies (as defined by that Directive) can nevertheless be “transparent” for the limited purposes of the 
Directive, which (in particular, in Articles 4 and 8(3)) restricts tax relief where transactions  involve "transparent" 
companies. Those restrictions do not, however, go as far as imposing a “pass-through” tax charge on the 
members of such a company in respect of its underlying income and gains. That is a matter left to each Member 
State. The Directive simply provides that a company is to be treated as “fiscally transparent” or otherwise “on 








Treating a LLC structured like Harbourvest as a form of limited partnership for UK tax purposes would 
in particular lead to a sensible outcome if that LLC carried on a trade through a UK “permanent 
establishment”, as well as having UK-resident members. In that case, the UK trading income of the 
LLC would be taxable at the level of the members, as partners, together with any non-UK income of 
the LLC allocable to its UK members (and, where relevant, remitted to the UK). By contrast, if the LLC 
were treated as a body corporate (not a partnership) but at the same time "transparent" in relation to 
its UK-resident members, then the outcome would be quite odd168. In particular, there is no reason 
                                                          
the law under which it is constituted”.  Similar words are used in Article 4(2) of the 2011 Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive (Directive 2011/96/EU). These “transparency” provisions have been reflected in UK law: see Sections 
140E to 140L TCGA. This UK legislation defines a "transparent entity" as one which is resident in a Member State 
other than the UK; is listed as a company in the Annex to the 2009 Directive; lacks "ordinary share capital" (as 
defined in Section 1119 CTA 2010) and “if it were resident in the United Kingdom, would not be capable of being 
a company, within the meaning given by the Companies Act 2006”: see Section 140L(1)(c) TCGA. It is not clear 
how Section 140L(1)(c) was derived from the definition of “transparent entity” in the 2009 Directive, which does 
not mention “ordinary share capital”.  Presumably the thinking was that only an entity which is truly a “body 
corporate” can issue a member’s interest which the UK would recognise as “ordinary share capital”. The last part 
of Section 140L(1)(c) then excludes from “transparent entity” status a non-UK entity which resembles a UK 
company limited by guarantee, which is of course a body corporate but does not have share capital. An example 
of a non-UK-resident “company” listed in the Annex to the Mergers Directive which is “transparent” on this basis 
is a Dutch “open” CV (see 7.3.2), which from a UK perspective is simply a contract between its members. Its 
ensuing lack of legal personality prevents it having “ordinary share capital” by UK standards and, if UK-resident, 
it could not become a company under the Companies Act 2006.  
 
The Articles in the Mergers Directive dealing with “transparent entities” have been reflected rather differently in 
the UK domestic law on “loan relationships” (Part 5 CTA 2009); “derivative contracts” (Part 7 CTA 2009) and 
“intangible fixed assets” (Part 8 CTA 2009). In those Parts, the implementing legislation simply defines a 
“transparent entity” as “a company which is resident in a Member State other than the United Kingdom and does 
not have an ordinary share capital”.  For example, see Section 438(4) CTA 2009. This language lacks the equivalent 
of the last part of Section 140L(1)(c) TCGA, with the result that a non-UK equivalent of a UK company limited by 
guarantee is, confusingly, treated as “transparent” for these purposes.  Overall, the 2009 Directive gives 
“transparent entity” a special meaning in UK tax law in order to limit certain EU law-based tax reliefs. This bespoke 
meaning, with its limited ambit, does not alter the general point that typically, a "body corporate" is an opaque 
entity for UK tax purposes, whether or not it has “ordinary share capital”. 
The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (2016/1164/EU as amended by 2017/952/EU)(“ATAD”) deals, in Articles 9 and 9a, with 
hybrid and reverse hybrid mismatches.  However, it does not directly define a “fiscally transparent” entity.  The closest it gets 
is a definition in Article 2(9)(i) of a “hybrid entity” as “any entity or arrangement that is regarded as a taxable entity under the 
laws of one jurisdiction and whose income or expenditure is treated as income or expenditure of one or more other persons 
under the laws of another jurisdiction”.  The second part of this definition describes fiscal transparency.  There are some 
parallels with the definition of a “hybrid entity” in Section 259BE TIOPA, for the purposes of Part 6A TIOPA.  Part 6A is the UK 
legislation tackling aspects of hybrid and other mismatches in response to the conclusions of BEPS Action 2.  Section 259BE is 
discussed further in 5.2.  It is not surprising that there are parallels between it and Article 2(9)(i) of ATAD, which gives effect 
in EU law to a number of the BEPS Action 2 recommendations.   
168 In Avery Jones: Partnerships op. cit. [2002] BTR 375 at 426-7, the learned authors suggest that entity 






why the LLC would not be subject to corporation tax in its own right, as a “company”, on its UK 
trading income. Yet would that income also be automatically allocated to its members as per the LLC 
agreement and taxable in their hands, whether or not distributed?  If so, how would this allocation be 
achieved if the special UK rules for taxing the income and gains of partnerships at partner level did 
not apply? Even if this allocation could be done, it would raise a major risk of double taxation for 
members. Corporation tax is a primary liability of the taxable entity. It is not a representative charge 
on behalf of the members of the entity. They would therefore have no right to set any corporation tax 
liability of the LLC against their own liability on the LLC’s income. Furthermore, the corporation tax 
definition of “income” differs from that for income tax e.g. in relation to the taxation of debt, 
derivative contracts and intangible fixed assets.  Hence, would tax be chargeable at both entity level 
(corporation tax) and member level (income tax) on different tax bases?169.  
 
3.4 While Anson marks a willingness to look beyond UK domestic law paradigms when addressing the 
classification of non-UK entities and tax transparency, and to focus on the legal system which gave 
birth to the entity, and the role of that entity within it, UK courts will wish to retain the last word. 
Otherwise the UK will have lost control of the shape and boundaries of its own tax system. Without a 
more sweeping reform imposing more prescriptive rules, the tax classification of non-UK entities will 
continue to involve asking detailed questions about the entity's structure compared to UK entities. 
Many of these questions may be meaningful and significant from a UK legal standpoint (e.g. is an 
entity member entitled to profits as they arise?; does the entity have legal personality?) but may well 
be rather less important from the standpoint of the relevant non-UK legal system, which may have a 
rather different approach to such questions.  
 
Without significant reform, the tax classification of non-UK entities is therefore likely to remain an 
expensive, time-consuming and uncertain process for both taxpayers and HMRC, especially as it may 
now require a deeper understanding of the legal system which gave birth to the relevant entity. 
HMRC have limited resources to devote to this area170 and entity classification questions will almost 
certainly involve obtaining evidence from experts on the relevant foreign law. Such experts may 
disagree on material issues.  Furthermore, the key questions which the UK regards as important from 
its tax perspective may lack meaning, or have an entirely different meaning, from the standpoint of 
the non-UK legal system in question. For example, German and Swiss law consider that an entity can 
lack legal personality and yet have full legal capacity, whereas English law would see legal personality 
and full capacity as two sides of the same coin. These differences in meaning risk devaluing the 
answers provided by local law experts.  
 
                                                          
entity’s home jurisdiction when taxing residents of A who invest in that non-A entity.  The classification 
approach of comparing a foreign entity with domestic entities would only apply where that foreign entity was 
being taxed by A at source.  The authors’ suggestion seems hard to operate where the entity in question has 
members resident in A and also has A-source income.  In effect, A would be applying to the entity concurrently 
two entity classification approaches, with potentially very different consequences if A regarded the entity as 
opaque but the entity’s home jurisdiction viewed it as “transparent”. .  
169 It is therefore very doubtful whether Anson ushers in the concept of a “transparent body corporate” for UK 
tax purposes, although some commentators have suggested otherwise: see, for example, Charles Yorke: 
“Anson: entity classification revisited” Tax Journal 8 July 2015.   
170 HMRC are prepared to give rulings on transparency and entity classification issues but this is likely to be a 
slow process and will involve the taxpayer providing HMRC with all the necessary material (including evidence of 






3.5  An important aspect of Anson is that it increases the divide between how the UK classifies 
domestic and non-domestic entities for tax purposes. Entities formed under the domestic law of 
England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland are usually classified prescriptively for tax purposes. 
Taxpayers have little or no scope to change that classification. In particular, companies incorporated 
in the UK (and, in particular, under Companies Act 2006) are taxable entities as such (leaving aside the 
special rules applying to UK LLPs and EEIGs, which in any case apply irrespective of how such an 
entity’s constitution is drafted). There is no reason to believe that a UK private limited company, with 
articles of association mirroring the LLC agreement in Anson, could successfully claim that it was not 
subject to UK corporation tax or that its shareholders are subject to tax on the basis that they are 
entitled to a prorata share of the company’s underlying profits as they arise.  Were a court to accept 
such an argument, the UK corporation tax base could be severely eroded. 
 
The UK entity classification position is of course more flexible and fact-sensitive regarding non-UK 
entities. The UK’s “corporate resemblance” approach is less prescriptive, works by analogy from UK 
paradigms and is influenced by the precise UK tax rules which are being applied. The effect of Anson is 
to increase this flexibility. Indeed it gives a taxpayer greater control over whether an entity is 
"transparent" for UK tax purposes, provided that the entity's constitution is drafted appropriately and 
the relevant governing law gives legal effect to that drafting (as Delaware law apparently does). It is 
not obvious that this extra flexibility is a good thing because it places at an even greater advantage 
those taxpayers with the advisory resources and the sophistication to exploit it.  This flexibility may 
also make it more attractive to conduct UK operations through a UK “permanent establishment” of an 
entity formed outside the UK, rather than to conduct them through a UK entity whose tax 
classification can be manipulated less easily.   
 
There must in any case be limits to this flexible classification system even in relation to non-UK 
entities.  Otherwise the UK will have lost control of the boundaries of its tax system.  In particular, if 
the evidence shows that a non-UK entity is not just a separate legal person but has a legal status in 
the relevant jurisdiction equivalent to a “body corporate” in English law, then that entity should be 
regarded as a “body corporate” for UK tax purposes, even if its constitution purports to give its 
members rights to underlying entity profits as they arise. A good example of such entities would be 
those US entities whose names include the suffix “Inc.” or “Corp”.  In these cases (unlike LLCs) there is 
a clear intention not just to create a separate legal person but to go further and create the very clear 
demarcation between the rights of the entity and the rights of its members which distinguishes a 
“body corporate”171.      
 
3.6  The more flexible post-Anson approach to the classification of non-UK entities could potentially 
raise issues under European Union law, which are discussed at 6.7.8.5.  
 
3.7  In the wake of the Memec litigation, HMRC published the list discussed in 2.13. The limitations of 
that list have already been discussed but post-Anson, it needs to be treated with extra caution. In 
particular, it is not clear that Harbourvest would have been treated as "transparent" on the basis of 
the HMRC criteria. While HMRC accord particular significance to an entity’s profits accruing to 
                                                          
171 Delaware law, like the law of a number of other US states, provides for the creation of such incorporated 
entities as well as partnerships and LLCs.  It differs from the historical position of English law by offering the LLC 
alternative which, as the First-Tier Tribunal noted in Anson, is a hybrid entity sitting somewhere between a 
classic general partnership and a “body corporate”.  The binary “body corporate” versus “partnership” approach 






members as they arise (as in Anson), Harbourvest LLC was also a separate legal person which owned 
assets, incurred liabilities and carried on business on its own behalf, not that of its members.  Under 
the listed HMRC criteria, most factors therefore pointed towards non-transparency. Hence, the list 
seems too restrictive following Anson. At the very least, item (iv) in the HMRC list seems to have 
acquired even greater significance172. 
 
3.8  A final question arising from Anson is whether Memec 173remains good law. The Supreme Court 
did not consider in detail and did not overrule Memec, in which a somewhat different question of 
"transparency" arose for UK foreign tax credit purposes.  
 
In the High Court in Memec, the judge focussed heavily on the "silent partner" needing, but lacking a 
proprietary interest in the shares held by the "silent partnership" and in its dividend income, in order 
to establish transparency. That reasoning seems very similar to that of the Upper Tribunal and the 
Court of Appeal in Anson and hence suspect in the light of the Supreme Court decision: the lack of 
such a proprietary interest cannot be regarded as conclusive.  Furthermore, despite the arguments 
which they advanced in both Memec and Anson, HMRC should be able to live with this, given their 
opinion of the decision in Dreyfus:  members of a SNC do not have a proprietary interest in its assets 
and income.  
 
In Memec, the Court of Appeal focussed less on proprietary interest and more on whether the "silent 
partner" was indeed carrying on a "business in common" with the other partner. The apparent lack of 
such a “business in common” precluded the transparency normally associated with a partnership. 
Hence no UK foreign tax credit was available. The Court of Appeal seems to have given little weight to 
the fact that the "silent partnership" structure is one mechanism whereby German law achieves an 
outcome very similar to a limited partnership registered under the Limited Partnerships Act 1907174.  
Such limited partnerships are common collective investment vehicles. The limited partners are 
typically passive investors (e.g. tax-exempt pension funds) which mainly provide subordinated debt to 
the partnership, the return on which is profit-linked.  Hence, their position closely resembles a silent 
partner.  Yet the classic UK limited partnership structure does not prevent there being a “business in 
common” between the limited and general partners, for the purposes of Section 1(1) of the 1890 Act.  
This is so even though the limited partner will necessarily play a very passive role and not engage in 
partnership management. .  
 
Therefore, it is harder to accept in the wake of Anson that the Court of Appeal decision was correct. 
The silent partner's interest may be "just a contractual one" but then so is the interest of a limited 
partner in a Scottish limited partnership registered under the 1907 Act. The separate legal personality 
of such a partnership denies the limited partner a proprietary interest in the partnership assets, but it 
is still treated as a partner in the business, although barred from taking part in its management if its 
liability is to remain limited.   
 
                                                          
172 Although HMRC are known to disagree with the decision in Anson. 
173 [1996] STC 1336 and [1998] STC 754. 
174 In order to avoid losing limited liability under the 1907 Act if and when a formal capital contribution is 
returned by the partnership, limited partners have typically structured most of their investment in a limited 
partnership as subordinated debt, not a formal capital contribution. That debt can then be repaid without 
prejudicing limited liability (although recent changes to the 1907 Act have reduced the need to use debt funding 






Under German law, the “silent partner” can behave as a partner in relation to the other partner who 
carries on the business, by sharing profits and absorbing a share of any losses, without becoming 
directly liable to third parties for obligations of the partnership.  This is because the identity of the 
silent partner is typically not disclosed to third parties.  Furthermore, under the German law of 
agency, the other partner would have to act “in the name of” the silent partner when dealing with 
third parties in order to make the silent partner liable to them175.  It would be unusual for the other 
partner to do that.   
 
By contrast, the starting point for English law is that all partners are each other’s agents when acting 
in the course of partnership business.  Hence they can bind each other in relation to third parties. In 
particular, a partner who is an undisclosed principal can become liable to a third party dealing with 
the partnership, through the agency of another partner. Without the registration procedure under 
the 1907 Act which limits partner liability, an undisclosed limited partner would automatically have 
unlimited liability, via the general partner, to third parties who have dealings with the limited 
partnership.  Registration ensures that the limited partner’s liability to those third parties is limited, 
provided that it does not take part in the management of the partnership business176.  Therefore, 
mechanically, English and German law limit the liability of a limited/silent partner in different ways, 
because of important differences in their underlying approach to the law of agency.  In many ways, 
the German approach is neater and simpler. However, these non-tax differences should not obscure 
for tax purposes the very close similarities between the role of the “silent partner” on the one hand, 
and the limited partner on the other, especially if the limited partner has no proprietary interest in 
partnership assets because the limited partnership is formed under Scottish law.   
 
In response, HMRC can point to Section 2(3)(d) of the 1890 Act which provides that “the advance of 
money by way of loan to a person engaged or about to engage in any business on a contract with that 
person that the lender shall receive a rate of interest varying with the profits, or shall receive a share 
of the profits arising from carrying on the business, does not of itself make the lender a partner with 
the person or persons carrying on the business or liable as such……” 
 
An example of such a profit-related loan arrangement falling short of partnership is a so-called 
“theatre angel” i.e. someone who provides financial backing for a theatre production by way of a 
limited-recourse loan carrying a right to a share of any profit from the production. HMRC practice is to 
treat such arrangements simply as lending. The profit over and above any return of investment is 
taxed as an “annual payment”177.  While this example is interesting, it is not conclusive when 
reviewing the facts of Memec, especially given the use of profit-linked loans to invest most of partner 
capital in an English limited partnership.  Furthermore, as discussed in 2.12.2, German law 
distinguishes between a profit-linked loan and a “silent partnership”.  
 
                                                          
175 Civil law countries such as Germany apply the law of agency in a way which makes it much harder than under 
the common law for an undisclosed principal to become liable to third parties via an agent.  A “silent partner” is 
a good example of such an undisclosed principal. For further discussion of the differences between the common 
law and the civil law of agency, see pages 431-441 of “An Introduction to Comparative Law” (3rd ed.) Zweigert 
and Koetz, translated by Tony Weir. Oxford.   
176 Section 6(1) of the 1907 Act. 
177 See Section 683 ITTOIA 2005. For further guidance, see page BIM66601 in the HMRC Business Income 






One may also query why some “theatre angel” arrangements are not treated as a form of partnership 
interest, as in Pooley v Driver178. However, if they were, registration under the 1907 Act would be 
needed to limit the liability of the “angel”. This would be cumbersome at the very least and may 
explain why in practice, HMRC are willing to tackle the matter in a different way. 
 
One final point regarding Memec is that apparently, the Court of Appeal judges emphasised that the 
silent partner only received its profit share, after the German company had taken a decision to pay 
out profits. In short, there was no automatic entitlement to be paid such profits.  In the author’s view, 
this seems little different from a standard limitation on the rights of partners in an English partnership 
to receive cash “drawings” on account of partnership profits.  It should not detract from their 
underlying entitlement to a share of accruing profit.  This is so even if that profit cannot be quantified 
until after the relevant period has ended and cannot immediately be paid out to them as cash.  
Furthermore, Drummond v Collins179 provides authority that income received by a person does not 
necessarily lose its underlying “source” simply because of an intervening third-party decision to 
allocate and pay that income to that person.  In Drummond, non-UK trustees of a non-UK trust 
exercised their discretion to pay underlying trust income to certain UK-resident beneficiaries.    
 
Following Anson, the conclusion in Memec on the “transparency” question seems too restrictive. This 
still leaves a difficult borderline. If it is possible for a member of an entity to be taxed on the basis that 
the entity is “transparent” even though the member has no proprietary interest in its assets and 
income, where does one draw that line?  The member’s interest in the entity is merely contractual.  
Yet so is the interest of a shareholder in a company; of a lender to an entity under a profit-linked loan; 
or of a bank counterparty under a “total return swap”.  One would not regard these last three 
examples of contractual rights as entitling their holder to be taxed as if the relevant entity were 
“transparent”.  However, it is harder to pin down what (apart from semantics) differentiates these 
three purely contractual entitlements from those of a member of an entity (e.g. a French SNC or a 
Delaware LLC) who is taxable on the basis that the entity is “transparent”.  The lender or swap 
counterparty may well not be a subordinated creditor, which is important.  That aside, does the 
answer to classification and “transparency” questions regarding non-UK entities depend largely on 
whether member entitlements have been drafted correctly? 
 
3.9 The UK rules for classifying entities as “companies” or as “partnerships” are therefore a mixture of 
specific statutory rules regarding some entity types (e.g. UK LLPs, EEIGs and “unit trusts”), 
supplemented by judge-made rules in relation to other entities, especially non-UK entities, where a 
fact-driven “resemblance” test applies. Overall the judge-made rules leave much to be desired, not 
least because they are often uncertain and can be very cumbersome to operate in relation to non-UK 
entities.  
 
Overall there is much less classification flexibility regarding entities formed under UK law, although 
(because of UK LLPs) a taxpayer can now choose a form of UK-incorporated business entity which is 
“transparent” for most tax purposes but which is little different from a private limited company.  Is 
giving taxpayers such an easy choice good tax policy? 
 
                                                          
178 (1877) 5 Ch 458. 







The courts have tried to limit the “unincorporated association” concept in order to minimise the risk 
of imposing corporation tax on unincorporated entities.  In the author’s view, this is a sensible, if 
rough-and–ready approach, but HMRC disagree.   
 
Turning to non-UK entities, the courts, HMRC and taxpayers struggle, when pigeon-holing the wide 
variety of non-UK entities, with very different legal cultures and conceptual frameworks.  Entities 
which are clearly and explicitly incorporated outside the UK can and should be classified as companies 
for UK tax purposes.  However, many other types of entity cannot be classified so easily and have 
features placing them in an intermediate category between the rather binary English law concepts of 
a “body corporate” and a “partnership” lacking legal personality.  UK law lacks a more elaborate 
spectrum of business entities (ignoring the rather special case of Scottish partnerships and the 
“transparent” body corporate known as the UK LLP).  Hence it is no surprise that much of the limited 
tax litigation in this area has focussed on this intermediate category.  It has so far not produced a 
coherent body of classification criteria, nor a clear order of priority in which to apply them.  The list of 
criteria produced some twenty years ago by HMRC was problematic in the first place and is now 
looking out-of-date.  In any case it has no binding force.  
 
Anson has cleared some of the undergrowth but has left important questions unanswered, not least 
because the Supreme Court judges were clearly keen to confine themselves to those issues needed to 
resolve that case.  At least Anson suggests that, when considering non-UK entities in particular, the 
main defining feature of a “partnership”, as opposed to a “body corporate”, is that members of the 
entity should be entitled to its underlying profits as they arise and that this can occur even if the 
partnership has what the UK would regard as legal personality. Such thinking is welcome although it 
probably gives too much scope to well-informed taxpayers to pick their preferred UK tax treatment 
for non-UK entities.  Anson also widens the gulf between the UK’s approach to classifying UK, versus 
non-UK entities, with the former being classified on a much more prescriptive basis than the latter.  
While this is not dissimilar to the Dutch approach (see 7.3), it is very different from the US approach 
see 7.2).   
 
Yet clear and effective entity classification criteria, which do not give taxpayers too much scope to 
pick and choose their tax treatment, are essential to demarcate and protect the UK tax base, and 
especially the corporation tax base.  In so doing, they determine those entities and arrangements 
which are not regarded as “companies” for tax purposes.  Such entities or arrangements are 
potentially “transparent” (in particular, taxable only at the level of their members) for UK tax 
purposes.  What “transparency” means will be explored in later chapters. In particular, it has specific 
connotations in relation to trusts.  What trusts are and their transparency under UK tax law are 
















4.1  Defining trusts and deciding when they are transparent for UK tax purposes 
 
The trust is often regarded as a distinctive creation of the common law (and more particularly of the 
English courts of equity), although some civil law jurisdictions have to varying degrees adopted trust-
like concepts180. Furthermore trusts have long been a very flexible tool for asset management and tax 
planning. The tax legislation has responded accordingly with extensive rules regarding the taxation of 
trusts themselves; of those who set them up or fund them in any way; and of those who have an 
interest in them. This chapter will discuss in particular the extent to which UK tax rules treat those 
interested in the trust as entitled to its underlying income and gains as they arise to the trustees (in 
short, treat it as "transparent"). The overall picture is far from simple and the outcomes far from 
satisfactory. There is much room for improvement.  
 
4.1.1 Identifying trusts 
 
It is important first of all to consider what should be treated as a trust for UK tax purposes.  While the 
tax interface between companies and partnerships has attracted a lot of discussion and analysis, the 
same is less true of the interface between trusts and other entities (e.g. companies), even though the 
precise classification of the entity can have major tax repercussions for it and those interested in it.  
One such repercussion is Inheritance Tax. This undoubtedly applies to trusts (or, to be more precise, 
“settlements”, a concept which includes, but is not confined to trusts).  However, it does not 
automatically apply to companies, although there are important exceptions for transactions involving 
“close companies”: see 5.3.  
 
For the most part, a trust is not an entity or person at all under English law (unlike a body corporate 
or indeed a Scottish partnership). Rather it is a special relationship between the person providing the 
assets subject to the trust (the "settlor", of whom there may be more than one); the persons who 
derive benefit from those assets and income in one way or another (the "beneficiaries")181; and above 
all the person(s) who own the assets provided by the settlor but are obligated to administer them for 
the beneficiaries. The latter are the “trustee(s)”. Classically, the trustee is simply a pre-existing legal 
person acting in a particular capacity for the benefit of others. Setting up a trust therefore does not 
per se create a new legal entity182 but does impose particular obligations on the trustee(s) and, in 
some cases, on third parties too. It is those obligations on third parties which in particular have 
enabled beneficial interests in trusts to be seen as a form of property right (at least in common law 
jurisdictions), although the proprietary nature of a beneficial interest in a trust is the subject of much 
debate183. Trustees may be natural persons or non-natural persons (typically, bodies corporate, 
                                                          
180 For example, France has created the concept of the “fiducie”.  Quebec, whose property law derives from the 
French civil law tradition, based on Roman law, has gone a stage further and enacted in 1994 a fully-fledged law 
of trusts or “fiducie”: see Marilyn Piccini Roy in “Usufruct in Quebec”, Trusts & Trustees (2017) 24(1): 17.  The 
trust is a recognised concept in both Scottish and South African law. Both these jurisdictions have “mixed” legal 
systems blending common law concepts with civil law concepts. In the case of Scottish law, the trust has been a 
feature since the seventeenth century and is a judge-made concept (unlike Quebec).  In South Africa, the courts 
began to develop the concept of the trust in the nineteenth century.  
181 Of course, in some situations, a trust may be set up for the benefit of fulfilling a specified purpose (notably, 
charity) rather than with specified beneficiaries. 
182 In one limited sense, a trust always has an entity-like quality: if a trustee is replaced, substituting a new 
trustee is not regarded as reconstituting the trust.  In short, once a trust has been set up initially, it is an 
enduring concept, even if the identity of the particular trustee(s) changes over time. 
183 See Akers and others v Samba Financial Group [2017] UKSC 6 at paragraph 35, where Lord Mance notes how 
courts in civil law jurisdictions (in particular, Scotland and Italy) have developed a separate concept of 






which are often purpose-formed for the role). Trustees are often professional trustees remunerated 
as such.  Under English law, the settlor may declare itself the trustee184. 
 
The Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 gives effect in UK law to the Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Trusts and on their Recognition.  Article 2 of that Convention185 (which is scheduled to the 1987 Act) 
contains a useful description of a trust: 
 
“A trust has the following characteristics: 
 
(a) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the trustee’s own estate; 
(b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name of another person on 
behalf of the trustee; 
(c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which he is accountable, to manage, 
employ or dispose of the assets in accordance with the terms of the trust and the special 
duties imposed upon him by law.  
 
The reservation by the settlor of certain rights and powers, and the fact that the trustee may himself 
have rights as a beneficiary, are not necessarily186 inconsistent with the existence of a trust.” 
 
This definition is deliberately designed to cover the trust concept as it exists in both common law and 
civil law jurisdictions.  In particular, there is no reference to the common law concepts of “legal” and 
“equitable” ownership, which are alien to the trust concept as developed in civil law jurisdictions and 
in those with a “mixed” common law and civil law heritage.  
 
In the recent Privy Council decision in Investec Trust (Guernsey) Ltd and another v Glenalla Properties 
Ltd and others187 [2018] UKPC 7, [2018] 4 All ER 738, the Board discussed in some detail the nature of 
a trust under English law. The majority188reiterated that a trust is not a legal person and that a trustee 
assumes liabilities as such personally and without limit.  Hence unless the trustee explicitly incurs 
obligations “as trustee only”, a trustee’s liabilities as such can be enforced against both trust and 
personal assets. However, a creditor has no direct access to the trust assets to enforce an obligation 
of the trustee, although the creditor can take a fixed charge over trust assets.  The trustee has a right 
of indemnity for itself from the trust estate, enforceable by equitable lien.  A creditor of the trustee 
can be subrogated to this right of indemnity, but that right may prove worthless (e.g. if the trustee is 
in breach of trust). The majority also alluded to the rather different approach of the law of trusts in 
the US, where the trust is increasingly regarded as a legal person, with the trustee acting as its agent.  
This relieves the trustee of personal liability for trust obligations, while giving creditors of the trust 
                                                          
protected from claims by a trustee’s personal creditors. This “patrimony” concept is not perceived by those 
jurisdictions as a new kind of property right. For more on “patrimony”, see fn 278.  
184 This may not always be possible under the “fiducie” concept, which may require a founding contract 
between the settlor and a separate trustee.   
185 As noted by Lord Sumption and Lord Collins in Akers and others v Samba Financial Group [2017] UKSC 6 (see 
in particular paragraphs 91-2 and 99-101), the main purpose of that Convention is to ensure that the main 
features of a trust are recognised by parties to the Convention (in particular, civil law jurisdictions) which would 
not otherwise recognise a trust. Currently, only 12 states are parties to the Convention (notably, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland).   
186 There may of course be cases where the reservation of powers by the settlor is so extensive that the alleged 
trust is an illusion: see fn 195.  
187 The case was not a tax case and ultimately focussed on the trust law of Guernsey and Jersey. 






better recourse in the form of a direct claim against its assets. In his dissenting judgment, Lord Mance 
developed this last point,189 noting the Delaware statutory trust which is discussed further below.  
 
4.1.2 Trusts v companies/ foundations, etc 
 
A trustee which is a "company" for UK corporation tax purposes (e.g. a body corporate purpose-
formed to act as trustee) cannot be subject to that tax in its capacity as trustee. Section 6(1) CTA 2009 
states that "A company is not chargeable to corporation tax on profits which accrue to it in a fiduciary 
or representative capacity except as respects its own beneficial interest (if any) in the profits". Hence 
corporation tax will not apply to the income and gains derived by a UK-resident corporate trustee 
from the assets which it holds pursuant to the trust190. Any fees which it earns for acting as trustee 
are earned by it in a beneficial capacity and are therefore subject to corporation tax. 
 
The words "fiduciary or representative capacity" in Section 6(1) should be read fairly narrowly. In 
particular, they should be limited to cases where the company is clearly acting as a trustee or 
nominee, as those concepts would be understood under English law. A company acting as a "trustee" 
for these purposes could of course include not just a trustee designated under an express written 
trust. It could also include a company treated as a "constructive trustee" under one of the various 
equitable doctrines imposing constructive trusteeship to remedy a perceived wrong.  
 
However, Section 6(1) should not apply to cases where the actual constitution of a body corporate 
requires it to pursue specific objects or to confer specified benefits on its members in a manner falling 
short of trusteeship. This is so even if those objects, etc could equally well have been pursued via a 
trust rather than by setting up a body corporate with specified objects. A good UK example is a 
company limited by guarantee formed to pursue charitable objects in its constitution. Typically, such a 
company will be a company limited by guarantee whose memorandum and articles of association 
prevent its members benefiting from the company's income and assets and require those assets to be 
applied solely for charitable purposes. Despite this, no trust applies to the income and assets of such a 
company, even if the same goals could have been pursued by setting up a charitable trust instead of a 
company limited by guarantee. As the High Court made clear191, this kind of limited company does not 
hold its assets on trust notwithstanding its charitable mission. Even though its constitution requires it 
to fulfil certain purposes, it holds those assets beneficially for the purposes of the company winding-
up legislation (in particular, so as to meet creditor claims). By the same token, it should be regarded 
as owning those assets beneficially for the purposes of Section 6(1) CTA 2009192. In that case, unlike a 
                                                          
189 At [2018] 4 All ER 738 at 797-8.  
190 With the partial exception of unit trusts (see 4.3.6 below), trusts which carry on an active trade or business 
are not automatically treated as “companies” for corporation tax purposes. This differs from the approach of 
the US: see 7.2.  
191 In Liverpool and District Hospital for the Diseases of the Heart v Attorney-General [1981] 1 All ER 994, 
192 A slightly confusing case in this regard is the Court of Appeal decision in Von Ernst & Cie SA and others v IRC 
[1980] STC 111.  The issue was whether a discretionary trust fell outside the charge to Capital Transfer Tax (the 
predecessor of Inheritance Tax – see 5.3) because the government bonds which it held were “excluded 
property”.  That depended on the status of one of the discretionary beneficiaries which was a UK charitable 
company.  In particular (see Buckley LJ at [1980] STC 111 at 121d) was the charitable company a “known person 
for whose benefit [emphasis added] the settled property or income from it had been or might be applied or who 
might become beneficially entitled [emphasis added} to an interest in possession in it”?  In interpreting those 
particular words, Buckley LJ (with whom Templeman LJ concurred) said, at [1980] STC 111 at 122b-c, that “….a 
corporation which is by its constitution debarred from using or acquiring assets for the purposes of making or 
obtaining any profit for itself or its corporators, and which serves the purpose only of machinery for carrying on 
exclusively charitable activities, is not an object for whose benefit settled property or income from it can be 






charitable trust, it will be subject to corporation tax, although no doubt entitled to claim various tax 
exemptions because of its charitable activity. 
 
Hence a charitable company limited by guarantee should not be regarded as a trust for UK 
corporation tax purposes, although the distinction between a company and a trust is clearly quite a 
fine one. By the same token, care is needed before treating as "trusts" entities formed in jurisdictions 
which lack the trust concept but which may seek to achieve broadly equivalent outcomes via that 
entity's constitution. Entities which may fall under this heading include Anstalten and Stiftungen 
which are widely used for estate and tax planning in some civil law countries. Such entities may in fact 
be more properly regarded as "bodies corporate", although any such conclusion requires a careful 
review of the particular entity's constitution, and the nature of a member's interest in it (if any), 
under the law governing that entity.  
 
Such a review was in fact carried out in the Canadian tax case of Her Majesty the Queen v Peter 
Sommerer193. An Austrian private foundation (“Privatstiftung”) had been set up by an Austrian-
resident founder.  One of the potential beneficiaries of the foundation was Canadian-resident.  The 
Canadian tax authorities sought to impute to that beneficiary certain capital gains realised on share 
disposals by the foundation. Both the court of first instance and the appeal court found for the 
taxpayer, mainly on grounds which applied even if the arrangements involving the foundation were a 
trust for Canadian legal and tax purposes.  However, detailed evidence of the relevant Austrian law 
was considered by the Canadian courts. The lower court ruled that the foundation was a corporation 
which, on the facts, was holding its property on trust for the beneficiaries, even though the judge did 
not regard the foundation as “per se” a trust.  The Canadian appeal court did not need to reach a final 
decision on this point but doubted the correctness of the lower court’s decision.  In effect it reached a 
conclusion similar to that in Liverpool and District Hospital for the Diseases of the Heart v Attorney-
General194.  Although the foundation could replicate many of the effects of a trust, it had the same 
right as a corporation to deal with its own property.  In particular, there was nothing in Austrian law 
(which did not recognise the trust concept) nor in the founding documents to suggest that the 
foundation was holding its property other than beneficially, even though (like a corporation), it had 
purposes.  The foundation’s beneficiaries were like the members of a company: their rights were 
“only an inchoate right to receive distributions of corporate property from time to time at the 
discretion of the board of directors, and to share in the distribution of the corporate property upon its 
dissolution”195.  
                                                          
meaning of [the statutory language].  …..I think one must look at the character of such a body to see whether it, 
rather than the purposes which it exists to serve, is capable of benefiting within the meaning of the [statute] 
and….it is not capable of doing so. It is a mere conduit pipe, just as in my view the trustees of an unincorporated 
charity are”. In the Liverpool District Hospital case, Slade J distinguished Von Ernst as resting on the 
interpretation of particular statutory words, “and not on the broader basis that a corporate charity is, ex 
hypothesi, in the position of a trustee of its funds”: see [1981] 1 All ER 994 at 1006c.  His comments are 
consistent with the UK law on “beneficial ownership” i.e. there can be (rare) cases where beneficial ownership 
of property is lacking without that property being held on trust strictly speaking e.g. the property of a company 
in liquidation, as discussed in Ayerst v C&K (Construction) Ltd [1975] 2 All ER 537.  His comments are also 
consistent with Bridge LJ in Von Ernst, who was content to assume that a charitable company is not a trustee of 
its assets: see [1980] STC 111 at 118d. 
193 2012 FCA 207 on appeal from 2011 TCC 212.  
194 Supra. 
195 This is not a perfect analogy because foundations do not have members in the same way as companies.  The 
court also reached its conclusion even though the founder had the right to revoke the foundation. In such a 
case, where the beneficiaries only have the discretionary entitlements described in Sommerer, one may wonder 
whether the founder (rather than the foundation) beneficially owns its assets. The UK courts have reached such 







Unsurprisingly, there has been some confusion about the correct UK analysis of a Liechtenstein 
foundation or “Stiftung”.  The issue is discussed in part 98.9 of James Kessler QC: “Taxation of Non-
Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries 2019-20” 18th edition.  In brief, HMRC have been known to treat 
them as trusts, a view which is now shared by that author. This author thinks that it is more accurate, 
and more faithful to their civil law roots, to characterise them as bodies corporate, like the foundation 
in Sommerer, or indeed the company in the Liverpool and District Hospital case, even though they 
have a specified purpose and beneficiaries. They may nevertheless be “settled property” for 
inheritance tax purposes because of the breadth of Section 43(2) IHTA 1986: see 5.3.2. Similarly, they 
may fall within the wide definition of “settlement” used in specific situations for both income tax and 
capital gains tax.  That definition is discussed in 4.2 and covers “arrangements” which may well not be 
trusts in the strict sense196.    
 
Similar comments can be made about the Liechtenstein establishment or “Anstalt”.  The author 
agrees with HMRC that an “Anstalt” should be regarded as a company, although HMRC have been 
known to treat it as a trust in the (rare) case where it is not carrying on a business activity and there 
are no “founder’s rights” over the “Anstalt”197.     
                                                          
Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank, State Corporation “Deposit Insurance Agency” v Sergei Viktorovich 
Pugachev and others {2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch). The beneficiaries of a foundation (unlike the beneficiaries of a 
trust) usually have little or no right to hold those running the foundation to account: see Philip Baker: 
“Beneficiaries of Trusts and Foundations” Gray’s Inn Tax Chambers Review. Volume VI, No 2 (June 2007). 
Foundations therefore seem to be a civil law-inspired construct where the entity deliberately has no members 
and where the hand of the founder is intended to govern extensively, and on an ongoing basis, the foundation 
and its assets. In the words of one commentator, “A foundation is a juristic person which is not a corporation.  It 
has no members.  It is an autonomous patrimony dedicated to a purpose”: George Gretton: “Trusts without 
Equity” (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 599 at 616. For similar remarks regarding 
foundations under German law, see Dr Bernd Noll in “Foundation and Trust in Succession Planning” at page 354 
in Flick Gocke Schaumburg “Cross-Border Investments with Germany – tax, legal and accounting”: Essays in 
honour of Detlev J. Piltz. Verlag Dr Otto Schmidt AG (2014).  English law regards this mindset as alien, because it 
tends to regard a trust as an inchoate gift-over-time by the settlor. Hence it gives greater weight to the rights of 
any beneficiaries, even in a discretionary trust: see Andrea Vicari: “A new type of civil law trust – the theory 
behind the San Marino Trust law” November 2014 Trust Quarterly Review at pages 3-12. Another unusual 
structure for holding UK property but governed by Luxembourg law (the Grossherzogliches Fideicommis or 
Grand Ducal Estate) was also considered not to be a trust, in a recent UK divorce case: see Richard Frimston and 
Paolo Panico: “When is a Trust not a Trust? Continental property arrangements and English real estate”: Trust 
Quarterly Review, Volume 17, Issue 2 (2019) at pages 25-30. Such entities also feature in Dutch and German 
succession law. 
196 See in this regard, James Kessler QC op. cit. at 98.9.5.  See also Felicity Cullen “Private Foundations – an 
Aspect of the Remittance Basis”, Gray’s Inn Tax Chambers Review, Volume VIII No. 1 – November 2008.  That 
author notes the uncertainty about whether a foundation is a company or a trust for UK tax purposes. She also 
notes that a foundation can be both a “company” and a “settlement” for the purposes of UK taxation of 
chargeable gains, if the wide definition of “settlement” applies.  Hence UK-taxpaying beneficiaries may be 
taxable on the foundation’s gains, either under the non-UK-resident “close company” attribution rules (if those 
beneficiaries can properly be regarded as “participators”, which is doubtful given their lack of enforceable rights 
– see Section 454 CTA 2010) or as and when they receive “capital payments” (widely defined) from the 
foundation.  In the regulatory area, the EU’s 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive now ensures that Article 31 of 
the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive applies to “trusts and other types of legal arrangements, such as inter 
alia, fiducie, certain types of Treuhand or fideicommisio, where such arrangements have a structure or functions 
similar to trusts.”  [Emphasis added]. For further discussion of the new anti-money laundering position, see 
Richard Frimston and Paolo Panico op. cit. at page 30.   
197 Founder’s rights give the founder of the Anstalt a transferable right to decide who the beneficiaries are from 
time to time, which does indeed seem inconsistent with the arrangement being a trust: see the discussion at 








4.1.3 Trusts as separate legal persons? 
 
While a trust is not a separate legal person under English law, but rather a special relationship 
between settlor, trustee and beneficiaries, this may not be so in other jurisdictions which recognise 
the trust concept. For UK tax purposes, a separate non-UK entity calling itself a trust may still be 
properly regarded as such depending on its structure under its governing law. For example, the law of 
Delaware allows the creation of a statutory trust198. Apparently this statutory trust is a separate legal 
person distinct from its beneficiaries. Unless otherwise provided in its governing instrument, its 
beneficiaries have no interest in specific trust assets but, rather, have an undivided beneficial interest 
in the statutory trust.  Those interests are freely transferable unless otherwise provided. A statutory 
trust can sue and be sued in its own name, and can execute documents in its own name via an agent. 
It has a perpetual existence unless otherwise provided. In particular, it may not be terminated by a 
beneficial owner nor by the dissolution, termination or bankruptcy of a beneficial owner.  
 
If holders of beneficial interests have an undivided beneficial interest in all the underlying assets of 
the Delaware statutory trust, and that interest is enforceable against that entity, then that entity 
should be recognised as a trust for UK tax purposes. The fact that it enjoys a separate legal personality 
should not alter that conclusion199. Some advisers have suggested that a Delaware statutory trust is a 
body corporate.  This is very doubtful if beneficial interest holders have an undivided beneficial 
interest in the underlying assets of the trust200. This would clash with the fundamental idea that a 
body corporate is a specific form of legal person which owns its assets beneficially and conducts its 
business, while any members merely have proprietary claims against the person itself and no interest 
in its underlying assets or business.  
 
4.2  Overview of UK tax "transparency" of trusts 
 
When taxing the income and gains of trusts (or their beneficiaries), the UK does not automatically 
treat beneficiaries as owning the underlying trust income and assets. Rather the trustees are treated 
as owning that income and those assets and are taxable accordingly. This is so even though the 
beneficiaries may be seen as having a form of proprietary interest in the trust fund.  However, taxing 
the trustees is consistent with the idea that a trustee is not simply an agent of the beneficiaries.  In 
any case, there are important exceptions to this approach.  
 
                                                          
Anstalt or Stiftung is a trust, not a body corporate, because it can be created by the wishes of a single individual 
and does not involve the coming together of at least two persons to form a body different from themselves. 
This analysis seems at odds with Sommerer. It also ignores the fact that under UK company law, a private limited 
company can have a single member.    
198 Under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act 12 Del. C. 3801 et seq. 
199 There is some similarity in this respect with Scottish partnerships where the partnership has legal personality 
even though the partners are regarded as carrying on the partnership business.  
200 In Investec Trust (Guernsey) Ltd and another v Glenalla Properties Ltd and others [2018] 4 All ER 738 at 798, 
Lord Mance discusses Delaware statutory trusts and does not suggest that they are anything other than trusts.  
The key difference with an English law trust is that the Delaware trust’s assets can be accessed directly by 
creditors of the trust while trustee liability is more effectively limited to the trust fund alone. The trustee’s role 
is effectively that of an asset administrator. For a discussion of how a trust can be a trust and still take the form 
of a legal person, or of a looser entity which is not a legal person but which still has a separate existence, see 
A.M. Honore: “Obstacles to the Reception of Trust Law? The Examples of South Africa and Scotland” in A.M. 
Rabello (ed.) “Aequitas and Equity: Equity in Civil Law and Mixed Jurisdictions” (Hebrew University of Jerusalem 






Furthermore, the income and gains of trusts will often be attributed, in particular, to the settlor (if a 
UK-taxable person) under special rules which cut across the basic rules for taxing the income and 
gains of trusts. There are in particular the so-called "settlement" rules. These not only attribute to the 
settlor the income and gains of trusts in the strict sense of the word. “Settlement” for the purposes of 
these rules includes201 “any disposition, trust, covenant, agreement, arrangement or transfer of 
assets”, provided that an "element of bounty" is involved. In short, genuinely commercial 
arrangements are not caught202 but difficult borderline situations can arise.  
 
As discussed in 1.2, rules such as the "settlement" rules should (despite having a similar effect) be 
seen as anti-deferral rules rather than a form of tax "transparency", not least because they give rise to 
a partial and asymmetrical "look through" of the relevant arrangements. In particular, income and 
gains203 are attributed to a particular UK taxpayer but not any losses from the underlying activities 
generating the relevant income and gains. In this respect, they differ from the US “grantor trust” rules 
(see 7.2.2 below) which apply to certain trusts as if their income and assets belonged to the “grantor” 
(i.e. “settlor”).  
 
4.3 "Bare trusts" 
 
This is the first category of trusts to consider when analysing the extent to which trusts are 
"transparent" for UK income tax and capital gains tax purposes.  
 
4.3.1 Bare trusts and income tax  
 
For income tax purposes, a "bare trust" is not defined as such204.  However, it is taken to mean a trust 
where the beneficiaries have vested, concurrent interests in the trust income and capital. A trust with 
successive beneficial interests (e.g. a trust with a vested life interest followed by a remainder) cannot 
therefore be a "bare trust". Nor can a discretionary or accumulation trust or indeed any other trust 
where beneficial entitlements are contingent, not vested.  
 
Where there is such a "bare trust", HMRC in practice ignore the trustee(s), who are not expected to 
file tax returns and account for tax on the trust income (although they can choose to do so). Those 
compliance duties fall to the beneficiaries, each in respect of their proportionate interests in the trust. 
Hence such a "bare trust" is a particularly clear-cut case of income tax "transparency", with 
beneficiaries being taxed as if each owned directly a pro rata share of the underlying trust income and 
assets.  The trustees are effectively ignored, although, strictly speaking, they should file a tax return in 
respect of any otherwise untaxed trust income.   
 
                                                          
201 Section 620(1) ITTOIA. 
202 See for example IRC v Leiner 41 TC 585; Bulmer v IRC 44 TC 1; and IRC v Levy [1982] STC 442. See also IRC v 
Plummer [1979] STC 793 although the effective result of this case was later reversed on other grounds in 
Moodie v IRC [1993] STC 188.   
203 Before this legislation was rewritten in 2005, it imposed a standalone income tax charge under the old 
Schedule D Case VI.  By contrast, although it now sits in Part 5 (Miscellaneous Income) ITTOIA, it purports (see 
for example Section 624(1) ITTOIA) to tax directly the underlying income from that “settlement”, whatever its 
particular source(s).  
204 However, for the purposes of Part 9 ITA, which deals with the income taxation of “settlements” (see 4.3.5 
below), “settled property” does not include (see Section 466(2) ITA) property held by a person as nominee for 
another person; or as trustee for another person who is absolutely entitled as against the trustee; or who would 
be so absolutely entitled if that other person was not an infant or otherwise lacking legal capacity. 






This approach is consistent with the Privy Council decision in Hardoon v Belilios205.  There the court 
ruled that a trustee holding the legal title to bank shares for a single fully-vested beneficiary of full 
capacity was entitled to an indemnity from the beneficiary for the costs of doing so (including 
meeting unpaid calls on the shares in a liquidation).  Furthermore, that indemnity was not limited to 
the trust property.  As Lord Lindley, giving the sole judgment, said:  
 
“The plainest principles of justice require that the cestui que trust [i.e. the beneficiary] who gets all 
the benefit of the property should bear its burdens unless he can show some good reason why his 
trustee should bear them himself”.  
 
4.3.2  Section 60 TCGA 1992 
 
4.3.2.1 The “transparency” rule 
 
For capital gains tax, the "transparency" of such “bare trusts” is explicitly provided for in Section 60 
TCGA. This states: 
 
"(1) In relation to property held by a person as nominee for another person or as trustee for 
another person absolutely entitled as against the trustee, or for any person who would be so 
entitled but for being an infant or other person under disability (or for two or more persons who 
are or would be jointly so entitled), this Act shall apply as if the property were vested in, and the 
acts of the nominee or trustee in relation to the property were the acts of, the person or persons for 
whom he is the nominee or trustee (acquisitions from or disposals to him by that person or persons 
being disregarded accordingly) [Emphasis added]  
 
(2) It is hereby declared that references in this Act to any property held by a person as trustee for 
another person absolutely entitled as against the trustee are references to a case where that other 
person has the exclusive right, subject only to satisfying any outstanding charge, lien or other right 
of the trustees to resort to the property for payment of duty, taxes, costs or other outgoings, to 
direct how that property shall be dealt with." 
 
There has been significant litigation regarding what is now Section 60. In particular its scope is wider 
than an initial reading might suggest. To fall within it, interests of beneficiaries must be fully vested, 
not contingent.  They must also be of the same quality, if not quantity. So Section 60 will cover a trust 
for A, B and C holding vested concurrent interests of 40%, 35% and 25% in the trust property. Their 
interests may differ in quantum but they are qualitatively the same because they are fully vested 
concurrent interests. If they were vested successive beneficial interests (e.g. an interest for life with 
remainder), then Section 60 would not apply206. In Section 60(1), the word "jointly" is not limited to 
the co-ownership concept of "joint tenancy" under English property law. It covers other forms of co-
ownership as well, so long as the interests are concurrent and fully vested207. 
 
If the trust property consists of land or (possibly) a controlling shareholding in a private company or 
mortgage debts208, and there are several vested concurrent beneficial interests in that property, then 
a holder of one of those interests may not be “absolutely entitled” as against the trustee(s) for 
Section 60 purposes. This is because the nature of the trust property is such that it cannot be 
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subdivided without being sold in its entirety.  This point was first raised by Walton J in Stephenson v 
Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd209and was further developed in the High Court in Crowe v Appleby210. In 
that case, freehold land was held on trust for sale, initially for several concurrent life interest holders.  
Some but not all of those life interests came to an end. Goff J ruled that those holding fully vested 
reversionary interests in those parts of the trust property where the life interests had ended were not 
“absolutely entitled” as against the trustee under what is now Section 60, despite their interests being 
fully vested.  In particular, so long as all the life interests had not come to an end, those reversionary 
holders were not able to “direct how that property shall be dealt with” for Section 60(2) purposes 
because they only had fractional interests in a single non-fungible asset.  They could not call for 
immediate transfer of their respective shares in that asset nor interfere with the trustees’ discretion 
to postpone sale. This would remain the case unless and until the trustee sold the land (e.g. at the 
direction of all the reversionary beneficiaries after all the life interests had ended). At that point, they 
could call for their shares of the cash proceeds. Only then would their interests in the trust fall within 
Section 60211. This had an important impact on the capital gains tax treatment of the sale of the land, 
all of which remained, until sale, “settled property” within a single trust which was a separate taxable 
entity in its own right, unlike a trust falling within Section 60212.    
 
Section 60 applies to vested interests even if they are held by minors or persons under some legal 
disability. However, it will not apply where the interest of a person is expressly defined under the 
terms of the trust as a contingent interest which only vests on reaching the age of majority. This can 
lead to fine questions of interpretation of the relevant trust.213 The language in Section 60(2) 
regarding charges and liens is to be read fairly restrictively. In particular, where there is a beneficial 
interest in the trust property (such as an annuity), which ranks prior to the main beneficial interests 
which purport to be within Section 60, that prior interest will not be a “charge” within Section 60(2).  
Hence there will be successive interests and Section 60 TCGA 1992 will not apply in this situation214. 
 
A person can be “absolutely entitled” as against a trustee for Section 60 purposes even if that person 
is not itself a “beneficial owner” of the relevant interest in the trust e.g. where A, B and C co-own the 
                                                          
209 [1975] STC 151 at 164. He also ruled that Section 60 was intended to apply in the same way regardless of the 
underlying trust assets, unless the individual beneficial interests vested at different times.      
210 [1975] 3 All ER 529. Goff J’s decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal on other grounds in Pexton v Bell 
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In particular, an absolute entitlement under a will to a minority interest in the shares was best satisfied by 
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211 HMRC consider that this principle does not apply to land in Northern Ireland where the Law of Property Act 
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retain an express power to appropriate specific assets so as to satisfy a beneficial share.  See CG37530-1 and 
CG37550-1 in the Capital Gains Manual (accessed 8 June 2020). 
212 See 4.3.4. 
213 See Tomlinson v Glyn's Executor and Trustee Company [1970] STC 381.   






shares of a company equally via a trust and C is itself the trustee of a second trust for D for life with a 
remainder to E215.    
 
Scotland has its own law of trusts which differs in some respects from English trust law. This is 
discussed further in 4.3.3.2. In particular, Scottish trust law recognises a form of trust called a “trust 
for administration” which can be revoked in the settlor’s (or, to use the correct Scottish term, the 
truster’s) own favour. A “trust for administration” can nevertheless fall within Section 60 TCGA, even 
though it might appear to create successive interests in the trust property. Factually, it can be difficult 
to identify whether a particular trust is in fact a “trust for administration”216.  
 
 4.3.2.2  Pooled property 
 
So long as beneficial interests are fully vested, it does not matter that they are interests in separate 
items of property which have been pooled by the beneficiaries via a trust and placed under certain 
restrictions as a consequence. Section 60 can still apply to that pooled property, as demonstrated by 
Booth v Ellard217. In that case, shareholders in a private company transferred their shares to trustees 
to hold them under what was in effect a shareholders' agreement. An aim of this arrangement was to 
ward off a possible takeover bid. The trustees could therefore vote all the shares held in trust in 
accordance with a majority vote of the beneficiaries: unanimity was not required. Each shareholder 
put a number of shares into trust in return for a pro rata beneficial share of the total number of 
shares in trust which reflected the number of shares which that shareholder contributed. The 
shareholder was effectively entitled to the return of the same number of shares as he had 
contributed, when the arrangements were unwound. The High Court and the Court of Appeal 
concluded that Section 60 applied to the trust. Hence there was no disposal for tax purposes when 
shares were put into trust even though the shareholder was giving up individual ownership of a 
number of shares in return for an equivalent co-ownership interest in a larger block of shares which 
were subject to various restrictions e.g. on voting. In the Court of Appeal, Buckley LJ made the 
following comments218: 
 
“Can it, then, be argued successfully that in the present case all the several settlors did in fact 
make a chargeable disposal of their shares because under [Section 60] all the shares which are 
subject to the trust are to be treated as vested in the settlors collectively, whereas before the 
inception of the trust they were vested in them severally? I think not.  The effect of the trust was 
to subject all the trust shares to powers and discretions conferred on the trustees for what was 
conceived to be the collective benefit of the settlors but, subject to those powers and discretions 
which the settlors collectively could override, the measure of the beneficial interests of the settlors 
remained unaffected by the trust. There was no transfer of any beneficial interest from any one of 
them to any other [emphasis added]”.  
 
Oliver LJ added219: 
 
“[The beneficiaries’] interests in the mass precisely reflect the individual interests which they had 
before the [trust] deed was entered into…….This was no more than a shareholders’ voting 
agreement carried out through the medium of a trust, and it would seem capricious and 
unreasonable to tax these shareholders on a wholly illusory gain simply because of the technical 
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machinery which they chose to adopt to effect an end which involved no quantitative alteration in 
their separate and individual beneficial entitlements.”  
 
There may have been an element of fungibility about the private company shares placed in trust in 
Booth v Ellard. There was no such fungibility in Jenkins v Brown220 where Section 60 was held to apply 
where family members had used a trust to pool different pieces of farmland. As in Booth v Ellard, 
beneficial interests in the trust were calculated as a proportionate share of the aggregate value of the 
various items of property subjected to the trust, with that share corresponding to the value of what 
each participant had put in. In Jenkins v Brown, the judge ruled that when a participant withdrew the 
same piece of land he had put in, there was no disposal for capital gains tax purposes. That 
participant was simply realising his proportionate interest in the overall pool. There was no question 
of any trust beneficiary disposing of a fractional interest in that land, when it was withdrawn. The 
logic of the judge's reasoning suggests that there would also have been no disposal if the participant 
had taken back another piece of land equal in value to what he had put in221. In this respect, the judge 
was applying Booth v Ellard to non-fungible property but in doing so, he stressed that222: 
 
“What the judgment of Buckley LJ is not based on, in my view, is an analysis of the particular 
subject-matter of the trust……The test that he applied was the measure of the beneficial interests 




“…the basis of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Booth v Ellard [is] that one looks at the mass 
and not at the individual case in transactions such as the present, where property was put into a 
pool, and where that result is reached (that the interests in the mass precisely reflect the 
individual interests before the [trust] deed was entered into) there is for capital gains tax purposes 
no disposal”.  
 
HMRC note224 that because of Section 43 TCGA 1992, the base cost of a participant in the pool on an 
eventual disposal of the asset taken out of the pool should be the original cost of the first asset 
contributed to the pool by that participant.  
 
The courts have therefore steered away from a theoretical interpretation of Section 60 which would 
treat beneficiaries with vested concurrent interests in a trust of pooled property as if they had each 
disposed of an undivided interest in the property which each put into the trust, in return for a 
fractional interest in each and every other asset in that trust225.  The same “no disposal” approach 
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applies in reverse when property is taken out of that trust.  In both situations, it is key that the 
beneficiary’s proportionate interest in the trust should reflect the value of what that beneficiary 
contributed, relative to the value of the other trust assets at the time when the beneficiary made its 
contribution. 
 
This approach has a number of consequences.  If another person subsequently contributes 
chargeable assets (which could include non-sterling currencies) to the pool in return for becoming a 
beneficiary, then there should be no disposal by any party provided that the new beneficiary’s 
proportionate interest in the pool reflects the relative value of his contribution to that expanded pool. 
 
If that person instead contributes sterling cash to the pool in return for becoming a beneficiary, then 
because sterling is not a chargeable asset226, the logic of Booth v Ellard and Jenkins v Brown does not 
apply. In that case, there would be disposals to that contributor, by the other pool participants, of 
fractional interests in any other chargeable assets within the pool.     
 
In a pooling of non-fungible assets, the relative values of assets may change within the pool without, 
apparently, triggering a chargeable gain or an allowable loss on a withdrawal of property.  Suppose A 
contributes Blackacre, B contributes Whiteacre and C contributes Greenacre and at that time, each 
plot of land was worth 30. Each of A, B and C therefore acquires a one-third interest in the trust.  
Suppose the value of Greenacre then doubles while that of Blackacre and Whiteacre remains 
unchanged. Hence the value of the trust assets is now 120. C now wishes to have returned to him his 
one-third interest in the trust, which is now worth 40. That is not a taxable event because his “interest 
in the mass” is equated with both the asset he put in and the asset(s) he gets out.  Effectively he is 
treated as getting back the asset he originally put in, which happens to have gone up in value by one 
third (10/30).  The same applies to A and B even though their beneficial shares will have each been 
enhanced by 10, purely because of the doubling in value of Greenacre, which was not contributed by 
either of them but by C.  
     
Jenkins v Brown may in fact give scope for avoidance. Suppose A and B pool in a trust two pieces of 
land of equal value where A's base cost in the land he contributes is much higher than B's in the land 
that B contributes. B had wished to dispose of that land but was deterred from doing so by the size of 
the potential gain, given his low base cost.  However, A could subsequently withdraw from the pool 
and dispose of the land contributed by B but with the benefit of the much higher base cost in the land 
which A put into the pool. B will remain beneficial owner of the unsold land contributed by A.  Of 
course, B will have the same base cost in that land as in the land which B actually put into the pool 
(and which has now been withdrawn from the pool by A). There is therefore scope for “shifting” base 
costs to achieve a tax saving. 
 
One final point is that the court in Booth v Ellard and in Jenkins v Brown made no mention of Crowe v 
Appleby227.  In short, neither court raised concerns about the beneficiaries of the pooling 
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arrangements not being “absolutely entitled” as against the trustee because of the nature of the 
underlying assets (a controlling interest in a private company and land).  Presumably this was because 
beneficiaries had fully vested concurrent interests so that they could in fact withdraw assets from the 
pool relatively easily.  Therefore they were all able to “direct how that property shall be dealt with”, 






4.3.2.3  Sections 248A-E TCGA 1992 
 
In 2010, Sections 248A-E TCGA were enacted228. These sit alongside Jenkins v Brown. They apply229 
where a person (the “landowner”) co-owns land with another person (“the co-owner”), but then 
disposes of an interest in that co-owned land for consideration which is or includes an interest in 
other land held jointly by the landowner and the co-owner. The legislation seems to relate only to UK 
land (and not to non-UK land or to other assets which could be pooled, such as the private company 
shares in Booth v Ellard). Section 248B(1) and (2) gives the landowner capital gains tax deferral relief 
in respect of the interest which it disposes of.  The extent of that deferral will depend in part on 
whether the amount or value of the consideration for the relinquished interest in land is less than, the 
same as or greater than the market value of that interest230.   
 
These rules do not apply in respect of land which is eligible for relief from capital gains tax as a private 
residence231.  Separate rules in Section 248E provide relief on disposing of joint interests in a private 
residence232.  
 
Sections 248A-E can only operate where there is a disposal by the landowner in the first place. Jenkins 
v Brown provides that there is no disposal if a beneficiary under a Section 60 TCGA trust simply 
withdraws from the pool of trust assets an amount which corresponds to the percentage of the pool 
which it provided in the first place. Similarly, putting those assets into the trust in the first place, in 
return for a proportionate beneficial interest, should not result in disposal.   
 
4.3.2.3 Flexible scope of Section 60  
 
The relative flexibility of Section 60 TCGA 1992 and the courts’ willingness to apply their transparency 
rationale in a pragmatic way (so as to avoid technical tax charges) is further illustrated by the decision 
of Goulding J in AndersUtkilens Rederi A/S v O/Y Lovisa Stevedoring Co A/B and Keller Bryant Transport 
Co Ltd233.  Anders arose from a court order underpinning a litigation settlement. In that order, a court 
had ordered the defendant to sell its premises and certain other assets and to divide the proceeds 
with the plaintiff.  The question arose whether that order created a trust over the property to be sold 
and thereby triggered a disposal for the purposes of corporation tax on chargeable gains when that 
property was put into trust. Any such tax was potentially deductible, under the settlement terms, 
from the amounts to be shared between plaintiff and defendant.  Goulding J ruled that because an 
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order for specific performance would have been given in support of the court order, an immediate 
constructive trust was indeed created over the premises and other assets. It was, however, a trust 
within Section 60 TCGA and the beneficiaries were the plaintiff and the defendant.  
 
He commented in particular234: 
 
“Counsel for the plaintiff seeks to distinguish the present case [from Booth v Ellard ] because the 
defendant alone [in the present case] was entitled to the income (if any) arising from the property 
before the sale.  Thus, he says the trust provided for successive interests, and the interests as co-
owners of the plaintiff and defendant only became similar when the property was sold.  However, 
that distinction has to be evaluated in the light of the parties’ express and immediate duty to one 
another to obtain an early sale of the property, and in that context it seems to me altogether too 
technical and refined to exclude the application of [Section 60 TCGA 1992]. Like Oliver LJ in Booth v 
Ellard, I am happy to reach a conclusion that seems to me to accord with common sense and 
commercial reality.  
 
From and after making the compromise, the plaintiff and the defendant are accordingly to be 
treated as co-owners of the property under [Section 60]. It follows, I think, first, that the 
compromise effected a part-disposal of the property by the defendant to the plaintiff within the 
scope of [Section 60 TCGA 1992], and second, that each of the parties subsequently made a 
disposal of its own interest to the final purchaser.  The incidence of taxation must be ascertained 
accordingly.” 
 
In that case, the UK tax authorities were offered the opportunity to be joined as parties to the case 
but declined.  This is strange not least because the beneficial interests under the trust were drafted 
not as fixed pro rata shares of the trust property but as vested interests which varied in quantum 
under a financial “waterfall”. In essence, the parties’ percentage interests in the “net sales proceeds” 
of the property could vary, depending on the proceeds realised.  If those proceeds did not exceed 
£105,000, then the plaintiff was entitled to 100%. Nevertheless, the beneficial interests under the 
trust were implicitly recognised by Goulding J as vested and concurrent, even though there were 
circumstances in which the defendant’s beneficial interest would have no economic value. A similar 
approach to defining beneficial interests has been adopted in receivables trusts for segregating 
cashflows in securitisation transactions.  These seem to have been accepted by the UK tax authorities 
as falling within Section 60 TCGA, presumably on the basis of Anders.      
 
Goulding J’s dismissal of the argument that there were successive interests also seems quite “broad 
brush”, especially given the decision in Stephenson v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd235 on whether a prior 
beneficial interest (in that case, an annuity) could be a “charge” within Section 60(2).    
 
Section 60 therefore imposes for capital gains tax purposes a rather radical form of transparency by 
disregarding the trust entirely and treating the beneficiaries as the co-owners of the trust property236. 
The courts have been prepared to apply it quite flexibly and commercially, in order to minimise purely 
technical taxable events. However, there are limits.  In particular, where there are vested concurrent 
beneficial interests under a Section 60 trust, that section by itself does not permit any beneficiary to 
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claim sole entitlement to any particular asset of the trust, for tax purposes. Rather each beneficiary 
has a fractional co-ownership interest in each and every trust asset237.   
 
This radical form of transparency also has drawbacks. It means that chargeable gains (whether 
distributed or not) and allowable losses on any disposal of underlying trust assets will accrue pro rata 
to each and every beneficiary. A disposal will also arise where beneficiaries' fractional interests in 
trust assets are varied, even if no underlying asset is disposed of e.g. where a beneficiary sells part of 
his beneficial interest to a third party. Hence the radical approach of Section 60 can give beneficiaries 
the compliance burden of tracking over time their fractional interests in a pool of underlying trust 
assets which may change.  They also risk incurring unfunded tax liabilities if they lack funds to pay tax 
arising when they are treated as disposing of a fractional interest in a trust asset. This could, for 
example, happen where the trustees do not distribute the proceeds of selling an underlying asset.  
 
4.3.3  Trusts with a vested interest in possession: income tax 
 
Where the beneficial interests in trust comprise a vested interest in income only, followed by 
an interest in remainder, there is a notable divergence between the income tax rules and the 
capital gains tax rules.  The latter are discussed at 4.3.4.  The income tax rules offer a degree 
of “tax transparency” for the holder of the interest in income. This form of “transparency” 
differs from that discussed above in relation to “bare trusts”. 
 
4.3.3.1  The “rule in Baker v Archer-Shee” 
 
A succinct summary of the income tax position in relation to life interest trusts with a vested income 
beneficiary was provided by Vinelott  in IRC v Berrill238: 
 
“Under English law a beneficiary entitled to the income of trust property under a trust instrument 
which contains no power of accumulation is entitled to the income of each asset comprised in the 
trust property; each asset constitutes a separate source of income [emphasis added]. In Baker …..v 
Archer-Shee [1927] AC 844 at 866….., Lord Wrenbury, describing the life interest of Lady Archer-
Shee under a will governed by the law of New York (on the assumption, afterwards shown to be 
incorrect, that the law of New York was the same in this respect as the law of England) said: 
 
‘It is, I think, if the law of America is the same as our law, an equitable right in possession to 
receive during her life the proceeds of the shares and stocks of which she is tenant for life. Her 
right is not to a balance sum, but to the dividends subject to the deductions as above 
mentioned.  Her right under the will is “property” from which income is derived.” 
 
The principle applies when the beneficiary is entitled to the income of trust property subject to an 
annuity (see Nelson v Adamson…[1941] 2 All ER 44…..) or subject to a charge for administrative 
expenses or the trustees’ remuneration, although, of course, a deduction can be made of the 
amount of the annuity and of the expenses and remuneration in ascertaining the beneficiary’s 
total income. If on the other hand, a beneficiary has no right to receive income but is paid income 
(or a sum which for tax purposes falls to be treated as income) in the exercise of a discretion, the 
exercise of the discretion constitutes a new source of income (see Cunard’s Trustees v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners …..27 TC 122 at 132, per Lord Greene MR.”  
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However, in order to understand the position better, one needs firstly to understand the basis on 
which income tax is charged on the trustees of a trust which is not a “bare trust” but where there is 
nevertheless a vested beneficial interest in trust income.  In particular, that income can be charged at 
the basic rate of income tax (or, in the case of dividends, at the “dividend ordinary rate”) on any 
person “receiving or entitled” to that income239.  A beneficiary with a vested interest in the trust 
income can be charged as a person beneficially “entitled” to that income.  However, a trustee can 
also be charged on that trust income as a person “receiving” or “entitled” in law to it. It has been 
established that this charge on the trustees is a “representative” charge only.  In other words, the 
trustee charge can be disapplied if and to the extent that a beneficiary with a vested interest in the 
same income would not have been taxable in the UK.  The consequence is an element of tax 
transparency: one must look through the trustee to the identity of the beneficiary, in order to 
determine whether and how the trustee is taxable.  
 
In particular, this “receiving or entitled” language was considered by the House of Lords in  
Williams v Singer; Pool v Royal Exchange Assurance240, where an assessment was raised on a UK-
resident trustee of a trust which owned US shares and whose sole vested income beneficiary was 
non-UK-resident and non-UK-domiciled.  Furthermore, the trustees had mandated that the dividends 
on the shares should be paid directly to the non-UK bank account of the beneficiary, so that no 
dividends were received in the UK.  Viscount Cave (with whom Lords Atkinson and Shaw concurred) 
made the following comments241: 
 
“In short, the intention of the [Income Tax] Acts appears to be that, where a beneficiary is in 
possession and control of the trust income and is sui juris, he is the person to be taxed, and that, 
while a trustee may in certain cases be charged with the tax, he is in all such cases to be treated as 
charged on behalf or in respect of his beneficiaries, who will accordingly be entitled to any 
exemption or abatement which the Acts allow [emphasis added].  Applying the above conclusions 
to the present Case, it follows, in my opinion, first that the …..trustees, who have directed the trust 
income to be paid to the beneficial tenants for life and themselves receive no part of it, are not 
assessable to tax in respect of such income; and secondly, that, even if they were so assessable, 
they would be assessable as trustees on behalf of the life tenants, who would accordingly be 
[exempt on the basis that they are neither domiciled nor resident in the UK].” 
 
Lord Wrenbury said242: 
 
“…These sections point to the conclusion that the person to be taxed is the beneficiary, not the 
trustee, and nonetheless because under certain circumstances the beneficiary is to be reached 
through the trustee.  If the trustee is a foreign subject resident abroad but the beneficiary is in the 
United Kingdom, taxation will not be escaped and, if the trustee is a British subject resident in the 
United Kingdom but the beneficiary is a foreign subject resident abroad, taxation is not imposed by 
reason of those facts….”.  
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trust in question and not on the trustee.  This is consistent with Section 6(1) CTA 2009: see 4.1.1 above.  For the 
charge to tax at the basic rate, see Section 11.  For the charge to tax at the dividend ordinary rate, see Section 
14 ITA. 
240 7 TC 387.  
241 7 TC 387 at 412. 






The court made clear that the charge on trustees in such cases was a representative charge and the 
conclusion would not have differed if there had been no dividend mandate243, because the underlying 
income had a non-UK-source and the vested income beneficiary was non-UK-resident.  In short, taxing 
the trustee in this case would have amounted to an extraterritorial extension of the UK taxing 
jurisdiction.  The trustees’ decision to direct the trust income to the tenant for life simply confirmed 
that the trustees were not persons “receiving or entitled” to the income anyway.   
 
The Court of Session in Reid’s Trustees v Inland Revenue Commissioners244 further considered this 
“receiving or entitled” language.  In that case, the trustees were UK-resident as were the beneficiaries 
and the trust income was UK-source.  Lord President Clyde in particular stated that245: 
 
“….trustees, albeit only the representatives of ulterior beneficial interests, are assessable generally 
in respect of the trust income [on the basis that they are receiving or entitled to it]; but….- just 
because they represent those beneficial interests – they may have a good answer to a particular 
assessment, as regards some share or part of the income assessed, on the ground that such share 
or part arises or accrues beneficially to a cestui que trust [i.e. a beneficiary] in whose hands it is 
not liable to Income Tax….”. 
 
The situation in Baker v Archer-Shee246 was the converse of Williams v Singer. While the underlying 
trust income was non-UK-source, it was the beneficiary with a vested life interest in trust income who 
was UK-resident. The trustees were non-UK-resident.  The key question was whether the life interest 
holder was to be treated as entitled beneficially to the underlying income of the trust as it arose.  Put 
another way, was the life interest holder entitled as such to income which could be characterised as 
dividends if the trust had invested its capital in dividend-yielding shares?  Alternatively, was the 
holder of the life interest merely entitled to require the trustees to administer the trust and its assets 
appropriately and to hand over a simple balance sum of indeterminate trust income to the life 
interest holder, after relevant trust expenses had been deducted?  As discussed below, the House of 
Lords, by a bare majority, ruled that the life interest holder was entitled beneficially to the underlying 
income of the trust as it arose and not entitled merely to a simple balance sum247.  
 
The background to Baker was an important change made on the eve of the First World War by David 
Lloyd George, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, to the “remittance” basis rules.  These rules had 
hitherto enabled UK-residents to defer income tax on all non-UK-source income which fell within the 
old Schedule D Case V as being income from a “foreign possession”.  Income tax was payable only 
when it was “remitted” (in essence, repatriated) to the UK. Finance Act 1914 denied many UK-
residents the benefit of the “remittance” basis where the non-UK-source income was income from a 
“foreign possession” but in particular was derived from “stocks, shares or rents”. The “remittance” 
                                                          
243 The House of Lords noted that even if the income was mandated, the trustees still had limited tax 
information filing obligations under what became Section 76 TMA, and which was repealed in 2011.  
244 14 TC 512. Aspects of Reid’s Trustees have been questioned on the basis that Lords Clyde and Blackburn 
incorrectly said that the trustees were “entitled” to the trust income whereas Lord Morison correctly said that 
they merely “received” it and were accordingly taxable: see Avery Jones, John F. and others: “The Treatment of 
Trusts under the OECD Model Convention”. European Taxation, December 1989, 379 at 384 fn 39 (hereafter 
“Avery Jones: Trusts”). While Lord Morison’s statement cannot be faulted, this author considers that the 
trustees were also “entitled” to the trust income (and Lord Morison suggests as much at 14 TC 530).  Even 
under English trust law, they would have been legal owners of that income and, in any case, under Scots trust 
law (which applied in Reid’s Trustees) the trustees alone can own trust income and assets.  
245 14 TC 512 at 525. 
246 11 TC 749. 






basis was preserved if, by contrast, the non-UK-source income was derived from a “foreign 
possession” other than “stocks, shares or rents”248.  
 
Under the then rules, the husband of Lady Archer-Shee was assessed to income tax in respect of her 
income from a New York trust in which she held a life interest and where the income was not all 
“remitted” to the UK.  The question was whether that life interest was a “foreign possession” entitling 
the holder to the income of the underlying trust assets as it arose.  If so, then if that underlying 
income was derived from “stocks, shares or rents”, the “remittance basis” was unavailable.   
 
The case was first heard by Rowlatt J in the High Court who, like the Special Commissioners, found 
against the taxpayer.  He firstly analysed the nature of the life interest and concluded that249:  
 
“What this lady enjoys is not the stocks, shares and rents or other property constituting the trust 
fund under the will; what she has is the right to call upon the trustees, and, if necessary, to compel 
the trustees, to administer this property during her life so as to give her the income arising 
therefrom according to the provisions of the trust. Her interest is merely an equitable one, and it is 
not an interest in the specific stocks and shares constituting the trust fund at all….But the question is 
whether that is so for the purposes of income tax [emphasis added]”.  
 
Despite the trust law position, he decided that, for income tax purposes, Lady Archer-Shee was 
entitled to the underlying income of the trust and therefore, the “remittance” basis was unavailable 
to the extent that this income was derived from “stocks, shares or rents”250. He was aware that his 
decision created complications e.g. if there were two concurrent life interest holders, only one of 
whom was UK-resident, and the trust was invested in non-UK stocks and shares as well as other 
“foreign possessions”.  To what extent was the UK-resident life interest holder entitled to the income 
from the non-UK stocks and shares? 
 
The Court of Appeal reversed Rowlatt J and found for the taxpayer.  In essence, they agreed with 
Rowlatt J’s analysis of the life interest as a matter of trust law but and thought that this dictated the 
income tax outcome. As Lord Hanworth MR put it251: 
 
“…what they [i.e. the trustees] remit is not what I will call the dividends in specie in their actual 
form….They do not remit the whole of the income from the profits, but they remit a sum which 
has lost its origin or parentage; it has lost the shape of dividends, share warrants, or the like, and is 
merely a sum of money which represents the balance after payment of the sums which would 
properly fall upon the trust.”   
 
Hence the income was derived from a “foreign possession” but was not derived from any underlying 
“stocks, shares or rents” arising to the trustees  In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal relied in 
part on the House of Lords’ earlier decision in the probate duty case of Lord Sudeley v Attorney-
                                                          
248 See Case V Rule 2 of Schedule D as it then was.  The 1914 changes to the “remittance” basis were to some 
extent an anti-avoidance measure.  They may also have been motivated by the increasing likelihood of a major 
war and the need to fund it.  The 1914 changes and the wider evolution of the “remittance” basis (although not 
the major changes to that basis in 2008 and subsequently) are discussed in greater detail in Taxing Foreign 
Income from Pitt to the The Tax Law Rewrite – the Decline of the Remittance Basis. John F. Avery Jones CBE. 
Studies in the History of Tax Law, ed Tiley, Hart 2004, page 15.    
249 [1927] 1 KB 109 at 116.  
250 [1927] 1 KB 109 at 117.  In this regard, he relied on Williams v Singer 7 TC 387, which in his view was based 
on allowing the non-UK-resident income beneficiary to look through the UK trustees to the underlying non-UK 
income of the trust.   






General.252 In that case, an estate was still being administered under an English law will. The court 
held that a beneficiary’s right to residue of that estate was simply a right situated in England to have 
the executors administer the estate properly.  It was not a right to any underlying non-UK property (in 
particular, mortgages on New Zealand real property) within the estate assets253.   
 
The Court of Appeal was reversed by a bare majority of the House of Lords.  The main judgment for 
the majority was given by Lord Wrenbury. The essence of that judgment has already been set out in 
the citation (supra) from IRC v Berrill254.  Lords Atkinson and Carson gave supporting judgments (the 
latter seeming to argue that the non-UK trustees could effectively be ignored on the basis of Williams 
v Singer255). The result was that the “remittance” basis was not available. There were indications that 
the judges (Lord Wrenbury in particular) were aware of the anti-avoidance purpose of the 1914 
legislation and were reluctant to allow interposing a trust between relevant assets and a non-UK-
resident beneficiary to frustrate that purpose256.  Furthermore, all the judges ruled on the basis that 
New York trust law was the same as English trust law (no evidence having been provided of New York 
trust law).   
 
There were two strong dissenting judgments.  In particular, Viscount Sumner ruled that, under English 
law: 
 
“Lady Archer-Shee …..does not for Income Tax purposes own and is not entitled to any of the 
stocks, shares, securities or real property that form part of the New York trust estate. These 
belong to the trustee company, to whom also the annual payments made in respect of them by 
way of rent, interest or dividends ‘arise’, ‘accrue’ and ‘belong’.  All that she has is a right, in the 
forum of the trustee and of the trust fund, to have the trust executed in her favour…..and this 
‘possession’ neither consists in the trust’s investments or any of them, nor is situated here. It is 
‘foreign’.”257 
 
On that basis, the life interest holder was entitled to the “remittance” basis because her income was 
derived from her interest in the non-UK trust and not from the underlying trust investments.  That 
trust interest was a “foreign possession” other than “stocks, shares or rents”. The dissenters also 
noted the problem which Rowlatt J had already identified if the majority were correct i.e. how to 
apportion trust income derived in part from stocks, shares and rents if there were two concurrent life 
interests in the non-UK trust fund, only one of which was held by a UK-resident.  
 
                                                          
252 [1897] AC 21. 
253 Lord Sudeley v Attorney-General did not in fact provide especially strong support for the Court of Appeal 
position.  In particular, the estate in that case was not fully administered so the residual assets net of liabilities 
were not fully ascertained.  This differed from the fully constituted trust in Baker v Archer-Shee. Even if the 
estate had been fully administered, the relevant beneficiary was only entitled to a quarter of the entire residue, 
so until assets were appropriated to satisfy that quarter share, one could not know what assets it would contain.  
This point was made by Lords Shand and Davey at [1897] AC 11 at 20-22.  It is not relevant to Baker v Archer-
Shee where Lady Archer-Shee was the sole life interest holder in the entire fully-constituted trust fund.    
254 [1981] STC 784 at 797.  
255 7 TC 387. 
256 In “The Archer-Shee Cases (1927) Trusts, Transparency and Source”, Chapter 6, Landmark Cases in Revenue 
Law ed. John Snape and Dominic de Cogan, Hart 2019, 139 at 149, Malcolm Gammie QC notes that from a UK 
income tax perspective, a life interest in a UK trust renders the trust transparent because under English trust 
law, the income beneficiary has an immediate entitlement to trust income.  One can therefore look at the 
underlying trust assets and income for the purposes of a tax assessment.  That is also true where non-UK trust 
law is to the same effect. In such cases, the trust disappears as a separate “source” of income for tax purposes.   






The further twists and turns of the Archer-Shee litigation are discussed below.258  However, it is 
important to note that a similar point had already been considered by the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council in Syme v Commissioner of Taxes259.  Syme was not cited in Baker, even though the 
judgment in that case had been given by the then Lord Sumner260. In Syme, the taxpayer was a life 
interest holder in a trust where the trustees owned and ran certain active businesses. The question 
was whether the life interest holder was entitled, under the relevant tax rules, to a lower tax rate in 
respect of his share of this trust income on the basis that it was derived from “personal exertion”, 
even though the life interest holder did not conduct the relevant businesses. The Privy Council found 
in favour of the life interest holder. “Income derived from personal exertion” was not defined so as to 
exclude this situation. In particular, there was an underlying active business in Victoria which 
generated the income and that active business was carried on by trustees for the benefit of the 
taxpayer and others. Furthermore, both the Australian trustees and the life interest holder were 
taxable in respect of the same income. As Lord Sumner expressed it: 
  
“What was the produce of personal exertion in the trustees’ hands till they part with it does not, in 
the instant of transfer, suffer a change, and become the produce of property and not of personal 
exertion, as it passes to the hands of the cestui que trust [i.e. the beneficiary]”261 
 
Syme itself does not appear to have been influenced by any anti-avoidance issues and the court did 
not allude to the importance of the governing law of the trust. Syme has been followed in Canadian 
cases involving the taxation of life interest holders262.   
 
4.3.3.2  The later Archer-Shee litigation and its implications 
 
Undaunted by defeat in the House of Lords, the Archer-Shees raised a new argument when they were 
refused the remittance basis. In particular, they produced expert evidence of New York trust law. 
                                                          
258 In the words of author of the article referred to in fn 248, this litigation “must be the longest running dispute 
in the history of tax, requiring two hearings in the House of Lords, three in the Court of Appeal, and four each in 
the High Court and the Special Commissioners to determine whether the life tenant of a trust receiving 
underlying income from securities, stocks, shares or rent received the same type of income as the underlying 
income, which meant that the remittance basis no longer applied, or a different type of income, trust income, 
from which the remittance basis had not been taken away.”  Yet to this day not all judges have grasped this 
distinction: in Ardmore Construction Ltd and another v HMRC 18 ITLR 291 at 303, the Upper Tribunal (Tax and 
Chancery) said that “[The Archer-Shee cases] did not concern source [emphasis added], but the question of 
entitlement to income under a will trust created by a US testator, which turned on the nature of the interest 
under the trust as ascertained by reference to the foreign law of the trust.” With respect, this misses the key 
point that the nature of the interest in the trust determined whether the “source” of Lady Archer-Shee’s 
income, for tax purposes, was “stocks, shares or rents”. The Archer-Shee cases were not considered by the 
Court of Appeal when dismissing an appeal from the Upper Tribunal decision in Ardmore: see 20 ITLR 874.   
259 [1914] AC 1013, an appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria in Australia.   
260 It was briefly cited and distinguished somewhat unconvincingly in the later Archer-Shee litigation: see 4.3.3.2.  
261 [1914] AC 1013 at 1021. Lord Sumner was also one of the judges in Drummond v Collins 8 TC 525, where he 
delivered a one-line judgment concurring, in particular, with Lord Wrenbury who strongly suggested that the 
“source” of a life interest holder’s taxable income was the underlying non-UK trust fund: see fn 149 above.   
262 Gilhooly v Minister of National Revenue [1945] Ex. C.R. 141 and Kemp v Minister of National Revenue [1947] 
Ex. C.R. 578. See also Avery Jones: Trusts op. cit. at page 384 fns 44 and 45. Syme was distinguished by the Court 
of Session in Fry (Surveyor of Taxes) v Shiel’s Trustees 6 TC 583. In that case, the question was whether the 
beneficiaries were entitled to a reduced rate of income tax on “earned income” from a trade held by trustees 
for their benefit.  The UK Finance Act 1907 only conferred a reduced rate on income “immediately derived by 
the individual from the carrying on or exercise by him of his profession, trade or vocation”. This test was more 
stringent than the test in the Australian legislation in Syme which simply required the income to be “derived 






Initially, they sought to raise this new argument in relation to the tax years which had already been 
the subject of litigation in Baker. However, a majority of the Court of Appeal263 ruled against them on 
the basis that, following the House of Lords’ decision in Baker, the nature of the interest in the New 
York trust was “res judicata”.   
 
They then raised this new argument again when the then Inland Revenue assessed them for later 
years. Initially, the Inland Revenue argued that Baker rendered the matter “res judicata” for those 
later years too. However, they then dropped this point and the appeal proceeded, on the basis of the 
new argument. A majority of the Court of Appeal264 ruled that the nature of the life interest in a trust 
governed by New York law was not sufficiently different from the English law position so as to alter 
the outcome compared to Baker.  However, the taxpayers then succeeded in their 1930 appeal to the 
House or Lords in Garland v Archer-Shee265. In essence, the court ruled that once the evidence of New 
York law was taken into account, the position was in fact as set out by Viscount Sumner in his dissent 
in Baker v Archer-Shee.266 As Lord Tomlin put it267: 
 
“The evidence upon American law…contains statements to the effect that the whole estate …in 
the trust funds is vested in the trustees and that the words of the trust give to [Lady Archer-Shee] 
merely the right to resort to a Court of equity to compel the trustees to discharge the task 
imposed upon them which was to apply the money which they receive as a net income from the 
trust to her use, that they have, within the limits of reasonable and conscientious behaviour, an 
absolute discretion as to the application of the income for her benefit, that if they decided to apply 
                                                          
263 In Archer-Shee v Baker (Inspector of Taxes) 15 TC 1. That second case stemmed from the order of the House 
of Lords to the Special Commissioners to give effect to their decision in Baker, and in particular to identify which 
of the trust’s investments were “securities” or “stocks, shares or rents” for the purposes of Schedule D Cases IV 
and V. Income from any such assets would not be eligible for the remittance basis. The Commissioners’ 
breakdown of the trust’s investments is at 15 TC 1 at 4-6.    
264 In this respect the Court of Appeal disagreed with Rowlatt J. Lawrence LJ in particular said, at 15 TC 693 at 
721-2, that American law was like English law in that a life interest holder in a trust of personalty (e.g. securities) 
had no legal or beneficial interest in the corpus of trust assets.  Furthermore, any extra discretion of the trustee 
under American law regarding when and how to apply income for the benefit of the life interest holder was 
immaterial: “The whole of the net income must ultimately be either paid over to or applied for the benefit of 
Lady Archer-Shee….thus showing conclusively that she has a right of property in the income and not merely a 
personal right against the trustee.  Further the trustee cannot unreasonably or indefinitely withhold the 
payment or application of the income….”   
265 15 TC 693 at 729. 
266 11 TC 749.  In “The Archer-Shee Cases” op. cit., Malcolm Gammie QC states that, in Garland v Archer-Shee, 
the taxpayer’s case depended on showing that the trust changed the character of what Lady Archer-Shee 
received and that in particular she “received the income not as a matter of entitlement pursuant to her interest 
under the trust but as a result of the trustee’s decision to exercise some discretion to pay her the income”. This 
is not meant to suggest that under New York law, the trust was a discretionary trust: Lady Archer-Shee retained 
a fully vested life interest in the trust fund. It means only that under a Garland-type trust, the rights of the life 
interest holder are simply the right to have income paid over to, or applied for the benefit of, the life interest 
holder, with the trustees having some discretion regarding the manner and time of doing so. The author 
disagrees with the following statement in Hudson: “Equity and Trusts” (9th edition – 2017) at page 158:  “Lady 
Archer-Shee was the only life tenant, having an interest in possession, under her father’s residuary estate with 
no other potential beneficiary in existence. Consequently, it was held that Lady Archer-Shee would have been 
entitled under the principle in Saunders v Vautier to have directed the trustees to deal with the trust property.  
Equally, Lady Archer-Shee was taxable on the income from the trust as though she was its absolute owner 
because this income was effectively held on bare trust for her”. There was no suggestion that Lady Archer-Shee 
had more than a life interest in the trust income or that she could call upon the trustees to transfer the trust 
capital to her. Otherwise Viscount Sumner’s dissenting judgment would have made no sense. Rather the case 
focussed instead on the true “source”, for income tax purposes, of Lady Archer-Shee’s trust income.  






the money for her benefit instead of paying it over they must exercise the power to do so 
reasonably, and that she had no right to any specific dividends or interest at all.   
 
In the face of these statements, I think the finding of fact must necessarily be that, according to 
American law, [Lady Archer-Shee] has no property interest in the income arising from the 
securities, stocks and shares constituting the trust fund but has only a chose in action available 
against the trustees. …the assessable income…..is income arising from a possession out of the 
United Kingdom other than stocks, shares or rents, viz., a chose in action available against the 
American trustees [and hence eligible for the ‘remittance’ basis]”.  
 
Doubt has been expressed about the accuracy of the expert evidence in respect of New York law on 
which this finding of fact was based268.  That evidence269 was that Lady Archer-Shee “had no right to 
any specific dividends or interest at all”; and that “whilst…the whole of the net income…..must 
ultimately be paid over to or be applied for the benefit of Lady Archer-Shee, the manner and times of 
doing so were within the discretion of the trustees subject to judicial supervision”. Nevertheless the 
relevance of the governing law of the trust, and how it analyses a life interest in that trust, is now 
firmly established. In Kelly v Rogers270,, there was evidence that under the law of New Jersey, which 
applied to the trust in that case, the income entitlement of the beneficiary in that case was to such a 
sum as was required for her maintenance: she had no right to the income of any specific stocks and 
shares but only the right to require the trustee to administer the trust reasonably271.   
 
The extent to which the governing law of the trust determines the UK tax position is not unlimited.  It 
will be key in deciding the nature of the beneficiary’s interest but it will then be a question for UK tax 
law whether that interest gives rise to income or capital receipts for tax purposes. Thus in Lawson v 
Rolfe,272it was agreed that the taxpayer had a life interest in a trust governed by the law of California 
which entitled her to the proceeds of specific shares in US companies. Her entitlement was not just a 
Garland right to have the trustees administer the trust properly. The underlying companies 
proceeded to issue bonus shares (or “stock dividends”) to which the taxpayer, as holder of the life 
interest, was entitled under the governing law of the trust.  She was assessed to UK income tax on 
these “stock dividends”. Foster J agreed with the taxpayer that the “stock dividends” were in fact 
capital, not income, for UK tax purposes.  The judge said273: 
 
“Under Californian law the nature of Mrs Lawson’s interest is that she is entitled to the income of 
her share and to bonus shares of a certain nature.  But the court must then consider whether those 
bonus shares when issued have the character of capital or income in accordance with the law of 
England.  In English law it was decided…..that shares credited to a shareholder in respect of a bonus 
being distributed by the company as capital were not income in the hands of that shareholder”274. 
                                                          
268 The findings of fact of the Special Commissioners regarding New York trust law are set out at 15 TC 693 at 
696-9, where two experts are quoted.  Doubts about the expert evidence are raised in the article referred to at 
fn 248 above and, in particular, the citation from Scott on Trusts (4th ed.) in footnote 150 of that article. See also 
Avery Jones: Trusts op. cit. page 384 at fn 46. In “The Archer-Shee cases” op. cit., Malcolm Gammie QC is more 
hesistant about whether the expert evidence was flawed: see fn 44 at page 154 of that article.  
269 See 15 TC 693 at 732.  
270 19 TC 692. 
271 The Court of Appeal in Kelly v Rogers also approved the statements of Lord President Clyde in the Court of 
Session in Reid’s Trustees v the Commissioners of Inland Revenue 14 TC 512 which were cited in 4.3.3.1 above. 
272 [1970] 1 All ER 761. 
273 [1970] 1 All ER 761 at 767. 
274 Foster J went on to rule that even though there had been a number of stock dividends, this did not amount 
to a separate source of income in the form of a “series of recurrent payments over a substantial period of time”. 







In Inland Revenue v Clark’s Trustees275, the Court of Session, in an estate duty case, ruled that Scottish 
law differed from English law, as determined in Baker v Archer-Shee276.  Lord President Normand 
stated277: 
 
“[In Baker v Archer-Shee], Rowlatt J ….said ‘What this lady enjoys is not the stocks, shares and rents 
or other property constituting the trust fund under the will; what she has is the right to call upon 
the trustees to administer this property during her life so as to give her the income arising 
therefrom according to the provisions of the trust.  Her interest is merely an equitable one, and it 
is not an interest in specific stocks and shares constituting the trust fund.’ In my opinion that is a 
very accurate description of the rights of a beneficiary enjoying a life rent under a Scottish trust 
deed, and……it is a very good description of what was proved to be the law of the State of New 
York in the second Archer-Shee case.” 
 
In the same case, Lord Moncrieff said (at page 6): 
 
“In my view, the right of property in the estate of the trust is vested in the trustees to the 
exclusion of any competing property, and the right of the beneficiary, exactly as is here said to be 
the right of the beneficiary under the law of New York, is merely a right in personam against the 
trustees to enforce their performance of the trust.  It is true that in the assertion of that right a 
beneficiary will in certain cases obtain the aid of the Court to enable him to use the names of the 
trustees, but it is only as representing the trustees in such a case that he can attach or assert any 
property right over the assets of the trust”.  
 
This statement reflects important differences between the Scottish and English law of trusts, 
reflecting the civil law foundations of Scottish law. One recent commentator has described the 
Scottish trust concept as follows: 
 
“Equity is absent from Scots law and under Scots law, separate rights of ownership cannot exist 
concurrently in the same property. Comparable concepts of ‘rights’ are used in matters of 
ownership of property and trusts. …In a Scottish trust, the trustees are absolute owners of the 
trust property, and so have a real right to that property, and to hold and defend title to it from 
third parties. The beneficiaries in turn then have a personal right against the trustees for 
implementation and fulfilment of their duties as trustees to the beneficiaries. This right of the 
beneficiaries is therefore enforceable against the trustees, not against the specific trust property. 
Scots law then applies a concept of ‘dual patrimony’ to deal with the separation of ownership of 
the trust property by the trustees, and the ownership of the trustees’ own personal 
property…[emphasis added]”278.     
                                                          
275 1939 Scots Law Times 2. 
276 11 TC 749.  
277 1939 Scots Law Times 5. 
278 Fiona Clarke: “One Island, Two Systems: the divergence of trust law in Scotland v England and Wales”. Trust 
Quarterly Review, Volume 17, Issue 2, 2019, pages 5-10 and in particular, at page 6.  The “dual patrimony” 
concept has significant practical implications e.g. it protects trust assets from the trustee’s personal creditors 
but it also prevents the creation of a floating charge over property held under a Scottish trust by a company - 
see Alisdair D.J. MacPherson: “Floating Charges and Trust Property in Scots Law: A Tale of Two Patrimonies” 
Edinburgh Law Review 22.1 (2018) at pages 1-28. For detailed discussion of “dual patrimony”, see George 
Gretton: “Trust without Equity” (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly at pages 599-620, 
where the author accepts that there is ongoing uncertainty about the nature of a Scottish trust. That 
uncertainty was also raised by Lord Hope in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (a company)(in 







The Scottish law position has in fact now been altered for income tax purposes by statute, so as to 
align it with English law as per Baker v Archer-Shee279.  HMRC have set out in their published 
guidance280 a list identifying which jurisdictions do and do not characterise a life interest in the same 
manner as in Baker v Archer-Shee. Most Commonwealth jurisdictions follow the approach under 
English law as set out in Baker but others (e.g. India, Quebec, South Africa) apparently characterise a 
life interest as in Garland v Archer-Shee281. The same is true of certain states of the United States, 
such as New York, although apparently most US states follow the approach in Baker282.    
 
The fact that the trustees of a trust with a life interest are also required to pay an annuity out of the 
trust income does not prevent Baker v Archer-Shee from applying when the trust is governed by 
English law283. 
 
The rule in Baker v Archer-Shee may treat the holder of a life interest as entitled for tax purposes to 
income directly from the underlying assets of the trust.  To that extent, it leads to a form of income 
tax “transparency”.  However, it is a more qualified form of “transparency” than that to which Section 
60 TCGA (supra) gives effect for capital gains tax purposes284.  This is evident in relation to the 
treatment of trust expenses, where it is clear that the trust is not simply disregarded.  Where the 
trustees legitimately incur trust expenses or pay tax which in either case is chargeable against the 
income of the trust, then those are expenses of the trust which reduce the amount of the income 
                                                          
between English and Scots law as to [the trust’s] nature and origin. For example, the law of Scotland does not 
accept that a relationship in trust can arise in equity. It has a more limited basis. Its origin can be traced back to 
the law of mandate or commission, which is part of the law of obligations: Stair Institutes of the Law of Scotland 
(1693) I.12.17.  Various attempts have been made to explain the basis for the concept.  They have not been 
successful, as its nature is considered to be of too anomalous a character to admit of a precise definition. But it 
can at least be said that the duty that the trustee owes to the beneficiary is fiduciary in character…..”     
279 See Section 464 ITA (formerly Section 118 Finance Act 1993). The 1993 changes were introduced in order to 
enable the life renter of a Scottish trust, like the life tenant of an English trust, to benefit from the lower rate of 
tax applied from 1993 initially to dividend income and from 1996 to all savings income: see also the article 
referred to at fn 248 above.   
280 At paragraph TSEM10423 of the Trusts, Settlements and Estates Manual (accessed 10 June 2020).  
281 15 TC 693. Like Scotland, both Quebec and South Africa have legal systems with deep roots in civil law  
(respectively, pre-1789 French law and pre-1800 Roman-Dutch law) but have nevertheless developed their own 
concept of the trust. For a comparison of the Scottish and South African conceptions of trust, see Honore op. 
cit. at 793-818.  It is not surprising that a life interest in a South African trust falls within Garland v Archer-Shee 
because a South African trustee will typically be the sole owner of the trust property for the purposes of 
administering it while a trust beneficiary will not have a “ius in rem” in that property.  It will only have a “ius in 
personam” against the trustee requiring it to enforce the trust: for a much fuller exposition, see Francois du 
Toit: “The South African Trust in the Begriffshimmel? Language, Translation and Taxonomy”. Rabels Zeitschrift 
fuer auslaendisches und internationales Privatrecht. Max-Planck Institute. October 2015 at 852, and especially 
at fn 110. Quebec introduced its own statute-based trust law in 1994. It goes further than South African and 
Scottish trust law because the property of a Quebec trust is a separate patrimony in which none of the settlor, 
the trustee nor the beneficiary has a proprietary right. The trustee’s role is therefore purely administrative. 
Hence, a Quebec trust seems quite similar to a civil law foundation: see 4.1.2 and also George Gretton: “Trusts 
without Equity” op. cit. at page 616. For further discussion of the trust concept in civil law jurisdictions and 
those with a “mixed” civil law and common law heritage, see Donovan W.M. Waters QC: “The Concept called 
‘the Trust’” (March 1999) Bulletin of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 118, and especially at 
118-122.  
282 For the reasons discussed above, there are doubts about HMRC’s position regarding the law of New York.  
283 Nelson v Adamson [1941] 2 All ER Annotated 44.   
284 Or indeed the transparency which would have arisen if the New York trustees, like the UK trustees in 







entitlement of the life interest holder (i.e. it is a net entitlement) even if they do not alter the 
underlying source(s) for tax purposes of that income entitlement.  Those expenses are not treated as 
incurred by the life interest holder, who is not regarded as entitled to the gross income of the trust 
before those expenses are deducted.  This is clear from two decisions of the Court of Session285.  In 
both cases, a life interest holder argued that trust income applied by the trustees in meeting trust 
expenses, after paying income tax on it, was nevertheless income to which that beneficiary was 
entitled.  If correct, the beneficiary would have been entitled to recover tax paid by the trustees on 
the income which they used to meet those expenses.  The Court in each case rejected the argument 
of the life interest holder286.  The latter’s interest is no greater than the amount the beneficiary is 
entitled to receive net of expenses of the trustees.  Hence tax paid by the trustees on the trust 
income used to meet those expenses is not recoverable by the beneficiary, although that tax may be 
at a lower rate (20%) than the beneficiary’s marginal income tax rate. The (reduced) amount to which 
the beneficiary is entitled must be grossed up where relevant by any tax paid by the trustees in 
respect of the amount to which the beneficiary is entitled.  The trustee-level tax referable to that 
amount may then be creditable/recoverable by the beneficiary287.  
 
It is also doubtful that the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee enables a life interest holder to claim tax losses 
in respect of income-generating activity carried on by the trust.  The rule is merely one identifying the 
source of a taxpayer’s income.  If the activity which potentially generates that income in fact produces 
a loss (e.g. where the trust conducts a loss-making trade), the life interest holder cannot claim its 
share of that loss for the purposes of setting it against other income as “sideways relief” because 
(unlike the trustees) it does not “carry on” that trade, as required by Sections 61(1) and 64(1)(a) ITA.  
This can be contrasted with the much more comprehensive tax “transparency” which exists in relation 
to a trading partnership. A partner’s income source is the underlying income of the partnership. If the 
partnership trades at a loss, the partner is entitled to claim its share of that loss and set it against 
other income288, precisely because the partner itself is treated as carrying on the single partnership 
trade by being a member of the partnership.  As Vinelott J expressed it in MacKinlay v Arthur Young 
McLelland Moores & Co289: 
 
“What has to be ascertained is the profits of the firm and not of the individual partners. That is 
not, I think, stated anywhere in the Income Tax Acts but it follows necessarily from the fact that 
there is only one business and not a number of different businesses carried on by each of the 
partners”.  
 
                                                          
285 Murray v Commissioners of Inland Revenue 11 TC 133 and Macfarlane v Commissioners of Inland Revenue 14 
TC 532, which fell chronologically either side of the House of Lords’ decision in Baker v Archer-Shee.    
286 It noted that in Baker v Archer-Shee, the Crown had conceded that the life interest holder was not taxable on 
trust income applied by the New York trustees in duly meeting trust expenses.  For a possible explanation of this 
concession, see Malcolm Gammie QC: “The Archer-Shee Cases” (op. cit.) fn 41 at 152-3. 
287 Chapter 8 Part 9 ITA now sets out in some detail these rules regarding the impact of trust expenses on the 
amount of the life interest holder’s income entitlement. These rules also apply if the holder of the income 
entitlement is subject to corporation tax: see Section 611 CTA 2010. For a good numerical example of how these 
rules work, see Example 18.6 in Fairpo and Salter: “Revenue Law: Principles and Practice” 37th edition, 
Bloomsbury Professional at page 558.  
288 See Sections 62, 64 and 65 ITA and subject to the general restrictions on “sideways relief” (e.g. Sections 66-
70 ITA).  
289 [1986] STC 491 at 504-5.  These dicta were approved by the House of Lords on appeal in [1989] STC 898 at 
901. While the method of assessing income tax on partners in a partnership has changed since the 1980’s, this 
does not affect the accuracy of this statement.  Furthermore, as the House of Lords made clear (reversing the 
Court of Appeal) this statement applies whether the partnership is small or (as in MacKinlay itself) large, so that 






The rule in Baker v Archer-Shee has been expressed to be a rule of English trust law, not of English tax 
law290. This has several consequences.  The first is that the impact of the rule is very much dictated by 
the governing law of the relevant trust.  This is so even though the rule primarily decides the source, 
for UK tax purposes, of the life interest holder’s income: the life interest itself or the income-
producing assets which underlie it? It is strange, and unsatisfactory as a matter of tax policy, that the 
UK income tax treatment of a life interest can be varied simply by setting up a trust with the “right” 
governing law291.  Yet this can have important practical implications.  For example, in the UK “offshore 
fund” rules, it can be important to decide whether a UK-resident holds an interest in a “transparent 
fund”292. If (as is typical) that fund is structured as a non-UK trust, then it cannot be a “transparent 
fund” unless the governing law is consistent with English trust law as described in Baker v Archer-
Shee293.  
 
Secondly, even as a rule of trust law, the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee is not easy to understand.  It 
purports to contrast the case where the life interest holder is entitled to underlying trust income (net 
of expenses) as it arises with the case where the life interest holder is simply entitled to have the trust 
fund properly administered and the aggregate net income paid over to it or applied for its benefit. Yet 
this does not seem to be a real distinction294 because the second situation is surely present in all life 
interest trusts. In such trusts, unlike bare trusts, the life interest holder has no entitlement to any of 
the underlying capital of the trust fund.  Surely any holder of a life interest is only entitled to have the 
trust fund properly administered and the aggregate income paid to it or applied for its benefit, 
whatever the governing law of the trust?  The distinction being drawn seems to be between cases 
where the trustees do, and where they do not have the right to apply income for the benefit of the 
life interest holder (rather than paying it to that person directly).  This seems an immaterial 
distinction, which is what the majority of the Court of Appeal decided in Garland v Archer-Shee.  This 
author has considerable sympathy for their approach. Whether and how income is taxable should not 
depend on a fine semantic distinction which can be easily manipulated by choosing the “right” 
governing law for the trust. 
 
The real question is whether all life interest holders should, despite the precise rights and powers of 
the trustees, also be regarded as entitled to underlying trust income as it arises so that each trust 
asset is, for UK tax purposes, a separate source of income when taxing that life interest holder. That 
should be a question of UK tax policy with a uniform answer for all life interest holders. There is much 
to be said for subjecting all life interest holders to the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee, whose underlying 
premise is that the source of income should not change simply by interposing a life interest trust. The 
                                                          
290 Hence the importance of the governing law of the trust when deciding if that rule applies or not. 
291 Interestingly, the decision of the Privy Council in Syme [1914] AC 1083, which was a forerunner of Baker v 
Archer-Shee, makes no reference to the significance of the governing law of the trust. 
292 In such a case, the UK-resident can avoid a number of disadvantages under the rules: see Regulation 29 
Offshore Fund (Tax) Regulations 2009 SI 2009/3001.  
293 See the definition of a “transparent fund” in Regulation 11 Offshore Fund (Tax) Regulations 2009 SI 
2009/3001, and in particular Regulation 11(a). The same approach applies in paragraph 8 Schedule 5AA TCGA: 
this determines if an income tax-“transparent”, “UK property-rich” “offshore collective investment vehicle” can 
elect, with investors’ consent, to be treated as a partnership for the purposes of taxing non-UK-residents on 
chargeable gains from direct or indirect investment in UK real property. This election is targeted at trust-based 
collective investment vehicles, which would otherwise be treated as a company, and their unitholders as 
shareholders, under Schedule 5AAA. For a more detailed discussion, see Sarah Squires: “Finance Act 2019 notes: 
section 13: disposals by non-UK residents etc: and Schedule 1, paragraph 21: Schedule 5AAA to the Taxation of 
Chargeable Gains Act 1992 – UK property rich collective investment vehicles, etc” [2019] BTR 278 at 285-7. 
294 It is not easy to explain this elusive distinction to non-UK lawyers in order to obtain local law advice on the 






author’s view is that the House of Lords in Garland v Archer-Shee took a wrong turn when it reversed 
the Court of Appeal.  
 
That wrong turn is further illustrated by the potential impact of Garland v Archer-Shee in cases like 
Williams v Singer (see 4.3.3.1). Suppose that non-UK-source income is received by UK-resident 
trustees of a trust with a non-UK-resident life interest holder. The trust’s governing law does not treat 
the life interest holder as entitled to underlying trust income.  Therefore, the effect of Garland v 
Archer-Shee seems to be that the trustees cannot avoid a 20% UK tax charge even though the trust 
income is non-UK-source and the life interest holder is non-UK-resident. Because the life interest 
holder is not entitled to underlying income but only to a distribution of net trust income, the source 
of that income is its rights to enforce the UK-resident trust and not the underlying income. Hence the 
holder cannot argue that an income tax charge at trustee level would (as in Williams v Singer) tax a 
non-UK-resident on non-UK-source income. If this is the effect of Garland v Archer-Shee, it highlights 
its flaws: minor technical differences in the trust’s governing law about the nature of a life interest 
mean that the UK tax charge on trustees can now have extraterritorial effect, contrary to Williams v 
Singer. Furthermore, the life interest holder is worse off than a non-UK-resident discretionary 
beneficiary of a UK-resident trust which distributes non-UK-source income, who can rely on ESC B18 
(see 4.3.5) to recover UK tax at trustee level on that income. The courts may in fact decline to apply 
Garland v Archer-Shee in this way. In Kelly v Rogers (see 4.3.3.1), Romer LJ indicated (obiter at 19 TC 
713) that if the income beneficiary had been non-UK-resident, then the UK-resident trustees would 
not have been taxable on the trust’s non-UK-source income. In that case (which postdated both 
Williams v Singer and the Archer-Shee litigation), the trust’s governing law meant that the UK-resident 
income beneficiary had no entitlement to specific underlying trust income. At a minimum, the rule in 
Baker v Archer-Shee should be confined to cases where there is a prima facie UK income tax liability, 
either because there is UK-source trust income or the holder of the vested income interest is UK-
resident.  Hence, Garland v Archer-Shee would never apply to the extent that non-UK-source trust 
income was to be applied for the benefit of a non-UK-resident life interest holder.  
 
Thirdly, formulating the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee as a rule of trust law means that it does not catch 
all income of the life interest holder for UK tax purposes.  There are a number of items which 
constitute “income” for tax purposes which do not amount to “income” under trust law. Such items 
cannot be treated as income of a life interest holder under the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee.  In one 
respect this makes sense: the life interest holder would not be entitled to require the trustees to pay 
it these amounts because they are not “income” under trust law. Therefore, it should not be taxed as 
if it is entitled to them as they arise.  However, because these items are “income” for tax purposes 
but not under trust law, then to that extent the trust is not “transparent”. Some such items may be 
taxed as income at the level of the trustee alone, under Section 481 ITA (see 4.3.5). Good295 examples 
of items which are “income” for tax purposes, but not for trust purposes, arise under the “short lease 
premium” rules and the rules taxing accrued income on debt securities.  The former296 tax as income 
part of the premium paid for the grant of certain shorter leases even though any such premium 
(unlike rent) is typically regarded for trust law purposes as a capital receipt when granting a lease.  
The accrued income rules297 bring into the income tax charge that element of the sale price of a debt 
security which represents accrued but unpaid interest. For trust law purposes, that “cum div” element 
                                                          
295 These examples are by no means exhaustive.  
296 Chapter 4 Part 3 ITTOIA and Chapter 4 Part 4 CTA 2009. 
297 Part 12 ITA. For corporation tax, an equivalent effect is achieved via the “loan relationships” code in Parts 5 






of the sale price of the security would be treated simply as part of its capital value (unlike the actual 
receipt of interest on an interest payment date)298.  
 
Fourthly, it appears that HMRC practice somewhat mitigates this aspect of the rule in Baker v Archer-
Shee. In particular299, where the trustees of a life interest trust carry on a taxable trade which would 
entitle them to claim capital (i.e. depreciation) allowances on the non-circulating assets of that trade, 
HMRC allow the life interest holder to claim those capital allowances and take them into account in 
computing its income from the trust.  This is sensible, not least because it should ensure that the life 
interest holder’s taxable income can be no greater than that of the trustees.  However, this answer is 
not easy to reconcile with the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee.  Where that rule applies in respect of a 
trading trust300, it simply treats underlying trust income (as defined under trust law principles) as the 
source of the life interest holder’s income.  Yet capital allowances are a standalone form of tax 
depreciation only.  They are not the same as commercial depreciation based on accounting principles, 
which may already be reflected in the trust law definition of income.  Capital allowances are a 
separate tax relief and are not automatically built into the concept of the income of a trade, for tax or 
trust law purposes301.   
                                                          
298 In the past, trust law and income tax law were aligned in this respect: see Wigmore v Thomas Summerson & 
Sons Ltd 9 TC 577. Accrued income profits will be taxed on the trustees at the special rates of income tax 
discussed at 4.3.5 (see Sections 481-2 ITA 2007) unless the trust is equivalent to one within Section 60 TCGA.  In 
that case, the trust is transparent in much the same way as a trust within Section 60 (see Section 666 ITA).  
Where a debt security is bought with accrued interest (“cum div”), the element of the purchase price 
representing accrued interest is offset against interest payable on the next interest payment date. The person 
entitled to that interest gets tax relief accordingly. If Baker v Archer-Shee applies, that person will be the life 
interest holder who thereby gets tax relief for an amount which, under trust law principles, is probably part of 
the capital cost of the security.  
299 See TSEM3772 in the Trusts Settlements and Estates Manual (accessed 10 June 2020). 
300 Questions have been raised about whether the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee can apply to a life interest in a 
trust which is carrying on an active trade.  This point arose (without being decided) in judicial review 
proceedings regarding retrospective tax legislation: see Kenneth Parker J in R on the application of Robert 
Huitson v HMRC [2010] EWHC 97 (Admin) and, in particular, paragraphs 52-3.  In that case, Baker v Archer-Shee 
was being relied on as part of a tax avoidance scheme involving a claim for treaty protection in respect of the 
profits of an Isle of Man partnership in which the UK-resident taxpayer invested via a life interest trust.  There 
were other purposive arguments on treaty interpretation which could have been deployed by HMRC anyway.  
Moreover, the court in Huitson was not referred to Syme v Commissioner of Taxes [1914] AC 1013, discussed at 
4.3.3.1.  In that case the court did apply to an “active” trust a principle very similar to the rule in Baker v Archer-
Shee.  Although a decision of the Privy Council, Syme is certainly very persuasive authority on the point. For this 
reason, the author doubts the correctness of the statement in Tiley’s Revenue Law (9th edition), at page 635, fn 
56, that an “active trust” is not subject to the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee.  Indeed, when corporation tax rates 
were higher than basic rate income tax pre-1984, trading trusts (rather than private limited companies) were in 
fact set up to take advantage of Baker.  The vested income beneficiaries would be the grandchildren of the 
settlor (thereby avoiding trust income attribution to the “settlor”); the trustees would only be taxed at the basic 
rate of income tax; and the beneficiaries could potentially use their own tax reliefs to recover some or all of the 
tax paid by the trustees.  For a discussion of how a trading trust could still be used to limit UK tax to 20% on 
profits from trading in UK land, see Patrick Soares: “Using Family Trading Trusts for Land Deals – Stopping Tax at 
the Basic Rate” (2008) Gray’s Inn Tax Chambers Review. Volume VII, No 2.  
301 Capital allowances are regulated by the Capital Allowances Act 2001. Under the HMRC practice described in 
the main text, if the life interest holder can claim capital allowances, then presumably the trust income must be 
increased to exclude any commercial depreciation already reflected in that income for trust law purposes.  
Otherwise, the life interest holder’s taxable income would be reduced by both capital allowances and 
commercial depreciation! HMRC practice seems generous to the life interest holder in further respects.  In 
particular, if capital allowances are claimed in respect of an asset used by trustees in a trade but that asset is 
later sold for more than its tax-written-down value, the excess over that value may be clawed back as income 







Therefore overall, the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee, when applicable, offers a life interest holder a 
degree of income tax “transparency”.  The life interest holder should therefore be entitled to any 
special rates of taxation applicable to the underlying trust income (e.g. lower rates of tax in 
dividends). Furthermore, if that income has been subject at source to non-UK taxation, the life 
interest holder should much be better placed to claim double taxation relief e.g. by way of credit.  
However, this form of “transparency” is by no means complete, in contrast to the position applying to 
“bare trusts”.  The rule is also idiosyncratic, not least because when it applies is dictated (at least in 
part) by the governing law of the relevant trust. These idiosyncracies have further knock-on effects 
when applying double tax treaties, as discussed in 6.8.6.  
 
4.3.4   Trusts with a vested interest in possession: capital gains tax 
 
For capital gains tax purposes, there is no equivalent of the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee. Where a trust 
does not fall within Section 60 TCGA, then the trust property will be “settled property” for capital 
gains tax purposes302.  The trustees will be treated as a separate and continuing person distinct from 
the persons who are trustees from time to time303.  Where that separate person is UK-resident304, 
then that person is potentially subject to capital gains tax at normal capital gains tax rates in its own 
right305.    
 
Some “interest in possession” trusts (because of the identity of the particular beneficiary) are eligible 
to pay tax on gains in respect of certain business assets owned by the trust at only 10%, because of 
“entrepreneurs’ relief”306.  Likewise, certain “interest in possession” trusts can benefit from 
“investors’ relief” on disposing of shares307. That relief is a preferential 10% rate of capital gains tax 
when certain non-listed shareholdings are disposed of.  Other types of trust (e.g. a discretionary trust) 
cannot benefit from either of those reliefs.      
 
Therefore a trust which falls outside Section 60 TCGA is in principle “opaque” for capital gains tax 
purposes, whether or not there is a vested interest in possession.  This is also true if the trust is non-
UK-resident under the rules in Section 69 TCGA. A transfer of assets to the trust will therefore be an 
outright disposal of the entire property being settled, even if the settlor is a trustee and/or has a 
beneficial interest under the trust308.  Generally, a transfer of an asset from the trust to a beneficiary 
will, if the trust is UK-resident, trigger a deemed disposal and reacquisition of that asset by the 
trustees at open market value309. If that results in a gain, the tax is a liability of the trust which cannot 
                                                          
clawback amount as part of the disposal price of a capital asset of the trust.  Because that amount is not trust 
income, the life interest holder should not be taxed on it even though it represents capital allowances already 
claimed by the life interest holder in reducing its taxable income from the trust.    
302 Section 68 TCGA. 
303 Section 69 TCGA. 
304 Under the rules in Section 69(2A) to (2E) TCGA. Rates of tax are currently 28% for capital gains in respect of, 
in particular, residential property and 20% in respect of almost all other capital gains. Because a UK-resident 
trust is now subject to capital gains tax at full marginal rates, the rules which used to attribute trust gains to a 
UK-resident settlor were abolished in 2008 in relation to UK-resident trusts. This further reduces the effective 
“transparency” of such trusts for the purposes of capital gains tax.   
305 Unlike the situation which pertains when Section 60 TCGA applies.  
306 See Chapter 3 Part V TCGA and in particular Section 169J TCGA.  The relevant “interest in possession” must 
not be for a fixed term. 
307 See Chapter 5 Part V TCGA and in particular Section 169VH TCGA.  Again, the relevant “interest in 
possession” must not be for a fixed term.  
308 Section 70 TCGA. 






be sheltered with reliefs (e.g. losses) available to the beneficiary. If it results in a loss, there is limited 
scope310 for the beneficiary to inherit and use those losses, provided they cannot be used by the 
trustees. In some cases, there may be scope for trustees to transfer a chargeable asset to a 
beneficiary without triggering gain if a “hold-over” relief claim is made.  In that case, the beneficiary 
acquires the asset at the historic base cost of the trustees311. 
 
This “opaque” tax treatment of the trust can mean that the UK tax burden in respect of capital gains is 
higher if those assets are held in a UK-resident trust than if they are held directly by the UK-taxpaying 
beneficiaries.  While the tax system should not encourage the use of trusts as a means of tax 
avoidance, making it detrimental tax-wise to put assets into a trust seems a step too far, given that a 
trust is above all an asset protection mechanism, for the benefit of its beneficiaries. 
 
Because trusts outwith Section 60 TCGA 1992 are not “transparent” for capital gains tax purposes, 
complex additional rules are required to deal with the consequences, and in particular the avoidance 
possibilities, to which an “opaque” trust gives rise.  While this is not the place for a  detailed analysis 
of those additional rules, a good example are the rules which can attribute capital gains of non-UK-
resident or dual-resident settlements to certain UK-resident settlors312 or to beneficiaries313 of such 
settlements.  These rules limit the scope for deferring UK capital gains tax by allowing gains to roll up 
untaxed in trusts which are otherwise outside the UK taxing jurisdiction.  
 
There are also rules which can relieve from capital gains tax a disposal of an interest in a trust falling 
outside Section 60 TCGA314.  These rules reflect the fact that the UK-resident trust is itself a separate 
taxable person for capital gains tax purposes.  Therefore a further tax charge should not necessarily 
arise when disposing of a trust interest which reflects underlying gain which is taxable at trust level. 
Otherwise there would be double taxation.  However, these tax-relieving rules on the disposals of 
trust interests are in turn disapplied in a number of cases to limit avoidance315. That in turn resurrects 
the risk of economic double taxation of trust capital gains: once at the level of the trust and again at 
the level of the beneficiaries.   
 
4.3.5  Trusts with no vested interest in possession: income tax and capital gains tax 
 
                                                          
310 Section 71(2) TCGA. 
311 Furthermore, Chapter 4 Part 2 Finance Act 2005 creates a special elective tax regime for trusts for 
“vulnerable beneficiaries” (essentially certain minors who are orphaned or who are the victims of crime; plus 
disabled persons).  This regime does not give rise to a fully “transparent” trust for income tax and capital gains 
tax purposes.  However, it does permit the trustees’ income and capital gains tax liabilities to be modified by 
reference to what the tax position would have been if the “vulnerable beneficiary” had been directly entitled to 
the trust’s income and gains. Because of certain tax reliefs and exemptions which are available to individuals but 
not to trustees (e.g. the income tax personal allowance), this is likely to lead to a reduced effective rate on the 
trust’s income and gains.      
312 Section 86 and Schedule 5 TCGA.  
313 Sections 87 to 96 TCGA.   
314 See Section 76 TCGA. In Harthan v Mason [1980] STC 94, it was made clear that what is now Section 76 TCGA 
could not apply to a disposal of an interest in a trust within Section 60 TCGA because such a trust is not “settled 
property” for capital gains tax purposes.   
315 See Section 76(1A) and (1B) TCGA, Section 76A and Schedule 4A TCGA and Section 85 TCGA. Section 85 in 
particular disapplies the Section 76 exemption when an interest in a non-UK-resident trust is disposed of, on the 
assumption that the trust may well not be subject to UK capital gains tax.  However, this is not necessarily true, 
not least because it may be taxable in the UK on gains from disposing of certain direct or indirect holdings in UK 






Trusts with no vested interest in possession are by definition outside Section 60 TCGA. Therefore, 
they are not “transparent” for capital gains tax purposes and are subject to the taxation regime 
summarised in 4.3.4.   
 
The income taxation of such trusts is more complicated but ends up in practice conferring a degree of 
relief from income taxation on beneficiaries, to reflect income tax borne by the trustees.  Thus double 
taxation of income at the level of both the trustees and the beneficiary is avoided.  Furthermore, the 
tax ultimately payable on that income can managed so that it is roughly what would have been paid if 
the beneficiary had been entitled to the underlying trust assets directly. However, this mechanism for 
taxing trust income, and avoiding it being taxed twice, is a very qualified form of “transparency”, not 
least because beneficiaries are not currently taxable on underlying trust income as it arises to the 
trustees and whether or not it is distributed.   
 
The rule in Baker v Archer-Shee is inapplicable. Instead Part 9 ITA comes into play. In particular, 
Section 479 ITA charges income tax316 at the “dividend trust rate”317 (on dividend income) or the 
“trust rate” 318 (on other income of the trust) where “accumulated or discretionary income arises to 
the trustees of a settlement”319 which is not a charitable trust.  This charge to tax on the trustees is 
not merely a representative charge.  Hence it differs from the income tax charge on trustees of 
interest in possession trusts which is “representative” i.e. its scope is qualified by the tax status of the 
vested income beneficiary on whose behalf the trustee is taxed.320   
 
The income tax rates on the trustees of this kind of trust are equal to the highest individual income 
tax rates. This discourages accumulation of income within the trust.  This contrasts with the 
corporation tax treatment of a UK-resident company whose undistributed income is taxed at a fairly 
low rate (currently 19%), which is significantly less than individual income tax rates. This encourages 
companies not to retain income. A company and a discretionary trust are often not radically dissimilar 
in terms of the way they are structured and function.  However, they will be subject to very different 
regimes for taxing their income.     
 
Section 480 ITA defines “accumulated or discretionary income” as follows: 
 
“(1) Income is accumulated or discretionary income so far as – 
(a) it must be accumulated, or 
(b) it is payable at the discretion of the trustees or any other person, 
and it is not excluded by subsection (3). 
 
                                                          
316 This charge can in principle apply to relevant trusts which are non-UK-resident in respect of their UK-source 
income: see IRC v Regent Trust Co Ltd (as Trustee of the Butt 1970 Settlement) 53 TC 54.  However, this will be 
subject to the limits on the UK income tax charge in respect of non-UK-residents in Chapter 1 Part 14 ITA (and in 
particular Sections 811-2 ITA). These limits will apply provided there are no actual or contingent UK-resident 
beneficiaries of the trust. 
317 Currently 38.1%: see Section 9 ITA.  This is currently equal to the highest rate of UK income tax on individuals 
in respect of dividends and other “distributions”.  
318 Currently 45%: see Section 9 ITA.  This is currently equal to the highest rate of UK income tax on individuals.  
319 Section 466 ITA (and in particular Section 466(4)) makes clear that property held in trust is within a 
“settlement” unless, in essence, the trust is of a type which could fall within Section 60 TCGA (see Section 
466(3), (5) and (6) ITA).  






(2) The cases covered by subsection 1(b) include cases where the trustees have, or any other 
person has, any discretion over one or more of the following matters321- 
(a) whether, or the extent to which, the income is to be accumulated, 
(b) the persons to whom the income is to be paid, and  
(c) how much of the income is to be paid to any person. 
 
(3) Income is excluded for the purposes of subsection (1) so far as –  
(a) before being distributed, it is the income of any person other than the trustees322, 
(b) it is income from property within subsection (4), or   
(c) it is income from service charges which are paid in respect of dwellings in the United Kingdom 
and are held on trust. 
 
(4) Property is within this subsection if it –  
(a) is held for the purposes of a superannuation fund …….[relating to a non-UK undertaking]….but 
(b) is not held as a member of a property investment LLP [a form of UK LLP primarily invested in 
real estate]……”  
 
The wording in Section 480(1) regarding accumulation of income or payment of income at the 
discretion of a trustee, etc, indicates that “accumulated or discretionary income” for Section 480 
purposes means income as defined under trust law, rather than tax law323.     
 
However, Section 481 ITA then extends the tax charge at the dividend trust rate or the trust rate to a 
list of items of taxable income324 in Section 482 ITA.  Significantly, this brings into charge to income 
tax at the higher trust rates certain items which would not be regarded as income for trust law 
purposes and hence would not be taxed in the hands of a holder of a vested interest in possession 
under the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee: see 4.3.3.2.  To that extent, one of the gaps (from HMRC’s 
perspective) in the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee is plugged indirectly, although the result is that these 
items may be taxed at a rate well in excess of the effective income tax rate of any interest in 
possession holder.    
 
The Section 481 charge does not apply to unit trusts (see 4.3.6) nor to charitable trusts nor to 
property held in relation to superannuation funds regarding non-UK undertakings.  It also does not 
                                                          
321 Section 480(2) ITA provides examples of the scope of Section 480(1) in a manner consistent with the broad 
interpretation of the predecessor legislation in IRC v Berrill [1981] STC 784.   
322 This effectively carves out underlying trust income to which a beneficiary is entitled under the rule in Baker v 
Archer-Shee. 
323 See also Chapter 29.2.3.2 at page 633 in Tiley’s Revenue Law (9th edition): Loutzenhiser. In Trustees of the PL 
Travers Will Trust v HMRC [2014] SFTD 265, the First-Tier Tribunal (Tax) analysed the principles determining 
whether trust receipts are income or capital under trust law.  It then applied them to two separate categories of 
copyright royalty received by a trust set up by the late author of Mary Poppins. On the facts, there was a 
direction to accumulate some of those royalties, for the purposes of Sections 479-480 ITA. This accumulation 
was not altered by any need to make good the value of the underlying copyright, which was a wasting asset.  
324 These items include accrued income profits of trustees in respect of debt securities; and amounts realised by 
the trustees under the “offshore fund” rules or in respect of “deeply discounted securities”. They also include 
certain distributions to trustees on a redemption or repurchase of a company’s shares and amounts payable to 
trustees under arrangements offering a choice of an income or capital return from a company.  The items 
mentioned in the last sentence are subject to the dividend trust rate, rather than the trust rate, of tax.  
Interestingly, the items listed do not include a balancing charge recapturing excess capital allowances. This 
would ordinarily be taxed as income, even though for trust law purposes, it would simply be part of the disposal 






apply to “accumulated or discretionary income”325 or what would be such income barring the 
exclusions in Section 480(3)(a)326or (c). 
 
The income tax charge at the trust rate or dividend trust rate can be mitigated by setting against it 
certain expenses of the trustees327. Those expenses must be properly chargeable to income of the 
trust as a matter of general trust law, ignoring the express terms of the settlement328. Section 486 
sets out in detail the steps for grossing up the relevant expenses and setting them off against 
different types of income taxable at the trust rate or the dividend trust rate.  Trust income offset by 
expenses in this way nevertheless remains taxable in the hands of the trustees at the basic rate 
(currently 20%) on the basis that they are “receiving or entitled” to it329.   
 
Relief from economic double taxation of the same income (at both trustee and beneficiary level) 
stems from Chapter 7 Part 4 ITA (and especially Sections 493-4 ITA). These only apply where an 
“annual payment” is made by the trustees of a settlement in the exercise of a discretion330, at a time 
when the trustees are UK-resident. Furthermore, that payment to the beneficiary must either 
constitute income of the beneficiary purely because of the fact of payment331; or be treated as 
                                                          
325 As defined in Section 480 ITA 2007 and charged under Section 479 ITA 2007. 
326 This exclusion makes clear that the Section 481 charge does not apply to income already taxable at the level 
of the life interest holder under Baker v Archer-Shee.  
327 Chapter 4 Part 9 ITA. 
328 See Section 484(5) ITA.  Hence the scope of the relief for trustee expenses cannot be expanded by providing 
expressly in the settlement for a broader class of expenses to be chargeable to trust income.  This is consistent 
with case law on the less explicit predecessor legislation: see Carver v Duncan, Bosanquet v Allen [1985] STC 
356, which also ruled that expenses incurred for the benefit of the whole trust estate (i.e. whose object is to 
benefit both the income and capital beneficiaries) must be charged to trust capital. For further authority on 
whether trust expenses are properly chargeable to income or capital of the trust, see In re Bennett, Jones v 
Bennett [1896] 1 Ch 778 and In re Sherry, Sherry v Sherry [1913] 2 Ch 508.  The implications of Carver v Duncan 
and In re Bennett were explored by the Court of Appeal in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Trustees of 
the Peter Clay Discretionary Trust [2009] STC 469.  The court accepted that if trustee and other professional fees 
can be properly apportioned between those attributable to dealing with the income of the trust and those 
attributable to dealing with trust capital (including income which the trustees have decided to accumulate), 
then the fees attributable purely to income can be charged to income and deducted under what is now Section 
484(5) ITA.  
329 See Section 484(4) ITA.  The “representative” basic rate charge on trustees’ income is thereby reinstated 
where the higher rate charges in Sections 479 and 481 ITA are inapplicable.   
330 Vinelott J in IRC v Berrill [1981] STC 784 at 798 stated (in relation to similar wording in the predecessor 
legislation) that the concept of the exercise of a discretion should be construed broadly. In particular, it could 
cover a situation where a beneficiary’s right to trust income becomes indefeasible because a power of 
accumulation or a power to divert income to some other beneficiary or purpose comes to an end, without the 
trustee exercising that power.   
331 This means that the payment must amount to new income (and not an advance of trust capital, even if there 
is underlying trust income) in the hands of the beneficiary because of the exercise of discretion. That would not 
be the case if the beneficiary were already entitled to the underlying trust income under the rule in Baker v 
Archer-Shee. It is generally accepted that there would be new income if a discretion were exercised in favour of 
the beneficiary. There is considerable authority on whether such discretionary payments are income or capital 
in the hands of the beneficiaries: for example, Trustees of the Will of H.K. Brodie v IRC 17 TC 432; Lindus & Hortin 
v IRC 17 TC 442; Jackson’s Trustees v IRC 25 TC 13; Cunard’s Trustees v IRC 27 TC 122.  Such payments (even if 
made out of trust capital) are likely to be income in the hands of the beneficiary if there is evidence of an 
intention to create an annuity or to ensure that the beneficiary maintains a specified level of income. However, 
the relevant facts are key and such payments, even if recurrent, may be treated as not being income, because 
they are made under a power to appoint capital: see Stevenson v Wishart [1986] STC 74 and [1987] STC 266.  In 
that case, it was important that the beneficiary was the object of a separate power to appoint capital and was 






income of a settlor under the rules attributing to a settlor income of a “settlement” paid to his or her 
relevant minor children.   
 
Where these rules apply, the “annual payment” made by the trust is grossed up for income tax 
purposes at the special trust rate of 45%.  The beneficiary, in particular, is treated as having paid 
income tax equal to the amount of that grossing-up332.  If that beneficiary has relevant reliefs and 
allowances, a refund may be obtained of the tax treated as paid at source on this “annual payment”.  
Any such refund is usually in effect a refund of the tax paid by the trustees under Sections 479 and 
481 ITA.  This is because much of that tax paid by the trustees when UK-resident is allocated to a “tax 
pool”333.  The running total of that “tax pool” is then matched against the amount by which “annual 
payments” from the trust have been grossed up.  Provided that the amount of the pool equals or 
exceeds the amount of the gross-up, the trustees have no further obligation to account for tax which 
the beneficiary is treated as having paid at source in respect of the “annual payment”.        
 
However, these rules are more a form of relief from economic double taxation rather than outright 
“transparency”.  The beneficiary has no entitlement to underlying income of the trust: the “source” of 
its income is a separate source - the exercise of a discretion in its favour.  Moreover the income from 
that separate source does not “mirror” the characteristics of the trust’s underlying income which 
funds it. This is highlighted by what happens if the only income of the trustees consists of dividends.  
In that case, the trustees will be taxed at the “dividend trust rate” of 38.1% but any discretionary 
payment funded by those dividends will be grossed up and taxed at 45%.  In short, that payment by 
the trustees is a distinct revenue item which is not treated as a dividend, despite being funded by 
them334. Because the “dividend trust rate” is less than 45%, the trustees will have to make good the 
shortfall between 38.1% tax on their dividend income and the 45% tax treated as paid on the 
discretionary payment335. Alternatively they will have to limit the latter payment, so that the amount 
of the gross-up does not exceed the amount of tax on the underlying dividend income.  The 
beneficiary’s income entitlement only comes into being when that discretion is exercised and the 
income becomes distributable to it, which is likely to postdate the accrual and payment of underlying 
trust income.  This is different from a classic case of “transparency” where the beneficiary is taxable 
on its share of underlying trust income as it arises, and whether or not it is distributed. 
 
The beneficiary, if non-UK-resident, may be unable to use a double taxation treaty to recover UK tax 
treated as paid in respect of the “annual payment”.  In particular, the UK has increasingly insisted, 
when negotiating treaties, that income arising from trusts and estates be excluded from the “Other 
                                                          
purpose (in that case, care home living expenses).  While such a trust distribution in the form of capital will not 
attract income tax, it is very likely to trigger inheritance tax: see 5.3.  See also Avery Jones: Trusts op. cit. page 
388 at fn 83.  
332 If the trust is caught by the “settlement” rules under Section 619 ITTOIA, things work differently.  In that case 
the recipient of the annual payment is treated as having paid income tax on that amount at the additional rate 
of 45%. That deemed tax payment is fully creditable against the recipient’s own tax liability but is not 
refundable: see Section 685A ITTOIA.   
333 See Sections 497 and 498 ITA.  The “tax pool” cannot include any amounts of UK tax which are in fact offset 
by the trustees claiming a credit for non-UK tax in respect of trust income. If the beneficiary receiving the 
income distribution from the trust is subject to UK corporation tax (which is unlikely), Section 610 CTA 2010 
ignores that distribution for corporation tax purposes but the beneficiary cannot obtain a refund of tax treated 
as paid at source in respect of it.  
334 Contrast in this regard the US tax treatment of a so-called “complex trust”: see 7.2.2 below.  
335 For a numerical example, see Example 18.5 on pages 556-7 in Fairpo and Salter: “Revenue Law: Principles 






Income” Article336. This preserves UK taxing rights in relation to UK-resident trustees. However, as 
discussed below, the non-UK-resident beneficiary may be able to claim other reliefs from UK tax.  
 
Section 111 TIOPA gives a UK-taxable beneficiary receiving discretionary income from UK-resident 
trustees the right to a UK foreign tax credit for creditable non-UK tax borne by those trustees. Hence 
to this extent, the trust is “looked through”.  In order for the beneficiary to claim this credit, the 
trustees must certify337 to HMRC that the discretionary payment is made at least in part from income 
giving rise to creditable non-UK tax and from a specified source.  That income must have arisen to the 
trustees not earlier than six years before the end of the UK tax year338 in which the discretionary 
income payment is made.  
 
The approach of Section 111 seems consistent with Drummond v Collins 8 TC 525. There it was 
decided that discretionary payments of income to UK-resident beneficiaries by the non-UK trustees of 
a foreign trust had as their “source” the non-UK trust fund, even though the beneficiaries had no 
proprietary interest in it. Of course Section 111 is limited to cases where the trustees are UK-resident, 
unlike Drummond. However, where discretionary trustees are non-UK-resident, a UK-taxable 
beneficiary may be able to rely on Drummond to claim a credit (under Sections 8 and 9 TIOPA) for 
non-UK tax on underlying trust income if it can show that its discretionary entitlement has been 
funded from the same taxed underlying income.  In that case, the “source” of the discretionary 
payment is the same as that of the underlying income. In practice, it may be hard to “trace” a 
discretionary entitlement to particular taxed items of underlying trust income.   
 
In any case, HMRC has adopted a further concessionary practice which adds an element of 
“transparency” to the income tax treatment of beneficiaries in trusts where there is no vested 
interest in possession339. This concession allows beneficiaries to “look through” the trust for certain 
additional purposes and falls into two parts.  The first applies to UK-resident trusts.  Where a 
beneficiary of such a trust receives a discretionary payment within Sections 493-4 ITA, the beneficiary 
may claim tax relief if and to the extent that the discretionary payment is made from underlying trust 
income which would have given rise to certain reliefs if it had been received directly by the 
beneficiary. The reliefs in question are those applying to certain tax-exempt UK government securities 
targeted at non-UK-residents340; double tax treaty relief; and any other relief which would have been 
                                                          
336 See for example Article 22(1) of the UK-US double tax treaty of 24 July 2001: SI 2002/2848. The Exchange of 
Notes by the UK and the US in respect of that treaty provides: “It is understood that the purpose of the 
exclusion from the paragraph for income paid out of trusts or the estates of deceased persons in the course of 
administration is to allow a recipient of such income the relief that would have been available to him under the 
provisions of the [treaty] had he received the income direct instead of through the trust or estate.” This is a 
reference to the further rules and practices which HMRC has now adopted in this area and which are discussed 
in the main text. See also in this regard Statement of Practice 3/86. According to one commentator, the UK has 
sought to exclude trust and estate income from the scope of the “Other Income” Article because otherwise no 
UK withholding tax at all would be payable on income from a discretionary trustee: see Avery Jones: Trusts op. 
cit. at 396.  
337 In practice, the trustees may not be willing to undertake this certification burden.  
338 6th April to the following 5th April.  
339 See Extra-Statutory Concession (“ESC”) B18 (and for UK estates in the course of administration, ESC A14). 
These Concessions are of long standing but should surely be put on a statutory footing, given the tax authorities’ 
limited powers to grant Extra-Statutory Concessions under their statutory powers to manage the tax system: 
see Lord Hoffmann giving the main judgment of the House of Lords in R (on the application of Wilkinson) v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners [2006] STC 270 at 276. ESC B14 is a radical modification of the statutory rules 
which would otherwise apply. It goes well beyond “dealing pragmatically with minor or transitory anomalies, 
cases of hardship at the margins or cases in which a statutory rule is difficult to formulate or its enactment 
would take up a disproportionate amount of parliamentary time”.  






available because the beneficiary is non-UK-resident.  In short, this first part of ESC B18 is targeted at 
non-UK-resident beneficiaries of a UK-resident discretionary trust. ESC B18 gives relief to the extent 
that the discretionary payment is made from income arising to the trustees within six years before the 
end of the UK tax year in which that payment is made341. The payment is treated as made ratably out 
of all sources of trust income on a last-in-first-out basis. Hence ESC B18 contains “tracing” rules. The 
trustees must be fully UK tax-compliant.  The beneficiary must claim relief within five years and ten 
months from the end of the tax year in which it received the discretionary payment. This time limit, 
plus the six-year condition mentioned above, ensures that HMRC has no open-ended obligation to 
give relief.  
 
The second part of ESC B18 applies where a beneficiary (whether or not UK-resident) receives a 
payment from discretionary trustees which is not within Sections 493-4 ITA (because non-UK-resident 
trustees exercise their discretion outside the UK).  Where a non-UK-resident beneficiary receives a 
discretionary payment from trust income which would have been chargeable to UK tax if received 
directly by it, that beneficiary may claim by concession a UK personal tax allowance in respect of that 
income. It can, however, only claim relief for UK tax in fact paid by the non-UK-resident trustees on 
that income (e.g. UK-source rental income) from which the discretionary payment is sourced.  To the 
extent that the payment is sourced from interest on FOTRA Securities, the beneficiary can claim a UK 
tax exemption for the discretionary payment.   
 
A UK-resident beneficiary receiving a discretionary payment from non-UK-resident trustees may claim 
credit for UK tax in fact paid by the trustees on income funding the discretionary payment, as if the 
payment were from a UK-resident trust to which Chapter 7 Part 9 ITA applied342. The trustees must 
again be fully UK tax-compliant, which will include paying UK tax on UK-source income (see fn 316). 
The beneficiary must claim relief within five years and ten months from the end of the tax year in 
which it received the discretionary payment. 
 
 
4.3.6  “Unit trusts” 
 
4.3.6.1  The concept of a “unit trust” 
 
No discussion of how trusts are treated for UK tax purposes, and whether they are “transparent”, 
would be complete without considering the special UK rules applicable to “unit trusts”.  These are a 
trust-based form of collective investment vehicle which has been very widely used in the UK, both as 
a vehicle for retail investors and also for more sophisticated investors and forms of investment.  Since 
the late 1990’s, “unit trusts” have increasingly been displaced, as a retail collective investment 
vehicle, by UK “open-ended investment companies”.  However, in other areas they have continued to 
                                                          
341 In a limited number of UK double tax treaties, the first limb of ESC B18 has in effect been reflected in the 
“Other Income” Article: see Brabazon op. cit. at page 248. For a simplified example of how ESC B18 operates, 
see Naomi Wells, “Staying Offshore” Taxation (17 January 2019) 12 at 13.  
342 No credit is given for any non-repayable UK tax treated as paid on income of the non-UK-resident trustees, 
where that tax would not be capable of entering the “tax pool” (see above) if the trustees had been UK-
resident. The most obvious example of this was the old UK “tax credit” on dividend income, which was 
abolished in 2016.  However, this non-repayable tax is ignored when grossing up the beneficiary’s discretionary 
income for the purposes of ESC B18.  ESC B18 should also entitle the UK-resident beneficiary to a foreign tax 
credit for non-UK tax imposed on distributed trust income in the state of source (but not third-state tax on the 






flourish, notably in relation to investment in UK commercial property, which has often been 
undertaken from outside the UK via a Jersey property unit trust or “JPUT”343. 
 
The current definition for tax purposes of a “unit trust scheme” is in fact in the UK’s legislation 
regulating financial services.  Section 237(1) Financial Services and Markets Act (“FSMA”) 2000 
provides that “….’unit trust scheme’ means a collective investment scheme under which the property 
is held on trust for the participants, except that it does not include a contractual scheme.” The key 
concept of a “collective investment scheme” is discussed below. “Contractual schemes” are a 
relatively new form of regulated UK collective investment structure typically used by non-retail 
investors. They are intended to be fully income tax-transparent in the UK and are either constituted 
as contractual co-ownership schemes or (more rarely) as limited partnerships formed under the 
Limited Partnerships Act 1907344.  They are of limited significance to the present discussion. 
 
“Collective investment scheme” is mainly defined, broadly, in Section 235 FSMA: 
 
“(1) In this Part, ‘collective investment scheme’ means any arrangements with respect to property 
of any description, including money, the purpose or effect of which is to enable persons taking part 
in the arrangements (whether by becoming owners of the property or any part of it or otherwise) to 
participate in or receive profits or income arising from the acquisition, holding, management or 
disposal of the property or sums paid out of such profits or income. [emphasis added] 
 
(2) The arrangements must be such that the persons who are to participate (‘participants’) do not 
have day-to-day control over the management of the property, whether or not they have the right 
to be consulted or to give directions. 
 
(3) The arrangements must also have either or both of the following characteristics: 
(a) the contributions of the participants and the profits or income out of which payments are to be 
made to them are pooled; 
(b) the property is managed as a whole by or on behalf of the operator of the scheme. 
 
                                                          
343The attraction of a JPUT stems mainly from its “semi-transparent” status for UK tax purposes.  In particular, it 
has been treated as a non-UK-resident company, and hence “opaque”, for UK capital gains tax and stamp duty 
land tax (“SDLT”) purposes.  Hence interests in it could typically be sold by non-UK-resident investors without 
incurring SDLT or tax on capital gains (although this capital gains tax advantage largely ended in April 2019).  
However, a JPUT is typically “transparent” for income tax purposes because it is formed under a governing law 
(e.g. Jersey) which is consistent with English law as per Baker v Archer-Shee. Income tax “transparency” in 
particular enables JPUT investors to claim capital allowances (i.e. tax depreciation) when computing their share 
of the underlying net rental income from the UK property.  If the JPUT is “transparent” for income tax purposes, 
as per Baker v Archer-Shee, the new Schedule 5AAA TCGA allows an irrevocable election to treat it as a 
“transparent” partnership (within Section 59 TCGA) for the purposes of UK tax on capital gains. If the unit 
holders are, say, non-UK-resident tax exempts, this election can ensure that any gain on disposing of the UK 
property interest held by the JPUT is not taxable, which may no longer be the case otherwise. A sale of a JPUT 
interest will also be treated as a sale of the underlying property so that a purchaser of the JPUT will get a 
“stepped-up” base cost in that property for the purposes of UK tax on chargeable gains.  This  
would not be the case if it were held by a non-UK-resident company, which cannot make the election 
mentioned above. The main text further discusses the UK tax treatment of “unit trusts”.  The UK tax benefits of 
a JPUT will not be available unless it is a “collective investment scheme” (see the main text) for UK regulatory 
purposes, This will not be the case if there is only one unitholder and may not be the case if the manager of the 
trust is a company affiliated with the trust’s unitholders: see fn 348.  
344 “Contractual schemes” were perceived as enabling the UK to offer a non-trust-based tax-transparent 
collective investment vehicle which could, for example, compete with the Luxembourg “fonds commun de 






(4) If arrangements provide for such pooling as is mentioned in subsection (3)(a) in relation to 
separate parts of the property, the arrangements are not to be regarded as constituting a single 
collective investment scheme unless the participants are entitled to exchange rights in one part for 
rights in another.  
 
(5) The Treasury may by order provide that arrangements do not amount to a collective 
investment scheme: 
(a) in specified circumstances; or  
(b) if the arrangements fall within a specified category of arrangement.”    
 
This definition of a “collective investment scheme” (or “CIS”) is broad because it underpins the UK 
regulation of the marketing and managing of all types of collective investment structure345.  It is not a 
tax definition although it has been borrowed for tax purposes.  It catches all kinds of “arrangement”, 
which will include certain types of trust but much else besides346. “Arrangements” in this case need 
not be legally enforceable. 
 
The CIS definition has proved both broad and, in some respects, unclear.  This is problematic because 
there are serious criminal and other consequences if a person is not properly regulated to run a CIS. 
Therefore, under Section 235(5) FSMA, regulations347 have been made which expressly carve out of 
that definition a number of structures which potentially fall within it.  The list of carve-outs is both 
lengthy and eclectic348 but its impact is limited for tax purposes, meaning that the main definition in 
Section 235(1)-(4) remains of primary importance.  Hence any trust-based structure for collective 
investment is likely to be a CIS and hence a “unit trust scheme”349.  
 
Regulations have also been published350 purely for tax purposes which ensure that certain structures 
which are potentially trust-based are not taxed as “unit trust schemes”.  These regulations have no 
                                                          
345 See in particular Section 19 FSMA. 
346 Section 235(1) FSMA makes clear that participants in a CIS need not own the underlying CIS property.  This 
would, for example, be the case if the CIS were an open-ended investment company, rather than a trust.   
347 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Collective Investment Schemes) Order 2001 (SI 2001/1062) (“the 
2001 Order”). 
348 For example, paragraph 4 of the 2001 Order provides that “arrangements do not amount to a collective 
investment scheme if they are operated otherwise than by way of business”. Paragraph 8 carves out certain 
employee share schemes. Paragraph 10 states that “arrangements do not amount to a collective investment 
scheme if each of the participants is a body corporate in the same group as the operator [of the 
arrangements]”.  Paragraphs 19 and 20 carve out certain pension schemes. Finally paragraph 21 provides that: 
“(1) Subject to subparagraph (2), no body incorporated under the law of, or any part of, the United Kingdom 
relating to building societies or registered societies or registered under any such law relating to friendly 
societies, and no other body corporate other than an open-ended investment company, amounts to a collective 
investment scheme. 
(2) Subparagraph (1) does not apply to any body incorporated as a limited liability partnership.”   
349 The Supreme Court ruled in The Financial Conduct Authority v Asset LI Inc and others [2016] 3 All ER 93 on 
the meaning of Section 235 FSMA. Their ruling confirmed its breadth and fact-sensitivity but provided some 
useful guidance. In particular, Lord Sumption drew a distinction between (i) cases where the investor retains 
entire control of the relevant property but employs the services of an investment professional to advise on 
exploiting that property; and (ii) cases where that investor and other investors surrender control over their 
property to the scheme operator so that it can either be pooled or managed in common, in return for a share of 
the profits generated by the collective fund.  Only (ii) is a CIS but it can apply even where the investors retain 
legal and/or beneficial ownership of the property in question (e.g. if the property is co-owned under a trust).  
350 Capital Gains Tax (Definition of Unit Trust Scheme) Regulations 1988: SI 1988/266 as amended. Income Tax 






bearing on the regulatory status of these structures.  The most important structure carved out of 
“unit trust” status by these regulations, for both income tax and capital gains tax purposes, is a unit 
trust scheme which is a “limited partnership scheme”.   
 
The regulations provide351 that “A unit trust scheme is a limited partnership scheme when the scheme 
property is held on trust [emphasis added] for the general partners and the limited partners in a 
limited partnership.” Hence this carve-out should be irrelevant in relation to those forms of limited 
partnership which have a legal personality enabling them to own their own assets beneficially: such 
structures should typically not involve any trust over scheme property, so the question of “unit trust” 
status for tax and regulatory purposes should not arise352.  Scottish limited partnerships have separate 
legal personality enabling them to own assets beneficially.  Therefore, unlike English limited 
partnerships (which lack such personality), they should not need to rely on the 1988 Regulations to 
avoid being classified as “unit trust schemes” for capital gains tax and income tax purposes353.   
 
4.3.6.2  Tax treatment of unit trusts 
 
4.3.6.3.2.1  Authorised unit trusts 
 
If a trust constitutes a unit trust scheme for tax purposes, then the next key question is whether it is 
an “authorised unit trust scheme”.  This is defined in Section 237(3) FSMA as “a unit trust scheme 
which is authorised for the purposes of [FSMA] by an authorisation order in force under Section 243 
[FSMA]”. Authorisations are in essence only granted where the UK regulatory authorities are satisfied 
that the unit trust is of a kind which can properly be marketed to the public and, in particular, to retail 
investors. 
 
Section 617 CTA 2010 then provides: 
 
“(1) In respect of income arising to the trustees of an authorised unit trust, and for the purposes of 
the provisions relating to relief for capital expenditure, the Tax Acts have effect as if: 
(a) the trustees were a UK resident company; and 
(b) the rights of the unit holders were shares in the company.  
 
(2) References in the Corporation Tax Acts to a body corporate are to be read in accordance with 
subsection (1)….” 
 
Hence the income profits of an authorised unit trust are subject to corporation tax354. Section 618 
CTA 2010 then provides that a special rate of corporation tax applies to an authorised unit trust, 
which is equal to the basic rate of income tax for the corresponding tax year.  This is currently 20%.355  
However, dividend income of the authorised unit trust will typically be exempt from corporation tax 
because of the general exemption for such income356.  Interest income will be taxable but there is 
                                                          
Pooling Schemes) Regulations 1996: SI 1996/1583 as amended.  Income Tax (Pension Funds Pooling Schemes) 
Regulations 1996: SI 1996/1585 as amended.  
351 See paragraph 4 of the Capital Gains Tax (Definition of Unit Trust Scheme) Regulations 1988 and paragraph 8 
of the Income Tax (Definition of Unit Trust Scheme) Regulations 1988.    
352 Of course the relevant partnership, even if not trust-based, could still be a “collective investment scheme” 
for UK regulatory purposes.   
353 See 2 for a fuller discussion of a Scottish partnership.   
354 Unlike its capital gains: see fn 358.  
355 The normal “mainstream” rate of corporation tax is currently 19%.  






scope for the unit trust to be treated as paying interest distributions357 which are deductible by it for 
corporation tax purposes (and taxed as interest in the hands of unit holders).  
 
An “authorised unit trust” is also treated as a UK-resident company for capital gains tax purposes358 
and its unit holders are treated as shareholders.  However, Section 100(1) TCGA then provides that 
the capital gains of an “authorised unit trust” are not subject to capital gains tax. This helps to ensure 
that an “authorised unit trust” normally incurs no UK tax at the level of the unit trust itself, provided 
that it does not engage in activity which amounts to trading for UK tax purposes359.  Unit holders are 
taxed on the income of the trust as it arises in a number of different ways360.  In brief, the income of 
the unit trust is treated in every period of account as distributed to unit holders in a form which is 
either interest or dividends for UK tax purposes. This ensures that there is no scope for deferring 
investor taxation on the income of the unit trust, even if it is reinvested by the trust.    
 
Therefore, overall, an authorised unit trust is not “transparent” for the purposes of income tax or 
capital gains tax.  In particular, the source of the unit holder’s income and gains in such a trust is its 
rights as a unit holder against the trustees.  The trust is not “looked through” so as to treat unit 
holders as entitled, as they arise, to the underlying income and assets of the trust itself.  In particular, 
unit holders typically do not pay tax on capital gains unless and until they dispose of their units at a 
gain.  There is no unit holder entitlement to losses of the trust361.  Overall, unit holders avoid the 
compliance complications to which full transparency of the trust could give rise, not least the need to 
identify and trace fractional interests in the underlying assets of the trust.  The composition of those 
assets is of course likely to change, as is the make-up of the class of unit holders362.   
 
However, the tax treatment of an authorised unit trust ensures that there should normally be little or 
no tax at the level of the unit trust itself (as opposed to its unitholders).  Avoiding economic double 
taxation in this way underpins the efficacy of an authorised unit trust as a collective investment 
vehicle: interposing the trust must not create extra tax compared to direct investment by unitholders 
in the trust’s underlying investments.  The trust is treated as making periodic distributions of its 
income (whether or not it does so in fact) which ensures timely taxation of trust income at unitholder 
level. Furthermore, the tax regime for authorised unit trusts allows some income distributions of the 
                                                          
357 See Regulations 18-21 Authorised Investment Funds (Tax) Regulations 2006: SI 2006/964 as amended (“The 
2006 Regulations”).  
358 Section 99(1) TCGA. This makes clear, inter alia, that its capital gains are only chargeable to capital gains tax, 
not to corporation tax on capital gains.  The authorised unit trust therefore cannot access certain reliefs (e.g. 
group relief) available in respect of corporation tax on capital gains. 
359 The full details of the taxation of authorised unit trusts and of their unit holders is beyond the scope of this 
work, as is a discussion of the concept of “trading” for UK tax purposes.  The relevant tax regime for taxing the 
trust’s income and that of its unit holders is set out in the 2006 Regulations.  Those Regulations set out a very 
similar regime for UK “open-ended investment companies” and their shareholders.   
360 See the 2006 Regulations. Section 99B TCGA ensures that unit holders get increased capital gains tax base 
cost in their units where those units are accumulation units. A holder of “accumulation” units is treated as 
receiving a distribution in respect of those units for tax purposes but receives no matching cash payment 
because the corresponding income is instead reinvested by the unit trust.  The holder of “accumulation” units 
receives an addition to base cost in those units to reflect the income which has been retained and reinvested by 
the trust but which is still treated as distributed to the holder for tax purposes. 
361 A similar approach (see Section 103D TCGA) has been adopted in relation to contractual co-ownership 
schemes. These are income tax-“transparent,” but non-trust-based UK collective investment schemes regulated 
under Section 235A FSMA.  Section 103D also applies to those “offshore funds” which are income tax-
“transparent” under the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee e.g. Luxembourg “fonds commun de placements”. Units in 
such schemes or funds are usually not treated as shares in a company but they are treated as separate assets 
from the underlying assets of the scheme or fund itself.  






trust to be treated, for UK tax purposes, as if they were payments of (deductible) interest363 or of 
dividends.  Therefore, unit holders can be treated, for UK tax purposes, as receiving different forms of 
income which reflect the investment base and underlying income sources of the trust, even though 
that unit trust is regarded as a company for tax purposes.  These rules therefore create an income tax 
result (but not a capital gains tax result) for unitholders which has some parallels with full income tax 
“transparency”364. 
 
4.3.6.2.2  Unauthorised unit trusts 
 
Unit trusts which are not “authorised” are known as “unauthorised unit trusts”.  They are not 
automatically regarded as UK-resident, although they can be365.  Whether or not an unauthorised unit 
trust is UK-resident, Section 99 TCGA will (subject to an exception mentioned below) treat it as a 
company, and its unitholders as shareholders, for the purposes of UK capital gains tax (not 
corporation tax).  Hence it will not be “transparent” for those purposes, in the same way as an 
“authorised” unit trust.  Unit holders thereby avoid the compliance complications to which full 
transparency of the trust could give rise, not least the need to identify and trace fractional interests in 
the underlying assets of the trust366.   
 
The exception mentioned above is if the trust is an “offshore fund” which is treated as income tax-
“transparent” under the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee367.  This will often be the case with non-UK-
resident unit trusts. That kind of trust is not treated as a company and unitholders’ interests in it are 
not usually treated as shares. They are, however, treated for capital gains tax purposes as separate 
assets from the underlying assets of the trust368.  
 
For income tax purposes, if a non-UK-resident unauthorised unit trust is governed by the law of a 
non-UK jurisdiction (e.g. one of the Channel Islands) which applies the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee 
when deciding the “source” of the unitholder’s income, the unitholder would typically be subject to 
tax-“transparent” treatment consistent with Baker v Archer-Shee.  This may lead to UK tax on 
undistributed as well as distributed income of that unit trust369. However, it may also be easier for the 
unitholder to claim double taxation relief (e.g. a credit for non-UK income tax borne by the trustee).  
                                                          
363 Provided that the unit trust’s investments comprise specified levels of debt instruments and related 
derivatives: see the 2006 Regulations, and especially Regulations 18-21. 
364 This analogy can only be taken so far. If underlying income of the authorised unit trust has suffered non-UK 
withholding tax, the trust itself will probably be unable to claim an effective foreign tax credit for that non-UK 
tax.  Moreover, because the unit holder is not treated as entitled to that underlying income, it will not be 
eligible for a UK foreign tax credit either.  There is no equivalent for authorised unit trusts of Section 111 TIOPA 
or ESC B18: see 4.3.5 above. 
365 Whether such a unit trust is UK-resident will depend on whether it is “centrally managed and controlled” in 
the UK.  A discussion of this concept is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
366 For a contrast, see the earlier discussion of trusts within Section 60 TCGA at 4.3.2. If the unauthorised unit 
trust is non-UK-resident and is treated as a company for capital gains tax purposes under Section 99 TCGA, this 
may make some unit holders taxable on its undistributed gains: see Sections 3-3G TCGA.  
367 See Section 99(1A) TCGA. 
368 Section 103D TCGA. Because this kind of non-UK-resident trust is not deemed to be a company, unitholders 
should not be taxable under Section 3 TCGA on its undistributed chargeable gains. 
369 The unit holder will get an addition to its UK base cost for capital gains tax purposes if and to the extent that 
it is taxed on undistributed income of the unit trust which is reinvested by the trustees: see Section 103D(4) 






The unitholder may also be able to rely on more favourable rules for computing its income from the 
trust370.           
 
If an unauthorised unit trust is UK-resident, different taxing rules prevail.  These are set out in the 
Unauthorised Unit Trusts (Tax) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/2819 as amended) (“the 2013 
Regulations”)371.  The 2013 Regulations in particular create a category of “exempt unauthorised unit 
trusts”. Such a unit trust is one whose trustees are UK-resident in the relevant period of account; 
whose unit holders throughout that period are “eligible investors” and which is approved by HMRC372 
as an “exempt unauthorised unit trust”. “Eligible investors” are essentially those who are exempt 
from capital gains tax or corporation tax on a disposal of their units (other than by reason of non-UK-
residence) e.g. charities, UK-approved pension funds and entities enjoying sovereign immunity 
(including some “sovereign wealth” funds).  Hence the “exempt unauthorised unit trust” is targeted at 
tax-exempt unit holders.  Capital gains of an “exempt unauthorised unit trust” are not subject to UK 
tax373.  Income of such a trust is treated as that of the trustees, not the unit holder and is chargeable 
at the basic rate (currently 20%)374.  Likewise only the trustees can claim tax relief for capital 
expenditure375.  The rules discussed at 4.3.5 in relation to taxing discretionary payments by UK-
resident trustees do not apply to an “exempt unauthorised unit trust”.   
 
Unit holders of an “exempt unauthorised unit trust” are treated as receiving taxable income from that 
trust if an amount is shown in the trust’s accounts as income available for payment to them or for 
investment376.  Those deemed payments to unit holders can be relieved against the net income of the 
trustees377.  Hence although the income of the unit trust is treated as that of the trustees and unit 
holders cannot “look through” to the underlying income source, the rules should operate to minimise 
any income tax liability at the level of the trustees.  Instead that liability is shifted to the level of the 
unitholders, who are of course tax-exempts.   
 
Any UK-resident unauthorised unit trust which is not an “exempt unauthorised unit trust” is a “non-
exempt unauthorised unit trust”.  Such unit trusts are to be treated as UK-resident companies for tax 
purposes and their unit holders are to be treated as shareholders378.  Hence unit holders cannot “look 
through” to the underlying income source.  There is a tax charge (currently at 19%) at the level of the 
trust, plus a potential income tax charge at the level of the unitholders, because the trust is brought 
within the corporation tax regime. There is no scope for a unitholder to recover or credit the tax 
charge at the level of the trust as and when they are taxed on trust distributions.   
 
4.3.7  Trusts: conclusion  
                                                          
370 See the summary of the UK tax treatment of a JPUT in 4.3.6.1 and fn 343.  A JPUT is a type of non-UK-
resident unauthorised unit trust.   
371 The previous rules applying to UK-resident unauthorised unit trusts (especially in relation to the taxation of 
income) were in Sections 504-6 ITA. They were perceived to offer avoidance opportunities and have therefore 
been repealed.   
372 See Regulations 4-9 of the 2013 Regulations for details of the approval process. These require in particular 
that revenue and capital in the unit trust’s accounts be computed in accordance with the Investment 
Management Association’s Statement of Recommended Practice for the Financial Statements of Authorised 
Funds published in October 2010 (or any successor statement of recommended practice).    
373 Regulation 10 of the 2013 Regulations. 
374 Regulation 12(1) of the 2013 Regulations.   
375 Regulation 13 of the 2013 Regulations. 
376 Regulations 15 and 16 of the 2013 Regulations.   
377 Regulation 18 of the 2013 Regulations. 
378 Regulation 28 of the 2013 Regulations which also provides that such a unit trust is a “body corporate” for 







There has been relatively little focus on how to define a trust for UK tax purposes, especially when 
dealing with non-UK asset protection vehicles (notably, foundations) which can have very similar 
effects but which are based on non-common law legal traditions.  The debate is further complicated 
by the UK direct tax and inheritance tax concept of “settlement” which can encompass arrangements 
(including foundations) which are not a trust in an English common law sense. The limited case law 
manages to establish a borderline between a trust and a body corporate, although much will turn on 
the detail of any given situation, including the non-tax effect of the arrangements under relevant non-
UK law. It is easier to draw that line where beneficiaries have vested interests allowing them to 
dictate how underlying assets are used… unlike the members of a company. Otherwise, the 
borderline can be very fine indeed. How much real difference is there between a foundation (which 
appears to be a separate legal entity with no members and whose discretionary beneficiaries with 
very few rights) and a discretionary and accumulation trust (which may or may not be a separate legal 
entity, which has no members and whose discretionary beneficiaries have slightly greater, but still 
very diffuse rights)?  
 
The borderline between a trust and a body corporate is nevertheless very important.  Under UK tax 
law, a body corporate is not “transparent” and its members will be subject to tax on their income and 
gains from the body corporate, often with no offset for any tax borne at entity level on underlying 
income and gains. The position in relation to trusts is much less simple, and in some cases gives rise to 
a “transparent” approach. In addition, trusts are often subject to UK inheritance tax but this is much 
rarer in relation to a body corporate379.  
 
It would make sense to redraw the borderline between “settlements” and other entities (notably, 
bodies corporate and partnerships) for UK tax purposes. This will not be easy but the current 
borderline is too flimsy and too formalistic, which is a gift to tax planning.  It would make more sense 
to distinguish between arrangements whose primary purpose is the conduct of business and those 
whose primary purpose is the protection and distribution of assets (even if investment of assets is an 
ancillary activity). The “settlement” label should be reserved for the latter, and their precise legal 
form (trust, foundation, limited company) should be immaterial380.  
 
The trust concept is highly malleable.  At one end of the spectrum, it covers quite simple 
arrangements for the concurrent co-ownership of property, often with a fairly fixed class of assets 
and beneficiaries. At the other end, it covers more complex arrangements under which beneficiaries 
have a diffuse nexus with the trust property, settlor control is extensive and the role of the trustees is 
potentially more wide-ranging381. Discretionary and/or accumulation trusts are a good example of the 
latter arrangements.  Yet again, the “unit trust” is an example of complex co-ownership arrangements 
where trustees often oversee the active management of a shifting and varied asset portfolio, while 
the class of beneficiaries is broad and fluctuating.  However, in the case of “unit trusts”, the holders of 
beneficial interests have a clear nexus with trust property.   
                                                          
379 See 5.3. 
380 The suggested distinction is not new. It shares much in common with the definition of a “trust” for US 
Federal tax purposes, which focusses on whether the purpose of an arrangement is to vest in a third party 
responsibility for protecting and conserving property for beneficiaries, who cannot share in the discharge of that 
responsibility.  Those beneficiaries are not therefore associates in a joint enterprise for the conduct of business 
for profit. Under the US definition, it is quite possible for a foundation to be treated as a “trust”, because the 
definition is not formalistic. For a fuller discussion: see Ismael Hajjar, Midya Omar and Suzanne Reisman: “DIFC 
and ADGM Foundation Laws – a UAE/US perspective”: Trust Quarterly Review, Volume 17, Issue 2 (2019) 31 at 
34-5. See also the discussion in 7.2.2 below.  
381 Not only must they administer the trust property but they must also make sensitive decisions about who is to 







The range of trust scenarios militates against a “one size fits all” approach to the tax “transparency” 
of trusts, even if instinctively, one might think that a beneficiary of a trust should be taxed as if it had 
a share in the underlying assets and income of the trust.  Therefore, the current rules often do not 
regard full “transparency” as an appropriate solution, especially in relation to the income taxation of 
discretionary and accumulation trusts. This is even truer in relation to the capital gains taxation of all 
trusts bar those within Section 60 TCGA. Apart from Section 60 trusts, the UK treats trusts as separate 
taxable persons from their beneficiaries for the purposes of taxing capital gains382. 
 
Even when tax “transparency” is an appropriate solution, it means different things in different 
scenarios 383. Such differences may be hard to justify, not least the oddities surrounding the rule in 
Baker v Archer-Shee. Generally, UK law on whether and when trusts are “transparent” has evolved in 
a fairly ad hoc way. 
 
Treating a trust as tax “transparent” can create as many problems as it solves for those with a 
beneficial interest in it384. It may avoid taxation at the level of the trust as well as at the level of those 
with an interest in the trust385. It may also give those interest holders easier access to relief for 
source-based tax (notably, foreign tax) on the underlying income and gains of the trust. It may even 
give those interest holders access to trust losses (e.g. under Section 60 TCGA).  However, it may also 
mean that interest holders will be currently taxed on distributed and above all undistributed income 
and gains of the entity, with no certainty that they will have cash resources with which to pay that 
tax386.  Furthermore, having an interest in a fully “transparent” trust gives the beneficiary potential 
compliance headaches: it must track over time the proportionate interest to which it is treated as 
entitled in each underlying asset and income source of that trust. Those headaches worsen if the 
trust’s beneficiaries, its income and assets change regularly387. 
 
The courts are alive to the pitfalls of tax “transparency”, even where it is in principle an appropriate 
outcome. Hence, when applying Section 60 TCGA388, the courts in Booth v Ellard and in Jenkins v 
Brown389 steered away from a fundamentalist approach to “transparency”. This could otherwise have 
                                                          
382 Section 69 TCGA in fact provides that “the trustees of a settlement shall, unless the context otherwise 
requires, together be treated as if they were a single person (distinct from the persons who are trustees of the 
settlement from time to time)”.  This departs from the normal UK approach of seeing a trust, not as an entity 
distinct from the trustees, but as a relationship of the latter with the beneficiaries.   
383 For example, the “look through” principle of Section 60 TCGA is much more pronounced (the trust is 
effectively disregarded) than transparency under the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee. In the latter case, the trust is 
not disregarded and the rule is limited to determining the tax “source” of the income of a beneficiary with a 
vested income interest.  
384 UK tax law does not give a beneficiary of a trust any right to elect whether or not to be taxed personally as if 
the trust were “transparent”.  This is consistent with the general UK approach of not allowing “transparent” tax 
treatment to be elective.  
385 Thereby simplifying some aspects of tax compliance and avoiding any risk of taxing trust income and gains 
twice. 
386 Such an outcome would be especially unsatisfactory for those with a diffuse interest in the assets of a trust 
e.g. a discretionary beneficiary. 
387 This situation could well arise in respect of an actively marketed and managed unit trust.  Treating 
unitholders’ interests in it as a separate asset for capital gains tax purposes, under Sections 99 and 103D TCGA, 
removes the need for unit holders to track their fractional interests in underlying trust assets.  Even though the 
unit trust is then “opaque”, its offshore location or a relevant capital gains tax exemption at the level of the trust 
(e.g. if it is an “authorised unit trust”: see Section 100(1) TCGA) should avoid capital gains tax at the level of the 
entity.  
388 Which clearly requires a transparency approach to certain trusts for capital gains tax purposes. 






led to unfunded tax charges390 on pooling and unpooling assets, even though there was no change in 
the proportionate economic interest of each participant in the asset pool. 
 
Of course where a non-“transparency” approach is more appropriate, in order to avoid some of the 
pitfalls set out above391, other issues may arise.  In particular, are there two layers of taxation on the 
income and gains of the trust, one at the level of the trustees and the other at the level of the 
beneficiaries?  Furthermore, if there is underlying tax at source on the income and capital gains of the 
trust, what relief can be given for that tax to the beneficiaries in particular? These are questions to 
which there is no simple answer. As discussed, an imperfect relief from what would otherwise be 
double taxation of trust income has been provided by the UK to beneficiaries of UK-resident 
discretionary and accumulation trusts.  That relief has developed into a more “transparent” approach 
by concession392. So far as the capital gains of trusts are concerned393, the response to these 
questions has been much more limited and piecemeal394.  There are real risks that the capital gains of 
a UK-resident trust will be double-taxed, at both trustee and beneficiary level.  Beneficiaries also have 
very little ability to access the capital losses of UK trusts395.    
 
In relation to “authorised” and “exempt unauthorised” unit trusts, which are collective investment 
vehicles, solutions other than full “transparency” have been adopted but with a result that is often 
similar.  These solutions ensure that there is little or no “sticking” taxation of income and gain at the 
level of the unit trust itself396.  By contrast, the so-called “non-exempt unauthorised unit trust” (see 
4.3.6.2.2) is simply taxed as a UK-resident company, which entails taxation at both entity and investor 
level.  
 
The rules regarding unit trusts can go further than merely avoiding entity-level taxation.  One example 
is the income tax “transparency” of a non-UK-resident unit trust, provided that its governing law 
follows the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee. This avoids tax at the level of the unit trust itself and may give 
beneficiaries other tax benefits e.g. a more favourable basis of income computation or effective relief 
for tax at source on the underlying trust income.  The beneficiaries will, however, be taxable on their 
share of that income, whether or not distributed.  The UK regime for “authorised unit trusts” also 
does more than simply remove entity-level taxation.  It enables some income distributions of the trust 
to be taxed as if they were payments of interest or dividends. This enables UK-taxpaying unit holders 
                                                          
390 Based on the theory that fractional interests in the underlying pooled assets were swapped between the 
beneficiaries of the Section 60 trust, when they pooled and later unpooled those assets.  
391 If a discretionary beneficiary is only subject to tax on income in fact distributed to it, that at least avoids it 
being taxed on underlying undistributed income.  This is an appropriate outcome given that beneficiary’s diffuse 
interest in the trust.   
392 That concessionary relief can apply to both UK-resident and non-UK-resident trusts. It shows a welcome 
willingness to apply “tax transparency” to reach an appropriate outcome even though, under classical UK 
income tax theory, income tax transparency has often been seen as unavailable to discretionary beneficiaries 
because their income stems from a “source” (the exercise of trustee discretion) which is distinct from the 
“source” of the underlying trust income.   
393 Other than trusts within Section 60 TCGA 1992. 
394 At a practical level, it is probably easier to avoid double taxation of capital gains in the first place by locating 
the residence of the trust in a tax haven.  This is common practice. In that case, one need only concern oneself 
with taxation of any UK-taxpaying beneficiaries or the settlor, and with (any) tax at source on the underlying 
capital gains of the trust.  Such taxation of gains at source is relatively rare (although real estate gains are a likely 
exception to the rule: see the recent changes to the UK taxation of capital gains of non-UK-residents from UK 
real estate).    
395 For a useful summary, see Davies: Principles of Tax Law, Eighth edition.  Sweet & Maxwell at pages 279-286. 
396 Avoiding two layers of taxation (one at the level of the vehicle and another at the level of those holding an 






to be taxed largely as if they were entitled to the unit trust’s underlying income, which can be 
beneficial (e.g. by accessing lower tax rates on dividends).  
 
Whether, when and how to treat an entity/arrangement as “transparent” for tax purposes is a tax 
policy question which is not confined to trusts, although the range of possible trust structures is 
reflected in a range of approaches.  Very similar questions arise in relation to the taxation of 
companies.  Of course, in the context of companies, the “solution” adopted has been more uniform 
and somewhat different.  A company tends to be regarded as a taxable entity in its own right397. The 
question then arises what relief, if any, to give its members for entity level taxation when they derive 
income (especially dividends) or gain from their holdings in the company.  Space does not permit a 
discussion of the general UK taxation of dividend income398.  However, any relief to company 
members for entity-level taxation often falls well short of what it would be if that entity were tax-
“transparent”.   
 
Despite some similarities between the structure of trusts and of companies, there is no automatic 
reason why trusts should be subject to two levels of tax: one at entity level and another at the level of 
the beneficiaries. Of course, in those cases where trusts are “transparent”, there is ultimately one 
level of tax only, at beneficiary level. However, there are many cases where that is not so.  Double 
taxation is the result. The commercial, non-tax justification for trusts is primarily that they offer a 
sophisticated asset protection mechanism, which can protect wealth and reconcile over time 
conflicting claims on that wealth.  Therefore, logic would suggest that a beneficiary of a trust should 
not be taxed, directly or indirectly, more heavily than if that person had invested directly in the trust 
assets. This could be achieved without invariably treating trusts as fully “transparent” for tax 
purposes.   
 
The current UK taxation rules on income and, in particular, capital gains of trusts generally fall well 
short of achieving tax neutrality between direct investment and investment via a trust, especially 
when the trustees are UK-resident. The main beneficiary of this is the “offshore trusts” industry, in 
jurisdictions such as Jersey and Guernsey. At the very least, the UK should change its rules on income 
or capital distributions so that beneficiaries who are taxed on those distributions can effectively 
“trace” them to underlying income and capital gains of the trust.  They could then be taxed as if they 
had received a slice of that income or gain, benefiting from any preferential tax rates on those items.  
They could also benefit from relief in respect of non-UK tax on the underlying income source and any 
UK tax already collected at the level of the trustees. This change of approach would build on the 
limited “transparency” foundations of ESC B13 in relation to income tax, and Section 87 TCGA in 
relation to distributions of capital gain from non-UK-resident trusts.  It goes beyond the narrow rule in 
Baker v Archer-Shee by offering a measure of “transparency” without taxing beneficiaries on 
undistributed income or gain, and without automatically giving them a heavy compliance burden399. It 
does not of course address the issue of inheritance tax on “settlements”, which is discussed in 5.3. 
                                                          
397 For philosophical reasons that are contested: “Tiley’s Revenue Law” (9th ed.) Loutzenhiser at 59.4.2. Notable 
exceptions to this approach are the UK limited liability partnership and European Economic Interest Groupings: 
see 2.7.  
398 Since the inception of corporation tax in 1965, the UK has taxed dividends in a number of radically different 
ways.  Initially, it adopted a “classical” system where dividends were separately taxed with essentially no relief 
to company members for entity level taxation.  It then sought to give relief to members for entity level taxation 
through a system of “partial imputation”.  This was found to contravene EU law.  Since then, corporate 
members have enjoyed a wide-ranging exemption in respect of their dividend income.  By contrast, non-
corporate members are now fully taxed on dividend income with limited relief for entity level taxation.    
399 For how this is achieved in the US, Australia and New Zealand, see Brabazon op. cit. at pages 58-61 and 
Appendix (at pages 293-345). To prevent a trust being used to defer taxation on income and gain prior to 






5. Further analysis of the concept of “tax transparency” and what it means in other areas of UK tax law. 
 
5.1  The previous discussion has focussed on the concept of “tax transparency” as it relates in 
particular to the taxation of income and capital gains (notably, the income and gains of trusts). This 
chapter discusses further aspects of the concept of “tax transparency”.  It considers, inter alia, what 
this means, if anything, in relation to inheritance tax, Value Added Tax and stamp duty land tax. 
However, to begin, it is useful to consider some recent attempts at international level to define “tax 
transparency”.  These help to show how this concept contains a number of different, albeit related 
ideas.  
 
5.2  The BEPS definition of “tax transparency” and related issues 
 
As part of the OECD’s output in 2015 from its highly-publicised work regarding BEPS (“Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting”), a lengthy document400 entitled “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements” was published.  This document embodied the conclusions of those working on BEPS 
Action 2: tax avoidance by using hybrid transactions and hybrid bodies and exploiting mismatches 
between jurisdictions in characterising such transactions and bodies.  Part II of that document (and in 
particular Chapter 14) recommended changes to Article 1 of the OECD Model Double Taxation 
Convention (“the OECD Model”) regarding “transparent entities”.  In particular, it recommended a 
new Article 1(2)401 to read as follows: 
 
“For the purposes of this Convention, income derived by or through an entity or arrangement that 
is treated as wholly or partly fiscally transparent [emphasis added] under the tax law of either 
Contracting State shall be considered to be income of a resident of a Contracting State but only to 
the extent that the income is treated, for purposes of taxation by that State, as the income of a 
resident of that State.” 
 
Article 1(2) of the 2017 version of the OECD Model402 now incorporates that wording as does (with 
modifications which are immaterial for present purposes) Article 3(1) of the OECD Multilateral 
                                                          
refund for that tax against any subsequent tax on distributions to beneficiaries).  If the trustees were not UK-
resident, a sliding scale of UK tax rates on beneficiaries could be used to encourage earlier distributions (cf 
Section 91 TCGA).  In any case, the settlor may already be subject to UK tax in respect of undistributed income 
and gain of the trust under the various “settlement” or anti-deferral rules. HMRC launched a consultation on all 
aspects of the UK taxation of trusts on 7 November 2018, although any conclusions have yet to be published: 
see “The Taxation of Trusts: a Review” https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/the-of-taxation-of-trusts-
a-review (accessed 12 June 2020).   
400 OECD (2015), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241138-en.  
401 For an extensive discussion of Article 1(2), and the equivalent provisions in the OECD multilateral instrument 
to implement BEPS measures related to tax treaties, see “Some Reflections on the Proposed Revisions to the 
OECD Model and Commentaries and on the Multilateral Instrument, with respect to Fiscally Transparent 
Entities”: Nikolakakis, Austry, Avery Jones, Baker, Blessing, Danon, Goradia, Hattingh, Inoue, Luedicke, Maisto, 
Miyatake, van Raad, Vann and Wiman. [2017] BTR 295.  This article is hereafter referred to as “Some 
Reflections”. Article 1(2) is also discussed further at 6.1. 
402 http://www.oecd.org/ctp/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-full-version-9a5b369e-en.htm 






Convention to implement tax treaty-related measures to prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(“the MLI”). The MLI403 was first signed on 24 November 2016404. 
 
Article 1(2) applies to the cross-border taxation of income and gains.  In particular, it is a limited 
attempt to ensure that a double taxation treaty does not give rise to double taxation or unintended 
double non-taxation of cross-border income which flows via an intermediate entity, simply because 
the parties to the treaty characterise that entity differently.  It is accompanied by revisions to the 
Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model.  In particular, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Commentary 
on Article 1 now read: 
 
“9. The concept of ‘fiscally transparent’ …..refers to situations where, under the domestic law of a 
Contracting State, the income (or part thereof) of the entity or arrangement is not taxed at the 
level of the entity or the arrangement but at the level of the persons who have an interest in that 
entity or arrangement.  This will normally be the case where the amount of tax payable on a share 
of the income of an entity or arrangement is determined separately in relation to the personal 
characteristics of the person who is entitled to that share so that the tax will depend on whether 
that person is taxable or not, on the other income that the person has, on the personal allowances 
to which the person is entitled and on the tax rate applicable to that person; also, the character 
and source, as well as the timing of the realisation, of the income for tax purposes will not be 
affected by the fact that it has been earned through the entity or arrangement. The fact that the 
income is computed at the level of the entity or arrangement before the share is allocated to the 
person will not affect that result.  States wishing to clarify the definition of ‘fiscally transparent’ in 
their bilateral conventions are free to include a definition of that term based on the above 
explanations. 
 
10.  In the case of an entity or arrangement which is treated as partly fiscally transparent under 
the domestic law of one of the Contracting States, only part of the income of the entity or 
arrangement might be taxed at the level of the persons who have an interest in that entity or 
arrangement as described in [the previous paragraph] whilst the rest would remain taxable at the 
level of the entity or arrangement.  This, for example, is how some trusts and limited liability 
partnerships are treated in some countries (i.e. in some countries, the part of the income derived 
through a trust that is distributed to beneficiaries is taxed in the hands of these beneficiaries whilst 
the part of that income that is accumulated is taxed in the hands of the trust or trustees; similarly, 
in some countries, income derived through a limited partnership is taxed in the hands of the 
general partner as regards that partner’s share of that income but is considered to be the income 
of the limited partnership as regards the limited partners’ share of the income405……)”.     
 
                                                          
403 http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-
prevent-BEPS.pdf (accessed 2 July 2020).  
404 The UK signed the MLI on 7 June 2017 and deposited with the OECD its instrument of ratification and final 
list of reservations and notifications (regarding the MLI’s operative provisions) on 29 June 2018.  The MLI 
entered into force in the UK on 1 October 2018, as a Schedule to the Double Taxation Relief (Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting) Order 2018 SI 2018/630. It began to have effect in the UK for the purposes of UK tax treaties 
from 1 January 2019 (for withholding tax), from 1 April 2019 (for corporation tax) and from 6 April 2019 (for 
income tax and capital gains tax). However, the date on which specific UK tax treaties are modified by the MLI 
depends on when the relevant treaty partner deposits its own instrument of ratification, acceptance and 
approval.  






This attempt to define “tax transparency” is fairly unambitious406. Its focus is simply on whether or not 
underlying income of the entity or arrangement is taxed at the level of those with an interest in the 
entity or arrangement on the same basis (and at the same time)407, and retaining the same source and 
character, as if the holder of that interest had been directly entitled to the underlying income.  There 
is no requirement that the holder of that interest must be entitled to claim any tax losses of the entity 
or arrangement.  Equally there is no requirement that under the relevant tax law, the holder of the 
interest must in fact be treated as owning a share of the underlying assets of the entity or 
arrangement. These more radical interpretations of “tax transparency” 408 are not mentioned. 
 
A more ambitious approach to “transparency” seems to have been adopted in the UK corporation tax 
legislation which partly implements the proposals in part I of BEPS Action 2 Final Report for 
combatting avoidance (in particular, unintended double non-taxation) via hybrid mismatches.  In 
particular, Section 259BE TIOPA reads: 
 
“(1) For the purposes of this Part, an entity is ‘hybrid’ if it meets conditions A and B. 
(2) Condition A is the entity is regarded as being a person for tax purposes under the law of any 
territory. 
(3) Condition B is that: 
(a) some or all of the entity’s income or profits are treated (or would be if there were any) for the 
purposes of a tax charged under the law of any territory, as the income or profits of a person or 
persons other than the person mentioned in subsection (2), or 
(b) under the law of a territory other than the one mentioned in subsection (2), the entity is not 
regarded as a distinct and separate person to an entity or entities that are distinct and separate 
persons under the law of the territory mentioned in that subsection…….” [emphasis added]. 
 
For these purposes, HMRC guidance (International Tax Manual INTM550630) considers that a 
“person” will include a partnership.  
 
Section 259BE(3)(b) TIOPA goes further than the OECD commentary on Article 1(2).  It envisages a 
situation where an entity is disregarded altogether for tax purposes.  However, this is not a “sine qua 
non” of hybrid entity status for these purposes: Section 259BE(3)(a) TIOPA operates independently 
and is much more in line with the approach of Article 1(2) and the related Commentary.  Section 
259BE(3)(a) also seems broad enough to cover a situation where the entity’s hybrid status arises 
solely because its income is treated as the income of another person under “controlled foreign 
                                                          
406 The authors of “Some Reflections” indicate that paragraph 10 of the OECD Commentary on Article 1(2) is 
based on regulations on “fiscal transparency” under Section 894(c) US Internal Revenue Code. 
407 The issue of the timing of the tax charge is obscured by the partial transparency example of the trust in 
paragraph 10 of the Commentary on Article 1(2). A contrast is drawn between income taxable at beneficiary 
level on distribution [emphasis added]; versus income accumulated at trust level.  Classically, if a trust 
arrangement is transparent, the beneficiary must be taxable on its share of underlying trust income as it arises 
to the trust and whether or not it is distributed.  Similar points are made in “Some Reflections”. In fairness to 
paragraph 10 of the Commentary, a more limited reading of “transparency” could cover cases where a 
beneficiary (e.g. of a discretionary trust) is not taxed on undistributed trust income but any distribution to it is 
treated as traceable to underlying trust income and gains (as under ESC B18 in the UK – see 4.3.5).      
408 See, for example, the UK capital gains tax fiction in Section 60 TCGA whereby the beneficiaries of certain 






company” or equivalent income attribution legislation.409  Such legislation tends to have an explicit or 
implicit anti-deferral purpose. Hence it is not usually seen as a classic example of “tax 
transparency”410.   
 
A number of further points can be made about the meaning of “tax transparency” in the light of the 
debate surrounding Article 1(2) of the OECD Model Treaty.   
 
Firstly, “tax transparency” is not a unitary concept in UK tax law. Instead it is a catchphrase which 
covers a range of situations where, to varying degrees, the taxation of the holder of an interest in an 
entity or arrangement is meant to reflect the tax result if that holder had been directly entitled to a 
share of the underlying income and/or assets of that entity or arrangement.  The extent of this “look 
through” tax treatment is to varying degrees dictated by the structure and policy objective of the 
relevant tax rules.  Where income is being taxed, the rules need not go as far as imputing ownership 
of underlying assets of the entity or arrangement to the holder of an interest in it.  All that is needed 
to achieve “look through” taxation is a rule which treats the holder’s income entitlement as having 
the same character and source, and arising at the same time, as the underlying income of the entity 
or arrangement, while respecting the separate existence of that entity or arrangement.  A good 
example of this is the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee, discussed at 4.3.3.  This kind of rule will not suffice if 
“look through” tax treatment is required for transactions involving underlying assets of the entity or 
arrangement (e.g. capital gains tax).  It equally may not suffice if the interest holder is to claim losses 
of the entity or arrangement.  Lastly, it will not be radical enough if the aim is to tax the holder of the 
interest as if the entity or arrangement did not exist at all e.g. if the holder wishes to claim a 
“participation exemption” in respect of profits from a shareholding owned by a trust or partnership in 
which the holder has an interest.  
 
Secondly, where income is being taxed, is it necessary, for an entity or arrangement to be “tax 
transparent”, that the interest holder’s income entitlement has precisely the same character and 
arises at exactly the same time as if the underlying income had been derived directly by that 
holder?411 Similarly, if the interest holder’s income entitlement is treated as having the same 
                                                          
409 For this to be the case, the controlled foreign company, etc legislation would have to attribute to that person 
the actual underlying income of the entity.  It would not be enough if the relevant legislation (e.g. the UK 
controlled foreign company legislation – see Bricom Holdings Ltd v IRC [1997] STC 1179) only taxed that person 
on a special type of deemed income, measured by reference to, but still distinct from the entity’s actual 
underlying income.    
410 In the legislation which preceded the new hybrid mismatch provisions in Part 6A TIOPA (see the now 
repealed Part 6 TIOPA and especially the former Section 236 TIOPA), it was made clear that “hybrid entity” 
status could not arise simply because the entity’s profits were caught by non-UK rules equivalent to the UK 
“controlled foreign company” rules.  The authors of “Some Reflections” consider that Article 1(2) of the OECD 
Model was probably not intended to cover cases where an entity’s income was attributed to its members under 
controlled foreign company rules or equivalent anti-deferral regimes unless the relevant regime effectively 
disregards the entity altogether.  This is probably rare: this is not the effect of the UK controlled foreign 
company legislation in Part 9A TIOPA.  Nor is it the effect of the UK legislation regarding “settlements” in Part 5 
Chapter 5 ITTOIA and the UK legislation regarding the “transfer of assets abroad” in Part 13 Chapter 2 ITA.    
411 See further in this regard “Some Reflections”, which refers in particular (in fn 104) to the observation of Lord 
Reed (giving judgment in Anson v HMRC [2015] UKSC 44 at para 114): “The words ‘the same’ are ordinary 
English words.  It should however be borne in mind that a degree of pragmatism in their application may be 
necessary in some circumstances if the object of the [double tax treaty] is to be achieved, for example where 
differences between UK and foreign accounting and tax rules prevent a precise matching of the income by 






character and source as the underlying income of the entity or arrangement, surely there is “tax 
transparency” even if this entitlement does not vest automatically in the holder but requires a prior 
decision to allocate income (e.g. by the trustees of a discretionary trust)?  That allocation decision 
may be taken after the underlying income arose.412 
 
Thirdly, if “tax transparency” is to go as far as disregarding an entity or arrangement, so that it 
becomes a tax “nothing”, then this will be need to be very clearly indicated in the relevant rules and is 
likely to occur very rarely.  For example, can a UK “group” relationship between two companies be 
traced via a partnership (e.g. for the purposes of corporation tax “group relief”?  This important 
question classically arises where one company is a partner in a partnership which in turn holds shares 
in the second company concerned.   
 
Arguing that tracing is possible because the partnership is ”tax transparent” simply begs the question 
of what transparency means in this context.  Whether the partnership has legal personality (e.g. a 
Scottish partnership) or not (e.g. an English common law general partnership), UK corporation tax 
rules do not clearly permit a corporate partner to demonstrate that it has the necessary “beneficial 
ownership” of shares held by the partnership in the second company with which it wishes to be 
“grouped”. Section 1258 CTA 2009 states that “Unless otherwise indicated (whether expressly or by 
implication) a firm413 is not to be regarded for corporation tax purposes as an entity separate and 
distinct from the partners”.  However, this does not mean that there is no partnership at all for tax 
purposes.  Otherwise the reference to a “firm” would be redundant. It simply states that for income 
and corporation tax purposes, the firm is the aggregation of its partners and vice-versa.  This is the 
classic English (but not Scottish) common law conception of partnership. Section 1258 therefore puts 
English and Scottish partnerships on an equal footing for corporation tax purposes, which is 
consistent with the judicial thinking mentioned in 2.9.6. However, the corporate partner wishing to 
establish a group relationship with another company via the partnership does not “beneficially own” 
any specific partnership assets (including any shares of the other company held by the partnership).  
Rather it has a contingent claim, in a solvent winding-up of the partnership, to a part-share in some or 
all of those assets net of the firm’s liabilities414.  This point was emphasised recently in Bayonet 
Ventures LLP and another v HMRC [2018] UKFTT 262 (TC).  This case considered Section 863 ITTOIA 
which treats a UK LLP carrying on business “with a view to profit” as being a partnership for income 
tax purposes. It is the income tax counterpart of Section 1273 CTA 2009. The judge pointed out that 
Section 863 did not treat all the activities of the LLP as carried on directly by its members.  Therefore, 
the LLP could not simply be ignored so as to treat a loan to it by a pension fund as being made directly 
to the LLP members.  Section 863 merely assimilated the position of LLP members with that of 
partners in a common law partnership. 
                                                          
412 In this regard see the discussion at 4.3.5 of, in particular, Section 111 TIOPA and ESC B18.   
413 Defined in Section 1257 CTA 2009 as persons carrying on a trade or business in partnership.   
414 There are rules enabling one company to establish its indirect “beneficial ownership” of ordinary share 
capital in another company but only via one or more intermediate “bodies corporate”: see Sections 1154-7 CTA 
2010.  Despite being formed as a body corporate, a UK limited liability partnership is typically regarded under 
Section 1273(1) CTA 2009 as a partnership for corporation tax purposes.  Section 1273(2)(c) further specifies 
that for corporation tax purposes, “references to a company [which will include a body corporate] do not 
include such a limited liability partnership”.  Section 1121(1) CTA 2010 (see 2.2) defines “company” to include a 
“body corporate” or an “unincorporated association” but not, inter alia, a partnership.  Hence a UK limited 
liability partnership carrying on a business “with a view to profit” cannot normally be a “body corporate” for the 
purposes of Sections 1154-7 CTA 2010.  It will also lack “ordinary share capital” which will prevent it being a 







The judge continued: 
 
“Property which belongs to a partnership, whether a limited liability partnership or a non-LLP, is no 
more the property of the individual partners than the property of a body corporate is the property 
of its shareholders.  Such property might become the property of the members and/or 
shareholders upon winding up or dissolution once debts and liabilities have been paid, but until 
that time it is the property of the partnership (firm) or, as appropriate, the LLP, each of which are 
recognised in law as having a legal persona separate and distinct from the members of the 
partnership.”  
 
One can take issue with parts of this statement.  In particular, an English partnership does not have a 
separate legal persona and the status of partnership property is not the same as the property of a 
body corporate.  However, the judge was correct that individual partners cannot contend, prior to 
partnership dissolution, that they own particular assets forming part of the partnership property415. 
Indeed even in a solvent dissolution, all they may end up owning is cash after assets have been 
                                                          
415 The judge’s thinking is supported by the Privy Council decision in Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
[1993] STC 294 at 297-8: Lord Jauncey, giving the sole judgment, stressed that a partner “does not have title to 
specific partnership property but has a beneficial interest in the entirety of the partnership assets…..This 
beneficial interest….is in the nature of a future interest taking effect in possession on….the determination of the 
partnership. ….He has rights….to share in the surplus assets [emphasis added] of the partnership on a 
dissolution”. Hadlee was a decision regarding New Zealand law which in this respect was treated as being the 
same as English law. It was followed by the High Court in the VAT case of Fengate Developments v Customs and 
Excise Commissioners [2004] STC 772. In Sandhu v Gill [2006] 2 All ER 22 at 27-29, Neuberger LJ (as then was) 
made statements to the same effect as Hadlee in a non-tax case.  Significantly, all these cases involved 
partnerships which did not have separate legal personality, which would clearly make it even harder to “look 
through” a partnership.  An outlier is the Court of Appeal decision in IRC v Gray [1994] STC 360.  This was a 
valuation case, for Capital Transfer Tax (now inheritance tax) purposes, where one of the assets was the 
deceased’s majority share in an English law farming partnership. Was this partnership share to any extent 
“land”? Hoffmann LJ (as he then was) gave the sole reasoned judgment.  He stated (clearly obiter) at page 377 
that it was “land”. In particular, he said “As between themselves, partners are not entitled individually to 
exercise proprietary rights over any of the partnership assets. This is because they have subjected their 
proprietary interests to the terms of the partnership deed which provides that the assets shall be employed in 
the partnership business, and on dissolution realised for the purposes of paying debts and distributing any 
surplus.  As regards the outside world, however, the partnership deed is irrelevant. [Emphasis added]  The 
partners are collectively entitled to each and every asset of the partnership, in which each of them has an 
undivided share. It is this outside view which identifies the nature of the property falling to be valued for the 
purpose of capital transfer tax….”  With respect, these comments are not a basis for treating a partnership as a 
simple co-ownership arrangement when deciding whether companies can trace share ownership through a 
partnership in order to form a group.  Hoffmann LJ’s dicta clearly cannot apply where a partnership has separate 
legal personality. They also overstate the case in relation to an English law general partnership, where, in the 
“outside world”, a personal creditor of a partner (but not of the firm) cannot enforce a claim against partnership 
property, even though the partner has an interest in it.  Section 23 of the 1890 Act limits that creditor to 
enforcing its claim against the partner’s share (i.e. its contingent claim to surplus), and not the underlying 
partnership property.  If partners were mere co-owners of the partnership assets, a personal creditor could 
presumably enforce directly against the partner’s vested share of the co-owned property. In a case involving 
estate duty (the predecessor of Capital Transfer Tax), Buckley J did not go as far as Hoffmann LJ, stating that 
“….(apart from some exceptional agreement) none of [the partners] has any exclusive interest in any asset of 
the partnership or, at any rate until all the liabilities of the partnership have been paid, any definite share of 
interest in any one partnership asset [emphasis added] capable of being realised and got in otherwise than in the 






liquidated and liabilities discharged. Hence the direct tax “transparency” of a partnership does not 
mean that, as a legal matter, one can “look through” it for the purposes of tracing a group 
relationship.  
 
Strict legal analysis aside, the “tracing” position in practice is much more nuanced. The ability to trace 
corporate affiliation via a partnership is closely tied to the special capital gains tax “transparency” 
rules which apply to partnerships and LLPs. These issues are therefore examined together in greater 
detail in Appendix A.  
 
There are other situations where the “tax transparency” of an entity does not entail its total disregard 
for UK tax purposes, even though the entity is not a taxable entity in its own right and may indeed lack 
legal personality.  While a partnership is “tax transparent” for UK direct tax purposes, its existence will 
still be recognised when applying the “remittance” rules whereby individuals who are not UK-
domiciled for tax purposes can defer UK tax on non-UK income and gains416.  In particular, if such an 
individual applies non-UK income and gains by investing in a non-UK partnership which then invests in 
an asset situated in the UK, HMRC appear to accept that the non-UK partnership acts as a buffer, even 
though such arrangements can be very artificial.  The result is that the income and gains are not a 
taxable “remittance” to the UK whereas there would have been a UK tax liability, on a current 
(“arising”) basis, if the individual had used the income and gains to buy directly the underlying UK 
asset.  The converse is also true. Hence investment in a UK partnership is the acquisition of a UK asset 
both for the purposes of the “remittance” rules and for inheritance tax. This is the case whether or 
not the partnership’s assets are themselves situated in the UK417.    
 
Before looking at the way in which UK taxes, other than taxes on income and gain, deal with 
“transparency” issues, mention should be made of Appendix B. This explores specific problems when 
applying the “transparency” concept, for corporation tax purposes, to transactions involving certain 
financial and intangible assets.    
 
5.3  Inheritance Tax and “tax transparency”    
 
Inheritance tax (“IHT”) is the UK tax on estates and gifts. It typically arises in respect of value transfers 
(“transfers of value”) by individuals which are either gifts or which are transfers at an undervalue. It is 
possible that the same value transfer gives rise to CGT, which structurally is triggered by a “disposal” 
of “assets” (but oddly, not usually triggered by a “disposal” of a liability). However, IHT, unlike CGT, is 
not a tax which is targeted as “profit”.   
 
It does not matter for IHT purposes whether the transfer of value arises during the individual’s 
lifetime or on death (e.g. under a will).  However, there are very significant exemptions for certain 
                                                          
416 See in particular Part 14 Chapter A1 ITA. 
417 For further comment on such situations, see Baldwin and Kiranoglu: United Kingdom Report, Volume 99b 
Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International, 2014 IFA Congress 835 at 839-840. From 6 April 2017, Schedule A1 
Inheritance Tax Act 1984 limits the use of non-UK “close companies” and partnerships to act as a buffer 
shielding UK residential property from inheritance tax.  However, this legislation is not a simple “look through” 
to the underlying UK assets.  Rather,“excluded property” status, for IHT purposes, no longer applies to the 
interest in the company or partnership, to the extent that its value is directly or indirectly attributable to UK 
residential property or (broadly) loans used to acquire such property: see Emma Chamberlain “Finance (No 2) 
Act 2017 Notes: Section 33 and Schedule 10: inheritance tax on overseas property representing UK residential 






lifetime transfers occurring at least seven years before death418 as well as a generous exemption for 
transfers between spouses, whether on or before death419.  IHT is typically a percentage of the value 
of the transfer, to the extent that it is not arm’s length.  Rates for taxable lifetime transfers by 
individuals (i.e. those which for one reason or other do not get the full benefit of PET treatment) are 
typically half of those applying to transfers on death420.  It is a tax imposed primarily on the transferor 
rather than the transferee. Overall, it is a tax on certain types of transaction, rather than on income 
and gain generated by such a transaction421.    
 
Conceptually IHT is therefore distinct from the taxation of income and gain. Nevertheless, situations 
arise where transfers of value or other events triggering IHT can occur which are not direct value 
transfers by an individual.  These involve transactions carried out through interposed entities or 
arrangements (notably, partnerships, companies and trusts) rather than by individuals.  The question 
is whether and how to tax those transactions by “looking through” to any individuals having an 
interest in, or other relevant connection with, the relevant entity or arrangement.  There is no single 
answer to this question and there is no necessary reason why the answer in relation to IHT should  be 
the same as that for UK tax on income or capital gains.  Indeed, over the years, the IHT answer has 
changed, especially as it relates to IHT and trusts.  The net result, since 2006 in particular, is an 
increasingly penal IHT regime for trusts.  They are now largely taxed on an “opaque” basis, for reasons 
of tax policy which have been heavily criticised.   
 
5.3.1   Partnerships 
 
In relation to transfers of value involving partnerships, HMRC practice is to “look through” the 
partnership.  To that extent, there is symmetry with the taxation of income and gains. The statutory 
basis for this approach is unclear but the practice seems well-established422.  Section 267A IHTA 
applies specifically to UK limited liability partnerships423: 
 
“For the purposes of this Act and any other enactments relating to inheritance tax: 
(a) property to which a limited liability partnership is entitled, or which it occupies or uses, shall 
be treated as property to which its members are entitled, or which they occupy or use, as 
partners,  
(b) any business carried on by a limited liability partnership shall be treated as carried on in 
partnership by its members,  
                                                          
418 Potentially Exempt Transfers or “PETS”: Section 3A Inheritance Tax Act (“IHTA”) 1984. 
419 Section 18 IHTA. 
420 Section 7 and Schedule I IHTA.  The current maximum rate on transfers on death is 40%. 
421 Certain jurisdictions tax the recipients of gifts in respect of the value received.  Such taxation can be regarded 
as a form of income taxation. This characterisation is not readily applicable to IHT because the tax falls primarily 
on the transferor rather than the transferee.  Furthermore, its incidence and quantum are not typically tied to 
the circumstances of the transferee, nor the amount received by the transferee.     
422 See paragraph IHTM25094 of the HMRC Inheritance Tax Manual (accessed 17 June 2020), although, 
confusingly, HMRC also state in that guidance that an interest in a traditional partnership “is a ‘chose in action’ 
(the right to recover assets through an action), valued by reference to the net underlying assets of the 
business”.  HMRC practice seems to originate from the fact that an English common law partnership lacks legal 
personality.  Of course this is not true of Scottish partnerships (as HMRC acknowledge) nor is it true of many 
non-UK bodies which style themselves as “partnerships”.  






(c) incorporation, change in membership or dissolution of a limited liability partnership shall be 
treated as formation, alteration or dissolution of a partnership, and 
(d) any transfer of value made by or to a limited liability partnership shall be treated as made by 
or to its members in partnership (and not by or to the limited liability partnership as such)”. 
 
The wording highlighted suggests that this Section does not simply disregard the LLP. Instead it 
assimilates the position of LLP members with that of partners in a non-LLP partnership for IHT 
purposes424.  With that proviso, Section 267A “looks through” the LLP entity when subjecting its 
members to IHT on transactions involving the LLP assets425.  This approach should be borne in mind 
when considering the IHT treatment of “close companies” (see 5.3.5 below) whose structure, 
operation and management may well be little different in practice from that of a UK LLP.   
 
There is one important proviso to the general “look through” approach for IHT in relation to 
partnerships and UK LLPs.  This relates to “business property relief”426 which applies, inter alia, to an 
“interest in a business”.427 That in turn is regarded as including a share in a partnership.  Hence, for 
these purposes, the partnership share is treated as a distinct intangible asset in its own right, and not 
a collection of fractional entitlements in underlying partnership assets.   
 
 
5.3.2   Trusts/settlements 
 
Much of the IHT legislation is given over to the taxation of trusts.  A detailed analysis of those rules is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  The focus instead is on the varying degree to which the IHT rules 
“look through” certain types of trust.  The broad thrust of the rules since 2006 has been not to “look 
                                                          
424 See the discussion of similar language in Section 863 ITTOIA in Bayonet LLP and another v HMRC [2018] 
UKFTT 262 (TC).   
425 HMRC Inheritance Tax Manual IHTM25094 states that “an interest in a LLP is deemed to be an interest in 
each and every asset of the partnership” unlike the “chose in action” approach which applies to a traditional 
partnership. There are quite close similarities with the IHT approach adopted for UK LLPs and that applying for 
capital gains tax in Section 59A TCGA.  There is a lack of clarity (cf SP D12 in relation to Section 59A) about how 
to quantify a partner’s share in LLP assets for IHT purposes. Furthermore, HMRC have been known to ignore the 
“look through” effect of Section 267A and to argue that, whereas “business property relief” would be available 
if shares in an unquoted trading company were held directly, it is not available where those shares are held by a 
UK LLP and a member of that LLP either dies or transfers a LLP interest. HMRC’s stance (see IHTM25094) is 
strange although in any case “business property relief” should apply on the basis that the value of the LLP 
interest is attributable (at least in part) to the underlying business property (i.e. the shares): see James Kessler 
and Oliver Marre: “ A Merry Dance” Taxation (20 March 2014) at 8.  
426 Sections 103-114 IHTA.   
427 Section 105(1)(a) IHTA. There is a similar approach in Section 227 IHTA, which deals with when IHT can be 
paid in instalments in relation to “qualifying property”.  The latter concept (see Section 227(2)) includes “a 
business or an interest in a business”.  In Re the Nelson Dance Family Settlement, HMRC v Trustees of the Family 
Settlement [2009] STC 802 at 815, Sales J (as then was) noted: “In the case where a person carries on a business, 
the language used in Section 105(1)(a) [for business property relief purposes] indicates that it is the business (or 
interest in the business) itself which is treated as the relevant business property, rather than property (such as 
trading stock) owned by him and used within the business”. For a discussion of this case, see Marika Lemos: 
“Nelson Dance: the High Court confirms that 100% BPR may apply where the value transferred is attributable to 
transfers of assets used in a business”. Volume VIII No 2 (April 2009) Gray’s Inn Tax Chambers Review.  That 
author agrees with the statement of Sales J cited above but regards some of his comments (obiter) (at [2009] 







through” trusts.  This causes disadvantages when holding property through a trust rather than 
directly.  These disadvantages are not easy to justify.   
 
The special IHT rules regarding trusts only apply if the arrangement involves “settled property”.  This 
means property comprised in a “settlement”, as defined in Section 43 IHTA.  Not all trusts are 
“settlements” for these purposes and, importantly, not all “settlements” are trusts.  Section 43(2) to 
(4) reads as follows:  
 
“(2) Settlement means any disposition or dispositions of property, whether effected by 
instrument, by parol or by operation of law, or partly in one way and partly in another, whereby 
the property is for the time being: 
 
(a) held in trust for persons in succession or for any person subject to a contingency or 
(b) held by trustees on trust to accumulate the whole or any part of the income of the property 
or with power to make payments out of that income at the discretion of the trustees or some 
other person, with or without power to accumulate surplus income; or 
(c) charged or burdened (otherwise than for full consideration in money or money’s worth paid 
for his own use or benefit to the person making the disposition) with the payment of any 
annuity or other periodical payment payable for a life or any other limited or terminable 
period, 
or would be so held or charged or burdened if the disposition or dispositions were regulated by the 
law of any part of the United Kingdom; or whereby, under the law of any other country, the 
administration of the property is for the time being governed by provisions equivalent in effect to 
those which would apply if the property were so held, charged or burdened [emphasis added].  
 
(3) A lease of property which is for life or lives, or for a period ascertainable only by reference to a 
death, or which is terminable on, or at a date ascertainable only by reference to, a death, shall be 
treated as a settlement and the property as settled property, unless the lease was granted for full 
consideration in money or money’s worth; and where a lease not granted at a rack rent is at any 
time to become a lease at an increased rent it shall be treated as terminable at that time.  
  
(4) In relation to Scotland, ‘settlement’ also includes: 
(a) an entail; 
(b) any deed by virtue of which an annuity is charged on, or on the rents of, any property (the 
property being treated as the property comprised in the settlement), and 
(c) any deed creating or reserving a proper liferent of any property whether heritable or 
moveable (the property from time to time subject to the proper liferent being treated as the 
property comprised in the settlement); 
 
and for the purposes of this subsection ‘deed’ includes any disposition, arrangement, contract, 
resolution, instrument or writing.” 
       
The special rules for Scotland in Section 43(4) reflect the fact that Scottish law does not draw the 
same distinction as English law between the legal and equitable ownership of property (see 4.3.3.2).  
In particular, given its roots in French law, Scottish law can give rise to non-trust-based arrangements 






“proper liferent”.  This appears to be 428 the Scottish equivalent of the civil law “usufruct”: namely, 
“the right to enjoy property belonging to another, as if its owner, at the expense of preserving that 
property”429.  Importantly, Section 43(4) is confined to Scottish “proper liferents” and does not extend 
to usufructs in general. Furthermore, Section 43(4)(c) only makes a “proper liferent” settled property 
for IHT purposes, but not for other tax purposes (e.g. capital gains tax)    
 
Section 43(3) and above all the last few lines of Section 43(2) clarify that certain entities or property-
holding arrangements which would not necessarily be trusts under English law can nevertheless be 
“settlements” for IHT purposes.  This is especially important in relation to certain non-UK 
arrangements for holding property, such as Anstalten or Stiftungen formed under civil law.  These are 
widely used for the purposes of wealth preservation and, as discussed in 4.1.1, may well be 
characterised by English law as companies.  They could nevertheless be “settlements” for IHT because 
of the closing words of Section 43(2)430.  A further complication is that they may also be “close 
companies” for the purposes of the rules discussed at 5.3.5431.   
                                                          
428 There is considerable debate about whether a civil law “usufruct” can in any case be treated as “settled 
property” under the closing words of Section 43(2) IHTA. HMRC seem to consider that a usufruct created under 
a civil law system other than Scotland is a “settlement” for IHT purposes because of the closing words of Section 
43(2).  This view is challenged in James Kessler QC op. cit. at section 98.15. If such a usufruct is not a 
“settlement”, but a Scottish proper liferent is because of Section 43(4), the holder of the usufruct may be 
disadvantaged for UK tax purposes in a manner which infringes EU law.  If there is a usufruct of French 
immovable property, another commentator has also argued that this cannot be a “settlement” within the 
closing words of Section 43(2) for two reasons.  First, the French law of immovable property would not 
recognise a trust over such property in France, and English private international law would respect French law 
as the “lex situs”. Hence the first part of the words highlighted above in Section 43(2) cannot apply.  Second, 
because property subject to a usufruct is not centrally administered, the last part of those highlighted words is 
irrelevant: see the reference to “the administration of the property”.  For further details, see Peter Harris: 
“French usufruits and Section 43(2) IHTA 1984”. The Tax Planning Review, Volume 7 (2018-9) at 1. In Francoise 
Findlay v HMRC [2018] UKFTT 217 (TC), the taxpayer sought a reference to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union on the basis that the capital gains tax treatment of the termination of a usufruct was less favourable than 
the termination of an English law life interest or a Scottish proper liferent, under Sections 63, 63A and 72-3. The 
taxpayer was seeking a stepped-up market value base cost in the relevant property when the usufruct ended, 
on the basis of the rules applying to life interests and proper liferents. The court ruled that a reference was 
premature, not least because it had yet to determine whether a usufruct was akin to a Scottish proper liferent. 
HMRC state, in their Capital Gains Manual at CG31301 and CG31305, that a French usufruct is “broadly similar” 
to a Scottish liferent.  The latter is not “settled property” for capital gains tax purposes, but Section 63 TCGA 
treats the person entitled to possession on the death of the liferenter as acquiring the relevant assets at their 
then market value.   
429 This is a translation of Article 587 of the French Civil Code: see James Kessler QC op. cit. at section 98.15, 
page 4535. Under French law, a usufruct is not a trust but a “dismemberment” where the “usufruitier” enjoys 
for a prescribed period the property of another, the “nu proprietaire”. Each has duties to respect the interest of 
the other. For a fuller discussion of the UK tax treatment of Scottish liferents in particular and of usufructs in 
general see sections 98.13 and 98.15 of James Kessler QC op.cit.  
430 In particular, the words “governed by provisions equivalent in effect” to a trust.  It will be important to look 
closely at the nature of the relevant entity under its governing law: see the discussion of a Liechtenstein 
“stiftung” in James Kessler QC op. cit. at 98.9.5., which that commentator regards as being a “settlement” for 
IHT purposes.  This author agrees.   
431 The IHT definition of “settlement” is not restricted to arrangements where there is an “element of bounty”, 
unlike the “settlement” legislation in Part 5 Chapter 5 ITTOIA attributing the income of certain “settlements” to 
the settlor for income tax purposes. Hence some types of commercial arrangement may be caught by the IHT 
“settlement” provisions, although the legislation has partly mitigated this: see for example the special regime 







However, the IHT definition of “settlement” does not catch “bare trusts” where the only beneficial 
interests are vested and concurrent.  In other words, trusts of a kind falling within Section 60 TCGA432 
should not be IHT “settlements” and should therefore simply be “looked through” for IHT purposes433.  
HMRC consider that this will in particular be the case in relation to an absolute trust for a minor even 
though, under Section 31 Trustee Act 1925, the trustees have certain discretions, during the minority, 
to apply trust income for that beneficiary or to accumulate it.  Such an arrangement does not become 
a “settlement” by virtue of Section 43(2)(b) IHTA because, whether income is accumulated or not, it 
can only ever be applied for the benefit of that beneficiary434.  
 
5.3.3   Settlements with a qualifying interest in possession 
 
Where arrangements constitute a “settlement” for IHT purposes, a key initial question is whether 
there is a “qualifying interest in possession” in the settled property.  If there is, then in a limited 
number of cases, the holder of that “interest in possession” will be treated, for IHT purposes, as 
beneficially owning the settled property underlying that interest, even though that is not the case as a 
matter of law. In particular, Section 49(1) IHTA states that: 
 
“A person beneficially entitled to an interest in possession in settled property shall be treated for 
the purposes of this Act as beneficially entitled to the property in which the interest subsists”.   
 
Whether there is an “interest in possession” requires a detailed review of the terms of the 
“settlement”.  Such an interest is not fully defined by the legislation but has been defined by the 
courts as a “present right to present enjoyment”435.  This judicial statement largely reflects a press 
release issued by the then Inland Revenue on 12 February 1976. That press release states in particular 
that: 
 
“…an interest in possession in settled property exists where the person having the interest has the 
immediate entitlement (subject to any prior claim by the trustees for expenses or other outgoings 
properly payable out of income) to any income produced by that property as the income arises; 
but ….a discretion or power…which can be exercised after income arises so as to withhold it from 
that person negatives the existence of an interest in possession.436For this purpose a power to 
                                                          
this way in respect of commercial arrangements, although in practice HMRC appear to turn a blind eye to such 
issues!  
432 See 4.3.2 above. 
433 To date, it is not clear whether the judicial decisions regarding Section 60 TCGA would be applied to a “bare 
trust” for IHT purposes.   
434 See HMRC Inheritance Tax Manual IHTM16068 (accessed 18 June 2020). 
435 See the majority decision of the House of Lords in Pearson v IRC [1980] 2 All ER 479.  Pearson has been 
followed by the Scottish courts: see Miller v IRC [1987] STC 108 and, more recently, Trustees of the Fairbairn or 
Douglas Trust v HMRC [2007] STC (SCD) 338. The latter case treated as an “interest in possession”, on the facts, 
an “alimentary liferent”, described by the judge (at page 342) as “a peculiarly Scottish device that may be used 
by a truster [i.e. settlor] as a means of protecting a beneficiary from his creditors (or, indeed, from himself)”. 
Section 46 IHTA in fact defines an “interest in possession” where IHT applies to Scotland.  In particular, it treats 
an interest under a “proper liferent” (see 5.3.2) as an “interest in possession”.  
436 This was the situation in Pearson, according to the majority. Consequently, there was no “interest in 
possession”.  The same was true in Re Trafford’s Settlement Trusts, Moore & Osborne v IRC [1984] STC 236, 
where there was a single current beneficiary of a discretionary trust of income, but the class of beneficiaries had 






accumulate income is regarded as a power to withhold it, unless any accumulations must be held 
solely for the person having the interest or his personal representatives.  On the other hand, the 
existence of a mere power of revocation or appointment, the exercise of which would determine 
the interest wholly or in part (but which, so long as it remains unexercised, does not affect the 
beneficiary’s immediate entitlement to income) does not …prevent the interest from being an 
interest in possession”437.    
 
A simple example of an “interest in possession” would be a vested life interest entitling the holder to 
any income from the settlement, although an “interest in possession” can exist even if the settlement 
gives rise to no income but the holder is entitled to the use or enjoyment of settled property438.  As 
the 1976 press release indicates, a power on the part of trustees to accumulate income from settled 
property may well prevent there being an “interest in possession”.  However, in HMRC’s view, this is 
not the case (at least outside Scotland) where trustee powers are merely “administrative” e.g. a 
power to use trust income to pay for advisers or for the upkeep and repair of trust property439.    
 
An “interest in possession” is “qualifying “only if it is one to which an individual is beneficially 
entitled440 or it is one to which a company is beneficially entitled in certain very limited 
circumstances441. 
 
Furthermore, if an individual becomes beneficially entitled to an “interest in possession” in a 
settlement after 21 March 2006, it will not be a “qualifying interest in possession” unless it is an 
“immediate post-death interest”442, a “disabled person’s interest”443 or a “transitional serial 
interest”444. The definitions of these categories are complex445.  Their overall effect is, quite 
                                                          
437 The minority in the House of Lords in Pearson regarded the situation as falling within this last sentence. The 
factual distinction between the majority and minority analyses is fine.   
438 See Section 50(5) IHTA, as well as Oakley and another (as personal representatives of Jossaume) v IRC [2005} 
STC (SCD) 343, where a right to rent-free occupation of premises was an “interest in possession” and not a 
lease.  For earlier cases where, on the facts, a right to occupy property rent-free was an “interest in possession”, 
and not just a licence granted by the trustees, see IRC v Lloyds Private Banking Ltd (as trustee of Irene Maude 
Evans, decd) [1998] STC 559, Woodhall (personal representative of Woodhall, deceased) v IRC [2000] STC (SCD) 
558 and Faulkner (trustee of Adams, deceased) v IRC [2001] STC (SCD) 112. In all these cases, it was the 
underlying substance that counted.  For example, in IRC v Lloyds Private Banking Ltd, the judge said (at page 
566) that the will “is dispositive and confers upon [X] a determinable life interest in the half-share [of a house] 
though it is dressed up as a set of administrative directions”.   
439 See HMRC Inheritance Tax Manual IHTM16067 (accessed 18 June 2020). This view reflects the (fine) 
distinction drawn by the majority in Pearson between (i) “dispositive” powers under which trustees could divert 
the net income of the trust (e.g. by accumulating it for the benefit of other beneficiaries); and (ii) administrative 
powers which merely permitted trustees to deduct, from the gross income of the trust, expenses and taxes 
properly incurred in trust management or preserving the value of the trust assets.  Miller v IRC [1987] STC 108 
was an example of an administrative power to use income to make good depreciation of the trust assets. This 
did not prevent there being an “interest in possession”.  
440 See Section 59(1)(a) IHTA. 
441 See Section 59(1)(b) and (2) IHTA. 
442 See Section 49A IHTA. 
443 See Section 89B IHTA. 
444 See Sections 49B-E IHTA. 
445 An “immediate post-death interest” in settled property is one to which an individual becomes beneficially 
entitled under a will or intestacy on the death of the testator or intestate; the settled property in question is not 
at any material time within Section 71A IHTA (trusts for bereaved minors); and the interest in possession is not 






deliberately, to limit significantly the situations in which holding a “qualifying interest in possession” 
leads to the holder being treated as owning the underlying settled property446.  In particular, it is now 
impossible to use a gift “inter vivos” to set up a new trust with a “qualifying interest in possession”, 
unless it is for the benefit of a disabled person447.  The main consequence is that much more settled 
property is now subject to the very different, and more onerous settled property regime discussed in 
5.3.4. 
 
The fiction that the holder of a “qualifying interest in possession” beneficially owns the underlying 
settled property has several IHT consequences. For example, the disposal or termination (e.g. on 
death) of the “qualifying interest in possession” shall be treated for IHT purposes as if the holder had 
made a “transfer of value” of the entire underlying settled property in which that interest subsists or 
subsisted448. The settled property is aggregated for IHT purposes with the personal property of that 
holder. If this transfer of value of the settled property occurs on the death of the holder of the 
interest in possession, then the higher IHT rates on death apply. Nevertheless no IHT is chargeable as 
a consequence if the holder of the interest in possession becomes beneficially entitled to the 
underlying settled property or to a further interest in possession in it, or, in some cases, the settled 
property reverts to the settlor or is transferred to the holder’s spouse, widow or widower.  These 
exceptions from IHT follow the logic of the statutory fiction that the holder of the interest in 
possession owns the underlying settled property.  There is no IHT charge on the trust449 itself and the 
IHT charge largely reflects the personal IHT profile of the interest-in-possession holder.  Hence, 
although there is not full “transparency”, the IHT regime where there is a “qualifying interest in 
possession” is better aligned with the IHT position where assets are owned directly, rather than via a 
settlement as an asset protection mechanism.  Such alignment is logical if one proceeds on the basis 
that the settlement is a form of gift-over-time to the beneficiaries.  
 
In some cases the statutory fiction is disapplied: if a person becomes entitled to an interest in 
possession because of a transaction for money or money’s worth, the Section 49(1) IHTA fiction that 
the interest holder owns the trust property is ignored when deciding if the giving of value for that 
interest is itself a “transfer of value” for IHT450.  This ensures that the actuarial value of the interest in 
possession is used to decide whether the person acquiring it has overpaid for it (and has thereby 
made a “transfer of value” to the extent of the overpayment).  That actuarial value could well be less 
than the value of the underlying settled property e.g. if there is a life interest and that measured by 
reference to the life of an old person.  
 
                                                          
requires there to be a beneficiary of the relevant settlement who is a “disabled person” (as defined). There are 
three different kinds of “transitional serial interest”.  In all three cases, the settlement must, inter alia, have 
commenced before 22 March 2006; it must not be a trust within Section 71A IHTA (trusts for bereaved minors); 
and the interest must not be a “disabled person’s interest” (within Section 89B IHTA).   
446 See Loutzenhiser: Tiley’s Revenue Law (9th edition) at pages 935-6 for some of the political background to 
these changes and, in particular, a belief by HMRC that “flexible interest in possession” trusts were being used 
to create tax-efficient arrangements which were little different from discretionary trusts. The latter have never 
been able to benefit from the less onerous “interest in possession” regime.    
447 This has important planning implications because only “inter vivos” transfers of value can benefit from the 
exemption for PETs 
448 See Sections 51-2 IHTA.  
449 Although the trustees can be secondarily liable for unpaid IHT. 






Because the interest in possession holder can be treated as owning the underlying settled property, 
any “reversionary interest” in that property is in principle “excluded property”, which is ignored for 
IHT purposes451.  There are, however, exceptions to that principle e.g. where the reversionary interest 
has at any time been acquired for money or money’s worth (whether or not full value was paid).  
These exceptions aim to prevent avoidance based around the “excluded property” status of a 
“reversionary interest”452.   
  
5.3.4   Settlements with no qualifying interest in possession 
 
If there is no “qualifying interest in possession” in a settlement, then a completely different IHT 
regime applies to that “settlement”, and the property in that settlement is referred to as “relevant 
property”453.  That regime is summarised below454.  The summary assumes that the settlement’s 
assets are not carved out of the “relevant property” regime as “excluded property” (e.g. because the 
assets are non-UK-situated and the settlor is not treated as UK-domiciled for IHT purposes).   
 
A transfer of assets by a settlor into a “relevant property” settlement is likely to be immediately 
subject to IHT at lifetime rates, taking into account the settlor’s “cumulative total” of chargeable 
transfers455.    
 
In addition, at each ten-year anniversary from the date when the trust was set up, there is a charge of 
up to 6%456 on the then market value of the “relevant property” in the settlement457.   The precise 
rate of tax depends a number of variables.  These include, in particular, the then market value of the 
“relevant property” plus the historic value of any so-called “related settlements” created by the 
settlor, certain other transfers of value by the settlor, as well as the historic value of any property in 
the settlement which is not “relevant property” e.g. because there is a “qualifying interest in 
possession” in that property. Therefore, the ten-year anniversary charge is to some extent influenced 
by the settlor’s behaviour but it takes no account of the fiscal circumstances of any beneficiary of the 
settlement.  This is true irrespective of the nature of that beneficiary’s interest. 
 
If assets were settled after the settlement was created or after the last ten-year anniversary, then an 
adjustment is made to tax those assets by reference to the period for which they have been “relevant 
                                                          
451 See Section 48(1) IHTA. 
452 This concept is defined in Section 47 IHTA to include any vested or contingent “future interest” under a 
“settlement”.  In Scotland, it includes “an interest in the fee of property subject to a proper liferent”.  
453 See Section 58(1) IHTA. 
454 Section 58(1) IHTA creates exceptions from the “relevant property” taxation regime for a number of specific 
types of settlement which would otherwise be within it e.g. charitable trusts, employee benefit trusts, certain 
pension schemes and “decommissioning security settlements” (created to secure legal obligations when oil 
fields are abandoned).  Some of these exceptions relate to entirely commercial arrangements caught by the 
“settlement” concept. Detailed IHT rules apply to some of these specific types of settlement and, in particular, if 
they lose their special status e.g Section 72 IHTA.  
455 In particular, that transfer of value is usually not a PET. 
456 The maximum 6% rate is arrived at by multiplying the relevant IHT rate for transfers of value other than on 
death (currently 20%) by 0.3. 






property”458.  For determining this period, the relevant ten-year period459 is split into three-month 
increments. 
 
Where assets are transferred out of the settlement, there is a separate IHT “exit charge” of up to 
6%460.  A transfer out of a settlement can occur when it ends; when assets are distributed to a 
beneficiary or the latter otherwise becomes “absolutely entitled” to an asset (directly or under a 
“bare trust”); when an asset becomes part of a trust regime (e.g. a charitable trust) falling outside the 
main “relevant property” regime; or when there is a non-commercial transaction which reduces the 
value of the settled property.  Different rules apply for calculating this charge depending on whether 
the transfer occurs before or after the first ten-year anniversary of setting up the settlement461. The 
rate of charge is also linked to the period (measured in three-month increments) that the relevant 
assets have been in the “relevant property” settlement since it was set up, or since the last ten-year 
anniversary of its creation.    
 
Overall the tax regime applying to “relevant property” settlements does not take account of the 
characteristics and circumstances of beneficiaries of the settlement.  It only takes limited account of 
the characteristics and circumstances of the settlor.  Similarly it does not treat beneficiaries as 
entitled to a share of the underlying “relevant property”, even if they have vested interests in it. 
Instead it treats the settlement as a separate and “opaque” taxable entity.  In addition to any IHT 
charge on creating the original “relevant property” settlement, this regime aims to tax the “relevant 
property” once a generation at roughly the IHT rate for lifetime transfers of value (20%)462.  This is 
very different from the IHT approach to bare trusts or to those with a “qualifying interest in 
possession” and is a significant deterrent to setting up trusts. It is true that the higher (40%) rate of 
IHT does not apply, even if major beneficiaries of the “relevant property” settlement die while it is in 
existence.  However, this lower headline rate of IHT is more than offset by the inability to access 
important exemptions which can apply where a beneficiary holds property directly or via a non-
“relevant property” settlement.  In particular, there is no scope for the spouse exemption in Section 
18 IHTA to operate in relation to a “relevant property” settlement, nor is PET treatment (under 
Section 3A IHTA) applicable.   “Relevant property” settlements can, however, still claim business 
property and agricultural property relief.  The settlement property may also be “excluded property” 
where it is non-UK-situated and the settlor is not deemed to be UK-domiciled.  
 
                                                          
458 This applies in particular to income of the settlement which is accumulated so that it becomes part of the 
“relevant property” from the date of accumulation.  In some cases (see Section 64(1A)-(1C) IHTA), settlement 
income is treated as accumulated even if it has not been formally allocated to capital by the trustees.  
459 Up to the first ten-year anniversary or between such anniversaries. 
460 See Section 65 IHTA.  This charge does not apply if in particular the appointment of assets would amount to 
income for tax purposes in the hands of a UK-resident.  It also does not apply to payments of costs and expenses 
in respect of assets which are “relevant property”; nor where the relevant transfer of assets occurs within 3 
months of creating the settlement or within 3 months of a 10-year anniversary: see Section 65(4) and (5) IHTA.  
461 See Sections 68-9 IHTA. 
462 See HMRC Consultation Document dated 6 June 2014: “Inheritance tax: A fairer way of calculating trust 
charges” at paras 2.2 and 2.29. HMRC make clear that they do not regard a settlor putting assets into a 
discretionary trust (where it could remain undistributed for a long period) as equivalent, for IHT purposes, to an 
outright gift by an individual, who has no further say in what happens to that property. While that may be true 
of discretionary trusts, since 2006 the “relevant property” regime also applies to many non-discretionary trusts 






The 2006 changes have therefore greatly expanded the scope of an “opaque” IHT regime so that it 
applies to many, if not most settlements.  For larger settlements in particular, this is more costly in 
actual tax terms, especially compared to what went before and compared to owning property 
directly463.  It is also a complex and costly regime with which to comply. If the settlement is a UK-
resident trust, its capital gains are also likely to be taxed on an “opaque” basis, at marginal rates of 
tax, as discussed in 4.3.4 and 4.3.5. It is strange that the tax rules should actively deter the use of 
settlements as a legitimate asset protection mechanism.  Arrangements which are not “settlements” 
(e.g. certain company-based structures) may now offer a better method of asset protection without 
the burden of IHT and with no (or at least lower) tax on capital gains.  This is a somewhat arbitrary 
outcome, not least because structurally, a private investment company with different classes of 
beneficial shareholding may not be that different, in legal and economic terms, from a discretionary 
trust.  
 
5.3.5  IHT: transfers of value, etc involving “close companies” 
 
While the IHT regime applicable to “relevant property” settlements places a clear limit on the “tax 
transparency” of settlements for IHT purposes, there is another situation in which IHT is imposed by 
“looking through” an intermediate entity to those with an interest in it. This is where that entity is a 
“close company”. 
 
Normally, and leaving aside “relevant property” settlements, IHT mainly applies to transfers of value 
by individuals464. However, the scope of the charge is extended by Part IV IHTA to certain transactions 
involving “close companies”.  These are defined in the same way as in CTA 2010, with the proviso that 
they need not be UK-resident465. 
                                                          
463 For further discussion of these issues, see James Kessler QC: “The Quest for Fair Inheritance Taxation of 
Trusts” at www.kessler.co.uk/about/Two lectures by James Kessler.  A particular point raised by that 
commentator is the almost unique nature of the UK “relevant property” regime.  This makes cases of double 
taxation more likely, where settlements have a mix of UK and non-UK assets and/or beneficiaries. See also 
proposals for reform of the IHT treatment of trusts in Emma Chamberlain: “Reform of Inheritance Tax” [2020] 
BTR 184 and especially at 198-9, although these proposals mainly focus on ending the status quo whereby non-
UK domiciliaries can set up trusts for UK-resident beneficiaries which enjoy long-term IHT-free status (because 
of the “excluded property” rules).  
464 See Sections 1 and 2(1) IHTA.  
465 See Section 102(1) IHTA. The definition of a “close company” in Part 10 Chapter 2 CTA 2010 is complex and 
broad.  In very simplified form, it only applies to a company which is under the “control” of five or fewer 
economic “participators”; or of economic “participators” who are also “directors”: see Section 439 CTA 2010.  
The very wide definition of “control” in Section 450 CTA 2010 is sufficient to catch many companies which are 
not obviously closely held. Certain publicly listed and traded companies are expressly excluded from “close 
company” status: see Section 446 CTA 2010. As the definition of a “close company” for IHT purposes extends to 
non-UK-resident companies, and as the definition of “settlement” (see 5.3.2) is not limited to trusts, there is 
potential for non-UK entities (e.g. stiftungen) in particular to be both “settlements” and “close companies” for 
IHT purposes.  In part, this will depend on whether those beneficiaries can properly be regarded as 
“participators” in a “close company”, which is doubtful given their lack of enforceable rights – see Section 454 
CTA 2010. If an entity is both a “settlement” and a “close company”, this may cause confusion, because the IHT 
rules for taxing transactions involving “close companies” operate very differently to those which  apply 
(especially after 2006) to “settled property” (see 5.3.4). While the courts would no doubt prevent an overt 
double charge under both the “settled property” and “close company” rules, in relation to the same transaction, 
that is not the end of the story. In particular, because different IHT rules apply to “close companies” and 







Section 94 IHTA provides: 
 
“(1) Subject to the following provisions of [Part IV] of this Act,  where a close company makes a 
transfer of value, tax shall be charged as if each individual to whom an amount is apportioned 
under this section had made a transfer of value of such amount as after deduction of tax (if any) 
would be equal to the amount so apportioned, less the amount (if any) by which the value of his 
estate is more than it would be but for the company’s transfer; but for this purpose his estate shall 
be treated as not including any rights or interests in the company.  
 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, the value transferred by the company’s transfer of 
value shall be apportioned among the participators466 according to their respective rights and 
interests in the company467 immediately before the transfer, and any amount so apportioned to a 
close company shall be further apportioned among its participators, and so on; but 
(a) so much of that value as is attributable to any payment or transfer of assets to any person 
which falls to be taken into account in computing that person’s profits or gains or losses for the 
purposes of income tax or corporation tax…. shall not be apportioned and  
 
(b) if any amount which would otherwise be apportioned to an individual who is domiciled outside 
the United Kingdom is attributable to the value of any property outside the United Kingdom, that 
amount shall not be apportioned.    
 
(3) [The “surrender” of certain reliefs (e.g. losses) by one company to another for corporation tax 
purposes is ignored in deciding whether there is a “transfer of value” by the former company].  
 
(4) Where the amount apportioned to a person under this section is 5 per cent or less of the value 
transferred by the company’s transfer of value, then…..tax chargeable under subsection (1) above 
shall be left out of account in determining, with respect to any time after the company’s transfer, 
what previous transfers of value he has made.  
 
(5) [Provides for the limited IHT “annual exemption” in respect of lifetime transfers to apply in 
respect of deemed transfers of value by an individual under Section 94. This would not otherwise 
be the case in respect of such a deemed transfer of value, which equally cannot be a “potentially 
exempt transfer”].”     
 
Hence Section 94 apportions the “transfer of value” by the “close company” to certain persons 
(especially individuals) with an interest in it, who are treated as having made an equivalent “transfer 
of value”.  If one of those persons with a relevant interest in the “close company” is itself a “close 
company”, then a further apportionment can be made among those holding relevant interests in that 
second “close company”, and so on.  The scope of Section 94 has been reduced to take account of 
                                                          
respect of different amounts. See also Baldwin and Kiranoglu: United Kingdom branch report Volume 99b 
Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International, IFA 2014 Congress 835 at 836.  
466 “Participator” is defined in the same broad manner as in Section 454 CTA 2010 but omitting anyone who 
would be a “participator” purely because of being a “loan creditor”: see Section 102(1) IHTA. This is an 
important limitation on the breadth of Section 454.  
467 These are the rights and interests in the assets of the close company which could potentially be distributed 






ordinary corporate transactions which might otherwise trigger it.  In particular, HMRC consider468 that 
a dividend payment from subsidiary to parent is not a “transfer of value” for Section 94 purposes. Nor 
is a transfer of assets at an undervalue between a wholly-owned subsidiary and its parent; or between 
two wholly-owned subsidiaries.  Any Section 94 charge is in fact a liability of the “close company”, 
although there is scope to collect the tax from the “participators” if the company fails to pay469. 
 
Where the rights attaching to the unquoted share or loan capital of a “close company” are altered or 
extinguished, then Section 98 IHTA treats that transaction as an IHT “disposition” by the 
“participators” holding the altered or extinguished rights.  That disposition can give rise to a “transfer 
of value”.470 Section 98(3) specifically prevents the deemed disposition from being a “potentially 
exempt transfer”.  However, because it is a deemed disposition, rather than just a deemed transfer of 
value, all other IHT exemptions can be invoked in respect of any transfer of value flowing from that 
disposition471.   
 
Sections 99 and 100 IHTA adapt Sections 94 and 98 IHTA in certain cases where the “participators” in 
the relevant “close company” include trustees of a “settlement” for IHT purposes.  Section 99 
provides in particular that if a transfer of value made by the company is apportioned to its trustee 
“participators”, then if there is a “qualifying interest in possession” in the settled property, that 
interest shall be treated as coming to an end to the extent of that apportioned value.  This may give 
rise to an IHT charge under Section 52 IHTA.  If there is no such “interest in possession”, then the 
trustee is treated as making a disposition reducing the value of the “settled property” by the 
apportioned amount. 
 
Section 100 applies where there is an alteration in the value of a “close company”’s unquoted shares 
or loan capital which gives rise to a Section 98 deemed disposition and one of the affected 
“participators” is a “settlement” trustee. If there is a “qualifying interest in possession”472 in that 
“settlement”, that interest is treated473 as ending to the extent that the alteration devalues any shares 
or loan capital which are both subject to the “settlement” and are attributable to that “interest in 
possession”.  Section 100 does not cover an alteration in the value of the company’s shares or loan 
capital, when the “participator” is a trustee of a “relevant property” settlement i.e. one without a 
“qualifying interest in possession”. 
 
If the “close company” itself holds an “interest in possession”, then that company’s “participators” 
are generally treated as being entitled to that interest474.  This in turn may subject them to the IHT 
regime for “settlements” where there is an “interest in possession”.  If those “participators” in turn 
                                                          
468 Statement of Practice E15. 
469 Section 202 IHTA.  
470 And hence give rise to IHT. Tax on chargeable gains may also arise because of “value shifting” e.g. under 
Section 29 TCGA.  
471 See HMRC Inheritance Tax Manual IHTM04069 (accessed 18 June 2020).  
472 If the individual only became beneficially entitled to the interest in possession after 21 March 2006, then in 
most cases it must be an “immediate post-death interest”, a “disabled person’s interest” or a “transitional serial 
interest”.   
473 This potentially gives rise to IHT under Section 52 IHTA. 
474 See Section 101(1) IHTA and also Statement of Practice E5.  The latter is supported by Powell-Cotton v IRC 
[1992] STC 625.  Generally, if the company became entitled to that interest in possession after 21 March 2006, 







include the trustees of a “settlement” in which another person holds a separate “interest in 
possession”475, then the underlying “interest in possession” held by the company is further attributed 
via those trustees to the holder of that second “interest in possession”476.  Consequently, a transfer of 
value will occur on the death of that person; or if the trustee participator’s interest in the “close 
company” is reduced otherwise than for full consideration477.   
 
Part IV IHTA 1984 consists of “tax transparency” or “look through” rules which are designed to 
prevent avoidance of IHT which could otherwise arise if individuals could make “transfers of value” 
indirectly via “close companies”.  It partly aligns the IHT position with what it would have been had 
the participators owned directly the assets of the “close company”. However, it stops well short of 
treating all transfers of value in respect of interests in a “close company” as equivalent to a pro rata 
transfer of that company’s underlying assets. In this and other respects, Part IV resembles the capital 
gains tax rules regarding “close companies” in Sections 3-3G TCGA.478  However, Part IV IHTA 1984 
applies automatically if the prescribed conditions are satisfied; and whether or not the transfer of 
value, etc by a “close company” is connected with arrangements to avoid tax.  The IHT rules regarding 
the taxation of “settlements” also apply automatically but are less anti-avoidance rules than a IHT 
response to structures for protecting and preserving wealth which do not involve direct beneficial 
ownership of that wealth by those standing to benefit.  
 
As already mentioned, some entities may be both “settlements” and “close companies” for IHT 
purposes.  In such cases, there is no clear guidance about which IHT regime should take precedence 
and there is a clear risk of double taxation.   
 
5.4  Value Added Tax (“VAT”) and “Tax transparency” 
 
5.4.1  Introduction 
 
VAT is a tax on the provision of goods and services479 rather than a tax on legal persons as such.  The 
primary relevance of legal persons is as collectors of this transaction-focussed tax. Therefore, the 
question rarely arises whether and how that tax should apply if the underlying transaction was 
regarded as carried out, not by the entity which in fact carried it out but by those with an interest in 
that entity. 
 
The VAT rules therefore contain situations where entities or arrangements which are often regarded 
as “look through” for other tax purposes can nevertheless be treated as “opaque” for VAT purposes.  
This applies in particular to partnerships and trusts.  Furthermore, the VAT “grouping” rules (which 
                                                          
475 In the “settled property” which makes the trustees “participators”. 
476 Section 101(2) IHTA.  
477 See HMRC Inheritance Tax Manual IHTM04092 (accessed 19 June 2020), which also makes clear that if the 
participators in the company are trustees of a “relevant property” settlement (i.e. with no “qualifying interest in 
possession”), then the participators’ share of the interest in possession held by the company is treated as 
comprised in the “relevant property” settlement. If a person with a “qualifying interest in possession” in settled 
property assigns it to a “close company” which that person wholly owns, Section 101(1) IHTA treats there as 
being no change in the beneficial ownership of that interest.    
478 Indeed the same set of facts may trigger both an apportionment for IHT purposes under Part IV IHTA and an 
apportionment of chargeable gains from a “close company” under Sections 3-3G TCGA.    
479 Technically, it applies to “supplies” of goods and services (as defined) as well as to the “acquisition” (from 






are a simplification measure) are a very clear, but rather specialised example of how an entity can be 
disregarded altogether for tax purposes.  This disregard (based directly on EU law) is one which the 
taxpayer triggers (subject to conditions) by applying for group status. Hence VAT group status does 
not apply automatically to affiliates with the appropriate level of connection. This differs from group 
treatment for corporation tax purposes.  
 
5.4.2   Partnerships: General 
 
A partnership is not typically regarded as an entity which one “looks through” for VAT purposes.  
Rather, it is an entity distinct from its underlying assets and partners. In Staatssecretaris van Financien 
v Heerma,480 the sole economic activity of a Dutch farmer was renting a cattle shed to a Dutch 
partnership of which he and his wife were partners. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”) regarded this as a supply for VAT purposes between two separate taxable persons, even 
though the purported lessor was dealing with a partnership of which he was a partner. For the 
purposes of what are now Articles 9 and 10 of Directive 2006/112, there was “economic activity” 
(because rent was being charged on an ongoing basis) and the partner was acting “independently” in 
relation to the partnership, not least because he was acting “in his own name, on his own behalf and 
under his own responsibility”. The fact that the Dutch partnership lacked legal personality under 
Dutch law did not affect this analysis.  That partnership could still be regarded as a taxable person for 
VAT because it still had the “de facto independence of companies”, enabling it to enter into the 
lease481.  
 
The fact that one does not “look through” partnerships for VAT purposes is particularly clear when 
one considers the VAT treatment of (i) the admission of a new partner in return for a capital 
contribution; and (ii) the transfer of a partnership share.  The former transaction was considered by 
the CJEU in KapHag Renditefonds 35 Spreecenter Berlin-Hellersdorf 3. Tranche GbR v Finanzamt 
Charlottenburg482.  In that case, the CJEU ruled that there was no “supply” for VAT purposes by a 
German partnership (a Gesellschaft des buergerlichen Rechts) which invested in real estate when a 
new partner was admitted to the partnership in return for a capital contribution.  In particular, there 
was no supply by the partnership to the new partner of a fractional interest in the underlying assets of 
the partnership483. The CJEU analysis did not turn on any non-tax analysis of the nature of the 
partnership in question e.g. whether or not it had legal personality as a matter of general law, 
                                                          
480 Case C23-98 [2001] STC 1437. 
481 A similar approach has been adopted more recently by the CJEU in relation to “freedom of establishment” 
and the UK capital gains tax exit charge on trusts: see Trustees of the P Panayi Accumulation and Maintenance 
Settlements v HMRC Case C-646/15 [2017] STC 2495. It was recognised that an English law trust is not a 
separate legal person and the question was therefore whether a trust was an “other legal person” which, under 
Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), could invoke the four freedoms. The 
court (at pages 2517-8) adopted the thinking of Advocate-General Kokott that “that concept of ‘other legal 
persons’ extends to an entity which, under national law, possesses rights and obligations that enable it to act in 
its own right within the legal order concerned, notwithstanding the absence of a particular legal form, and 
which is profit-making”. The trust met this condition because it existed to generate profits from its assets and 
the trust and its trustees “constitute an indivisible whole”.     
482 Case C-442/01 [2005] STC 1500.  
483 In other words, the partnership share is seen as an asset distinct from the underlying partnership assets, 
even though it derives its value from them.  This is akin to the distinction between a share in a company and the 
underlying assets of that company.  See Appendix A for the entirely different approach to analysing a 






although the Advocate-General’s opinion seems to assume that the partnership had legal personality.  
HMRC Business Brief 21/2004484 points out that VAT may arise in such cases if goods or services are 
contributed by the new partner to the partnership in return for being admitted.  The partnership may 
be able to recover some or all of this VAT. However, any such tax charge485 (on the market value of 
those goods and services) is effectively a clawing-back of any “input VAT” previously claimed by the 
new partner in respect of goods or services which are now being contributed in a transaction 
(admission to the partnership) which is not a “supply” by the partnership for VAT purposes. All that is 
acquired by the new partner is an ownership interest in the business entity, which is not analysed as a 
bundle of fractional interests in the underlying assets of that entity.        
 
HMRC similarly consider, based in part on Kretztechnik AG v Finanzamt Linz486, that a transfer of a 
partnership interest is a transfer of a chose in action which is a distinct asset from the underlying 
assets of the partnership487.  Again, the VAT analysis does not “look through” to the underlying 
partnership assets but treats the partnership as an entity distinct from its underlying assets. Whether 
the transfer of that interest is a supply for VAT purposes depends on a number of factors discussed in 
HMRC Business Brief 30/2004488. However, none of these factors calls into question the distinction 
between the partnership interest and the underlying partnership assets.  If, rarely, the disposal of the 
partnership interest is a “supply” (because the disponor carries on a business of dealing in such 
interests or it acquired the interest in order to control the partnership business) it will typically be a 
VAT-exempt supply of a financial service489.    
 
 
5.4.3  Partnerships - Section 45 VATA 1994 (“VATA”) 
 
                                                          
484 Dated 10 August 2004.  
485 Pursuant to Articles 16 and 26 of Directive 2006/112.  
486 Case C-465/03 [2005] STC 1118. In that case, the CJEU followed KapHag. Although Heerma 
 was not cited, the Advocate-General stressed that the analysis did not turn on differences in legal 
characteristics between business entities (e.g. the presence or absence of legal personality).  For further 
discussion, see Paul Williams: “VAT and Partnership Interests”. Tax Journal.  Issue 763, 15. 1 November 2004.  
487Treating a partnership share as an interest in an entity distinct from the underlying partnership assets is 
unfamiliar in the UK direct tax context, where there is a tendency to see the partnership as an aggregation of 
partners’ fractional interests in a pool of assets; and not as an entity in its own right.  This tendency is of course 
influenced heavily by the nature of an English common law partnership. However, this analysis of a partnership 
share as a separate asset is not unique to VAT. The 2017 decision of the United States Tax Court in Grecian 
Magnesite Mining, Industrial & Shipping Co, SA v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 149 TC 3 concluded that, for 
US Federal income tax purposes, the redemption of an interest in a US limited liability company (taxed on a 
“transparent” basis as a partnership) was not a deemed disposal of a share of the underlying partnership assets, 
save where the tax rules clearly specified otherwise (as they only did for certain assets such as US real estate).  
Rather, the redemption of the partnership interest was the sale or exchange of a separate “indivisible capital 
asset”: the taxpayer’s partnership interest. The US Court of Appeals (Washington D.C. circuit) upheld the Tax 
Court in June 2019, but on narrower grounds relating to the US income sourcing rule known as the “US office” 
rule: see www.cadc.uscourts.gov decision No. 17-1268. On appeal, there was no challenge to the Tax Court’s 
finding that the partnership interest was a single “indivisible capital asset”. The Grecian Magnesite decision has 
in any case been reversed by statute for future years: see 7.2.6.2.1.  
488 Dated 19 November 2004.   
489 Because of Article 135(1)(f) Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax. This has direct 
effect and applies in particular to “transactions…..in shares, interests in companies or associations [emphasis 
added]”.  Article 135(1)(f) is given effect in UK domestic law via Schedule 9 Group 5 VATA, but the UK 






Section 45 VATA is a special permissive rule regarding the VAT registration of partnerships.  In 
particular, Section 45(1) provides: 
 
“The registration under this Act of persons: 
(a) carrying on a business in partnership, or 
(b) carrying on in partnership any other activities in the course or furtherance of which they 
acquire goods from other member States, 
may [emphasis added] be in the name of the firm490; and no account shall be taken, in 
determining for any purposes of this Act whether goods or services are supplied to or by such 
persons or are acquired by such persons from another member State, of any change in the 
partnership.” 
 
In Business Brief 21/2004, HMRC stress that Section 45(1) is not the legal basis for concluding that 
there is no supply from a partnership to an incoming partner.  Nor does it have any bearing on the 
VAT treatment of the transfer of a partnership interest.  Both these matters and their EU law analysis 
have been discussed at 5.4.2. Rather Section 45(1) deals, in particular, with the consequences of 
English common law partnerships having no legal personality and, especially, the fact that a new 
partner joining a partnership, or an old partner leaving it, would technically leads to a dissolution and 
formation of a new partnership, rather than a change to the existing one.  Where it applies, Section 
45 therefore treats the partners in a partnership from time to time as a separate continuing person 
for VAT purposes only, even if this would not otherwise be the case (e.g. under English partnership 
law). Hence Section 45 is a practical solution to discontinuation under English partnership law on a 
change of partners491.  
 
HMRC also consider that the Section 45 VAT registration procedure for partnerships can, and should, 
be used where property (e.g. land) is co-owned via a trust and is commercially exploited492. 
 
Where an English limited partnership is formed under the Limited Partnerships Act 1907, then current 
practice is that VAT registration should only be in the name(s) of the general partner(s).  This is 
because the 1907 Act actively deters a limited partner from taking part in the management of the 
                                                          
490 HMRC guidance is to the effect that Section 45(1) allows the partnership to register in the firm name or 
trading style: see VAT Manual on Registration at para VATREG08800 (accessed 19 June 2020).   
491 The same discontinuation issues appear to arise under Scottish law even though Scottish partnerships are 
separate legal persons. There are limits on the extent to which Section 45 allows separate registrations for 
partnerships.  In particular, if two individuals are partners in both of two distinct general partnerships, A and B, 
HMRC is entitled to give them a single registration under Section 45 which covers both the partnerships.  There 
is no need to give each partnership a separate registration. This is because the effect of Section 45 is to register, 
in the firm name, the individual partners carrying on the business from time to time but not the partnership 
business as such: see Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Glassborrow [1974] STC 142. Glassborrow was 
distinguished in Saunders v Sorrell [1980] VATTR 53, where the same two individuals, X and Y, were partners in 
two limited partnerships. X was the general partner of one limited partnership but Y was the general partner of 
the other. For reasons explained in fn 493, only the general partners were regarded as carrying on business for 
VAT purposes.  Therefore, a separate registration was required for each general partner. Had there been more 
than one general partner in either limited partnership, then presumably the general partners of that limited 
partnership could have been registered as a partnership under Section 45.  
492 See HMRC VAT Manual on Registration at VATREG09100 (accessed 19 June 2020). There is no specific 
provision in the VAT rules for registering trusts, so unless the trust is registered as a partnership under Section 
45, it must be registered under Section 46 as a form of unincorporated association.  Registration under Section 






partnership business. Therefore, a limited partner cannot be treated as making VATable supplies in 
the course or furtherance of the partnership’s business493.   An English limited partnership is not a 
separate legal person and hence, if the limited partners are disregarded for registration purposes, 
registration can only apply to the general partner(s).  By contrast, a Scottish limited partnership 
formed under the 1907 Act is a separate legal person, although a change in the partners may well 
lead to a technical dissolution.  Therefore, registration of a Scottish limited partnership should be in 
the name of the Scottish firm. 
 
The fact that an English limited partnership is not a separate legal person has also meant in practice 
that, if the general partner is a “body corporate”, it has always been able to join a VAT group.  If it 
does so, the partnership’s business activities will be part of the group’s activities and are dealt with 
under the VAT group registration: see 5.4.5 below. Treating the corporate general partner alone as a 
member of a VAT group seems inconsistent with the CJEU’s thinking on partnerships, in the cases 
mentioned in 5.4.2 as well as the Larentia and Minerva decision (see 5.4.5). 
 
UK LLPs are corporate bodies which are usually subject to UK direct taxation (but not VAT) as if they 
were partnerships. Consequently, a UK LLP should be registered as a separate corporate body for VAT 
purposes.  A UK LLP has always been eligible to join a VAT group. Similar rules may apply, depending 
on the facts, to certain non-UK limited partnerships which seek a UK VAT registration and/or 
membership of a VAT group.  
 
5.4.4   Trusts 
 
As mentioned in 5.4.3, the VAT legislation contains no special rules for registering trusts for VAT 
purposes.  HMRC consider that where a trust is engaged in business activity, it should be registered as 
a partnership under Section 45(1) VATA, with the effects described in 5.4.3.  However, they also 
acknowledge that a trust could be VAT-registered under Section 46 VATA.  This provides in particular 
as follows: 
 
“(2) The Commissioners may be regulations make provision for determining by what persons 
anything required by or under this Act to be done by a person carrying on a business is to be done 
where a business is carried on in partnership or by a club, association or organisation [emphasis 
                                                          
493 See the decision of the VAT Tribunal in Saunders v Sorrell [1980] VATTR 53. HMRC appear to accept this 
decision, even though doubts have been cast on its correctness.  The decision seems out of kilter with the 
CJEU’s approach in the cases mentioned in 5.4.2 and in the Larentia and Minerva decision (see 5.4.5), which is 
to treat a partnership as a separate “person” for EU law purposes, even if it lacks separate legal personality 
under its governing law. Furthermore, the decision seems to have been based on the fact that, because the 
1907 Act deters a limited partner from taking part in managing the limited partnership (on pain of losing its 
limited liability), there is therefore no “business” being conducted for VAT purposes by the limited partner 
together with the general partner.  Hence there is no “business in partnership” for Section 45 purposes.  Yet, if 
the arrangement is to be a partnership at all under the 1890 Act and the 1907 Act, there must be a “business in 
common” between the general partner and the limited partner(s). In any case, the definition of a “business” for 
VAT purposes is wide: see Section 94 VATA based on Article 9 of Council Directive 2006/112.  The VAT definition 
of a “business” will not extend to mere passive investment (see the line of cases on what amounts to “economic 
activity” within Article 9, and beginning with Polysar Investments Netherlands BV v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten 
en Accijnzen, Arnhem [1993] STC 222).  Those cases may occasionally be relevant if the limited partnership is an 
investment partnership. In Saunders v Sorrell itself, the limited partnerships were in fact carrying on an active 






added] the affairs of which are managed by its members or a committee or committees of its 
members.  
 
(3) The registration under this Act of any such club, association or organisation may [emphasis 
added] be in the name of the club, association or organisation; and in determining whether goods 
or services are supplied to or by such a club, association or organisation or whether goods are 
acquired by such a club, association or organisation from another member State, no account shall 
be taken of any change in its members…. 
 
(6) References in this section to a ‘business’ include references to any other activities in the course 
or furtherance of which any body corporate or any club, association, organisation or other 
unincorporated body acquires goods from another member State.”  
 
Section 46(3) in particular is similar in effect to Section 45(1) because it ensures that a change in the 
make-up of the body of trustees does not affect a VAT registration of a trust under Section 46.  This is 
especially relevant in relation to trusts under English law which do not have separate legal 
personality.494  HMRC consider495 that they cannot refuse applications for separate VAT registrations 
for trusts, even where each of the trusts concerned has the same trustees.  Each trust is to be 
registered in the names of the trustees and the trust for which they act496.  
 
One further point to note is that a corporate trustee has in practice been allowed to join a VAT group 
if it meets the conditions for VAT group treatment in Section 43 VATA497: see 5.4.5.  This may for 
example apply to the corporate trustee of a pension fund.  If a corporate trustee of a pension fund is 
allowed to join a VAT group, then it will be included in that group in respect of all its business 
activities (both fiduciary and non-fiduciary) so long as it has been granted “unitary treatment” under 
Section 45 or 46 VATA by HMRC498. This practice regarding corporate trustees seems out of line with 
recent CJEU thinking (see 5.4.2) that even if a trust lacks legal personality under its governing law, the 
trust itself (rather than the trustee) can be a “legal person” in its own right for EU law purposes.   
 
 
5.4.5   VAT Groups 
 
                                                          
494 Rather than being a separate entity, a trust under English law is a series of obligations imposed on the 
trustee(s) and typically enforceable by the beneficiaries: see 4.1.1. However, see fn 481 regarding whether a 
trust lacking legal personality under its English law can nevertheless be regarded as a “legal person” for EU law 
purposes.  
495 See HMRC VAT Registration Manual at para VATREG12850 (accessed 19 June 2020). Contrast this approach 
with their stance regarding Section 45 VATA, which was upheld in Commissioners of Customs & Excise v 
Glassborrow [1974] STC 142. The difference in approach reflects the lack of legal provisions for registering trusts 
and trustees for VAT, compared to Section 45(1).  
496 Regulation 8 of the VAT Regulations 1995 makes all members of an entity registered under Section 46 VATA 
jointly and severally liable for anything required to be done by or under VATA.   
497 This is similar to the position discussed at 5.4.3 regarding the corporate general partner of an English limited 
partnership.   
498 See HMRC VAT Registration Manual at VATREG13000 (accessed 19 June 2020).  If such “unitary treatment” is 
unavailable, fiduciary business activities of the corporate trustee must be accounted for outside the group 






The VAT grouping rules are a unique example in UK tax law of a tax grouping regime which requires 
one or more entities to be largely (though not entirely) disregarded and its or their activities 
attributed to another person.  This is not the case under the “grouping” regimes which apply for the 
purposes of corporation tax, stamp duty and stamp duty land tax.  Under those regimes, members of 
the group are not disregarded and their activities are not attributed to related persons.  Instead, 
those rules simply enable group members to share certain corporation tax attributes (e.g. losses).  
They also generally ensure that transactions between group members are tax-neutral.   
 
The VAT grouping rules are a form of “tax transparency” only in the sense that they largely disregard 
the activities of certain entities affiliated as a group and attribute them to the group’s “representative 
member”.  Although subject to anti-avoidance conditions, these grouping rules are not per se anti-
avoidance rules. They are a business facilitation measure for closely-related entities: eligible entities 
can choose whether to seek a VAT group registration.  Indeed, it is possible to create more than one 
VAT group registration within the same corporate group499.   
 
The current source of the VAT grouping rules is Article 11 of Council Directive 2006/112500 on the 
common system of value added tax: 
 
“After consulting the advisory committee on value added tax (hereafter, the ‘VAT Committee’), 
each Member State may regard as a single taxable person any persons [emphasis added] 
established in the territory of that Member State who, while legally independent, are closely bound 
to one another by financial, economic and organisational links. 
 
A Member State exercising the option provided for in the first paragraph, may adopt any measures 
needed to prevent tax evasion or avoidance through the use of this provision.” 
 
Article 11 does not have direct effect in the domestic law of Member States:  each Member State can 
decide whether to create a VAT grouping regime under its domestic law and how to do so, consistent 
with the overall effect of Article 11501.  The UK has chosen to create a grouping regime502.  
 
Section 43 VATA provides in part as follows: 
 
“(1) Where under sections 43A to 43D any bodies corporate [emphasis added]503 are treated as 
members of a group, any business carried on by a member of the group shall be treated as carried 
on by the representative member [emphasis added], and 
                                                          
499 Conversely Section 46(1) VATA permits, in limited cases, a single “body corporate carrying on business in 
several divisions” to seek separate VAT registrations for the activities of those divisions. 
500 Previously Article 4(4) of the Sixth VAT Directive (77/388/EEC).  There is no material difference between 
Article 4(4) and Article 11 of the 2006 Directive.  
501 See HMRC v Taylor Clark Leisure Plc [2018] UKSC 35 at para 19.  
502 See in particular, Sections 43-44 VATA.   
503 The UK historically restricted membership of a VAT group to “bodies corporate”.  This is a narrower concept 
than the corporation tax concept of “company”: see Section 1121 CTA 2010. It is also narrower than the 
concept of “persons” mentioned in Article 11 of the 2006 Directive, which is not limited to entities with legal 
personality: see the decision of the CJEU in Beteiligungsgesellschaft Larentia and Minerva mbH & Co KG v 
FInanzamt Nordenham and Finanzamt Hamburg-Mitte v Marenave Schiffahrts AG Cases C-108/14 and C-109/14 
[2015] STC 2101. Following Larentia and Minerva, Section 53 and Schedule 18 Finance Act 2019 introduced, 







(a) any supply of goods or services by a member of the group to another member of the group 
shall be disregarded; and  
(b) any supply which is a supply to which paragraph (a) does not apply and is a supply of goods or 
services by or to a member of the group shall be treated as a supply by or to the 
representative member; and  
(c) any VAT paid or payable by a member of the group on the acquisition of goods from another 
member State or on the importation of goods from a place outside the member States shall 
be treated as paid or payable by the representative member and the goods shall be treated: 
(i) in the case of goods acquired from another member State, for the purposes of [the 
duty to make returns]; and  
(ii) in the case of goods imported from a place outside the member States, for those 
purposes and the purposes of [the prescribed procedures on importing goods], 
as acquired or, as the case may be, imported by the representative member  [emphasis 
added]; 
and all members of the group shall be liable jointly and severally for any VAT due from the 
representative member.   
(1AA) Where  
(a) it is material, for the purposes of any provision made by or under this Act (“the relevant 
provision”), whether the person by or to whom a supply is made, or the person by whom 
goods are acquired or imported, is a person of a particular description, 
(b) paragraph (b) or (c) of subsection (1) above applies to any supply, acquisition or 
importation, and  
(c) there is a difference that would be material for the purposes of the relevant provision 
between: 
(i) the description applicable to the representative member, and  
(ii) the description applicable to the body which (apart from this section) would be 
regarded for the purposes of this Act as making the supply, acquisition or 
importation or, as the case may be, as being the person to whom the supply is 
made, 
the relevant provision shall have effect in relation to that supply, acquisition or importation as 
if the only description applicable to the representative member were the description in fact 
applicable to that [other] body. 
(1AB) Subsection (1AA) above does not apply to the extent that what is material for the 
purposes of the relevant provision is whether a person is a taxable person.”  
 
                                                          
set out in fn 505 below. In particular, a UK VAT group will be required to have at least one member which is a 
“body corporate” “established” or with a “fixed establishment” in the UK. However, group status will also be 
available in some cases where the “body/ies corporate” in question are controlled by an individual or by a 
partnership. It is not clear why these changes fail to cover other unincorporated entities besides partnerships 
e.g. trusts and unincorporated associations. This may yet fall to be tested before the courts. To some extent, the 
Finance Act 2019 changes have already been pre-empted in Baillie Gifford & Co v HMRC [2019] UKFTT 410 (TC). 
The judge concluded that the pre-November 1 2019 VAT grouping rules breached the EU principle of “fiscal 
neutrality”.  While Article 11 of the 2006 Directive did not have direct effect, the UK rules could still be given a 
conforming interpretation consistent with Larentia and Minerva, so that three “bodies corporate” owned 
directly by a Scottish partnership could form a VAT group. The same would apply if the controlling entity had 






As already discussed504, a “body corporate” for the purposes of the grouping rules can include a 
corporate general partner of a limited partnership and, in some cases, a limited liability partnership, 
as well as a corporate trustee.  Under the UK rules, if a body corporate is a member of the UK VAT 
group, then that entire body is included in the group even if it has one or more “fixed establishments” 
outside the UK505.  The effect of the grouping provisions is to largely disregard the separate existence 
of all the group members other than the body corporate which is chosen to be the “representative 
member”506.  In effect each other member’s VAT-relevant activities (its “business) are attributed to 
the “representative member”507.  Supplies, etc between those other members or between any of 
them and the “representative member” are usually ignored for VAT purposes.  Supplies, etc between 
non-group members and group members are treated as made by or to the “representative 
member”508.  Hence, the UK implementation of Article 11 does not treat a VAT group as a notional 
                                                          
504 See 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 above. 
505 The revised Section 43A VATA now specifies when a “body corporate” and other persons are eligible to be 
treated as a group member.  In particular: 
“(1) Two or more UK bodies corporate are eligible to be treated as members of a group if 
(a) one of them controls each of the others, 
(b) one person (whether a body corporate or an individual) controls all of them, or 
(c) two or more individuals carrying on a business in partnership control all of them. 
(2) …. 
(3) …. 
(4) An individual carrying on a business and one or more UK bodies corporate are eligible to be treated as 
members of a group if the individual 
(a) controls the UK body corporate or all of the UK bodies corporate, and  
(b) is established, or has a fixed establishment, in the United Kingdom in relation to the business. 
(5) Two or more relevant persons carrying on a business in partnership (‘the partnership’) and one or more UK 
bodies corporate are eligible to be treated as members of a group if the partnership 
(a) controls the UK body corporate or all of the UK bodies corporate, and 
(b) is established, or has a fixed establishment, in the United Kingdom in relation to the business. 
(6) In this section 
(a) ‘UK body corporate’ means a body corporate which is established or has a fixed establishment in the 
United Kingdom [emphasis added]; 
(b)  ‘relevant person’ means an individual, a body corporate or a Scottish partnership.”  
Section 43AZA determines whether a body corporate, individual or partnership “controls” a UK body corporate 
for Section 43A purposes.   
506 See Commissioners of Customs & Excise v Kingfisher PLC [1994] STC 63. Actions, rights and liabilities of an old 
representative member must be automatically ascribed to the new representative member on a change of 
representative member: see HMRC v Taylor Clark Leisure Plc [2018] UKSC 35 at paras 21 and 27.  The 
representative member is therefore a continuing entity akin to a “corporation sole” whose role is fulfilled by 
whichever group member holds that office from time to time. It is not per se the agent or trustee of the other 
group members: see HMRC v Taylor Clark Leisure Plc [2018] UKSC 35 at para 31. 
507 An assessment for VAT due from the group is to be issued in the name of the “representative member” at 
the time when the assessment is raised, whether or not that company was a group member when the liability in 
fact arose: Thorn PLC v Commissioners of Customs & Excise. LON/96/1708.   
508 For a recent case where VAT grouping triggered recovery of input VAT on costs incurred by the general 
partner of an investment limited partnership, see the First-Tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) in Melford General 
Capital Partner Ltd v HMRC [2020] UKFTT 0006(TC). The general partner was grouped with a UK LLP which 
provided advisory services to the limited partnership and to certain companies owned by the limited 
partnership via the general partner.  As the group representative member, the general partner was treated as 
performing the services rendered by the LLP, which meant that it was treated as engaged in economic activity 
over and above passive share investment. Hence it was carrying on “business” for VAT purposes once grouping 






separate person embracing all its members509, including the representative member.  It simply deems 
most VAT-relevant activity to be carried on by the representative member only. Because Section 43 
VATA does not give rise to a notional separate person embracing all group members, a repayment 
claim made by a group member, but not by the “representative member” itself, is not treated per se 
as being made by the “representative member”.  The situation is different if there is clear evidence 
that the group member makes that claim as the agent of the “representative member”510.   
 
The separate existence of group members other than the “representative member” is still taken into 
account occasionally in relation to VAT-relevant transactions511.  In particular, Section 43(1AA) 
provides that one takes into account the characteristics of the group member, when taxing a supply, 
acquisition or importation, if the VAT-relevant characteristics of the representative member differ 
materially from those of the group member which would be party to the supply, etc if the grouping 
fiction were ignored. Section 43(1AA) is an anti-avoidance rule, permitted by Article 11.  
 
There are also restrictions in Section 43(2A) to (2E) on the general rule disregarding intra-group 
supplies.  These prevent some partly-exempt VAT groups (i.e. groups with restricted “input” VAT 
recovery) from avoiding an irrecoverable VAT cost when they buy in certain services (in particular, 
buying in telecoms services via the non-UK “fixed establishment” of a group member).  Those services 
would be used to make a disregarded intra-group supply to the UK establishment of another VAT 
group member.  Section 43(2A) to (2E) impose a “reverse charge” to VAT on the “representative 
member” in respect of certain supplies512 of services between group members, even though such 
supplies are usually disregarded. The VAT triggered by that “reverse charge” can be recovered by the 
group, but only subject to the normal rules on recovering “input tax”513. In practice, this means that 
VAT recovery will be restricted.  
 
                                                          
509 This approach to implementing Article 11 is compatible with EU law: see Lloyds Banking Group PLC, 
Blackhorse Limited, MG Rover Group Limited, Standard Chartered PLC, Standard Chartered Bank, 2016 G1 
Limited v HMRC and BMW (UK) Holdings Limited [2019] EWCA Civ 485 at paras 104, 115 and 116. Contrast the 
different approach of the anti-fragmentation rules in paragraphs 1A and 2 Schedule 1 VATA. These are also 
based on Article 11. They permit HMRC in specified avoidance cases to direct that certain persons “shall be 
treated as a single taxable person [emphasis added] carrying on the activities of a business described in the 
direction”. That fictional single taxable person is deemed to be a partnership. The Court of Appeal in Lloyds 
Banking Group PLC (see para 123 of the judgment) regarded this alternative approach as permissible too under 
Article 11.     
510 See HMRC v Taylor Clark Leisure Plc [2018] UKSC 35. 
511 The separate existence of each group member is, for example, recognised to the extent of making it jointly 
and severally liable for VAT due from the representative member.  
512 There is no charge if the intra-group supplier makes the (otherwise disregarded) supply entirely out of its 
own resources (i.e. it does not buy in the services from outside the group); or that supply would be “exempt” 
anyway for UK VAT purposes under Schedule 9 VATA. 
513 These rules are discussed in detail in Part 7 of VAT Notice 700/2: Group and divisional registration, which was 






There are important differences between the UK VAT grouping rules and those adopted in other EU 
member states514.  In particular, certain other jurisdictions515 have rules which can treat a “fixed 
establishment” (broadly a branch) in that jurisdiction of an entity formed outside that jurisdiction as 
being part of a VAT group under those rules without treating the rest of that entity as belonging to 
that VAT group.  The result of such “establishment only” grouping rules is that VATable supplies can 
therefore arise between a foreign entity and its “fixed establishment” in the relevant jurisdiction 
because, exceptionally, that establishment is treated as a separate person because it belongs to the 
local VAT group (which is itself a separate person for VAT).  Such rules were considered by the CJEU in 
Skandia America Corp (USA), filial Sverige v Skatteverket516.  In the wake of that case, HMRC issued 
Revenue and Customs Briefs 2(10 February) and 18(30 October) of 2015.  These state517 that for UK as 
well as non-UK VAT purposes, a non-UK “fixed establishment” of a UK-established entity can be 
regarded as a separate taxable person if that “fixed establishment” belongs to a VAT group in a 
member state (such as Sweden) with “establishment only” grouping rules.  In such cases, the normal 
rule518 that there can be no VATable supply between one part of a single legal entity and another will 
be overridden, because the relevant non-UK grouping fiction treats a branch of that entity as part of a 
separate person for VAT purposes.  This situation can arise whether or not the UK-established entity 
itself belongs to a UK VAT group519.  
  
The Skandia case has caused considerable complexity and uncertainty, not least because it requires 
taxpayers, when applying their own domestic VAT rules, to consider the status of their “fixed 
establishments” under the VAT grouping rules of other EU jurisdictions520.  
 
                                                          
514 Article 11 of Directive 2006/112 does not mandate the adoption of VAT grouping rules and there are 
apparently none in Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia: see HMRC 
Brief 23 (11 December 2015). Italy and Luxembourg have apparently adopted VAT grouping rules recently: see 
Mark Agnew and Philippe Gamito: “VAT focus – VAT groups: ‘reverse Skandia’ for intra-entity supplies?” Tax 
Journal, Issue 1468 (6 December 2019) at page 24.  
515 Notably Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia and Sweden: see HMRC 
Brief 23 (11 December 2015). Italy and Luxembourg appear to take the same position under their recently-
enacted VAT grouping rules: see “VAT focus – VAT groups: ‘reverse Skandia’ for intra-entity supplies?” op. cit. 
Ireland and the Netherlands take the same approach as the UK to VAT grouping i.e. where an entity is within an 
Irish or Dutch VAT group, all its “fixed establishments” (wherever situated) are within that group.  However, 
such an “establishment” could also become a separate person for VAT purposes if it is grouped with other 
entities under the “establishment only” grouping rules of another Member State.  
516 Case C-7/13 [2015] STC 1163. The fact pattern in that case was very similar to the situations which had 
previously led the UK to enact Section 43(2A) to (2E) VATA. 
517 See now in addition Part 8 of VAT Notice 700/2: Group and divisional registration, which was last updated by 
HMRC on 19 March 2019.  
518 See the CJEU in Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze v FCE Bank (Case C-210/04) [2007] STC 165. 
519 If the UK entity is in a UK VAT group and there is a VATable supply to that group in a Skandia-like situation, 
the Section 43(2A)-(2E) “reverse charge” rules do not also apply.  This is because the non-UK “establishment 
only” grouping rules will treat the non-UK “fixed establishment” of the UK entity as a separate person for VAT 
purposes.  Hence the UK VAT group can be party to a VATable transaction with that “fixed establishment” on 
general principles.  
520 For further discussion of these complications and a recent reference from the Swedish Supreme Court to the 
CJEU regarding the scope of Skandia, see “VAT focus – VAT groups: ‘reverse Skandia’ for intra-entity supplies?” 
op. cit. The referred case relates to a cost recharge between the head office of a Danish bank (within a Danish 
VAT group) and its Swedish fixed establishment which was in neither a Danish nor a Swedish VAT group. Unlike 






There are extensive rules to prevent the UK VAT grouping rules being used for tax avoidance 
purposes521.  In particular, Sections 43B and 43C VATA permit HMRC to, respectively, refuse an 
application for group membership or an application to terminate group membership if refusal 
appears necessary “for the protection of the revenue”.  Such anti-avoidance legislation seems 
consistent with Article 11 of Directive 2006/112522.  
 
5.4.6   Conclusion regarding VAT and “tax transparency” 
 
Overall, it seems clear that for the purposes of VAT, the concept of “tax transparency” has limited 
relevance.  In particular, VAT is a tax on transactions and its incidence is closely linked to the nature of 
those transactions.  Consequently, there is less need to “look through” an entity carrying out a 
transaction and to tax by reference to those with an interest in it, rather than by reference to the 
entity itself.  Hence the VAT analysis of the acquisition and transfer of partnership interests is in 
essence the same as the VAT analysis of share acquisitions and transfers in respect of a company. 
Little attention is paid to the minutiae of the governing law of the relevant entity and it seems clear 
that an entity can still be a distinct “person” for VAT purposes even if it lacks legal personality 
(whatever that means) under its governing law.  This approach makes sense because VAT is intended 
to be a harmonised tax applying in broadly the same way across a spectrum of EU Member States 
with very different domestic legal traditions.  
 
Furthermore, Sections 45-6 VATA, where they apply, are the opposite of “look through” rules: they 
create a single enduring person registered for VAT in cases where otherwise (e.g. in relation to a 
partnership) it would be necessary to change VAT registrations on a regular basis because of changes 
in entity membership. At the very least, this would be cumbersome.   
 
The VAT grouping rules largely disregard group members (other than the “representative member”).  
However, this is a very specialised example, mandated by EU law, of ignoring an entity for VAT 
simplification purposes.  It does not significantly alter the overall approach, for VAT purposes, of not 
“looking through” business entities.  Member States have considerable discretion to limit this 
disregard in order to prevent tax avoidance. In any case, it has little or nothing to do with the factors 
which classically underlie “tax transparency”: namely, whether the nature of an interest in an entity or 
arrangement (viewed in isolation) justifies taxation at member level only.  Instead, the entity 
disregard for VAT grouping purposes is an optional business facilitation measure.    
 
5.5 Stamp Duty and “Tax transparency” 
 
Stamp duty is a tax on the documentation giving effect to certain transactions. Since December 2003, 
its scope has been limited to certain transactions (especially transfers on sale) relating to “stock” or 
“marketable securities”, and in some cases partnership interests523.  Before that date, it had also 
applied to transfers of interests in land and to the grant of leases.  Those transactions are now subject 
instead to Stamp Duty Land Tax (“SDLT”) which is discussed further at 5.7. 
 
                                                          
521 See in particular Sections 43AA to 44 VATA, Schedule 9A VATA and the VAT (Groups: eligibility) Order 2004 SI 
2004/1931.   
522 It is discussed in some detail in VAT Notice 700/2: Group and divisional registration, which was last updated 
by HMRC in March 2019. 






5.5.1   Stamp duty and partnerships 
 
Historically, for stamp duty purposes, there was no question of “looking through” to the underlying 
assets of the partnership.  In short, they were “non-transparent”.  Hence stamp duty was payable at 
standard rates on a document transferring a partnership interest on sale, without reference to the 
partnership’s underlying assets. The rationale for this is set out in para STSM091040 (accessed 22 
June 2020) of the HMRC Stamp Taxes on Shares Manual as follows: 
 
“A partnership interest or share is, in law, a separate item of ‘property’ in its own right.  A partner 
cannot claim to be the owner of any particular partnership asset, nor of any specific share of a 
partnership asset.  Rather, a partnership interest represents a right to control the partnership 
assets and affairs for as long as the partnership lasts and, upon dissolution, a right to have the 
assets liquidated, the liabilities discharged and a division of any surplus.” 
 
This is consistent with the case law on partnership interests discussed in 5.2. However, with effect 
from 23 July 2004, a partial transparency regime for stamp duty applies on a transfer of a partnership 
interest in accordance with paragraphs 31-33 Schedule 15 FA 2003.  This regime applies where the 
partnership assets consist of an interest in land; and/or “stock” or “marketable securities”524. Without 
paragraphs 31-33, a transfer of a partnership interest would not be subject to stamp duty at all 
because of Section 125 FA 2003, even if, in particular, its underlying assets included “stock” or 
“marketable securities”.  Such assets would of course still be subject to stamp duty if they were 
transferred on sale directly, rather than being transferred indirectly by selling the partnership 
interest.   
 
Any stamp duty on the transfer of a partnership interest is charged at the (higher) general rates rather 
than the special 0.5% rate which applies on a direct transfer of “stock” or “marketable securities”. 
However, paragraphs 32-33 are likely to greatly reduce any such stamp duty charge525. 
 
Paragraph 32 applies where the partnership property includes a “chargeable interest” in land for SDLT 
purposes.526  Because such “chargeable interests” are intended to be dealt with under the SDLT 
regime, paragraph 32 carves them out of stamp duty, by reducing the stampable consideration for 
the transfer of the partnership interest.  The reduction is (broadly) the market value of the 
“chargeable interest” in land (less any loan secured on it), multiplied by the percentage interest in the 
partnership which is being sold. 
 
Paragraph 33 only imposes stamp duty where the partnership holds “stock” or “marketable 
securities”527.  It limits the stamp duty chargeable to what it would be if (i) the instrument transferring 
the partnership share were a direct transfer of the “stock” or “marketable securities” (stampable at 
                                                          
524 Other than any stock or marketable securities admitted to trading on a “recognised growth market” but not 
listed on any market: see paragraph 33(8A) Schedule 15 FA 2003, together with Section 99A FA 1986.   
525 If it has not already been reduced to nil under the “certificate of value” procedure which exempts certain 
lower value transactions from the general rates of stamp duty (but not from the 0.5% applicable to transactions 
directly involving “stock” or “marketable securities”).   
526 As discussed in 5.7 below, Schedule 15 FA 2003 contains detailed SDLT rules regarding transactions in 
relation to partnerships, where the partnership holds one or more “chargeable interests”.   
527 Other than any stock or marketable securities admitted to trading on a “recognised growth market” but not 






0.5%); and (b) the consideration were the market value of the “stock” or “marketable securities” (less 
any loan secured on them), multiplied by the percentage interest in the partnership which is being 
sold.  For these purposes, “stock” or “marketable securities” will include non-UK “stock” or 
“marketable securities” held by the partnership528. 
 
In order to invoke paragraphs 32 and 33, the relevant instrument of transfer must be submitted to 
the Stamp Office in Birmingham for adjudication under Section 12 Stamp Act 1891529.   
 
Parties may regard the procedure in paragraph 33 as excessively cumbersome.  In that case, they may 
choose instead to execute the unstamped instrument of transfer outside the UK and keep it there.  If 
so, then unless and until stamped in accordance with paragraph 33, the instrument cannot be used as 
evidence in UK civil proceedings nor can it be effectively enforced in the UK530.  The instrument of 
transfer can later be repatriated without penalty so long as it is stamped within 30 days of being 
brought into the UK531.  However, interest on unpaid stamp duty will run from the date when the 
instrument is executed532.  
 
Paragraphs 32 and 33 create a partial “look through” of a partnership for stamp duty purposes, 
although mainly to preserve the stamp duty charge in respect of “stock” or “marketable securities” 
held by the partnership, when a partnership interest is transferred.  Generally, however, a partnership 
is not “looked through” for stamp duty purposes.  This is apparent where a new partner is admitted to 
a partnership. Provided that the incoming partner contributes cash or other assets in return for a 
partnership share and there is no connected withdrawal of capital by an existing partner, HMRC do 
not regard the transaction as a stampable sale533.  In particular, they do not regard the incoming 
partner as effectively purchasing a fractional interest in any “stock” or “marketable securities” held as 
partnership assets534.   
 
The same position holds in reverse i.e. when a partnership is dissolved, which will include any partner 
leaving the partnership.  In that case, the distribution of “stock” or “marketable securities” in 
proportion to the partners’ interests is not treated as a stampable transfer on sale535.  
 
5.5.2   Definition of a “partnership” for Stamp Duty and SDLT 
 
                                                          
528 Such non-UK securities would typically not be subject to stamp duty in practice if transferred directly. 
529 See paragraphs 32(9) and 33(8) Schedule 15 FA 2003.  
530 Section 14(4) Stamp Act 1891. 
531 Section 15B Stamp Act 1891 
532 Section 15A Stamp Act 1891. 
533 See paragraph STSM092020 of the Stamp Taxes on Shares Manual (accessed 22 June 2020). The position 
would be different if the partner being admitted paid cash or transferred assets directly to the existing partners.  
In that case, the new partner would be treated as having acquired a partnership interest on sale.  The amount of 
stamp duty payable would again be subject to paragraphs 32-33. When a partnership converts into a UK LLP 
(which is of course a form of body corporate), there is a special stamp duty relief in Section 12 Limited Liability 
Partnerships Act 2000, which must be claimed by seeking Stamp Office adjudication under Section 12 Stamp Act 
1891.   
534 Cf Sections 59 and 59A TCGA, which are discussed in Appendix A.  
535 Unless the distribution is in satisfaction of a debt due to the partner from the partnership; or the partner 
assumes a liability in return for the distribution; see paragraph STSM092050 of the Stamp Taxes on Shares 






For stamp duty and SDLT purposes in FA 2003, a “partnership” means536 anything counting as a 
partnership under the 1890 Act; a limited partnership registered under the Limited Partnerships Act 
1907; and a UK LLP, as well as “a firm or entity of a similar character to any of those mentioned above 
[emphasis added] formed under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom”.  This 
closing language is broad, bearing in mind that a UK LLP is in fact a body corporate which is merely 
treated as a partnership for certain UK tax purposes. This language is also unclear.  Does a “similar 
character” refer to tax or non-tax characteristics of the relevant non-UK entity, or indeed to both?  
Take the example of a Delaware limited liability company.  From a non-tax perspective, this entity, 
and its members’ interests are similar to those of a UK LLP which is a form of body corporate under 
UK domestic law.  From a tax perspective, they are also similar: both are typically treated as 
“transparent” in their home jurisdictions for direct tax purposes, although such treatment can be 
changed by election in the case of a Delaware limited liability company: see 7.2.4.2.  
 
Paragraph 2 Schedule 15 FA 2003 further provides that, for SDLT purposes, a “chargeable interest” in 
land held by or on behalf of a partnership (as defined above) is treated as held by or on behalf of the 
partners, even if the partnership is a legal person, or even a body corporate under the law of the 
jurisdiction in which it is formed.  This “look through” rule is therefore quite radical in disregarding the 
partnership, and in envisaging that some bodies corporate can be partnerships for these purposes 
(although it is unclear which ones).  SDLT is discussed further in relation to partnerships in 5.7, where 
paragraph 2 is relevant in relation to the special SDLT computation rules in Schedule 15, which limit 
the extent of any “look through”.  Paragraph 2 is itself limited in one key respect.  It is irrelevant when 
deciding if a partnership can be “looked through” for the purposes of claiming group relief from SDLT: 
see 5.5.3.  This can have especially odd consequences where the partnership is a UK LLP. It is strange 
that this “look through” rule only applies when an interest in land is held by or on behalf of a 
partnership.  
 
Paragraph 3 Schedule 15 ensures that the partnership is regarded as the same partnership 
throughout, notwithstanding changes in partnership membership, so long as there at least one 
continuing member.  Paragraph 4 Schedule 15 FA 2003 also provides that a partnership (as defined in 
paragraph 1) is not to be regarded for stamp duty or SDLT purposes as a “unit trust scheme” or an 
“open-ended investment company”.  Both of these latter entities are typically not “looked through” 
for stamp duty or SDLT. 
 
5.5.3   Partnerships and stamp duty/SDLT group relief 
 
Paragraphs 31-33 Schedule 15 FA 2003 set out limited circumstances in which a partnership can be 
treated as “transparent” for stamp duty purposes.  However, these are computational provisions only, 
when a partnership interest is transferred.  They are not a wholesale disregard of the partnership for 
stamp duty purposes. This is clear in relation to the rules regarding group relief.  Those rules537 
exempt from stamp duty certain transfers between “associated” “bodies corporate”, and there are 
equivalent rules for SDLT (which is it convenient to deal with here).  Broadly, such bodies are 
“associated” if one is a direct or indirect 75% subsidiary of the other or both bodies are direct or 
indirect 75% subsidiaries of a third body corporate.  Whether this affiliation threshold is satisfied 
                                                          
536 Paragraph 1 Schedule 15 FA 2003.   






depends primarily on the direct or indirect “beneficial ownership” by one “body corporate” of the 
issued “ordinary share capital” of another.  
 
Because a UK LLP is in fact a form of body corporate538, HMRC accept539 that it can be the 75% 
beneficial owner of another “body corporate” for the purposes of stamp duty group relief.  However, 
because members’ interests in a UK LLP are not “ordinary share capital” (or indeed share capital at 
all), it cannot be the 75% subsidiary of another company for such purposes.  Therefore no stamp duty 
or SDLT group relief is available on an asset transfer from a body corporate which is the parent of the 
UK LLP either to that LLP itself or to a third body corporate which is a subsidiary of the UK LLP. In the 
latter scenario, one presumably cannot “look through” the UK LLP in the same way as for corporation 
tax group relief purposes because there is no stamp duty equivalent of Section 1273(1)(c) CTA 2010: 
see Appendix A.8. 
 
Furthermore, the limited “look through” rule in paragraph 2 Schedule 15 FA 2003 (see 5.5.2) creates 
further complications in relation to SDLT group relief only540. Paragraph 2 only treats LLP members as 
owning underlying LLP assets where those assets are “chargeable interests” in land, not shares. So in 
the example above, paragraph 2 does not treat the parent of the UK LLP as owning directly the shares 
of the LLP’s subsidiary, so as to establish a group relationship between that parent and the subsidiary. 
However, if the UK LLP transfers a “chargeable interest” in land to the subsidiary, paragraph 2 does 
apply. The result is that the land is treated as being transferred to the subsidiary not from the UK LLP 
itself (with which it is grouped) but from the LLP’s parent (with which it is not grouped). Hence the 
limited paragraph 2 “look through” denies SDLT group relief where it might be expected to apply. 
Paragraph 2 would not have this effect if, instead, the interest in land were merely transferred from 
one subsidiary of the UK LLP to another.  
 
This places UK LLPs at a disadvantage, for no good reason, compared to general and limited 
partnerships formed under English law, which can (at least in practice) be “looked through” for all 
purposes541. HMRC state that because partnerships formed under English law lack legal personality, 
they can be “looked through” in order to determine whether “bodies corporate” form a group for 
stamp duty purposes.  In particular, “as such the companies that are the partners of an English 
general or limited partnership can, depending upon the facts [emphasis added] be grouped with those 
companies that are below the partnership in the group structure.”  These HMRC statements are more 
tentative than the equivalent guidance on corporation tax group relief (see Appendix A.8). While they 
have practical merit542, any “look through” sits uneasily with HMRC’s accurate analysis of the nature 
of a partner’s interest in a partnership543. However, if one accepts this HMRC guidance, then group 
relief is available for SDLT purposes where a corporate partner has, say, a 75% share in an English 
partnership which transfers an interest in land to another company whose shares are held by that 
                                                          
538 There is no general rule deeming it to be a partnership for all stamp duty purposes, despite paragraph 1 
Schedule 15 FA 2003. 
539 See paragraph STSM093020 in HMRC Stamp Taxes on Shares Manual.   
540 For further discussion, see Neil Warriner, Michelle Williamson and John Tolman: “Analysis – LLPs, groups and 
stamp taxes” [2010] Tax Journal. Issue 1053, at page 13.  
541 It also places UK LLPs at a disadvantage compared to a UK private limited company, which will be unaffected 
by paragraph 2, Schedule 15 FA 2003 and which typically has “ordinary share capital”.  It can therefore be 
readily grouped with its parent company.  
542 HMRC make similar statements in paragraph SDLTM34360 onwards (accessed 22 June 2020) of the Stamp 
Duty Land Tax Manual in relation to SDLT group relief, in Schedule 7 FA 2003. 






partnership. As discussed above, no SDLT group relief would be available if the English partnership 
were replaced by a UK LLP.  
 
These HMRC statements about “looking through” an English partnership for group relief purposes 
also do not extend to Scottish partnerships because the latter have legal personality.  However, 
because Scottish partnerships are not “bodies corporate” (unlike UK LLPs)544, it is also not possible to 
form a group for stamp duty or SDLT between a Scottish partnership and another company whose 
shares are wholly owned by it. It is not satisfactory that there should be such a divergent approach 
between Scottish and English partnerships, especially given judicial pronouncements on the need for 
consistent interpretation of (non-devolved) tax legislation between the two jurisdictions545. 
 
5.5.4   Trusts and stamp duty  
 
There is no rule which requires all trusts to be automatically “looked through” for stamp duty 
purposes.  If “stock” or “marketable securities” are held via a trust in which beneficiaries have a 
vested interest in both trust income and capital (i.e. a ”bare trust”), then a written transfer of a 
beneficial interest in that trust should be regarded as stampable because it transfers a vested 
beneficial interest in “stock” or “marketable securities”.  However, the same is not true if the trust 
holding the “stock” or “marketable securities” is (a) one in which the beneficiaries’ interests are 
successive, so that they lack a vested interest in trust capital; or (b) a discretionary and/or 
accumulation trust.  Unless the trust can be “looked through” (as in the case of a “bare trust”) to the 
underlying “stock” or “marketable securities”, a transfer of a beneficial interest in it is not subject to 
stamp duty since December 2003.  
 
Since February 2000, there has also been no stamp duty charge in respect of transactions involving 
“units” in a “unit trust”546.  
 
5.6 Stamp Duty Reserve Tax (“SDRT”) and “Tax Transparency” 
 
SDRT is a directly-assessable tax chargeable on certain transactions involving “chargeable securities”, 
as defined in Section 99 FA 1986.  In particular, it is charged at 0.5% on an agreement to transfer such 
securities547.  Unlike stamp duty, a transaction can be subject to SDRT whether or not it is 
documented.  
                                                          
544 See fn 41. 
545 See 2.9.6. As it so happens, SDLT no longer strictly applies in Scotland and Wales. Land and Buildings 
Transaction Tax applies in Scotland from April 2015 and Land Transaction Tax applies in Wales from April 2018.  
In each case, there are transitional provisions.  Both these devolved taxes are, however, largely inspired by 
SDLT.  
546 See paragraph 1 Schedule 19 FA 1999. There was previously such a charge under Sections 54-7 Finance Act 
1946.  For those purposes, a “unit trust” was defined in essentially the same way as for the purposes of the 
direct tax legislation (see 4.3.6.1), including carve-outs for, in particular, “limited partnership schemes”, 
“approved profit sharing schemes” and certain employee share ownership plans: see Stamp Duty and Stamp 
Duty Reserve Tax (Definitions of Unit Trust Scheme) Regulations 1988 SI 1988/268 (as amended). Those 
Regulations are still relevant for stamp duty reserve tax purposes. The carve-out for “limited partnership 
schemes” only applies to a UK limited partnership. On general principles, a partnership with separate legal 
personality (e.g. in Scotland) should not give rise to a “trust” and hence cannot be a “unit trust” anyway.  
547See Section 87 FA 1986. Section 92 FA 1986 sets out the main conditions for ensuring that the same 







The main definition of “chargeable securities” is in Section 99(3) FA 1986, namely: 
 
“(a) stocks, shares or loan capital; 
  (b) interests in, or in dividends or other rights arising out of, stocks, shares or loan capital; 
(c) rights to allotments of or to subscribe for, or options to acquire, stocks, shares or loan 
capital; and 
  (d) units under a unit trust scheme.” 
 
This definition548 does not readily apply to an interest in a partnership, whether or not that 
partnership owns stocks, shares or loan capital.  Were the partnership to be heavily, or indeed solely 
invested in stocks, shares or loan capital, then one might argue that a partnership interest was an 
“interest in” such underlying investments, within Section 99(3)(b).  However, the author is not aware 
of HMRC having argued this for SDRT purposes549.  This may be because of how HMRC analyse an 
interest in a partnership: see 5.5.1550.  Section 99(3)(b) FA 1986 should cover a vested beneficial 
interest either in stocks, shares or loan capital held on trust, or in the rights to income attaching to 
them. 
 
Where a trust is a “unit trust scheme”, Section 99(3)(d) also applies.  For these purposes, a “unit trust 
scheme” is defined in much the same way as for income tax purposes551.  A unit in a “unit trust 
scheme” also potentially falls within Section 99(3)(b) FA 1986.  However, in practice, in such cases, 
one would expect HMRC to apply only the specific SDRT rules relating to units in a “unit trust 
scheme”.   Such a unit is prima facie a “chargeable security” regardless of the underlying trust 
property.  Nevertheless, Section 99(5A)(b) and (5B) FA 1986 treat units in a unit trust scheme as not 
being “chargeable securities”, where that scheme is only invested, in particular, in investments which 
are outside the charge to stamp duty and SDLT.  To this limited extent, one can “look through” the 
unit trust to its underlying investments, when deciding whether units are subject to SDRT.  
 
A further illustration of the partial “transparency” of unit trust schemes for SDRT purposes is Section 
90(1B) FA 1986.  This removes the 0.5% charge “as regards an agreement to transfer trust property to 
the unit holder on the surrender to the managers of a unit under a unit trust scheme if the unit holder 
is to receive only such part of each description of asset in the trust property as is proportionate to, or 
as nearly as practicable proportionate to, the unit holder’s share.”  In short, on its surrender (but not 
on sale to a third party), the unit is treated as equivalent to one or more fractional interests in each of 
                                                          
548 This is the basic definition but there are a number of important exceptions to it in Section 99 FA 1986, not 
least where the relevant stocks, shares or loan capital are issued by non-UK persons.  Those exceptions are not 
considered further in this discussion. 
549 In other contexts, HMRC take a different approach.  The employment-related securities rules in Part 7 ITEPA 
2003 can apply to “units in a collective investment scheme”: see Section 420(1)(e) ITEPA 2003. The published 
guidance in the Employment-Related Securities Manual at ERSM20170 states that where a partnership is a 
collective investment scheme, one should not usually “look through” to its underlying assets.  However, it is 
appropriate to “look through” where the partnership invests in so-called “restricted securities”(whose value is 
reduced by restrictions such as forfeiture provisions) in order to apply the special “restricted securities” tax 
rules in Chapter 2, Part 7.   
550 If the partnership is a legal person, it is harder to argue that a partnership share is an “interest in” the 
underlying investments of the partnership.  However, this risks creating different outcomes depending on 
whether a partnership is an English or Scottish partnership: SDRT applies to the entire UK.  






the underlying scheme assets. Hence if the unitholder receives on surrender those underlying 
fractional interests, there is no SDRT charge. 
 
FA 2014 repealed552 the special rules in Part II Schedule 19 FA 1999 which imposed SDRT on the 
surrender of units in a unit trust. Those rules were introduced in 2000.  
 
5.7 Stamp Duty Land Tax (“SDLT”) and “tax transparency” 
 
SDLT was introduced by Part 4 FA 2003 as a replacement for stamp duty in relation to transactions 
involving UK real estate. Its scope is broader than that of stamp duty pre-FA 2003.  In particular, it is a 
directly assessable tax which is not a tax on legal documentation.  Slightly different variants of the 
SDLT legislation apply in Scotland and in Wales, via the legislation devolving certain powers to those 
parts of the UK. The specifics of the Scottish and Welsh regimes are not discussed here553.   
 
5.7.1   SDLT and Trusts 
 
Section 105 and Schedule 16 FA 2003 deal with how SDLT applies to trustees, subject to the special 
rules regarding “unit trusts” which are discussed below.  Paragraph 1 Schedule 16 draws a distinction 
between “settlements” and “bare trusts”. The latter are defined554 in a manner which closely 
resembles Section 60 TCGA. 
 
Paragraph 3 sets out a partial “look through” regime in relation to “bare trusts” for SDLT purposes.  In 
particular: 
 
“(1) Subject to subparagraph (2), where a person acquires a chargeable interest [in UK land] or an 
interest in a partnership as bare trustee, [SDLT] applies as if the interest were vested in, and the 
acts of the trustee in relation to it were the acts of, the person or persons for whom he is trustee.  
(2) Subparagraph (1) does not apply in relation to the grant of a lease. 
(3) Where a lease is granted to a person as bare trustee, he is treated for the purposes of [SDLT], 
as it applies in relation to the grant of the lease, as purchaser of the whole of the interest acquired.  
(4) Where a lease is granted by a person as bare trustee, he is to be treated for the purposes of 
[SDLT] as it applies in relation to the grant of the lease, as vendor of the whole of the interest 
disposed of.”   
 
For “settlements” (i.e. all trusts other than “bare trusts”, as defined in paragraph 1 Schedule 16), 
paragraph 4 Schedule 16 FA 2003 provides: 
 
“Where persons acquire a chargeable interest or an interest in a partnership as trustees of a 
settlement, they are treated for the purposes of [SDLT], as it applies in relation to that acquisition, 
as purchasers of the whole of the interest acquired (including the beneficial interest).”  
                                                          
552 With effect from 30 March 2014.  
553 Land and Buildings Transaction Tax applies in Scotland from April 2015 and Land Transaction Tax applies in 
Wales from April 2018.  In each case, there are transitional provisions.  
554 See paragraphs 1(2)-(4) Schedule 16 FA 2003 and Pollen Estate Trustee Company Ltd v HMRC [2013] STC 
1479.  The assets of any such trust will consist of one or more interests in UK land, so the operation of the “look 
through” rules regarding such trusts for SDLT purposes may be limited by Crowe v Appleby [1975] 3 All ER 529: 







Hence, there is no SDLT “look through” in relation to a trust which is a “settlement” and which 
acquires an interest in land.  This is true whether or not there is a vested interest in possession in the 
trust income.  
 
The same non-“look through” approach applies in relation to those trusts which qualify as unit trusts, 
even if they would otherwise be “bare trusts”.  Section 101(1) FA 2003 provides in particular that 
SDLT applies to a “unit trust scheme”555 “as if the trustees were a company556; and the rights of the 
unitholders were shares in the company.”  Therefore, if the trust is a “unit trust scheme”, it is non-
“transparent” for SDLT purposes, even if its assets include one or more “chargeable interests” in UK 
land.  This partly explains why investments in UK land via Jersey property unit trusts (“JPUTs”) have 
been popular: there is no SDLT in respect of a transfer of units nor is there any SDRT or (in practice) 
stamp duty on such a transfer, because units in the JPUT will be registered in a register of ownership 
kept outside the UK. 
 
This approach in respect of unit trusts should be contrasted with the rules regarding partnerships 
owning interest in UK land, which are discussed below557.   
 
5.7.2   SDLT and partnerships 
 
Schedule 15 FA 2003 sets out quite complex rules governing the SDLT treatment of certain 
transactions involving partnerships.  This is especially true where there is a transfer of a “chargeable 
interest” in land to or from the partnership; or where there is a transfer of an interest in a 
partnership558. The definition of “partnership” for SDLT purposes has already been discussed at 5.5.2.  
In particular559, a “partnership” is not a “unit trust scheme” for SDLT purposes, so Section 101 FA 2003 
is not relevant.  The definition of “partnership” is also broad enough to embrace certain “bodies 
corporate”, which cuts across the general SDLT approach of not “looking through” companies.  There 
is a tension here because the definition of “company” in Section 100(1) FA 2003 excludes a 
“partnership”, but the definition of “partnership” is broad enough to cover some companies which 
are akin to UK LLPs in particular. 
 
5.7.3  Transfer of a “chargeable interest” to a partnership 
 
                                                          
555 As defined in FSMA: see Section 101(4) FA 2003. 
556 This deemed company status does not, however, entitle the unit trust scheme to certain reliefs, such as SDLT 
group relief, in Schedule 7 FA 2003: see Section 101(7) FA 2003. Section 100(1) FA 2003 makes clear that a 
“company” for SDLT purposes includes an unincorporated association but excludes a partnership. 
557 The non-“look through” approach is also applied by Section 102A FA 2003 to the species of “tax-transparent” 
collective investment schemes known as “co-ownership authorised contractual schemes”: see Section 235A 
FSMA.  They are not trust-based and hence are not unit trusts.  They are also not partnerships although similar 
to an investment limited partnership. Indeed an “authorised contractual scheme” can be set up as a limited 
partnership (rather than as a purely contractual arrangement), in which case it will be treated as a partnership 
for SDLT purposes.  
558 In that case, Part 3 of Schedule 15 FA 2003 potentially applies.  The transfer of a “chargeable interest” in land 
will include the grant, creation or variation of such an interest, as well as its surrender or release: see paragraph 
9(2) Schedule 15 FA 2003.  






There are special rules560 where a “chargeable interest” in land is transferred to a partnership by an 
existing partner; by someone who thereby becomes a partner; or by a person “connected” with an 
existing or incoming partner. These rules can apply where the partnership already exists or is being 
formed.  What follows is a summary of those rules.  
 
The aim is to impose SDLT on that part of the market value of the “chargeable interest” which is not 
attributable post-transfer to the partnership share561 of the person who made the transfer and/or a 
partner “connected” with that person562.  In other words, SDLT only applies to that economic slice of 
the value of the “chargeable interest” which has been given to partners other than (i) the person 
making the transfer to the partnership or (ii) persons “connected” with that transferor.  Unlike a 
company or “unit trust scheme”, the partnership is therefore “looked through” so as to treat the 
person making the transfer, or a person “connected” with that person, as effectively continuing to 
own a slice of the contributed chargeable interest via their ongoing partnership share. The precise 
taxable amount is given by the formula563 MV multiplied by (100-SLP)%, where MV is the market value 
of the interest transferred and SLP is the “sum of the lower proportions”564.  
 
Under paragraph 12A Schedule 15, a “property-investment partnership” (“PIP”) can elect irrevocably 
to disapply paragraphs 10-12.  A PIP is one whose “sole or main activity is investing or dealing in 
chargeable interests (whether or not that activity involves the carrying out of construction operations 
on the land in question)”565.  If this election is made, the transfer of the “chargeable interest” to the 
partnership is subject to SDLT in the normal way on the full market value of what is transferred: the 
“look through” formula in paragraphs 10-12 (based on market value discounted by the “sum of the 
lower proportions”) is then irrelevant.  Making the election can have advantages for the PIP in relation 
to subsequent transactions, notably in relation to interests in the PIP itself which could otherwise 
trigger SDLT: see 5.7.4.  To make the election worthwhile, the SDLT saved on those later transactions 
must exceed the extra SDLT incurred upfront, as a result of making the paragraph 12A election.  
 
5.7.4   Transfer of interest in a “property-investment partnership” 
 
Subject to specific exceptions, the acquisition of an interest in a partnership does not give rise to a 
chargeable transaction for SDLT purposes, even if the partnership property includes land566. Hence 
there is no comprehensive “look through” treatment of partnerships for SDLT purposes, in contrast 
for example to their capital gains tax treatment (see Appendix A, where the pitfalls of a 
comprehensive “look through” are discussed). 
                                                          
560 Paragraphs 10-12 Schedule 15 FA 2003.  
561 A person’s partnership share is the proportion in which he is entitled at that time to share in the income 
profits of the partnership: see paragraph 34(2) Schedule 15 FA 2003. This is odd because partner’s commercial 
entitlements to “chargeable interests” owned by the partnership may in fact be measured differently to their 
entitlement to its income profits.  
562 The definition of “connected” persons is taken from Section 1122 CTA 2010 with certain modifications.  In 
particular, paragraph 39(2) of Schedule 15 disapplies Section 1122(7) CTA 2010, which in many cases treats 
partners as automatically connected with one another.  Continuing to apply Section 1122(7) would undermine 
what paragraphs 10-12 Schedule 15 are trying to achieve.  
563 See paragraph 10(2) Schedule 15 FA 2003. 
564 The detailed rules for determining SLP are in paragraph 12 Schedule 15 FA 2003. 
565 See paragraph 14(8) Schedule 15 FA 2003. A PIP should not include, say, a partnership owning and running a 
hotel.  Nor in practice should it include a partnership whose main profit-making activity is developing property.  







Paragraph 14 Schedule 15 is one of those specific exceptions567.  It subjects to SDLT the transfer of an 
interest in a “property-investment partnership”, where the “relevant partnership property” includes a 
“chargeable interest” in UK land.  Paragraph 14 is therefore a limited “look-through” to the underlying 
real estate assets of the partnership.  SDLT is applied to a percentage of the market value of the 
“relevant partnership property”568.  That percentage corresponds to the partnership share transferred 
(if the person acquiring it was not previously a partner) or the increase in that person’s partnership 
share (where the acquirer was previously a partner).  
 
5.7.5   Transfer of interest in a partnership pursuant to earlier arrangements 
 
Even if the partnership is not a “property-investment partnership”, a transfer of an interest in it can 
trigger a SDLT charge under paragraph 17 Schedule 15.  This will apply where the transfer of the 
interest takes place pursuant to “arrangements” in place when there was a previous transfer of a 
“chargeable interest” in land to that partnership.  That prior transfer must itself have been subject to 
the restricted SDLT charge under paragraphs 10-12 Schedule 15, discussed at 5.7.3.  The SDLT charge 
on the later transfer is a proportion of the market value (at the time of the later transfer) of the 
chargeable interest which was previously transferred to the partnership.  The proportion reflects the 
extent to which the transferor’s partnership share drops when the partnership interest is later 
transferred.  In effect these rules tax a two-step realisation of the value of the underlying interest in 
land, firstly by transferring it to a partnership under paragraphs 10-12 and then disposing of an 
interest in that partnership.   
 
A similar rule in paragraph 17A Schedule 15 applies where there is a transfer of a “chargeable 
interest” in land to a partnership; that transfer falls within paragraphs 10-12 Schedule 15; and a 
“qualifying event” occurs within three years of that transfer of land569.  “Qualifying events” broadly 
consist of extracting value570 from the partnership either by reducing a partner’s capital 
account/partnership interest or by securing repayment of a loan made to the partnership by the 
person in question.  SDLT is imposed on the value extracted.  However, the SDLT charge is reduced to 
the extent that the value extracted is greater than the market value of the “chargeable interest” in 
land when it was transferred to the partnership.  This adjustment reflects the overall aim of paragraph 
17A: to impose SDLT on an indirect realisation of the value of the underlying interest in land, after it 
has been transferred to a partnership with the benefit of paragraphs 10-12.    
 
                                                          
567 The others are paragraph 10 Schedule 15 (discussed at 5.7.3 above) and paragraph 17 Schedule 15 
(discussed at 5.7.5 below).   
568 The meaning of the “relevant partnership property” varies depending on whether or not the partnership 
interest acquired has been directly or indirectly paid for by the person acquiring it.  In any case (see paragraph 
14(5) and 14(5A) Schedule 15), “relevant partnership property” will exclude, in particular, any “chargeable 
interest” transferred to the “property-investment” partnership in return for the transfer of the partnership 
interest; certain leases granted at a market rent; and any underlying “chargeable interest” which is not 
attributable under the partnership agreement to the partnership interest which is being transferred.  In some 
cases, “relevant partnership property” will also not include a “chargeable interest” transferred to the 
partnership subject to an election under paragraph 12A Schedule 15: see 5.7.3. 
569 Paragraph 17A does not apply if an election has been made in respect of the transfer of land to the 
partnership under paragraph 12A Schedule 15.  In that case (see 5.7.3), SDLT on that transfer will not be 
reduced in the first place under paragraphs 10-12.   






The amount of any paragraph 17A charge is reduced by the amount of any concurrent charge under 
paragraph 14: see 5.7.4. 
 
 
5.7.6   Transfer of a “chargeable interest” in land from a partnership 
 
Paragraphs 18-24 Schedule 15 deal with the converse situation to paragraphs 10-12: namely, where a 
“chargeable interest” in land is transferred from a partnership to a present or former partner, or to a 
person “connected” with a present or former partner.  SDLT is imposed on the market value of the 
“chargeable interest” transferred, multiplied by (100-SLP) %571. As before, “SLP” means the “sum of 
the lower proportions” but this time computed according to paragraphs 20-24. 
 
The aim is to ensure that SDLT is not charged to the extent that the “chargeable interest” is being 
transferred from the partnership to a partner or to certain persons572 “connected” with that partner.  
Effectively the rules “look through” the partnership to treat that partner or “connected” person as 
already owning part of the underlying “chargeable interest”, to the extent of the relevant partnership 
share.  There is no SDLT to the extent of that “pre-owned” part (cf the capital gains tax equivalent in 
Section 3 of SP D12, discussed in Appendix A).  Paragraph 21 ensures that this “look through” does 
not apply (and hence more SDLT is due) unless the transfer of the “chargeable interest” to the 
partnership573, and certain subsequent increases in the relevant partnership share, previously 
attracted stamp duty or SDLT.  Hence the “chargeable interest” cannot be extracted from the 
partnership with no or less SDLT if it has not been put into the partnership in a way which previously 
triggered stamp duty or SDLT.   
 
Paragraph 24 applies if a “chargeable interest” is transferred from a partnership when all the partners 
are bodies corporate.  If that is the case and SLP is at least 75, SDLT is charged on the entire market 
value of the “chargeable interest” transferred, with no discount by reference to SLP.  However, if the 
partners are bodies corporate within a group for SDLT purposes, then group relief may be available 
under Schedule 7 FA 2003574, whether or not the entire market value of the transferred interest is 
subject to SDLT.  Group relief can potentially apply because of paragraph 2 Schedule 15 FA 2003.  This 
(see 5.5.2) will treat the partners in the partnership as each transferring an appropriate share of the 
underlying “chargeable interest” which is being transferred out of the partnership.     
 
5.7.7  Anti-avoidance 
 
The courts are alert to attempts to use the “transparency” approach of Schedule 15 FA 2003 for 
avoidance purposes, bearing in mind that it is quite mechanistic. As the Court of Appeal said, 
approving an earlier statement of the Upper Tribunal: 
 
“Schedule 15 should be read, construed and applied in the context of the SDLT legislation as a 
whole, and should not be treated as if it formed some sort of legislative island all by itself575” 
                                                          
571 An irrevocable election under paragraph 12A overrides these rules. 
572 In particular, individuals and certain companies acting as trustee of the “chargeable interest” and mentioned 
in paragraph 20(3) Schedule 15.  
573 Assuming the “effective date” of that transfer was after 19 October 2003.  
574 As modified by paragraph 27 Schedule 15 FA 2003. 







In that case, an attempt to avoid SDLT based in part on paragraph 10 Schedule 15 failed, because, 
under the relevant statutory fictions being invoked by the taxpayer, there was in fact no transfer of a 
“chargeable interest” by a partner to a partnership, as required to trigger paragraphs 10-12.    
 
The breadth of the SDLT general anti-avoidance rule in Sections 75A-75C FA 2003 has been confirmed 
by the Supreme Court in Project Blue Ltd (formerly Project Blue (Guernsey) Ltd) v HMRC576. This also 
needs to be borne in mind when relying on Schedule 15577. In addition, if Section 75A bites so as to 
reconstitute a number of steps as a single notional land transaction subject to a higher SDLT liability, 
the special SDLT computation rules for partnerships in Schedule 15 FA 2003 do not apply to that 
notional transaction578. 
 
5.8    Conclusion on different types of “transparency”  
 
This chapter illustrates how the term “tax transparency” in UK tax law is in fact a number of distinct, if 
related ideas, which have often evolved independently of each other.  These all address the extent to 
which the tax treatment of a person holding an interest in an entity or arrangement should be the 
same as if that person had a direct interest in the underlying activities and assets of that entity or 
arrangement. Furthermore, this chapter shows how the concept of "tax transparency" is often less 
radical than some might argue. Hence it is applied in a much more limited way to those UK taxes 
which are not taxes on income and capital gain. In particular, there are fewer cases when an entity or 
arrangement is "looked through" so as to tax those with an interest in the entity or arrangement as if 
they were carrying on its underlying activities directly, or at least as if they had a direct interest in 
those underlying activities.  Generally, the relevant tax rules have evolved piecemeal and are fact-
sensitive. There is no one theme underlying their evolution. Rules have even developed for particular 
taxes without taking proper account of other rules governing the same tax (notably, the IHT 
“settlement” rules).  This can cause confusion and lead to sub-optimal outcomes.   
 
In relation to VAT, the concept of "tax transparency" has especially little role to play. This is most 
noticeable in relation to the VAT treatment of partnerships: a type of business entity which has been 
classically regarded for UK income and capital gains tax purposes as "flow through".  This is not so for 
VAT, which characterises a partnership interest as an intangible asset distinct from the underlying 
partnership assets. This characterisation strongly resembles the way in which VAT analyses a 
shareholding in a company. By way of exception, the VAT grouping rules are a clear, but limited 
example of "looking through" certain entities entirely. This is purely because of the wording of Article 
11 of Directive 2006/112, which merely empowers Member States to create grouping rules.  It does 
not detract materially from the general point made about VAT and “tax transparency”.  
 
For IHT purposes, the concept of "tax transparency" plays an increasingly limited role. Partnerships 
can be "looked through" so as to tax transactions undertaken by the partnership as if undertaken by 
the partners. The same is true of so-called "close companies". In the latter case in particular, partial 
                                                          
576 [2018] STC 1355. 
577 SDLT also falls within the scope of the wider UK general anti-avoidance rule in Sections 206-215 Finance Act 
2013, although in some respects Section 75A-C FA 2003 are wider, not least because they do not require proof 
of a tax avoidance purpose nor that any “double reasonableness” threshold is crossed.  
578 Section 75C(8A) FA 2003, as applied in Hannover Leasing Wachstumswerte Europa Beteiligungsgesellschaft 






"look through" rules ensure that companies (which are not normally liable for IHT) cannot be used by 
individuals and trustees with an interest in them, so as to avoid IHT.  These are essentially anti-
avoidance rules, although it is not necessary to demonstrate an avoidance motive to trigger them.  
This may expose these rules to challenge under EU law, given the EU law-driven changes to the capital 
gains tax “close company” apportionment rules in Sections 3-3G TCGA.  
 
A "look through" approach is adopted for IHT purposes in respect of those simpler co-ownership 
arrangements which are not characterised as "settlements".  This approach is shared with income tax 
and capital gains tax, as well as stamp duty, SDRT and SDLT but with one important difference: the 
concept of a "unit trust scheme" (often treated as opaque, save for income tax) has no relevance for 
IHT.  Furthermore, IHT has a broad concept of "settlement" which covers more than trusts (including 
some corporate bodies and other commercial arrangements). Confusingly, it does not mean the same 
thing as a “settlement” for income tax or capital gains tax. The IHT “settlement” rules overlap 
confusingly in terms of the entities which they cover with the IHT "close company" rules mentioned 
above. Furthermore, their approach is very different from those close company rules.  In particular, 
since 2006,"settlements" are increasingly subject to a fairly harsh IHT regime which taxes them as 
separate entities, taking no account of the tax profile of the “settlement” beneficiaries but taking 
some account of the tax profile of the settlor. This non-"transparent" approach further complicates 
the confusing IHT overlap between "settlements" and "close companies" because the "close 
company" rules invariably adopt a form of "look through" treatment. 
 
For the purposes of stamp duty, SDRT and SDLT, arrangements and entities tend (apart from "bare 
trusts") not to be "looked through" for tax purposes. This is especially true of companies and "unit 
trust schemes", even though the latter are in essence a form of "bare trust". Yet there are exceptions 
where a qualified "look through" approach is permitted. In the case of partnerships, those exceptions 
are quite elaborate (especially for stamp duty and SDLT). However, for stamp duty purposes, the 
partnership “look through” is a limited anti-avoidance device while the SDLT “look through” 
deliberately falls well short of treating partnerships as “look through” whenever they engage in 
transactions involving real estate. In that respect, it differs from the capital gains tax approach to 
partnerships in Sections 59-59A TCGA and thereby avoids a number of complications for partners 
generated by that approach. The definition of "partnerships" for stamp duty and SDLT purposes is 
problematic.  In particular, it includes some entities (notably UK LLPs) which in essence are private 
companies. This reflects the extent to which the commercial concept of a “partnership” has changed 
but is also confusing: “partnerships” can sometimes be subject to stamp duty and SDLT on a "look 
through" basis whereas companies cannot. The ability to switch between different types of corporate 
entity to achieve a desired tax outcome will not be lost on taxpayers and their advisers.   
 
Finally, when deciding whether a group relationship exists between two companies for UK tax 
purposes, it is very doubtful technically whether the "transparency" of a partnership allows the 
required degree of affiliation to be traced through a partnership which is interposed between those 
two companies. It is clear that HMRC sometimes take a more generous approach in practice and it 
would be much better if this practice were clearly codified, with proper safeguards against avoidance.  
However, the status quo show how, for UK tax purposes, "transparency" typically does not mean 
totally disregarding an entity or arrangement, even if it is not taxed in its own right but only at the 







6.   The UK classification of entities and the significance of “tax transparency” as it relates to the UK’s 
double taxation treaties and EU law 
  
6.1 Introduction and Article 1(2) OECD Model Tax Treaty 2017 
 
The UK has a very extensive network of double taxation treaties (“treaties”) which are mainly 
modelled on various versions of the OECD’s Model double taxation agreement (“the OECD Model”)579. 
Cross-border transactions are especially likely to highlight differences between the UK approach to 
classifying entities for tax purposes and the approach of other jurisdictions.  Similarly such 
transactions often highlight differences between the UK and other jurisdictions regarding whether 
arrangements are “tax transparent” or not and, if so, what this signifies.   
 
Such differences have of course been actively exploited in order to avoid tax.  To give a simple 
example, one jurisdiction (“A”) may be prepared to give treaty relief at source in respect of royalty 
income paid to an entity in another jurisdiction (“B”) which it regards as “transparent” (e.g. a 
partnership) and all of whose members are individuals resident for tax purposes in B.  From A’s 
perspective, income is treated as being currently paid to individual taxpayers resident in B, whether or 
not the entity distributes that income to its members. However, if B in fact regards the same entity as 
both non-taxable in its own right and non-“transparent”, then the income relieved at source in A may 
in fact escape current taxation in B, both at the level of the entity and of its members.  Because of the 
differing perspectives of A and B, there is therefore a risk of double non-taxation (or at last under-
taxation), whereas the general aim of a treaty should instead be to avoid both double taxation and 
unintended double non-taxation. Mismatches of this kind are of course the target of Action 2 of the 
BEPS project580.  Of course, such situations can also create a risk of double taxation contrary to the 
aim of a treaty. To reverse the example above, if A regards the payee of royalties as a non-taxable 
entity, then the risk arises that it will refuse treaty relief even though B regards that entity as a 
partnership so that its royalty income is currently taxable in the hands of its members who are 
residents of B.  
 
As discussed in 5.2, the new Article 1(2) of the OECD Model goes some way to addressing these 
double taxation issues. The UK has been regularly negotiating language along the lines of Article 1(2) 
in recently-concluded treaties581.  Furthermore, as discussed in 5.2, the UK is a party to the MLI which 
                                                          
579 For the most recent version of the OECD Model, see the Model Taxation Convention on Income and Capital 
2017, dated 21 November 2017 and the accompanying Commentary (“the OECD Commentary”) 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-full-version-9a5b369e-en.htm. 
(accessed 23 June 2020). This version includes significant changes in the wake of the OECD’s work on BEPS, 
including changes regarding treaties and “tax transparency”, which have already been mentioned in 5.2 and 
which will be considered further in this Chapter.   
580 Action 2 has been partly embodied in UK domestic law by the extensive “hybrid mismatch” rules in Part 6A 
TIOPA. At EU level, Articles 9 to 9b of Directive 2016/1164 (as modified by Directive 2017/952) set out how the 
principles of Action 2 are to be given effect in the domestic law of Member States.  This necessitated some 
limited changes to Part 6A TIOPA, taking effect from 2020. A discussion of these rules, which focus on curbing 
double non-taxation, is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, while extensive, and in some respects broader 
than the Action 2 recommendations, they by no means cover all potential situations giving rise to double non-
taxation arising from hybrid mismatches, not least because they only apply to UK taxpayers subject to 
corporation tax.  They also do not generally disturb the underlying UK tax architecture on entity classification 
and the meaning of “tax transparency”.  
581 One example is Article 4(3) of the UK-Uruguay double tax treaty signed on 24 February 2016 and entering 






is now in force in the UK582. Article 3(1) of the MLI is in essence the same as Article 1(2) of the OECD 
Model and, generally, subsequent references to Article 1(2) should be read as including Article 3(1).  
 
Generally, the UK adopted the Article 3 provisions on “transparent entities”583in its list of notifications 
and reservations, when it deposited its instrument of ratification of the MLI.  However, some UK 
treaties which already contained bespoke wording regarding “transparent entities” (notably, the UK-
France and UK-Netherlands treaties) have, unusually, not been modified by Article 3(1) of the MLI. 
Those treaties are discussed later in this Chapter.  
 
Article 1(2) is very much a compromise which does not, in particular, seek to impose on treaty parties 
common entity classification standards.  Furthermore, it has weaknesses discussed below.  However, 
it represents the current, and most advanced, UK position on how tax treaties should address the 
allocation of taxing rights where “transparent” entities are involved and especially where the parties 
to the treaty do not agree on entity classification. The UK position is therefore substantially in line 
with the post-BEPS thinking as reflected in the OECD Model and MLI. This chapter considers how the 
UK got to this position and, in particular, the impact of the current UK-US double tax treaty, which 
largely foreshadowed Article 1(2).  Generally, the UK (unlike the US) has not led the debate in this 
area and has historically tended to address such entity classification issues in detail in its treaties 
where concerns have been raised by its treaty partners (notably, the US, France and the Netherlands).  
 
As already mentioned, the strengths and weaknesses of Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 
3(1) of the MLI have been extensively analysed584. Without repeating that analysis in detail, it is 
helpful to summarise some key points, before turning to the evolution of UK treaty policy in this area: 
 
6.1.1 Article 1(2) only sets a minimum standard. In particular, it only addresses whether a source state 
should grant treaty relief in respect of source state income paid to or earned by an entity which is 
regarded as “transparent” by either contracting state. That entity can be in a third state.  Article 1(2) 
does not address the situation whether that income is paid from such a ”transparent” entity.  Some 
                                                          
treaty of 1993 (SI 1994/770), following amendment by a Protocol signed on 24 January 2018 and entering into 
force on 1 June 2018.    
582 http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-
prevent-beps.htm (accessed 23 June 2020). The UK has begun to publish “conforming” versions of its treaties, 
as modified by what it and its treaty counterparties have agreed to, and reserved against, under the complex 
procedure for applying the MLI, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this thesis. While these 
“conforming” versions are useful in understanding how the MLI has modified existing treaties, they have no 
binding legal authority.  Ultimately, the treaty in question must be compared with the list of notifications and 
reservations deposited by the UK and the relevant treaty counterparty with the OECD under the MLI procedure.  
583 The final list was published by HMRC on 17 July 2018: see http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-
position-united-kingdom.pdf. (accessed 9 January 2020). The only part of Article 3 against which the UK has 
reserved is Article 3(2).  This provides that one party to a treaty is not required to grant one of its residents 
double taxation relief in respect of its income where that treaty permits the other party to the treaty to tax that 
same income on the basis that it is derived by a resident of that other jurisdiction.  Such a situation could, in 
particular, arise because of the “saving” clause in Article 11 of the MLI, which entitles a contracting state to tax 
its residents as if the relevant treaty did not apply (with limited exceptions). Paragraph 7.5 of the Explanatory 
Notes to Double Taxation Relief (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) Order 2018 (SI 2018/630 which gives effect to 
the MLI in UK domestic law) states that the UK agrees with the policy underlying Article 3(2) but its wording 
differs from the wording of existing treaties to which it might apply. It might therefore cause uncertainty, which 
has led the UK to reserve its position on Article 3(2). .   






countries have chosen to negotiate treaties which go beyond this minimum standard e.g. the US – 
Canada treaty, whose Article IV(6) and (7) were added in a 2007 Protocol585.  
 
Article 1(2) only deals with the attribution of income of a “transparent” entity to those with an 
interest in that entity.  Therefore, it does not address questions whether (notably in Article 15(2) of 
the OECD Model) such an entity is, or can be a “resident” of a particular state.  
 
6.1.2 Article 1(2) allows the state of source to decide whether an item constitutes taxable income in 
the first place and if so, its amount and when it arises.  The other contracting state has no say in these 
matters, even if, for example, it might regard a particular event as not giving rise to taxable income, 
such as a “deemed dividend”.   
 
6.1.3 As discussed in 5.2, the meaning of “fiscally transparent” for these purposes is not clear. The 
focus seems to be simply on whether income derived via an entity is taxable in its members’ hands on 
(?) a current basis (whether or not distributed by the entity), and as if the underlying income of the 
entity had arisen directly to those members. It is unclear whether Article 1(2) applies if the entity’s 
income is attributed to its members, or to the settlor of a trust, on a current basis, under anti-deferral 
rules such as “controlled foreign company” or “settlement” rules. Is this kind of scenario “fiscal 
transparency”? The fact that such anti-deferral rules do not always operate in the same way adds to 
the uncertainty586.  It is also unclear whether Article 1(2) can operate if some prior discretionary step 
(other than an actual distribution) has to take place at entity level before an income entitlement can 
arise587. 
 
A related point not covered by Article 1(2) is whether treaty benefits should be granted at source 
even where income is derived via an entity which the source state regards as “opaque”, in cases 
where that income would have been exempt from tax anyway in the hands of an entity member if the 
latter had received it directly.  In modern treaties based on the OECD Model, the fact that a resident 
of one jurisdiction is exempt from tax in respect of certain income in its home jurisdiction does not 
per se prevent it claiming treaty relief from source state tax in respect of that income. For example, 
many pension funds can claim treaty relief from withholding tax in respect of investment income 
which they receive directly.  If treaty relief would be granted where a tax-exempt receives income 
directly, it would be odd to deny treaty relief where the income is instead derived via an interposed 
“opaque” entity.     
 
6.1.4 Equally unclear is whether Article 1(2) can apply if the member of the “fiscally transparent” 
entity is fully taxable on its allocated share of income, even if that allocated share does not have the 
same character and source in the member’s hands as the underlying entity income. In this case, it 
                                                          
585 See “Some Reflections” op. cit. at page 302. 
586 See “Some Reflections” op. cit. at pages 315-6.  
587 The authors of “Some Reflections” op. cit. at page 317 consider that such a scenario is consistent with “fiscal 
transparency”, whereas an income entitlement which is conditional on a distribution is not so consistent, at 
least if that distribution is treated as a separate income source. This author agrees. For a similar argument which 
may in fact go slightly further, see Brabazon: op. cit, at page 208, who states that transparency should depend 
solely on whether income of the entity is currently attributed to an entity participant for tax purposes in that 
participant’s home jurisdiction. If there is such current attribution, it is not relevant whether it is in fact 






seems unobjectionable in policy terms for the source state to grant treaty relief.  However, this 
scenario is harder to describe, technically, as “fiscal transparency”.  
 
6.1.5 It is not clear how Article 1(2) (and in particular Article 3 of the MLI) affect treaties which already 
adopt a “partial residence” approach to certain potentially transparent entities.  Such “partial 
residence” provisions often predate the 1999 OECD Partnerships Report, which deprecated their use.  
They operate, in particular, by treating a partnership or trust as resident in a contracting state, to the 
extent that its income is currently taxable in that state, either at entity or at member level.  Hence 
they recognise certain prima facie “transparent” entities as wholly or partly treaty-resident. “Partial 
residence” provisions can sometimes be more generous (in terms of granting treaty relief) than 
Article 1(2) and Article 3 of the MLI.  
 
6.1.6 Is one of the effects of Article 1(2) to treat as “beneficial owner” any member of an entity 
relying on it to claim source state treaty benefits?   Article 1(2) does not explicitly address the 
question of “beneficial ownership” in, for example, Articles 10-12 of the OECD Model.  However, 
presumably a treaty-resident which relies on Article 1(2) to claim treaty benefits in respect of income 
derived via an entity which is “transparent” in that taxpayer’s residence state should be regarded as 
the “beneficial owner” unless other additional factors are in play e.g. the entity itself or the treaty-
resident receives the income as nominee for a third party588. Otherwise, lack of “beneficial 
ownership” by the entity member would largely undercut the benefits of Article 1(2).  
 
Nevertheless, this remains a point of contention, not least because the Technical Explanation of 
Article 11 of the US Model Treaty says that the source state should determine the question of 
“beneficial ownership” and the Commentary on Article 1(2) does not contradict this589.  
 
6.1.7 A related issue arises from the interaction between Article 1(2) and Article 10(2) of the OECD 
Model.  The latter grants an extra reduction in the permitted withholding tax rate on dividends 
received by a “company” resident in one contracting state, where they arise in respect of a 
substantial shareholding “held directly” in a company resident in the other contracting state.  Can this 
condition ever be satisfied where the first company has an interest in a “transparent” entity which 
owns the shares in the second company?  In particular, is this a “direct holding”? Article 1(2) does not 
explicitly attribute ownership of the assets of a “transparent” entity to its members, although some 
treaties go further and address this issue explicitly. Furthermore, whether it is appropriate to 
attribute at all, and how, will depend heavily on the facts.  For example, if the shares in the second 
company are owned by a trust in which all beneficiaries have vested, concurrent interests in trust 
capital and income, then one can make a better case for attributing those shares to a corporate 
beneficiary of the trust in proportion to its beneficial interest. It is much harder to make such a case 
where a trust beneficiary only has a beneficial interest in underlying trust income or, indeed, is a mere 
discretionary beneficiary.   
 
It may be easier to conclude that the equivalent of Article 10(2) in a treaty applies where it merely 
requires the substantial shareholding to be subject to the “control” of the first company, and that 
shareholding is owned by a “transparent” entity in which the first company has a significant interest.  
                                                          
588 See “Some Reflections” op. cit. at pages 333-8.  
589 See Leopoldo Parada: “Hybrid Entities and Conflicts of Allocation of Income within Tax Treaties: Is New 
Article 1(2) of the OECD Model (Article 3(1) of the MLI) the Best Solution available?”[2018] BTR 335 at pages 






Even then, depending on the facts, it may be difficult to conclude that the first company has such 
“control” e.g. if it is only the income beneficiary of a trust which owns the shares590.  
 
6.1.8 If a “transparent” entity has a “permanent establishment” in the source state, can that 
establishment be attributed to those with an interest in the entity when applying Article 1(2)?  
Policywise, this makes sense if those interest holders are relying on Article 1(2) to claim treaty 
benefits in respect of income derived via that entity. Otherwise those interest holders may be in a 
better position in terms of claiming treaty relief at source than if they had invested directly. Yet it is 
unclear that Article 1(2) goes that far591.  It is even less clear, on both policy and technical grounds, 
that one can attribute to the entity a “permanent establishment” in the source state which the holder 
of an interest in that entity may have quite independently of the entity itself.  
 
6.1.9 Where the “transparent” entity is established in a jurisdiction which requires it to tax its own 
distributions to those holding an interest in it, Article 1(2) does not assist e.g. where the entity is 
regarded as non-“transparent” in its home state, even though those with an interest in it are resident 
in another state which regards that entity as “transparent”.   Similarly, the “saving” clause discussed in 
6.1.10 does not apply because its focus is on preserving the right of the entity’s home state to tax the 
entity itself, rather than distributions by it to the entity’s members.  
 
6.1.10 Article 1(2) sits alongside Article 1(3) which introduces into the OECD Model a “saving” clause 
of the type familiar for many years in treaties with the US.  This preserves the right of a person’s state 
of residence to tax that person as if the treaty were not in force, with limited exceptions.  The 
exceptions in particular permit that person to invoke the treaty’s elimination of double taxation 
provisions, the non-discrimination Article and the Article dealing with mutual agreement proceedings 
between the treaty parties.  Article 11 of the MLI contains a “saving” clause which is broadly the same 
as Article 1(3).  Alternatively, Article 3(3) of the MLI contains a short-form “saving” clause without the 
exceptions listed in the penultimate sentence.    
 
Article 1(3) means that if the state where an entity is established regards it as tax-resident there (e.g 
on the basis that it is not “transparent”), that state can tax it.  This is so even if members of that entity 
resident in another jurisdiction can invoke the equivalent of Article 1(2) to obtain treaty benefits in 
                                                          
590 See “Some Reflections” op. cit. at pages 339 to 342. At page 366, fn 218, the authors suggest that, by 
contrast, there is no difficulty tracing the required corporate affiliation through a “transparent” partnership for 
the purposes of the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive 2011/96/EU.  Article 3 of that Directive simply refers to a 
“holding in the capital” or a “holding of voting rights” in the putative subsidiary. The author is not aware of this 
point having been addressed by the CJEU.  It would be much harder to apply this reasoning to show the 
required level of inter-company affiliation for the purposes of the EU Interest and Royalties Directive 
2003/49/EC. Article 3(b) of that Directive requires a “direct minimum holding” of capital or voting rights by one 
company in another. For a further discussion on tracing corporate affiliation through a trust for Article 10(2) 
purposes, see Brabazon op. cit.at pages 240-243.  
591 See “Some Reflections” op. cit. at pages 342-3, where the authors note, inter alia, that in relation to 
partnerships, the 1999 OECD Partnership Report indicated that a partnership’s “permanent establishment” 
should be attributed to its partners. In GE Capital Finance Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 9 ITLR 
1083, the Australian Federal Court declined to treat a US unit holder in an Australian unit trust as having an 
Australian “permanent establishment”. In particular, it refused to apply an Australian rule which treated a non-
Australian-resident trust beneficiary as having an Australian “permanent establishment” for treaty purposes, 
where a non-Australian-resident trustee had such a “permanent establishment”. This type of rule is a standard 
feature of Australian tax treaties: see Brabazon op. cit. at page 233 and see also below the discussion of the UK-






the state where the entity’s income is sourced and which they derive through that entity.   Hence the 
“saving” clause creates the risk that the same underlying income will be taxed twice, on the basis of 
residence, in the hands of two different taxpayers: the entity itself and its members.   
 
If the entity is tax-resident in its home state, it may be entitled to treaty benefits in its own right when 
it receives income from another state. Any such benefits would arise under the treaty between the 
entity’s home state and that source state.  Of course the entity’s members may also be seeking treaty 
benefits from the source state in respect of the same income. They would be relying on the separate 
treaty between that state and the residence state of the members, and in particular on that treaty’s 
equivalent of Article 1(2).  Following the 1999 OECD Partnership Report and consequent changes to 
the OECD Commentaries, in this situation the source state must apparently give tax relief under 
whichever of the two treaties is the more favourable. This does not of course extend to refunding the 
same amount of source tax twice592. It also does not address the risk that underlying income is taxed 
twice on the basis of residence because of the “saving” clause: see the previous paragraph.     
 
One should also query whether, in the last situation, the source state should have to give treaty relief 
under whichever of the two treaties is the more favourable.  The entity members have not invested 
directly in the source state but (for whatever reason) via the entity.  It is one thing to say, as per 
Article 1(2), that the source state should not refuse them treaty relief simply because it regards the 
entity as “opaque” while it is “transparent” in the residence state of the members.  But why should 
the source state go one step further and grant those members the higher level of treaty relief they 
would have obtained if they had invested directly, and not via the entity?  
 
6.1.11. Article 1(2) has no direct bearing on whether the residence state of the members of an entity 
should give them a foreign tax credit for tax imposed on the entity itself.   
 
Where that residence state regards the entity as “transparent”, then presumably there should be 
little difficulty conceding a foreign tax credit so long as the foreign tax was not imposed on that entity 
purely because it was a resident of another jurisdiction. In other words, that tax would need to be a 
source-based tax on its underlying income.  The position is more difficult when the members’ 
residence state regards the entity as “opaque”, even if the entity is regarded as “transparent” in its 
home state or the state where its income is sourced.  This in essence is the situation which 
confronted the UK courts in Anson v HMRC593.   
 
Articles 23A and B of the OECD Model have in fact been amended to make clear that one state is not 
required to give double taxation relief to one of its residents for tax imposed by the other state in 
accordance with the treaty where that tax stems solely from residence-based taxation by the other 
state: see the inserted words “(except to the extent that the [ … ] provisions [of the treaty] allow 
taxation by that other State solely [emphasis added] because the income is also income derived by a 
resident of that State)”. The word “solely” may therefore preserve a right to some relief in the 
                                                          
592 See “Some Reflections” op. cit. at pages 350-352.  
593 [2015] UKSC 44: see 2.14. In that case, the Supreme Court sidestepped the problem by concluding that the 
limited liability company was, on the particular facts, “transparent” in the state where the members were 






residence state where the other state is entitled to tax the income in question as both local source 
income, and as income of a resident of that state (e.g. under an Article 1(3)-type “saving” clause).594  
 
6.1.12 Article 1(2) has been rightly criticised for not protecting adequately the taxing rights of the 
source state.  One commentator has argued that “it fails in achieving the two principal purposes of 
the BEPS project, which are to allocate taxing rights to states in which the economic activities 
generating income are carried on, and to abate unintended non-taxation of income.  Not only is the 
provision inadequate, [but] read in conjunction with the saving clause, it also facilitates unrelieved 
double taxation of income in certain circumstances, in scenarios in which courts had been able to 
devise ways of avoiding such double taxation”595. The court decisions alluded to are Anson v HMRC596 
and Bayfine v HMRC597.  
 
This commentator in particular notes that Article 1(2) removes source state taxation rights simply 
because of legal fictions on “transparency” applied to the relevant entity by the contracting state in 
which that entity’s members are resident. In some cases, those fictions may even be applied at the 
option of that entity’s members.  Furthermore, if there is active income from business activities in the 
source state, that state may lose the right to tax that income if the definition of “permanent 
establishment” is narrower in its treaty with the state in which the entity’s members are resident, 
when compared to its treaty with the entity’s state of residence598. The first of these criticisms is 
unconvincing: “opacity” and “transparency” are inherently legal fictions and the very essence of 
Article 1(2) is that the source state should to some extent respect the fiction prevailing in the 
residence state of the entity’s members, if it leads to “transparency”.  The precise mechanics of that 
fiction, even it is elective, are irrelevant. The second criticism, regarding different “permanent 
establishment” definitions, is justified. In essence, it is the same criticism as this author made 
regarding differential withholding rates in 6.1.10. 
 
Another commentator has even suggested that, for simplicity and partly to protect the source state, 
Article 1(2) should be replaced by a rule whereby each state accepts the tax characterisation of the 
entity in the state where it is “formally and legally established or incorporated”599. Yet that state could 
be a third country (including a tax haven) where the entity has little real presence.  Moreover, its rules 
on characterising entities (if any) may radically differ from those of the source state and the state 
where the entity’s members are resident. For example, that third country may give taxpayers a lot of 
freedom to choose the entity’s tax characterisation from time to time. Furthermore, the rules in that 
                                                          
594 For a fuller discussion of the changes to Articles 23A and B and their implications, see Christopher Bergedahl: 
“Hybrid Entities and the OECD Model (2017): The End of the Road?” Bulletin for International Taxation (July 
2018) 417 and especially pages 421-8.  
595 See discussion of Article 1(2) in Dhruv Sanghavi: “Structural Issues in the income tax treaty network: Towards 
a coherent framework”.  Ipskamp Printing BV, Enschede. 2018. ISBN 978-94-0280-972-5. 
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/portal/en/publications/structural-issue.     
596 [2015] STC 1777. 
597 [2011] STC 717. The reference to this case is strange because, as discussed in 6.4.3, the courts concluded 
that the UK did not need to give credit against tax on a UK-resident company for US tax imposed on its parent 
company under the “saving” clause in the then UK-US treaty. In other words, there was potential unrelieved 
double taxation. 
598 The treaty with the entity’s residence state may, for example, contain an expanded definition of “permanent 
establishment” covering the provision of services related to activities in the putative source state. For an 
example of such an expanded definition, see Article 5(2)(k) of the UK-India treaty SI 1993/1801 (as amended).  






country could be changed unilaterally. It is doubtful whether either the source state or the state 
where the entity’s members reside will want to delegate to a third country effective control over what 
entities it treats as taxable600.  
 
6.1.13  One point raised by commentators601 is whether treaty benefits should be denied at all in the 
source state under Article 1(2) where the same income flow is treated as non-deductible anyway 
under anti-hybrid mismatch rules introduced to give effect to BEPS Action 2. To deny treaty benefits 
as well as a tax deduction risks overkill. Sections 187 and 187A TIOPA (in the UK “transfer pricing” 
rules) are a useful precedent for avoiding this kind of overkill.   
 
6.1.14  A final point relates to practical problems in applying Article 1(2).  As one commentator has 
put it recently: “…neither the Partnership Report nor the new OECD Commentary on the fiscally 
transparent entity provision [i.e. Article 1(2)] explains exactly how in practice a source country can 
give treaty benefits to the members of a legal entity when it taxes the entity and not the 
members”602. Applying Article 1(2) may be especially complex where one is dealing with an entity with 
a large and shifting cast of members. While there may be opportunities for streamlining treaty relief 
applications via the manager of that entity, the source state is likely to play safe, by withholding tax 
on income of the entity and then dealing with suitably-evidenced refund applications from entity 
members. The process of securing treaty relief under Article 1(2) is unlikely to be quick.  
 
6.2 Persons: do they include partnerships and trusts?  
 
6.2.1     Background 
 
Historically, most UK treaties did not address directly the position of potentially tax-transparent 
entities such as partnerships or trusts, which were effectively regarded as “nothings” for treaty 
purposes.  Events were to undermine this approach. A UK treaty will typically define the persons to 
which it applies in accordance with the OECD Model.  Article 1(1) of the OECD Model provides that: 
 
“This Convention shall apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting 
States”. 
 
Article 3 of the OECD Model then provides that “unless the context otherwise requires”: 
 
“(a) the term ‘person’ includes an individual, a company and any other body of persons [emphasis 
added];  
 
                                                          
600 The same commentator has suggested that to be fully effective, all states would have to adopt the rule for 
classifying entities by reference to the law in their state of formation. This rule would also need to be disapplied 
where it incentivised entity formation in jurisdictions with advantageous tax treatment: see Leopoldo Parada: 
“Hybrid Entity Mismatches: Exploring Three Alternatives for Coordination” (2019) Intertax, Volume 47, Issue 1 at 
page 24 and in particular, parts 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. .      
601 See “Some Reflections” op. cit. (at fn 91, page 318). 
602 See Richard Vann commenting on Resource Capital Fund IV LP v Commissioner of Taxation 21 ITLR 655 at 
660. That case is discussed further at 6.3.2. It involved two limited partnerships which were regarded as 






(c) the term ‘company’ means any body corporate or any entity that is treated as a body 
corporate for tax purposes”. 
 
This definition of “person” is not exhaustive (hence the word “includes”).  The Commentary to the 
OECD Model incorporates the 1999 OECD Partnership Report (“the Partnership Report”)603, of which 
paragraph 30 stresses that a partnership is a “person” for treaty purposes either because it is “any 
other body of persons” or because (in some cases) it falls within the second part of the definition of 
“company”.  The Commentary, as so amended, will be relevant when interpreting “person” in any UK 
treaty concluded since the Commentary was amended to reflect the Partnership Report. In any case, 
even in respect of older treaties, the UK courts are likely, in the light of the Padmore decision604 
discussed below, to conclude that a “person” includes a “partnership”.  They are also likely to 
conclude that a “person” includes a trustee or a body of trustees, the latter being an “other body of 
persons”605.  This should be the case even if the treaty definition of “person” is made exhaustive by 
replacing “includes” (as per the OECD Model) with “comprises”.  
 
6.2.2   Padmore v IRC 
 
Padmore ended any perception that partnerships and trust are “nothings” for the purposes of the 
UK’s treaties, even though its precise effects in UK domestic tax law no longer apply.  In Padmore, a 
UK-resident partner in a Jersey partnership sought to rely on the old UK-Jersey treaty606 to avoid tax 
on income from his partnership share.  The then treaty607 exempted the profits of a “Jersey 
enterprise” from UK tax provided that its business was not being conducted through a UK “permanent 
establishment”.  It was accepted that the partnership had never done business through a UK 
“permanent establishment”. Article 2(1) defined a “Jersey enterprise” as an “industrial or commercial 
enterprise or undertaking carried on by a resident of Jersey [emphasis added]”.  
 
Article 2(1)(f) in turn defined a “resident of Jersey” as “any person [emphasis added] who is resident 
in Jersey for the purposes of Jersey tax and not resident in the United Kingdom for the purposes of 
United Kingdom tax”.  This definition did not require the “person” to be liable to tax in Jersey608.  
Hence, although the partnership was not taxable as such in Jersey609, the courts ruled that it could be 
                                                          
603 https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/the-application-of-the-oecd-model-tax-convention-to-
partnerships_9789264173316-en#page1. (accessed 23 June 2020). 
604 [1987] STC 36 upheld on appeal in [1989] STC 493.   
605 See Philip Baker QC in “The Application of the Convention to Partnerships, Trusts and Other Non-Corporate 
Entities” (2002) Gray’s Inn Tax Chambers Review, Volume II No. 1, page 1 at pages 15-16.  The author notes that 
where there is more than one trustee, it is better to see the trustees as a single “body of persons”, and hence a 
“person” for treaty purposes, rather than treating each trustee as a separate “person”.  In particular, this works 
better in terms of allocating the trust a single place of treaty residence where different trustees are resident in 
different jurisdictions. 
606 SI 1952/1216, which has now been superseded by SI 2018/1348.  
607 Article 3(2) 
608 As discussed below, this definition of “residence” for treaty purposes is archaic and out of line with current 
practice, as exemplified by the OECD Model.  
609 As in the UK, a Jersey partnership’s profits are apparently currently taxable at the level of its members and 
and the partnership entity itself is not a separate taxpayer.  The precise Jersey position at the time of Padmore 
resembled the pre-1997 UK approach to taxing partnerships. In other words, while the partnership was not a 
separate taxpayer and while the tax due on the partnership profits was the aggregate of the tax computed on 






resident in Jersey for the purposes of this particular treaty because it was, on the facts, managed and 
controlled there610.   
 
That left the question whether the partnership was a “person”, rather than a “nothing”.  Article 
2(1)(d) of the UK-Jersey treaty defined “person” to include “any body of persons, corporate or not 
corporate”.  This wording is not the same as the OECD Model to which the courts in Padmore did not 
refer.  It was, however, very similar to Schedule 1 of the Interpretation Act 1978 which provides 
“unless the context otherwise requires”, that “ ‘person’ shall include any body of persons corporate or 
unincorporated”.  In both definitions, the closing words appear to be words of expansion. On that 
basis, the courts ruled that the Jersey partnership was a “body of persons”, as defined, and hence a 
“person”, not a “nothing”, for the purposes of the treaty.  It was therefore exempt from UK tax on its 
profits and so was the UK-resident partner.  The courts drew no distinction for these purposes 
between the partnership itself and the partnership share of the partner, not least because the Jersey 
partnership resembled a classic English general partnership.  It therefore lacked a legal personality 
distinct from that of the partners.  Fox LJ in the Court of Appeal said611: 
 
“[The UK-Jersey treaty] relieves from United Kingdom taxation all the profits of a Jersey 
enterprise…..That enterprise in the present case is a partnership.  The partnership is not an entity 
distinct from the partners.  The profits belong to them.  As a matter of construction….. I see no 
words which exclude the individual partner’s share of the profits from the exemption.  The 
exemption is in general terms and I see no reason why the greater does not include the less.”   
 
The UK tax authorities also argued that the relevant definition of “body of persons” was in fact the 
very old UK definition in what is now Section 118(1) TMA, as well as in Section 989 ITA and Section 
1119 CTA 2010.  This defines “body of persons” as “any body politic, corporate or collegiate, and any 
company, fraternity, fellowship and society of persons, whether corporate or not corporate”612.  It 
was argued that this definition was narrower than the definition of “person” in the UK-Jersey treaty 
and that, in particular, it excluded partnerships.  The Court of Appeal assumed that it was a narrower 
definition but decided that it was displaced by the specific definition of “person” in the treaty613.  
                                                          
partnership profits was assessed on and due from the partnership, with each partner being jointly and severally 
liable.  This is discussed at first instance in Padmore by Peter Gibson J (as he then was), at [1987] STC 45.  
610 In reaching this conclusion, they derived support from what is now Section 857(1)(b) ITTOIA and its oblique 
suggestion that “control and management” is the key criterion when deciding whether a partnership has a 
specific place of non-UK residence (rather than just being resident “outside the UK” without specifying where).  
For a recent decision concluding that a partnership was controlled and managed wholly outside the UK, even 
though one of the two partners was UK-resident, see Mark Higgins Rallying (a firm) v HMRC [2011] SFTD 936.  In 
that case, management remained in the Isle of Man although the only relevant question was whether it was 
situated “outside the UK” for Section 857(1)(b) purposes. No tax treaty was relevant in that case.  
611 [1989] STC 493 at 500.  
612 This early nineteenth-century definition dates back to the origins of UK income tax.  It is mainly relevant 
when deciding which “bodies of persons” can be assessed to UK income tax (not corporation tax) under Section 
71 TMA. 
613 The only basis for bringing in the old domestic law definition of “body of persons” would have been that a 
“body of persons” was an otherwise undefined term and hence a reference to domestic law was appropriate 
under Article 2(3) of the UK-Jersey treaty.  The courts decided that “body of persons” in this treaty was not an 
otherwise undefined term. Even if it had been, John Avery Jones has argued (see [1990] BTR 453) that the 
context indicates that the relevant UK domestic law definition for the purposes of Article 2(3) is not Section 
118(1) TMA but rather, the definition of “person” in Schedule 1 Interpretation Act 1978, which closely 







Article 3 of the OECD Model and the Commentary on it (in particular paragraph 2) are consistent with 
Padmore. In particular, Article 3(1)(a) provides that “unless the context otherwise requires”, “the 
term ‘person’ includes an individual, a company and any other body of persons”.  The Commentary 
notes that a partnership will for these purposes either be a “company” or an “other body of persons”.   
 
The effect of Padmore in exempting the UK-resident partner from tax on the partnership share was 
reversed retrospectively by what is now Section 858 ITTOIA. That legislation614 also overrode the UK’s 
treaties. It was further expanded in 2008 to counter arrangements whereby UK-resident persons tried 
to rely on Padmore by investing in a non-UK partnership indirectly via a trust, rather than directly615.   
 
UK treaties typically make clear that a UK-resident partner cannot invoke the treaty to avoid UK tax in 
circumstances akin to Padmore.  This avoids double non-taxation and is more diplomatic than simply 
relying on the treaty override mentioned earlier.  It is also consistent with the Commentary on the 
OECD Model as amended in the light of paragraph 128 of the Partnership Report.  Furthermore, 
following the Report on BEPS Action 6, the new Article 1(3) of the OECD Model is a “saving” clause of 
the type long familiar in treaties with the US616.  Article 11 of the MLI covers very similar ground and it 
has been adopted by the UK. This “saving” clause allows each contracting state to continue to tax its 
residents as if the treaty did not apply, with limited exceptions617.  Hence, the scope for UK-residents 
to run Padmore-type arguments will increasingly be negated.  
 
6.3 Can a “partnership” or trustee(s) be a “resident” of a Contracting State under a modern UK treaty? 
 
6.3.1     Article 4(1) of the OECD Model 
 
While Padmore shows that a partnership or trustee(s) can be a “person” for UK tax treaty purposes,  
that is usually of little benefit unless the “person” is also a “resident” of a treaty state and hence 
entitled to its protections618.  The treaty in Padmore contained a definition of “resident” which is now 
archaic.  It did not, in particular, require the Jersey partnership to be liable to Jersey tax on the basis 
that it was formed and established in Jersey.    
 
By contrast, Article 4(1) of the OECD Model now states: 
                                                          
TMA/Section 989 ITA/Section 1119 CTA 2010 definition of “body of persons” should be repealed as otiose and 
in any case probably does include partnerships, given that “companies” at the start of the nineteenth century 
were in effect large partnerships (see [1987] BTR 88 at 89-90).  
614 There have been unsuccessful challenges to the retrospective legislation, most notably in Padmore v IRC (No 
2) [2001] STC 280.   
615 There remains an argument that Padmore potentially exempts the trustees of a non-UK trust which is 
resident in a treaty jurisdiction, and consequently, exempts the trust income of a UK-resident life interest 
holder, with a vested interest in that income.  That may well be true in theory on the basis that the trustees, like 
the partners in Padmore, are a “body of persons” and hence a “person”.  Dawson v IRC [1989] STC 473 at 475 
supports this position but in practice the UK would legislate retrospectively to negate any such outcome.   
616 See, for example, Article 1(4) and (5) of the current 2001 UK-US treaty: SI 2002/2848. 
617 Notably, the Articles dealing with elimination of double taxation, non-discrimination and the mutual 
agreement procedure.  
618 Of course being a “resident” of a Contracting State is usually a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for 
treaty protection. That “resident” may also need to show, for example, that it is the “beneficial owner” of the 







“For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘resident of a Contracting State’ means any person 
who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax619 therein by reason of his domicile, residence, 
place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature [emphasis added], and also includes 
that State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof as well as a recognised pension 
fund of that State.  This term, however, does not include any person who is liable to tax in that State 
in respect only of income from sources in that State or capital situated therein [emphasis added].”  
 
Wording very similar to this now forms the standard definition of a “resident of a Contracting State” 
in UK tax treaties. Unless a partnership or group of trustees is taxable as such620 and that tax liability 
does not depend on the tax characteristics of its partners/beneficiaries, then it is unlikely to satisfy 
this definition.  In particular, paragraph 40 of the Partnership Report indicates that a partnership is 
not “liable to tax” for these purposes if any tax payable by it or its partners is determined by the tax 
characteristics of the partners themselves621.  The same approach ought to apply to trustees where 
there is a vested interest in possession in the trust income such that the beneficiary is taxed as if the 
underlying income arose directly to that beneficiary.622 In that situation, the question is whether or 
not the income beneficiary can satisfy Article 4(1).   
                                                          
619 In UK tax law, “liable to tax” does not necessarily mean that actual tax is chargeable, not least because a tax 
exemption may apply in the circumstances e.g. to a pension fund. It simply means that the income in question 
must potentially be within the relevant tax charge (“within the tax net”). For the distinction between “liable to 
tax” and “subject to tax” in the treaty context, see the decision of the UK First-Tier Tribunal (Tax) in Weiser v 
HMRC [2012] SFTD 1381. This related to the “Pensions” article in the UK’s ageing tax treaty with Israel but the 
judge also took into account international case law, academic commentary and the OECD Commentary. He 
endorsed published guidance of the UK tax authorities stating that to be “subject to tax”, a person must actually 
pay tax on the income in question, unless the income in question is low enough to be covered by a “de minimis” 
exclusion such as the UK “personal allowance”. Until 1966, it was standard UK treaty practice to include a 
“subject to tax” proviso. The thinking in Weiser may not be accepted in other jurisdictions: see the 2015 
decision of the French Conseil d’Etat in Ministre du Budget v Landesarztekammer Hessen Versorgungswerk; 
Ministre du Budget v Societe Santander Pensiones (joined cases Nos. 370054 and 371132) 18 ITLR 554.  The 
French court ruled that two pension funds were not “liable to tax” (and were therefore not “residents” of 
Germany and Spain for treaty purposes) because they were exempt from tax/subject to a nil tax rate in those 
jurisdictions because of their “status or activity”. The “Conclusions” of the Rapporteur public, Marie-Astrid de 
Barmon, suggest (at 569) that the decision partly reflected a French policy of treating non-French tax exempts 
as “resident” in a treaty state only on a case-by-case basis.  
620 For example, certain limited partnerships are taxed in Australia as companies: see the Commentary in 
Resource Capital Fund IV LP v Commissioner of Taxation (2019) 21 ITLR 655 at 659. 
621 This is so even if, for the purposes of assessment, the income of the partnership is computed at partnership 
level before being allocated to the partners; and even if the tax on this income is physically paid over by the 
partnership.   
622 In other words, a trust falling within Baker v Archer-Shee [1927] AC 844.  In the case of a UK trust, this should 
be the case even though the trustees can be taxed on the trust income on the basis that they “receive or are 
entitled to it”: this is only a representative charge whose incidence depends on the tax characteristics (and 
especially the residence) of the beneficiary: see 4.3.3.1 above.  However, even if there is a vested interest in 
possession, certain types of income for tax purposes, but which are not income for trust law purposes, remain 
taxable at the level of the UK trustees only.  This is not a representative charge: see 4.3.5.  In such cases, one 
can argue that a trust with a vested income interest is nevertheless a “resident” of a contracting state for treaty 
purposes.  
One commentator has argued that the second sentence of Article 4(1) of the OECD Model means that the 
“beneficial ownership” condition for treaty relief in some Articles of the OECD Model (first introduced in 1977) 
is unnecessary where a UK trustee or nominee receives income for a non-UK-resident vested income 







What about an interest in possession trust which falls outside the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee because 
of the trust’s governing law?  In short, an interest in possession trust with, in particular, UK-resident 
trustees, where Garland v Archer-Shee 15 TC 693 applies. In such cases, the beneficiary’s “source” of 
income is not the underlying trust income but, instead, its rights against the trustee(s) to have the 
trust enforced. In that case, the trustees will be taxable because they “receive or are entitled to” the 
underlying trust income but this charge is not a purely representative charge whose ultimate 
incidence depends on the tax characteristics of the beneficiary. The trustee(s) and the beneficiary are 
in this case being taxed on different sources of income. Hence, the trustee(s) should be regarded as 
taxable in their own right and as within Article 4(1) of the OECD Model, even though such a case is 
little different from one within the Archer-Shee rule623. Trusts subject to Garland v Archer-Shee are 
not discretionary trusts so the non-UK-resident income beneficiary cannot use ESC B18 (see 4.3.5) to 
get relief for any UK tax borne by the trustees on the underlying trust income. This is harsh, especially 
as the UK treaty with the beneficiary’s home jurisdiction will not give relief for tax paid by the 
trustees, because it is paid on income which is not from the same “source” as the beneficiary’s.  
 
What about a trust which is a discretionary or accumulation trust?624.  The latter (where trustees can 
retain trust income and add it to trust capital) are somewhat simpler. If the beneficiaries are not 
taxed on the retained income as it arises and any tax charged on the trustees in respect of that 
income is a standalone charge unaffected by the beneficiaries’ tax characteristics, then those trustees 
should fall within Article 4(1) of the OECD Model.  If the trust is a pure discretionary trust (which is 
unlikely625), the answer should be the same as for an accumulation trust, if the trustee tax charge is 
unaffected by the beneficiaries’ tax characteristics626. This is typically the case in relation to a UK-
                                                          
and cannot therefore be “resident” in the UK for treaty purposes, because the charge on the trustee is purely 
“representative” and will fall away if the income beneficiary is non-UK-resident. That “representative” tax 
charge will arise if there is UK-source income but in that case, the trustee will be a person who is only liable for 
UK tax in respect of UK-source income and hence is not a “resident” of the UK because of the second sentence 
of Article 4(1).  See John F. Avery Jones: “The Beneficial Ownership Concept was never necessary in the Model”, 
in “Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends” ed. Lang, Pistone. Schuch, Staringer and Storck. IBFD publications 
2013, Chapter 20 at page 333.  
623 This wafer-thin distinction further illustrates the flaws in Garland v Archer-Shee 15 TC 693. There are doubts 
whether the rule in Garland v Archer-Shee can apply where UK-resident trustees receive non-UK-source income 
for a non-UK-resident vested income beneficiary: see 4.3.3.2. 
624 The beneficial interests in a trust can comprise a vested interest in possession in part of its income while the 
remaining income is subject to a discretionary and/or accumulation trust. 
625 A pure discretionary trust is one where income of the trust must be distributed in full over a specified period, 
but the trustees can decide the distribution allocation between beneficiaries. Therefore, a beneficiary may 
receive nothing. In practice, a discretionary trust is likely to have an accumulation feature.   
626 There is an avoidance risk here because of ESC B18 (see 4.3.5). If UK-resident trustees of a discretionary and 
accumulation trust claim treaty relief on the basis that they are “resident” in the UK, the UK’s treaty partner 
may lose out if a subsequent trust distribution to a non-UK-resident beneficiary allows the latter to claim relief 
from any UK tax on the trustees’ underlying income on a “look through” basis.  For a New Zealand insight into 
whether trustees can be “resident” for treaty purposes, see John Prebble: “Accumulation Trusts and Double Tax 
Conventions” [2001] BTR 69.  The New Zealand position is complicated by its lack of a separate concept of trust 
residence. Hence there may be no New Zealand income tax liability in respect of a trust with New Zealand-
resident trustees but whose income is not New Zealand-source and whose settlor is not New Zealand-resident.  
Prebble nevertheless argues that such a trust can claim relief from tax at source under New Zealand’s tax 
treaties. This has been challenged: see Mark Brabazon: “Trust Residence, Grantor Taxation and the Settlor 
Regime in New Zealand” 22 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy (December 2016) at 346 and in 






resident discretionary trust: see 4.3.5.  In particular, there is no deduction at trustee level in respect 
of any distribution to a discretionary beneficiary.  Furthermore, apart from “bare” trusts, all UK-
resident trusts are separate taxable entities in respect of chargeable gains, without reference to the 
beneficiaries’ tax characteristics: see 4.3.4 and 4.3.5.   
 
Hence partnerships and some trustees may be unable to claim the benefits of the UK’s treaties 
because they are not “residents” of the other Contracting State.  In their Double Taxation Relief 
Manual627 HMRC have in the past stated that, where there is no specific treaty provision dealing with 
partnerships and a partnership is not a “resident” of the other Contracting State for the reasons given 
above, “the partnership should be treated as transparent for the purpose of claims to relief under a 
double taxation agreement.  Where a partnership is treated as transparent, claims may be made by a 
partner who is a resident in a country with which the United Kingdom has a double taxation 
agreement in respect of his share of partnership income as if he had received that income direct.” 
With respect, this statement oversimplifies the situation, although it is presumably inspired by the 
Partnership Report.  It works where both the UK and the treaty jurisdiction where the partner is 
resident both characterise the “partnership” as “tax transparent” so that the partner is currently 
taxed in the state of residence on the UK-source partnership income which is eligible for treaty relief.  
This look-through approach does not, however, work well if the partner’s residence state regards the 
“partnership” as non-“transparent” so that the UK may end up giving treaty relief for UK-source 
income which is not currently taxed at partner level.  In that case, double non-taxation is a real risk.  
Of course, this is what Article 1(2) of the OECD Model is meant to address more effectively, including 
the situation where the two contracting states characterise the entity differently: see 6.1.  
 
To date, the UK courts have not been asked to treat a non-UK entity as “resident” for the purposes of 
a treaty based on Article 4(1) of the OECD Model, on the basis that, although the entity is not liable to 
tax itself on all of its income in the other jurisdiction, that income is still currently taxable there, either 
at entity level or in the hands of residents of that jurisdiction with an interest in the entity (e.g. the 
partners in a partnership).  However, non-resident partnership-type entities have been treated as 
“resident” for treaty purposes on this basis by the Tax Court of Canada in TD Securities (USA) LLC v Her 
Majesty the Queen628, and also by the Indian Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in Linklaters LLP v Income 
Tax Officer – International Taxation Ward 1(1)(2), Mumbai629. In the first case, a US limited liability 
company sought treaty protection from the Canadian branch profits tax.  The Canadian court ruled in 
its favour, even though it was a single-member “disregarded entity” with no entity-level US tax 
liability.  The claimant won because its sole member was a US corporation whose income was fully 
liable to current US taxation. The Canadian court was not prepared to treat the limited liability 
company as “resident” in the US simply because it was formed there630. In the second case, the Indian 
court took a similar line in relation to a UK limited liability partnership which had advised Indian 
clients. In particular, the court noted that India had not accepted the approach of the Partnership 
Report631.  Hence: 
                                                          
627 Formerly at DT1750, although no longer available at 24 June 2020. 
628 (2010) 12 ITLR 783.  
629 (2010) 13 ITLR 245.  
630 The case related to taxable periods before the entry into force of a Fifth Protocol to the US-Canada treaty.  
This was agreed in 2007 and introduced a new Article IV(6) and (7).  These are similar to (although more 
elaborate than) Article 1(2) of the OECD Model: see 12 ITLR 783 at 809. Article 1(2) does not treat a 
“transparent” entity as itself being “resident” for treaty purposes.   







“…the assessee was indeed eligible to [sic] the benefits of India-UK tax treaty, as long as entire 
profits of the partnership firm are taxed in UK – whether in the hands of the partnership firm 
though the taxable income is determined in relation to the personal characteristics of the 
partners, or in the hands of the partners directly”632.   
 
This approach of treating the “transparent” entity itself as “resident” for treaty purposes is not 
consistent with HMRC’s position to date, which is more aligned with the Partnership Report and now 
Article 1(2) of the OECD Model. Article 1(2) may also make the UK courts less receptive to such 
arguments.  Neither court had to address the more difficult situation where the limited liability 
company/partnership had members resident in more than one jurisdiction and, in particular, not the 
one in which the entity was formed. It is hard to see how the courts’ all-or-nothing approach to entity 
residence applies in such cases, which are more effectively dealt with, in particular, under Article 1(2) 
of the OECD Model.  
 
Nevertheless, the approach of the Canadian and Indian courts has some similarities with Article 4 of 
the former UK-US treaty, which is analysed next.   
 
6.3.2    Article 4 of the 1975 UK-US treaty 
 
The UK has experimented in various treaties with other definitions of “resident” which do not depend 
on a partnership or trust itself being liable to tax.  An important example was in the 1975 UK-US 
treaty.633  In particular, Article 4(1)(b)(i) of that treaty defined “resident of the United States”634 as: 
 
“(i) any person, other than a corporation, resident in the United States for the purposes of United 
States tax; but in the case of a partnership, estate or trust, only to the extent that the income 
derived by such partnership, estate or trust is subject to United States tax as the income of a 
resident, either in its hands or in the hands of its partners or beneficiaries [emphasis added]; and (ii) 
a United States corporation.”     
 
This definition would permit, for example, a US partnership635 to be “resident” in the US for treaty 
purposes (and hence able to claim treaty benefits) if and to the extent that its income was subject to 
                                                          
632 (2010) 13 ITLR 245 at 321. The Mumbai Income Tax Appellate Tribunal has recently followed the Linklaters 
decision in ING Bewaar Maatschappij I BV – as trustees of ING Emerging Markets Equity Fund v Deputy 
Commissioner of Income Tax International Taxation Circle 2(2)(1), Mumbai ITA No. 7119/Mum/2014.  In that 
case, a Dutch “Fonds Vor Gemene Rekening” or FGR could be treated as a resident of the Netherlands for the 
purposes of the Dutch-India tax treaty. The entity which had been assessed to Indian tax was the Dutch 
corporate custodian of the FGR.  The latter, under Dutch law, was not an entity in its own right but simply a 
contractual arrangement all whose participants were Dutch-resident taxable entities. The authors of “Some 
Reflections” op. cit. at pages 326-332 have queried the correctness of these Canadian and Indian decisions.  
633 SI 1980/568.  This has of course been superseded by the 2001 treaty.   
634 Article 4(1)(a) contained a broadly equivalent definition of a “resident of the United Kingdom”.   
635 There were in fact technical concerns about whether this definition would apply to a US limited liability 
company which was taxed as a partnership in the US: see Michael McGowan: “Entity Classification under UK 
Law, with particular reference to the UK-US double tax treaty”- November 1994 paper presented to the 
Princeton Tax Club in New York, pages 40-44.  In practice, the UK tax authorities appeared to ignore these 
concerns and to assimilate such a limited liability company to a partnership for the purposes of applying Article 
4(1)(b). This practice was first published in the June 1997 edition of “Tax Bulletin”. It was repeated on page 3 of 






US tax either at entity level (which would be unusual) or in the hands of US-resident partners.  This 
meant that a US partnership with some non-US-resident partners would only be regarded as “semi-
resident” in the US for treaty purposes.  Therefore, the definition addressed the problem of members’ 
mixed residence which was not addressed by the Canadian and Indian court decisions mentioned in 
6.3.1.  
 
This provision was unique in UK treaties and has not been replicated in the 2001 treaty which is 
discussed in 6.4636.   Article 4(1)(b)(i) was not simply a “look through” rule.  If it applied to a 
partnership, estate or trust, then that entity itself (and not its members/beneficiaries) was the 
“person” “resident in the United States” which could claim treaty benefits.  That could affect what 
treaty benefits were available when compared to the position if the entity was simply “looked 
through”.  For example, suppose that a US partnership was owned 50:50 by two US corporations, A 
and B, and that the partnership itself owned all of a UK-resident company, C.  Therefore, A and B each 
had indirect economic ownership of 50% of C via the partnership.  However, the effect of Article 
4(1(b)(i) was that the partnership itself was not “looked through” but was treated as itself being a 
resident of the United States, because all its partners were taxpaying US corporations. Being a 
resident of the United States, the partnership was therefore entitled to a partial refund637 of the UK 
imputation “tax credit”638 which attached to any dividend paid by C to the partnership.  However, 
although treated as a resident of the United States, the US partnership remained a partnership, not a 
corporation under the 1975 treaty. Hence it could not claim the larger refund of the imputation “tax 
credit” which was only available for dividends paid to US corporations controlling a significant 
shareholding in a UK-resident  company639.  Furthermore, because (i) Article 4(1)(b)(i) did not “look 
through” the US partnership to its corporate partners, A and B, and (ii) that US partnership would 
typically have legal personality, there was no clear scope for either partner to claim its share of that 
larger refund even though each effectively owned 50% of C via the partnership.  
 
Matters would have been different if A and B had simply formed a contractual joint venture (falling 
short of partnership) to co-own C 50:50 directly.  They might also have been different if the 
“Residence” Article of the 1975 UK-US treaty had mandated a “look through” approach instead, and 
depending on the extent of the “look through”.   
 
For a partnership to be a “resident of the United States” under Article 4(1)(b)(i), it was, strictly, not 
enough for all its partners to be US-resident taxpayers.  In particular, the opening words of the 
paragraph could be read as requiring the partnership itself to be “resident in the United States for the 
                                                          
636 The Partnership Report was unenthusiastic (see paragraphs 45-6) about “residence” definitions such as 
Article 4(1)(b). A particular concern was that they enabled third-country partners to obtain treaty benefits by 
having a “permanent establishment” in the state of the partnership. The words “as the income of a resident” in 
Article 4(1)(b)(i) resolve this concern.  Other US double tax treaties, such as the US treaty with Norway dated 
December 3 1971, contained language similar to Article 4(1)(b): see “Tax Treaties, Partnerships and Partners: 
Exploration of a Relationship” – Richard O. Loengard, Jr (1975) 29 Tax Lawyer 31 at 37 (hereafter “Loengard”).  
Article 4(1)(b) of the US Model Income Tax Treaty of 1981 also contained language similar to Article 4(1)(b), but 
such language no longer features in the US Model. There is further discussion of such “partial residence” articles 
in “Some Reflections” op. cit. at 326-332.  
637 Under Article 10(2)(a)(ii) of the 1975 treaty. It is assumed that for these purposes, the US partnership would 
be the “beneficial owner” of the dividends from C and that the anti-avoidance rules in Article 10(7) did not 
apply.   
638 Formerly available under Section 231 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 and now abolished. 






purposes of United States tax”640. Hence a partnership in a third state all of whose partners were US-
residents would apparently not fall within Article 4(1)(b), further illustrating its non-“look through” 
nature.   
 
This particular concern has been considered by the Australian courts recently.  While Article 4(1) has 
not been litigated in either the UK or the USA, the Australian Federal Court (Full Court) considered a 
very similar definition of a “resident of the United States” in Article 4(1)(b)(iii) of the US-Australia 
treaty, in Resource Capital Fund IV LP v Commissioner of Taxation.641 That case related to gains on the 
sale of shares in a Toronto-listed, Australian lithium mining company.  The sellers were Cayman Island 
limited partnerships, many of whose partners were apparently US-resident for tax purposes.  It was 
accepted that these partnerships were “transparent” for US tax purposes, but were taxable entities in 
their own right in Australia. The majority of the court read the relevant definition of “resident of the 
United States” quite restrictively642.  Firstly, the court ruled (rather harshly) that there was no 
evidence that the income of the partnerships was in fact subject to US tax.  In any case, Article 
4(1)(b)(iii) required the partnership to meet two conditions: it had to be a resident of the United 
States itself for tax purposes and its income had to be subject to US tax. A partnership formed in the 
Cayman Islands could not be a resident of the United States for US tax purposes and so the first 
condition was not met. Hence neither partnership could rely on Article 4(1)(b)(iii) to show that it was 
treaty-resident643.  The majority went on to indicate that each US-resident partner in either 
partnership could in fact rely on the treaty but not in these proceedings which involved a tax 
assessment on the limited partnership itself644.  
 
The majority interpretation is both restrictive and impractical, not least because of the procedural 
restrictions it imposes on each partner when claiming treaty benefits.  An alternative, and superior, 
                                                          
640 For further discussion about the problems this raised, see the paper mentioned in fn 635 and in particular at 
pages 41-3, where it is noted that under US tax law, the concept of the “residence of a partnership” has little 
independent significance. Furthermore, to the extent this concept is defined (e.g. in the regulations under 
Section 861 Internal Revenue Code defining US-source income), using this definition when interpreting Article 
4(1)(b)(i) could lead to anomalies, with some US-formed investment partnerships being unable to claim that 
they were US-resident, because they lacked a US trade or business!  For more recent comments to the same 
effect, see Blanchard: “The Tax Significance of Legal Personality: a US View”, op. cit. at page 47.    
641 (2019) 12 ITLR 655.  
642 (2019) 12 ITLR 655 at 695-699.  
643 In this respect, the majority of the court followed the first instance judge in Resource Capital Fund III LP v 
Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 15 ITLR 814 (“RCF III”). They noted that their conclusion that the Cayman 
limited partnership could be assessed as a taxable entity, despite the US-Australia treaty, was consistent with 
the decision of the Full Federal Court when RCF III was appealed: see Commissioner of Taxation v Resource 
Capital Fund III LP (2014) 16 ITLR 876. For further discussion of RCF III, see John Azzi: “Impact of the OECD 
Multilateral Convention to implement tax treaty related measures to prevent base erosion and profit shifting on 
the taxation of fiscally-transparent entities under the Australia-UK double tax agreement”: [2018] BTR 556.  That 
article predates the decision of the Full Federal Court in RCF IV. That commentator notes that the High Court of 
Australia refused special leave to appeal against the Full Federal Court’s decision in RCF III, and questioned 
whether individual partners could contest the Australian tax assessment on the limited partnership. It was even 
suggested that the only way they could do so was via the treaty-based mutual agreement procedure. That 
commentator rightly questions how effective such a remedy would be, even now that the MLI has introduced a 
binding arbitration mechanism into the UK-Australia treaty.  There is further discussion of the UK-Australia 
treaty at 6.8.1. 
644 The court indicated that a partner could invoke the treaty in recovery proceedings or in seeking a declaration 
that the treaty protected that partner’s profit share.  The court did not allude to the possibility of using the 






interpretation was put forward in Davies J’s partial dissent in the same case645.  The judge rejected the 
two condition approach and, in particular, the idea that Article 4(1)(b)(iii) required the partnership 
itself to be a resident of the United States for tax purposes.  Rather:  
 
“…..although under United States tax law a partnership is a fiscally transparent entity, the proviso 
in Article 4(1)(b)(iii) would attribute a residency status to a partnership separate from its partners 
for the purposes of the application of the [treaty] where income of the partnership is taxable in 
the hands of the United States partners (or if exempt from United States tax, it is exempt other 
than because such partners are not United States residents). On this construction, it is the 
residency of the United States partners for United States tax law purposes which would dictate 
whether a partnership is a resident of the United States for the purposes of the [treaty].  On this 
construction also, there is no separate and additional requirement that partnerships be recognised 
by the United States as a resident of the United States. Rather, partners who are United States 
residents and taxable in the United States on the partnership income may claim through the 
partnership to get the benefit of the [treaty] whether or not the partnership is a United States 
domestic partnership [emphasis added]”. 
 
Again this alternative interpretation does not have the same “look through” effect as Article 1(2) of 
the OECD Model because it recognises that Article 4(1)(b)(iii) confers residence for treaty purposes on 
the partnership entity itself, to the extent that its income is subject to tax in the hands of its US-
resident partners.  However, it gives treaty relief to partnerships formed outside the US to the extent 
that their partners are US-residents. This is sensible: partnerships are “transparent” anyway for US 
income tax purposes so little purpose is served by reading the treaty restrictively so as to require the 
partnership itself to be formed in the US.   
 
Article 4(1)(b) of the 1975 treaty also applied to trusts and estates.  The US Technical Explanation of 
that treaty stated that, consequently, “the treatment of income received by a trust or estate will be 
determined by the residence and taxation of the person subject to tax on such income, which may be 
the grantor [i.e. the settlor], the beneficiaries or the trust or estate itself, as the case may be”646.  
While the US Technical Explanation is a purely unilateral commentary by one state on the treaty, and 
therefore of limited persuasive authority before a UK court, this statement seems sensible. In 
particular, it caters for the different ways in which the income of a trust may be taxable in the hands 
of US persons, whether at trust level or in the hands of others linked to the trust. As with 
partnerships, the US Technical Explanation makes no mention of Article 4(1)(b)(i) requiring the trust 
or estate to be a resident of the US in its own right for US tax purposes.   
 
A final weakness of Article 4(1)(b) of the 1975 UK-US treaty was that it did not cater easily for 
situations where the two contracting states had different ideas of what amounted to a “partnership, 
estate or trust”.   As one commentator has put it: 
 
                                                          
645 (2019) 12 ITLR 655 at 758-763. Davies J’s interpretation is in fact consistent with the interpretation of Article 
4(1)(b)(i) of the 1975 UK-US treaty in the US Treasury’s Technical Explanation of that treaty:  
 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/uktech.pdf (accessed 24 June 2020).  
   






“Thus there would seem to be a sound practical reason for looking to the partner’s residence to 
determine the application of tax to a partnership’s income.  A rule which looks solely to the 
partners and disregards the partnership entirely not only prevents abuse of the treaty but also 
avoids attaching undue significance to determining whether a partnership exists. [Emphasis added] 
This latter point is especially significant in connection with US tax because the United States treats 
a loosely organised joint venture (sometimes amounting to little more than co-ownership of 
property) as a partnership….if the joint activity rises above the level of mere investment.  This 
being so, it seems highly desirable that the international significance of the existence of a 
partnership be minimized”.647 
 
Consequently the 2001 UK-US treaty has taken a rather different approach to these issues, in line with 
later changes to the US Model tax treaty. Article 1(2) of the OECD Model has now gone down the 
same road.  
 




The treatment of “tax transparent” entities was a key issue when the UK last renegotiated its tax 
treaty with the US648.  The 2001 UK-US treaty649 takes a very different approach to the 1975 treaty 
and in so doing, both echoes the Partnership Report and anticipates Article 1(2) of the OECD Model 
and Article 3 of the MLI.  Article 1(1) provides that: 
 
“Except as specifically provided herein, this Convention is applicable only to persons who are 
residents of one or both of the Contracting States”.   
 
Article 3(1)(a) and (b) then provide that “unless the context otherwise requires”, 
 
“(a) the term ‘person’ includes an individual, an estate, a trust, a partnership [emphasis added] a 
company and any other body of persons; (b) the term ‘company’ means any body corporate or any 
entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes.” 
 
Hence the treaty makes very clear that trusts and partnerships are “persons”.  It is standard US treaty 
practice to be so explicit650. Article 4(1) then sets out a definition of “resident of a Contracting State” 
which is very different from Article 4(1)(b) of the 1975 treaty: 
                                                          
647 See Loengard op cit. at page 43.  This comment foreshadows Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3 of 
the MLI. The problem highlighted by this comment had an impact on whether a US limited liability company 
treated as a partnership for US tax purposes could claim the benefit of the 1975 UK-US treaty because the UK  
does not regard such entities as partnerships for UK tax law purposes: see also pages 34-40 of the paper 
mentioned in fn 635.  As noted there, UK published practice has tended to gloss over this issue. For further 
discussion of the US entity classification rules, see 7.2.  
648 Not least because of the radical changes in 1997 (see 7.2) to the US entity classification tax rules and the 
introduction of UK limited liability partnerships in 2000.    
649 SI 2002/2848. 
650 For a slightly different approach, which sees a trust as a quasi-person, see the definition of “entity” as a 
“legal person or a legal arrangement such as a trust” in Article 1(hh) of the September 2012 Agreement 
between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of 







“….the term ‘resident of a Contracting State’ means, for the purposes of this Convention, any 
person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, 
residence, citizenship, place of management, place of incorporation, or any other criterion of a 
similar nature….” 
 
This is very similar to Article 4(1) of the OECD Model and means, in particular, that a partnership 
whose income is taxable only at partner level, by reference to the personal characteristics of the 
partners, is not a “resident of a Contracting State” for the purposes of the 2001 treaty.  But this is not 
the end of the story651.  
 
6.4.2 Article 1(8) and Article 1(4) 
 
In particular, Article 1(8) of the 2001 treaty652 also provides: 
 
“An item of income, profit or gain derived through a person that is fiscally transparent under the 
laws of either Contracting State [emphasis added] shall be considered to be derived by a resident 
of a Contracting State to the extent that the item is treated for the purposes of the taxation law of 
such Contracting State as the income, profit or gain of a resident”. 
 
In other words, this rule operates (to some degree) as a “look through” rule, conferring treaty 
benefits on the resident of a treaty state who derives and is liable to tax as a resident on the income 
in question, so long as that income is derived via a person regarded as “fiscally transparent” in the 
state in which that person is resident, or in the other contracting state.  Article 1(8) therefore differs 
from Article 4(1) of the 1975 treaty. It does not seek to make the “fiscally transparent” person itself a 
resident of either the UK or the US653.  Indeed, it appears to apply even where the “fiscally 
transparent” person is established in a state other than the UK or the US654.  The entire focus is on the 
tax treatment of those deriving income via that person.  Crucially, Article 1(8) can operate even if only 
one of the treaty partners regards the person as “fiscally transparent”.  It is not necessary that the UK 
and the US see eye to eye on the classification of the relevant entity.  This sidesteps a key weakness of 
Article 4(1)(b) of the 1975 treaty. Unlike Article 1(2) of the OECD Model, Article 1(8) does not 
expressly cover cases of “partial transparency”.  
 
                                                          
651 One assumes that the UK courts would be unlikely to interpret Article 4(1) in the same way as the Canadian 
and Indian courts in the cases mentioned in, respectively, fns 628 and 629. In particular, Article 1(8) indicates an 
alternative approach to dealing with “transparent” entities for treaty purposes.   
652 Article 1(8) is based on the US domestic withholding tax regulations under Section 894(c) Internal Revenue 
Code 1986 and the 1996 US Model double tax treaty: see Avery Jones: Partnerships op. cit. at pages 430-1. For a 
discussion of the equivalent, and slightly different provision in the 2006 and 2016 versions of the US Model 
treaty, see “Some Reflections” op. cit. at pages 309-311.   
653 In the HMRC Double Taxation Relief Manual at DT19853 (accessed 24 June 2020), there is a statement that 
Article 1(8), like the 1975 treaty, treats partnerships “as residents of a particular country only to the extent that 
their income is taxed in that country as income of a resident”.  This does not seem correct and is at odds with 
the first paragraph of DT19851A (accessed 24 June 2020).  
654 This is what the treaty says and is the view expressed in the US Treasury Technical Explanation of the 2001 
treaty https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/teus-uk.pdf (accessed 24 June 
2020). That document is of course purely the view of one Contracting State and hence has minimal weight as a 






Article 1(8) operates in tandem with the “saving” clause which has long been a feature of all modern 
US tax treaties655.  In this case, it is in Article 1(4) which reads: 
 
“Notwithstanding any provision of this Convention except paragraph 5 of this Article, a Contracting 
State may tax its residents (as determined under Article 4, (Residence)), and by reason of 
citizenship may tax its citizens, as if this Convention had not come into effect”.   
 
Article 1(5)(a) provides, however, that Article 1(4) does not prevent a resident of a Contracting State 
from invoking “the benefits conferred…….under paragraph 2 of Article 9 (Associated Enterprises), sub-
paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 and paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 17 (Pensions, Social Security, 
Annuities, Alimony and Child Support), paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article 18 (Pension Schemes) and 
Articles 24 (Relief from Double Taxation), 25 (Non-discrimination), and 26 (Mutual Agreement 
Procedure) of this Convention [emphasis added]”.   
 
The interplay between Article 1(8) and the “saving” clause, as well as other aspects of Article 1(8), are 
set out more fully in the Exchange of Notes signed by the UK and the US in conjunction with the 2001 
treaty.  In particular, the Exchange of Notes states: 
 
“It is understood that where an item of income, profit or gain is derived through a person which is 
a resident of a Contracting State the provisions of [Article 1(8)] shall not prevent that Contracting 
State from taxing the item as the income, profit or gain of that person656.   
 
It is further understood that, where, by virtue of [Article 1(8)], an item of income, profit or gain is 
considered by a Contracting State to be derived by a person who is a resident of that Contracting 
State and the same item is considered by the other Contracting State to be derived by that person 
or by a person who is a resident of that other Contracting State, [Article 1(8)] shall not prevent 
either Contracting State from taxing the item as the income, profit or gain of the person 
considered by that State to have derived the item of income, profit or gain657.  
 
It is further understood that, in applying [Article 1(8)], the United Kingdom shall, exceptionally, 
regard an item of income, profit or gain arising to a person as falling within [Article 1(8)] where 
another person is charged to United Kingdom tax in respect of that item of income, profit or gain: 
 
(a) under section 660A or 739 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988658; or 
                                                          
655 And which is now included in Article 1(3) of the OECD Model and Article 11 of the MLI. 
656 If all else fails, by relying on Article 1(4).  
657 This is consistent with Article 1(8) not being listed in the exceptions to the “saving” clause in Article 1(5).  
Consequently Article 1(8), as interpreted in the Exchange of Notes, creates a significant risk of double taxation 
because of conflicting characterisations by the UK and the US e.g if one states taxes the fiscally transparent 
entity as a resident and the other state taxes its members on the entity’s underlying income.  A good example 
would be where income is earned by a UK-resident unlimited liability company whose sole shareholder is a US 
corporation. This risk is intended to be mitigated via Article 24 (Relief from Double Taxation) as expanded by the 
Exchange of Notes: see 6.4.3.   
658 Section 660A has been repealed and replaced by the essentially similar Sections 624-628C in Part 5 Chapter 5 
ITTOIA which impose income tax on the “settlor” of certain arrangements amounting to “settlements”, where 
the “settlor” retains an interest in the “settlement”. Part 5 Chapter 5 contains other rules which also attribute 
income of a “settlement” to the “settlor”, notably under Section 629 ITTOIA, where income is paid to relevant 






(b) under section 77659 or 86 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992. 
 
It is further understood that, in applying [Article 1(8)], a person shall be regarded as fiscally 
transparent under the laws of the United Kingdom in relation to an item of income, profit or gain 
where a charge is made on another person on that item either: 
 
(a) by virtue of section 13 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992660; or 
(b) because that other person has (or under section 118 Finance Act 1993, is treated as having) 
an equitable right in possession in a trust”661.    
 
The latter paragraphs of this section of the Exchange of Notes are an attempt by the UK in particular 
to clarify, and indeed expand, what is meant by “fiscal transparency” for Article 1(8) purposes.  “Fiscal 
transparency” is otherwise undefined and this clarification is only partial. Interestingly, Article 1(8) is 
clearly regarded by the UK as applying where income or gain of a person is imputed to a UK-resident 
under various anti-avoidance or anti-deferral rules, even though these rules would not ordinarily be 
seen as making that person “fiscally transparent”662.  The anti-deferral rules listed are not an 
exhaustive list of such rules.  In particular, they do not include the UK “controlled foreign company” 
rules, for reasons which are unclear663.  However, the overall approach is sensible: if income or gain of 
an entity is effectively liable to current UK taxation in the hands of a person with an interest in that 
                                                          
for reasons which are unclear. Part 5 Chapter 5 is one limb of the UK equivalent of the US grantor trust rules. 
Section 739 has been repealed and replaced by the essentially similar “Transfer of Assets Abroad” rules in Part 
13 Chapter 2 ITA  In particular, Section 739 is replaced by the income tax charge in Sections 720-1 ITA on a UK-
resident individual with “power to enjoy” income arising from certain transfers of assets outside the UK. 
659 Section 77 was repealed in 2008. It treated a UK-resident settlor of a UK-resident trust as taxable on capital 
gains of that trust. It became redundant when UK-resident trusts became taxable on their capital gains at the 
highest marginal UK rate. Section 86 is the equivalent rule taxing a UK-resident settlor of a non-UK-resident 
trust in respect of capital gains of that trust.   
660 Section 13 TCGA has been replaced by Sections 3-3G TCGA, although the substance remains essentially the 
same. The effect is usually to attribute the actual capital gains of a non-UK-resident, closely-held company to its 
UK-resident shareholders and certain other UK-residents (“participators”) with a direct or indirect interest in it.  
661 This refers to the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee: see 4.3.3.  Section 118 Finance Act 1993 (now Section 464 ITA) 
applies that rule to trusts formed under the law of Scotland, even though Scottish law does not distinguish 
between legal and equitable interests in property. For further discussion of the Scottish position, see 4.3.3.2.  
662 In the US Treasury Technical Explanation of the 2001 treaty op.cit., it is stated that for US purposes, “fiscally 
transparent” persons will include partnerships, common investment trusts under section 584 Internal Revenue 
Code, grantor trusts and US limited liability companies which are treated as partnerships for US tax purposes. 
663 The UK “controlled foreign company” rules are now in Part 9A TIOPA. They may not be mentioned in the 
Exchange of Notes because they do not technically impose a charge directly on the underlying income of the 
company in question: see fn 8. However, this explanation is not convincing because the same is true, for 
example, of the “Transfer of Assets Abroad” rules mentioned in fn 658, which (as the successor of Section 739 
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988) are presumably meant to be covered by the Exchange of Notes. In IRC 
v Willoughby [1995] STC 143 at 169, the UK Special Commissioner of Income Tax ruled that Section 739 in its 
original form was a charge on deemed income measured by reference to another (non-UK) person’s actual 
income. Hence Section 739 could not be overridden simply because the non-UK owner of the actual income was 
treaty-protected.  The taxpayer in Willoughby succeeded on other grounds, including in the House of Lords: see 
[1997] STC 995. The higher courts did not consider the treaty argument. For further discussion of Willoughby, 
see Daniel Sandler: “Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation – Pushing the Boundaries” (2nd 
edition - 1998) Kluwer Law International at pages 194-5.  The approach in Willoughby has been followed 
recently by the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) in Davies, McAteer and Evan-Jones v HMRC [2020] 
UKUT 67 (TCC). That case related to the interaction between the UK-Mauritius tax treaty and both Section 739 






entity, then the policy underlying Article 1(8) is being met.  This is so even if that entity (e.g. a non-UK-
resident closely-held company) would not be regarded, classically, as “transparent” in the same way 
as, say, a partnership.   
 
One commentator664 has suggested that Article 1(8) (or Article 1(2) of the OECD Model) may not give 
treaty relief at source to a UK-resident if rules of the kind discussed in the previous paragraph do not 
attribute the actual income or gain of a person to a UK-resident but only a notional amount computed 
by reference to that income or gain665.  The author is unpersuaded. The UK attribution rules referred 
to in the Exchange of Notes often, although not always, attribute a notional amount to a UK-resident 
yet this is not a bar to applying Article 1(8) of the UK-US treaty. This is a sensible result. The UK has 
often drafted its attribution rules in this way, so that they apply even if the underlying income or gain 
used to determine the notional amount is the actual income of a treaty-protected non-UK-resident.  
Hence drafting attribution rules in this way is intended to defeat Padmore-type arguments (see 6.2.2) 
by UK-residents.  It is not clear why a drafting technique to prevent tax avoidance in the residence 
state of a taxpayer with an interest in a “transparent” entity should then lead to treaty relief being 
denied in the source state under a provision such as Article 1(8). For the source state, what matters is 
that an amount corresponding to source state income derived by or through that entity is, at a 
minimum, liable to current taxation in the hands of a resident of the treaty partner. If that current 
taxation occurs by attribution under, say, a “controlled foreign company” rule, it is the rule’s effect 
that matters, not its precise linguistic structure. In any case, if its linguistic structure better ensures 
current taxation in the non-source state, that protects the interests of the source state too.  The 
author’s preferred interpretation is also consistent with the anti-hybrid mismatch rules in the first 
part of the October 2015 OECD Recommendations on BEPS Action 2.  Recommendation 5.1 ( at 
paragraph 171) states that “payments made through a reverse hybrid structure will not result in a 
[deduction/non-inclusion mismatch] if the income is fully taxed under a CFC, foreign investment fund 
(FIF) or a similar anti-deferral rule in the investor jurisdiction that requires the investor to include its 
allocated share of any payment of ordinary income made to the [entity] on a current basis.”  
 
Article 1(8) will give effect to one state’s analysis of an entity as “fiscally transparent” but only if this 
leads to residents of that same state being liable to current taxation on the entity’s underlying 
income.  Therefore, when giving treaty relief on that income, the source state can be confident that 
double non-taxation should not arise, unless there are separate policy-based reasons for non-taxation 
of those with an interest in the entity (e.g. entity members which are recognised tax-exempts).  
Because of its right to tax its own residents (in Article 1(4)), the source state can also be confident 
that the treaty will not restrict its taxing powers in a purely “domestic” situation i.e. where source 
state income flows to an entity resident in the source state.  The source state can tax that entity as a 
resident even if it is regarded as “transparent” in the other contracting state.   
 
6.4.3. Article 24 and the Exchange of Notes 
 
The way Article 1(8), together with Article 1(4), is interpreted in the Exchange of Notes creates a 
particular risk of double taxation if one state taxes an entity as a resident taxpayer under its own 
domestic laws while the other state regards that entity as “fiscally transparent” and therefore taxes 
the entity’s members resident in that other state on their share of the entity’s underlying income as it 
                                                          
664 See Brabazon op. cit. at pages 226-229.   






arises. For example, consider Bayfine UK v HMRC666. Bayfine involved a tax avoidance scheme based 
on the “saving” clause (Article 1(3)) in the 1975 UK-US treaty coupled with the elimination of double 
taxation article in that treaty (Article 23).  A key aspect of the structure was that a US corporation 
wholly owned a UK unlimited company. The latter made a profit from entering into a derivative 
contract.  The UK taxed the profit of what it perceived to be a UK-resident company (either under the 
“Business Profits” Article of the treaty or by relying on the “saving” clause).  However, the US treated 
the unlimited company as “fiscally transparent” in the most absolute sense: it “disregarded” it under 
US domestic tax rules because it was unlimited and had only one member667. The US therefore 
treated the income of the unlimited company as belonging to its US parent and sought to tax it 
accordingly under the “saving” clause.  Hence each jurisdiction was seeking to tax the same pool of 
profit in a situation which would now fall under Article 1(4) and 1(8) of the 2001 treaty.  The UK 
courts ultimately refused the unlimited company a foreign tax credit for the US tax incurred by its US 
parent. The Exchange of Notes to the 2001 treaty seeks to address this important economic double 
taxation risk, to a degree which is not encountered in other UK tax treaties, or indeed in double tax 
treaties generally668.  In particular, it states the following in relation to Article 24 (Relief from double 
taxation):  
 
“It is understood that, under paragraph 4 or 8 of Article 1….., the provisions of the Convention may 
permit the Contracting State of which a person is a resident (or, in the case of the United States, a 
citizen), to tax an item of income, profit or gain derived through another person (the entity) which 
is fiscally transparent under the laws of either Contracting State, and may permit the other 
Contracting State to tax (a) the same person; (b) the entity; or (c) a third person with respect to 
that item.  
 
Under such circumstances, the tax paid or accrued by the entity shall be treated as if it were paid or 
accrued by the first-mentioned person for the purposes of determining the relief from double 
taxation to be allowed by the State of which that first-mentioned person is a resident (or, in the case 
of the United States, a citizen), except that, in the case of an item of income from real property to 
which paragraph 1 of Article 6 …..of the Convention applies, or a gain from the alienation of real 
property to which paragraph 1 of Article 13 …..applies, the tax paid or accrued by the person who is 
a resident of the Contracting State in which the real property is situated shall be treated as if it were 
paid or accrued by the person who is a resident of the other Contracting State. [emphasis added] 
 
In the case where the same item of income, profit or gain derived through a trust is treated by 
each Contracting State as derived by different persons resident in either State, and (a) the person 
taxed by one State is the settlor or grantor of a trust; and (b) the person taxed by the other State is 
a beneficiary of that trust, the tax paid or accrued by the beneficiary shall be treated as if it were 
paid or accrued by the settlor or grantor for the purposes of determining the relief from double 
                                                          
666 [2011] STC 717 reversing [2010] STC 1379 and upholding [2009] STC (SCD) 43.   
667 See 7.2.5 for further discussion of the relevant US tax rules.  
668 Article 3(2) of the MLI makes clear that a residence state is not expected to give double taxation relief for tax 
imposed on the same income by the other contracting state solely on the basis of residence.  The UK has 
reserved against this part of the MLI but for linguistic reasons only.  As Bayfine (supra) illustrates, the UK agrees 
with the underlying policy. For a fuller discussion of the limited extent to which tax treaties address double 
taxation where two states each tax on the basis of residence alone, see Brabazon op. cit. at pages 246-250, in 
which it is rightly pointed out that such situations are especially likely to arise in respect of trusts where a 
contracting state may seek to tax any of the following persons as a resident taxpayer: the trust itself, a 






taxation to be allowed by the State of which that settlor or grantor is a resident (or, in the case of 
the United States, a citizen), except that, in the case of an item of income from real property to 
which paragraph 1 of Article 6 …..of the Convention applies, or a gain from the alienation of real 
property to which paragraph 1 of Article 13 ….applies, the tax paid or accrued by the person who is 
a resident of the Contracting State in which the real property is situated shall be treated as if it 
were paid or accrued by the person who is a resident of the other Contracting State. 
 
It is further understood that paragraphs 2 and 5 of Article 24 shall apply to such an item of income, 
profit or gain to the extent necessary to provide relief from double taxation669.”  
 
The highlighted words apply directly to the Bayfine situation.  In particular, the UK tax payable by the 
UK unlimited company is to be treated as “paid or accrued” by the US company670 when determining 
what double taxation relief the latter can claim in respect of the income on which it is taxed under the 
“saving” clause when the US “disregards” the UK subsidiary.  
This wording in the Exchange of Notes was briefly considered by the Court of Appeal in Anson v 
HMRC671, where the taxpayer sought to rely on it at quite a late stage in respect of that part of its UK 
foreign tax credit claim which fell within the 2001 treaty672.  Anson was discussed in detail in 2.14.  
The attraction to the taxpayer of relying on the Exchange of Notes was that, if it applied, a UK foreign 
tax credit was available for the taxpayer’s share of the US Federal and state income taxes on the 
income of the limited liability company (“LLC”), whether or not that income belonged to the taxpayer 
as it arose. Put another way, it was no longer necessary to show, for UK foreign tax credit purposes, 
that UK and US tax had been paid on the same profits.  The Court of Appeal declined to allow this 
point to be introduced at a fairly late stage.  Arden LJ (as she then was) stated, at paragraph 92: 
                                                          
669 This sentence refers to the rules in Article 24 which define the “source” of items taxable according to the 
allocation rules in the 2001 treaty.  Those “source” rules make it easier to claim double taxation relief, usually by 
treating an item taxable in a contracting state in accordance with the treaty as having a “source” in that state 
for the purposes of granting double taxation relief in the other state.   
670 The US company would not be entitled to double taxation relief for any withholding tax payable on a 
distribution to it by its “disregarded” UK subsidiary. It can only claim a credit for what would otherwise be 
underlying tax on the profits of the UK subsidiary.  This distinction is odd.  The overall goal seems to be that a 
resident (“A”) of the jurisdiction which perceives the entity to be “transparent” should not suffer double 
taxation simply because the other jurisdiction perceives the entity differently, provided that A is currently taxed 
in its state of residence on its share of the income of that entity.  In that case, logic would suggest that any 
taxation on the entity’s profits (distributed or undistributed) should generate double taxation relief in A’s 
jurisdiction of residence, where those profits are being fully taxed.  While this distinction between tax on 
distributed and undistributed profits of the entity is odd, paragraph 133 of the Partnership Report draws the 
same distinction in its Example 18.  That Report argues that because the residence state of A sees the entity as 
“transparent” and therefore does not tax a distribution from the entity, it should not be required to give double 
taxation relief for any withholding tax on that distribution.  It should only be required to give such relief for 
underlying tax on the entity.  The author finds this distinction unconvincing (as clearly do the authors of “Some 
Reflections” op. cit.).  For practical budgetary reasons, A’s right to claim relief for withholding on a distribution 
would need to be limited to distributions paid within a set time period.  The Netherlands-Belgium treaty of 2001 
apparently does not draw the same distinction as the Partnership Report.  It does give relief from possible 
double taxation when there is a distribution by an entity treated as “transparent” in the state where its 
members are resident.  It does this by having the residence state of that entity waive its tax on such a 
distribution: see Verhoog & Breuer: “Hybrid Entity Issues in a Tax Treaty Context: OECD Approach versus Actual 
Tax Treaties” Volume 44 Intertax Issue 8 and 9, 684 at 694.     
671 [2013] STC 557 and in particular paragraphs 87 to 93. 







“There is clearly some dispute as to the mischief to which the exchange of notes is directed. There 
would have to be further evidence to resolve that dispute.  Moreover, the words ‘with respect to 
that item’ [at the end of the first paragraph of the part of the Exchange of Notes dealing with 
Article 24] ….are, on the face of it, consistent with [HMRC’s submission] that no change is made in 
the requirement for the profits taxed in each jurisdiction to be the same profits in order to qualify 
for [double taxation relief].  If an alteration to Article 23 [sic] was intended, it is surprising that it 
was dealt with in this oblique way.”  
 
The author considers that Arden LJ ignored a large part of the point that the Exchange of Notes is 
making.  Because of the way Article 1(8) and the “saving” clause interact, there is scope for different 
persons to be taxed in respect of the same profits (as in Bayfine), not least because of differences 
between UK and US domestic tax rules on entity classification.  The effect of those rules may well be 
that one jurisdiction perceives the profits to be the income of one legal person while the other 
jurisdiction regards them as the profits of a second person, because that other jurisdiction treats the 
first legal person as “tax transparent”.  Left unaddressed, there could therefore be unrelieved double 
taxation673.  The part of the Exchange of Notes dealing with Article 24 seeks to address this. It cannot 
address this problem effectively674 if “no change is made in the requirement for the profits taxed in 
each jurisdiction to be the same profits in order to qualify for [UK double taxation relief]”.      
 
However, on a narrower point, the Court of Appeal was correct to reject the taxpayer’s submission. 
The relevant part of the Exchange of Notes only addresses a situation where the person claiming 
double taxation relief is resident in a treaty jurisdiction which regards the relevant entity as 
“transparent” while the other jurisdiction regards it as “opaque” and hence taxable in its own right.  
Those facts are the converse of Anson where Mr Anson was a resident of the UK which sought to treat 
the LLC as “opaque”, while the US regarded it as “tax transparent” so that its income was only taxable 
for US purposes at the level of its members.  The Exchange of Notes would have been relevant if Mr 
Anson had invested in a US partnership (usually recognised as “tax transparent” in the UK) which had 
elected to be taxed as a corporation in the US675.   The fact that the Exchange of Notes does not cover 
                                                          
673 The UK will give a unilateral foreign tax credit for non-UK tax imposed on income or gain of a UK taxpayer, 
even if that non-UK tax is imposed on a different person.  In each case, the UK and non-UK tax must be 
calculated by reference to the same income or gain, and the income must arise or the gain accrue in the 
jurisdiction imposing the non-UK tax. Hence, identity of taxable income or gain is required and the tax must be 
imposed by the jurisdiction of source, not just on the basis of residence. Identity of taxable persons is not 
required: see Section 9 TIOPA.   
674 The Exchange of Notes should have the same force in UK domestic law as the main body of the treaty.  In 
particular, the concept of “arrangements” in the treaty-enabling legislation in Section 2 TIOPA should be wide 
enough to include a contemporaneous Exchange of Notes signed by both contracting states and appended to 
the treaty itself.  For a useful recent summary of the broader, more purposive approach of the UK courts to 
interpreting tax treaties, as well as the materials they will take into account, see the judgment of the Upper 
Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) in Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited (in special liquidation), Irish 
Nationwide Building Society v HMRC [2019] UKUT 277 (TC), especially paragraphs 22-26.  
675 This in effect is the mirror image of the first example set out on page 95 of the US Treasury Technical 
Explanation of the 2001 treaty op.cit., towards the start of the discussion of Article 24. For the relevant US 
entity classification rules, see 7.2.4.  Where the UK regards the US partnership as “transparent” but the US does 







the Anson situation is an undoubted weakness676, although the Supreme Court ultimately relied on 
findings of fact regarding the members’ profit entitlements under Delaware law, so as to give double 
taxation relief for the US tax on the entity’s profits (see 2.14).   
 
The US Treasury Technical Explanation has some further interesting comments677 on how the US 
regards the Exchange of Notes as operating in respect of Article 24.  Firstly, it discusses the effect of 
the Exchange of Notes in cases involving real property, where primary taxing rights with respect to 
real property income must rest with the contracting state where that property is located678. It gives 
the following example:  
 
“….a UK unlimited liability company (“ULC”) with U.S. resident partners derives gain from the sale 
of U.S. real property.  The ULC has elected to be treated for U.S. tax purposes as a partnership and, 
therefore, the U.S. taxes the U.S. resident partners on the gain derived.  However, because the 
United Kingdom treats the ULC as a company resident in the United Kingdom, the saving 
clause…..ensures that the United Kingdom may continue to tax the company as a U.K. resident.  
Because the notes provide that the United States retains primary taxing rights with respect to real 
property located in the United States, the United Kingdom will treat the tax paid by the U.S. 
resident partners as having been paid by the ULC679 for the purposes of providing the foreign tax 
credit to the ULC with respect to the gain derived from the sale of U.S. real property.”  
 
The US Treasury Technical Explanation also discusses how Article 1(8) and Article 24 apply in relation 
to trusts.  As in the UK (see Chapter 2), some US trusts are taxable as such while in the case of others, 
income and gain are attributed to the “grantor” (i.e. the “settlor”)680.  Furthermore, US-taxpaying 
beneficiaries of trusts can be taxable on underlying trust income. Unrelieved double taxation issues 
can potentially arise where one contracting state seeks to tax trust income at, say, the level of the 
trust itself or in the hands of its beneficiaries, while the other contracting state seeks to tax the same 
income at grantor level.  In this regard, the Technical Explanation states: 
 
                                                          
676 Similar criticisms have been made of the new Article 1(2) of the OECD Model, which closely resembles Article 
1(8): see “Some Reflections” op. cit. at pages 357-8. 
677 Op. cit. on pages 95-6. As already mentioned, being a unilateral publication of the US Treasury, the Technical 
Explanation lacks the status, for interpretation purposes, of the Exchange of Notes itself. However, there is no 
equivalent UK publication and its insights are therefore interesting. It has recently been cited as relevant for 
treaty interpretation purposes (in a different context) in Royal Bank of Canada v HMRC [2020] UKFTT 267 (TC) at 
paragraphs 39-40.  For other reasons, the taxpayer’s appeal was unsuccessful.  
678 “Real property” has an expanded definition here because of Article 13(1) of the 2001 treaty.  In particular, it 
includes certain indirect real property interests: on the US side, a “United States real property interest” under 
the FIRPTA legislation and, on the UK side, certain shareholdings, partnership or trust interests deriving their 
value from UK real estate.  
679 This scenario is quite similar to Bayfine [2011] EWCA Civ 304, but, unlike that case, the Exchange of Notes 
expressly requires the UK to give credit for the US tax imposed on the US members of the ULC in respect of the 
US real property gain. This part of the Exchange of Notes should in fact be consistent with the normal UK 
approach. In particular, when giving credit for non-UK tax against UK tax on chargeable gains, the UK requires 
that the income or gain arise or accrue in the relevant non-UK jurisdiction and that non-UK tax be computed by 
reference to the same gain as the UK tax.  However, the UK does not require that the UK and non-UK tax 
liabilities should arise at the same time nor that they should be charged on the same person: see Section 9 
TIOPA and Statement of Practice 6/88.    






“…..A U.S. company pays interest to a U.S. complex trust (“UST”) with UK beneficiaries.  The UST is 
treated for U.K. tax purposes as a fiscally transparent entity.  …..the U.K. beneficiaries claim an 
exemption from U.S. withholding tax with respect to that interest.  However, because the United 
States treats the UST as a taxable entity resident in the United States….., the saving clause 
…….ensures that the United States may continue to tax the trust as a U.S.-resident.  Pursuant to 
the notes, the United Kingdom will treat the tax paid by the UST as having been paid by the U.K. 
beneficiaries for purposes of providing a foreign tax credit to the U.K. beneficiaries with respect to 
the interest income681.  
 
……If a trust is a grantor trust for U.S. tax purposes, the income of the trust is included in the 
income of the U.S. grantor, and the grantor is taxed on the income. However, for U.K. tax purposes 
the trust income may be included in the income of the beneficiaries of the trust so that the 
beneficiaries pay tax on the income in the U.K. Thus each country will have a different view 
regarding the identity of the taxpayer……[emphasis added]. The notes provide that if the person 
taxed by one State is the grantor of the trust and the person taxed in the other State is a 
beneficiary of the trust, the tax paid or accrued by the beneficiary will be treated as if it were paid 
or accrued by the grantor for the purposes of determining the relief from double taxation allowed 
by the State of which the grantor is a resident.  Thus, in the case of the trust described above, the 
United States would provide a credit to the U.S. grantor for the U.K. tax imposed upon the U.K. 
beneficiaries of the trust.  An exception to this special rule applies with respect to an item of 
income from real property……or gain from the alienation of real property……[In that case] the tax 
paid by the resident of the Contracting State in which the property is located will be treated as if it 
were paid by the person who is a resident of the other Contracting State.”     
 
6.4.4  The limits of Article 1(8), etc 
 
As one would expect, Article 1(8) is consistent with US tax treaty policy since the 1996 version of the 
US Model Treaty abandoned the “partial residence” approach reflected in Article 4 of the 1975 UK-US 
treaty. Article 1(8) provides a way of avoiding double taxation or double non-taxation without one 
contracting state’s entity classification rules prevailing over those of the other.  So long as the 
members of a “tax transparent” entity resident in the non-source state are liable to tax on a current 
basis in respect of an item of income derived via that entity from the source state, the latter should in 
principle be prepared to give treaty relief. This is subject to any other preconditions for relief set out 
in the wider body of the treaty, and to the right of the source state to decide the incidence and timing 
of source state taxation.  This is consistent with the Partnership Report and with Article 1(2) of the 
OECD Model and the related Commentary.  
 
Article 1(8) is of course similar to Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3(1) of the MLI, even 
though it long predates, and provides the inspiration for, both. There is no attempt to define what is 
meant by “fiscally transparent” for the purposes of Article 1(8)682.  Apparently, the US withholding tax 
regulations under Section 894(c) Internal Revenue Code 1986 regard an entity as “tax transparent” 
only if holders of interests in it must treat its underlying income as theirs regardless of distributions, 
                                                          
681 Giving a UK foreign tax credit for US tax paid on the US-source interest in these circumstances is consistent 
with standard UK foreign tax credit policy: see fn 679.  
682 The limited guidance on this topic in the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model may be of some help: 
that part of the Commentary postdates the 2001 UK-US treaty, although it does develop aspects of the 






and the character and source of the holders’ income is determined by the original item of underlying 
income683.  In fact the focus on “fiscal transparency” is something of a distraction.  What is important 
when deciding whether the source state should grant treaty relief is whether the members of the 
intermediate entity are liable to current taxation in respect of their shares of its income for whatever 
reason.  That may be because the entity is regarded by a contracting state as “fiscally transparent” in 
the fairly narrow sense described above in the US withholding tax regulations.  However, the source 
state should be prepared to grant treaty relief if the entity is not regarded as “fiscally transparent” in 
this way but its members are currently taxable on its income, at a non-preferential rate, for other 
reasons e.g. under a “controlled foreign company” or “grantor trust” income attribution regime.  In 
that case, too there is no unintended double non-taxation in respect of the income item.  This point is 
not fully reflected in the 2001 treaty but the Exchange of Notes obliquely recognises it (on the UK 
side) by expanding the concept of “tax transparency” to include some of the UK’s anti-deferral rules in 
respect of the income and gains of non-UK entities684.  Such rules should ensure liability to full current 
taxation of the entity’s underlying income at the level of its members, without relying on a “tax 
transparency” theory of the kind mentioned in the US Section 894(c) regulations.  
 
Article 1(8) also leaves unresolved some of the other issues arising in respect of Article 4(1)(b) of the 
1975 UK-US treaty.  In particular, it only provides a limited “look through” of the “tax transparent” 
entity.  Suppose that two UK-resident companies set up a UK partnership (in which they share 50:50) 
to own 100% of a US subsidiary which then pays dividends.  It is not clear that Article 1(8) disregards 
the partnership sufficiently to enable each of the UK-resident corporate partners to claim the 5% rate 
of US withholding tax under Article 10(2)(a) on the basis that it is the “beneficial owner” of shares 
representing at least 10% of the voting power of the US subsidiary685.  Article 1(8) also does not 
resolve other issues which can equally arise in relation to Article 1(2) of the OECD Model: see 6.1.6, 
6.1.8, 6.1.10 and 6.1.12.  
 
Thirdly, Article 1(8) does not attempt to resolve a number of other potential entity classification 
conflicts which could arise elsewhere in the 2001 treaty, and especially in the distributive Articles of 
the treaty dealing with taxing rights over particular forms of income.  These are discussed further in 
6.8.   
 
Lastly, Article 1(8) does not interfere with the characterisation and quantification of income by the 
state of source, nor the persons which it taxes and when it taxes them.  The source state’s rules 
prevail in that regard even if the other contracting state might have characterised and/or quantified 
that income differently e.g. by treating the income in question as interest rather than a dividend.  In 
this respect, Article 1(8) foreshadows Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3(1) of the MLI.   
 
Before leaving the 2001 treaty, it should be noted that it is not affected by the UK being a signatory to 
the MLI, to which the US is not a party.  
 
                                                          
683 See “Avery Jones: Partnerships” op cit. at 430.   
684 See the discussion in 6.4.2 above. 
685 At the end of Article 10(10), there is a special “look through” rule which treats a “pooled investment vehicle” 
holding a partnership interest as thereby owning directly a proportion of the partnership’s interests in real 
property.  There is nothing so explicit in Article 1(8) and it is doubtful (see 5.2) whether a partner “beneficially 






6.5 The unique approach of the 2008 UK-France treaty to “tax transparent” entities686 
 
6.5.1  Introduction: the French taxation of partnerships 
 
The UK and France concluded a double tax treaty (SI 2009/226) which took effect in the UK from April 
2010. It is notable for an expanded Article 4 (“Residence”) which deals in particular with “any 
partnership, group of persons or any other similar entity” (hereafter “partnerships”).  Both the UK and 
France are parties to the MLI but this part of Article 4 is not intended to be altered by the MLI687.   
 
France has historically adopted an unusual position regarding the taxation of partnerships. In 
particular, it regards a partnership (especially a French partnership) as a taxable person in its own 
right even though the partnership’s tax liability on its income is collected from the partners; and the 
liability of each partner in respect of that income will be computed taking into account the personal 
circumstances and tax attributes of that partner (e.g. whether the partner is an individual or a 
company). This approach is usually described in French legal literature as treating partnerships as 
“translucent”.  Hence under French domestic law, a non-resident partner in a French partnership will 
be taxable in France even if that partnership earns purely passive income and has no French 
“permanent establishment”688. That partner is not entitled to treaty protection from French tax, 
unless the treaty specifically provides otherwise. To that extent the French partnership is “opaque”. 
By the same token, France regards French partnerships as “resident in France” for the purposes of its 
tax treaties.  France does not accept that income simply “flows through” a partnership to its partners, 
even though the partners are liable to be taxed on their share of the partnership’s income in 
accordance with their personal circumstances. France reserved its position accordingly in the 
Partnership Report, and has usually required specific provisions in individual tax treaties concluded by 
it in order to give effect to the conclusions of the Partnership Report689.  These ideas are reflected in 
                                                          
686 See in this regard, De Boynes and Howard: “Treatment of Partnerships in the 2008 France-UK Tax Treaty” 
[2009] Tax Notes International Volume 54 Number 5 at 401; and John F. Avery Jones: “The Revised UK-France 
Tax Treaty” (2008) 62 Bulletin for International Taxation No. 10 page 457. 
687 See the synthesised text of the UK-France treaty published by HMRC at 
www.gov.uk/government/publication/france-tax-treaties (accessed 15 December 2019). In particular, France 
has relied on Article 3(5)(a) of the MLI to disapply Article 3 to all of its tax treaties which are otherwise affected 
by the MLI: see France’s instrument of ratification, etc dated 26 September 2018 in the section headed 
“Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention to implement tax treaty related measures to prevent 
base erosion and profit shifting” at www.oecd.org. (accessed 15 December 2019).      
688 This was the case in the decision of the Conseil d’Etat in Re Societe Kingroup Inc. Case No. 144211 (1997/98) 
1 OFLR 399.  The French entity in that case was a “groupement d’interet economique” (“GIE”), which had legal 
personality and received royalty income, but which was not liable to French tax in its own name.  A Canadian-
resident member of the GIE could not rely on the France-Canada treaty to avoid French tax on its share of the 
GIE profits derived from those royalties.  
689 In November 2010, France published a proposal for reform of its tax treatment of partnerships.  This reform 
was abandoned but had it come to pass, France would have regarded certain non-French partnerships 
“equivalent” to French partnerships as fully “transparent” where their French-source profits were regarded as 
the profits of the partners, both in the jurisdiction where the partnership was formed and in the jurisdiction 
where the partners were resident. Therefore, non-French-resident partners would have been able to claim 
treaty protection from French tax unless the partnership was carrying on business through a French “permanent 
establishment”. This treatment would only have been available to partnerships established in EU Member 
States or in a third country with a double tax treaty with France providing for comprehensive information 
exchange. See pages 113 and 115 of “Hybrid Entities and the EU Direct Tax Directives” ed. G.K. Fibbe and A.J.A 
Stevens. Wolters Kluwer; and also “Proposed Legislation on French Tax Treatment of Partnerships” – Sullivan & 






the 2008 treaty with the UK and in particular Article 4(5).  France clearly does not intend to change its 
stance in the light of Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3 of the MLI.  
 
Since Kingroup, the Conseil d’Etat has shed further light on what “translucence” means and how far it 
extends. In 1999, in Re SA Diebold Courtage Case No. 191191690, the Conseil d’Etat was prepared to 
“look through” a “closed” Dutch limited partnership (a “besloten commanditaire vennootschap” or 
“CV”691), whose partners were Dutch-resident private limited companies (“BVs”). It relied on the fact 
that, while the CV itself was not liable to Dutch tax and, importantly, lacked legal personality, this was 
not true of its Dutch-resident corporate partners who could therefore be treated, under Article 12 of 
the then France-Netherlands treaty, as receiving the French-source royalties earned by the CV.   
 
This decision initially seems at odds with Kingroup, because the French court “looked through” the 
non-French partnership.  However, the decision related to a non-French partnership lacking legal 
personality, as noted by the Conseil d’Etat in its 2014 decision in Re Artemis SA Case No. 363556692.  In 
the latter case, the court decided that the French “participation exemption”693 did not apply where a 
French-resident taxpaying company owned almost all of a Delaware general partnership which in turn 
owned more than 10% of a US corporation. In particular, that exemption only applied to dividends 
paid directly to the French company from the other company.  That condition was not met because 
the interposed general partnership had legal personality under Delaware law, unlike the CV in 
Diebold.  The fact that it was “tax transparent” in the US was irrelevant. The US-France tax treaty 
regarded US-source dividends as being distributed to the French partner in the Delaware partnership 
to the extent of its partnership share.  However, this fell short of treating those dividends as paid 
“directly” for the purposes of the French domestic “participation exemption”.    
 
In deciding whether a non-French partnership is not just “translucent” but may be “looked through” 
for French income tax purposes, it therefore seems very important whether that partnership has legal 
personality under its governing law (whether or not it is a taxable entity under any non-French law to 
which it may be subject)694.  The fact that the analysis turns on whether there is legal personality is 
not ideal, not least because different jurisdictions may interpret this concept differently.  For 
example, some jurisdictions (e.g. the UK) are likely to regard an entity with full legal capacity to own 
assets and incur rights and liabilities as thereby being a legal person. Others may not regard full legal 
capacity as synonymous with legal personality, as seems for example to be the case regarding certain 
German and Dutch entities695.   
 
The concept of “translucence” has been further analysed as follows by one Luxembourg 
commentator696: 
                                                          
690 (2000) 2 ITLR 365.  
691 See also 7.3.2. 
692 17 ITLR 582.  See in particular the analysis of Diebold at page 600 in the “conclusions” of the Rapporteur 
Public, Emmanuelle Cortot-Boucher.  These “conclusions” are not the judgment of the Conseil d’Etat as such but 
rather a detailed opinion on the questions at stake.  This is intended to assist the court in reaching a decision. In 
Artemis, the court reached a decision which was consistent with those “conclusions”.   
693 Articles 145 and 216 Code General des Impots.  
694 See 2.9.5 for a discussion of the problems which arise for UK entity classification purposes, if one focusses on 
whether an entity has legal personality or not. 
695 See the findings of fact regarding the Dutch VOF mentioned in the UK Court of Appeal decision in Rowan 
Companies Incorporated v Lambert Eggink Offshore Transport Consultants VOF [1998] CLC 1574. 







“Fiscal translucence is what would be considered in Luxembourg as fiscal transparency697, namely 
a calculation in common of the profits of the partnership, which are then divided among the 
partners for the purpose of taxing them.  Each partner is taxable according to the particular rules 
applicable to his tax situation….. [extract translated from French by the author]”. 
 
This commentator identifies two competing schools of thought regarding “translucence”. The first 
sees there as being a single tax debt of the partnership, which is then simply collected from the 
partners. This school of thought seems to be articulated by Professor Jean-Pierre Le Gall in part I.A.3 
of his General Report on the Worldwide Taxation of Partnerships for the 1995 Congress of the 
International Fiscal Association. It comes close to seeing the partnership as opaque, which seems to 
go too far. The second school sees "translucence” as a two-stage process, whereby the tax base and 
the nature of the partnership’s income are worked out at partnership level but where each partner is 
then taxable individually, by reference to its circumstances, on its share of the partnership profits 
ascertained at stage one. The second school of thought seems a more accurate analysis. This differs 
from the classic “opaque” entity, which is a taxpayer in its own right in respect of its own separately 
computed income tax base, and whose tax base and tax liability are unaffected by the tax 
characteristics of its members.   
 
Even though this second school of thought defines “translucence” in a manner which more closely 
resembles what other jurisdictions (including the UK) would regard as income tax “transparency”, 
“translucence” nevertheless regards the partnership, obliquely, as having its own tax liability, even if 
this is collected from the partners and even if it reflects each partner’s personal circumstances.  
Hence the court in Kingroup698 regarded the Canadian partner in the French GIE as being liable for 
French tax on its share of the entity’s income, even though there was no French “permanent 
establishment”. The partner was liable for its share of what, indirectly, was the tax liability of the GIE 
itself. 
 
There is one limited situation in which France regards an entity as being fully “transparent”.  This 
entity is a “societe immobiliere de copropriete”, whose role is to acquire or build property to be 
leased to, or otherwise used by, its members699.  The Luxembourg commentator quoted earlier 
states700: “Despite their legal form, [such entities] have no fiscal personality separate from their 
members. The latter are treated as owning the entity’s assets directly, in proportion to their rights in 
the entity [extract translated from French by the author]”701.  Hence France reserves the concept of 
tax “transparency” for the (rare) situation where an entity is literally “looked through” for tax 
purposes and where its members are treated as having a direct share in the entity’s underlying assets 
and income stream, and not just in its net profit computed at entity level. The closest UK analogy to 
this type of “transparency” is the capital gains tax treatment of “bare” trusts under Section 60 TCGA 
                                                          
697 It also seems very similar to the way in which the income profits of a partnership are taxed in the UK and 
which is regarded for UK tax purposes as a form of tax “transparency”, even though the tax base is first 
established at partnership level: see, in particular, Sections 846-858 ITTOIA. The rather different form of 
“transparency” for taxing partnership chargeable gains in the UK is discussed in Appendix A. Article 8 Code 
General des Impots is regarded as codifying the “translucency” principle, in respect of both French and non-
French partnerships: see 17 ITLR 582 at 593, 604. 
698 (1997/8) 1 OFLR 399. 
699 See Article 1655ter Code General des Impots. 
700 Jean Schaffner, op. cit. at page 583. 






or of partnerships under Sections 59-59A TCGA (see Appendix A). This is yet another reminder that 
“transparency” can mean different things in different contexts, and that one jurisdiction’s concept of 
“transparency” may be broader or narrower than that of another. Indeed a single jurisdiction may, 
concurrently, use several different meanings of “transparency”, in different situations. 
 
This uniquely French thinking strongly influences the UK-France double tax treaty.  
 
6.5.2  Article 3 
 
Article 3(1)(e) and (f) define “person” and “company” in the same way as the OECD Model. 
 
6.5.3  Article 4: general 
 
Article 4(1) provides a definition of a “resident of a Contracting State” which is very similar to Article 
4(1) of the OECD Model.  However, Article 4(4) then provides702: 
 
“The term ‘resident of a Contracting State’ shall include where that Contracting State is France any 
partnership, group of persons or any other similar entity:  
(a) which has its place of effective management in France; 
(b) which is subject to tax in France; and 
(c) all of whose shareholders, associates or members are, pursuant to the tax laws of France, 
personally liable to tax therein in respect of their share of the profits of that partnership, 
group of persons or other similar entity”.  
 
This of course reflects France’s stated position on the “translucence” of French partnerships and on 
the treatment of partnerships under double tax treaties.  It is not clear what is meant by a 
partnership, etc being “subject to tax in France”. In particular, the more normal formulation “liable to 
tax” is not used.  The discussion above of “translucence” suggests that Article 4(1)(b) is hinting at the 
idea that a “translucent” partnership has, obliquely, a tax liability, even though this is given effect (see 
Article 4(1)(c)) as the personal tax liability of shareholders, associates or members in respect of their 
share of the entity’s profits. Presumably Article 4(4) does not extend to a “societe immobiliere de 
copropriete” which France regards as fully “transparent”, and not merely “translucent”.  
 
Article 4(4) should also be read in the light of paragraph 3 of the Protocol where the French-resident 
partnership has a UK “permanent establishment” (which would ordinarily entitle the UK to tax the 
profits of that “permanent establishment” under UK domestic law).  In that case, that “permanent 
establishment” is to be regarded as a “permanent establishment” of each member of the partnership 
who is entitled to the benefits of the 2008 treaty.  Hence, in this particular situation, “translucency” is 
replaced with full “transparency”703.  The same applies in the converse situation i.e. a UK partnership 
with a French “permanent establishment”.  It is rare to find an example in a UK tax treaty of the 
                                                          
702 This kind of provision now exists in a number of French treaties e.g. Article 4(6) of the France-Japan treaty: 
see “Treatment of Partnerships in the 2008 UK-France Treaty” op. cit. at page 402 fn 11.  It did not exist in the 
previous UK-France treaty.   
703 This is consistent with paragraph 81 Example 12 of the Partnership Report.  The majority view in that Report, 







“permanent establishment” of a partnership or trust being expressly attributed to those with an 
interest in the entity704.  However, this approach make sense. 
 
The 2008 treaty does not attempt to define “partnership” and the English courts in particular have 
had difficulties characterising entities which France would regard as partnerships705.  The use of the 
phrase “partnerships, groups of persons or any other similar entity” should go some way to ensuring 
that such characterisation conflicts do not cause problems applying Article 4.706 In particular, the 
breadth of that phrase should limit the situations where each state finds it necessary to fall back on its 
domestic law to interpret the treaty, as per Article 3(2). An unresolved question is whether this 
phrase covers trusts, which are now capable of existing under French law too.  Given recent 
pronouncements by the CJEU regarding trusts707, there is much to be said for applying this phrase to a 
trust, at least if it makes profits and has at least two trustees.  
 
6.5.4  Article 4(5) 
 
This contains six scenarios and sets out how the 2008 treaty should apply to each.  The outcomes 
broadly reflect the Partnership Report.  This detailed approach is consistent with the French 
reservation to that Report mentioned earlier. 
 
6.5.4.1  Article 4(5)(a) 
 
“….an item of income, profit or gain: 
 
(i) derived from a Contracting State through a partnership, group of persons or other similar 
entity that is established in the other Contracting State; and  
(ii) treated as the income of beneficiaries, members or participants of that partnership, 
group of persons or other similar entity under the laws of that other Contracting State; 
 
shall be eligible for the benefits of the Convention that would be granted if it were directly 
derived by a beneficiary, member or participant of that partnership, group of persons or other 
similar entity who is a resident of that other Contracting State, to the extent that such 
beneficiaries, members or other participants are residents of that other Contracting State and 
satisfy any other conditions specified in the Convention, without regard to whether the income is 
treated as the income of such beneficiaries, members or participants under the tax laws of the 
first-mentioned State”.  
 
In this scenario, the source state does not recognise the transparency of the partnership 
“established” in the other Contracting State, while that other State does recognise its transparency.  
In practice, because France does not regard partnerships as “transparent”, this scenario will apply 
where the source state is France and the partnership is “established” in the UK. The outcome in this 
scenario is consistent with the Partnership Report, Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3(1) of 
                                                          
704 As in many Australian treaties, there is a similar provision in the UK-Australia treaty of 2003, dealing with the 
“permanent establishment” of a trust: see Brabazon op. cit. at page 233.   
705 See Dreyfus v IRC 14 TC 560, discussed at 2.10.  
706 Although paragraph 3 of the Protocol only applies to “partnerships”. 
707 See the discussion in Trustees of the P Panayi Accumulation and Maintenance Settlements v HMRC (Case C-






the MLI.  It should not give rise to unintended double non-taxation.  In particular the source state 
grants treaty relief and accepts the characterisation of the partnership by the other contracting state, 
precisely because the partners resident in that other state are currently liable to tax on their share 
(distributed or otherwise) of the partnership income and gains708. 
 
Interestingly, the words “fiscally transparent” are not used as such, unlike Article 1(8) of the 2001 UK-
US treaty, Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3(1) of the MLI.  Article 4(5)(a)(ii) appears to 
apply even if the other Contracting State did not regard the partnership as “transparent” but 
nevertheless taxed the partners currently on its income via a CFC-type regime or other income 
attribution regime709.     
 
Like the other limbs of Article 4(5), Article 4(5)(a) also applies on a “per item of income” basis.  This is 
useful if the entity in question is only partly “tax transparent” in the non-source state.  A good 
example would be where the income of a trust is partly subject to a vested interest in possession and 
partly subject to a discretionary and accumulation trust. Article 4(5)(a) should apply to those items of 
income which are caught by the vested interest in possession and (presumably) treated as the income 
of the holder of that interest by the non-source state.  
 
There is also no definition of when a partnership is “established” in a Contracting State.  The views of 
France and the UK may not coincide in this regard. One view is that it is enough for a partnership to 
be “established” in a Contracting State if it is formed under the law of that state710.  However, given 
the relative ease with which the governing law of a partnership may be changed, this would be a weak 
nexus with a contracting state for treaty purposes.  A better approach would surely be to read 
“established” as connoting some level of senior management activity in the relevant Contracting 
State.  This is also consistent with the wider context of the treaty and, in particular, Article 4(4), which 
was discussed in 6.5.3.  Article 4(4) focusses on the place of “effective management” of a partnership 
and not on its governing law.  
 
Paragraph 3 of the Protocol discussed above will permit a French “permanent establishment” of the 
UK partnership to be attributed to the partners, which may correspondingly limit their treaty relief 
under Article 4(5)(a).  
 
Article 4(5)(a) shares some of the weaknesses of Article 1(8) of the 2001 UK-US treaty, and of Article 
1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3(1) of the MLI.  It does not disregard the partnership altogether.  
Consequently, it is not clear that two UK-resident corporate partners, sharing 50:50 in a UK 
partnership owning a French company, can claim the special nil rate of French withholding tax on 
dividends, which applies under Article 11(1)(c) where the “beneficial owner” of those dividends is “a 
company liable to corporation tax which holds, directly or indirectly, [emphasis added] at least 10 per 
                                                          
708 Apparently, the treaty in this respect provides legal underpinning for the practice of the French tax 
authorities, in Guideline 4 H-5-07 published in March 2007 following the decision  in Diebold supra: see BOI-INT-
DG-20-20-20-10, para 110 (for dividends) and BOI-INT-DG-20-20-30, para 120 (for interest and royalties).  
However, unlike the treaty, those guidelines only apply where the French-source income is interest, dividends 
or royalties: see “Treatment of Partnerships in the 2008 France-U.K. Treaty” (op. cit.) at page 404. 
709 So long as that regime deems the partners to receive the actual underlying income of the partnership.  This 
would not be so, in particular, under the UK CFC regime (see Bricom Holdings Ltd v IRC [1997] STC 1179).  
However, it can be the case under the rules for attributing chargeable gains of non-UK-resident “close 
companies” in Sections 3-3G TCGA 1979.    






cent of the capital of the company paying the dividends”.  Arguably the words “directly or indirectly” 
save the day for the UK partners.  The position may also be improved by the decision in Artemis711 
mentioned earlier.  In that case, it was the legal personality of the Delaware general partnership 
which prevented the French domestic participation exemption from applying. If the UK partnership is 
an English general or limited partnership (but not a UK LLP), then it will lack legal personality under 
English law. In that case, a French court may find it easier to accept that a UK-resident corporate 
partner in that partnership “holds, directly or indirectly” shares in the underlying French company712. 
 
6.5.4.2   Article 4(5)(b) 
 
This states that “an item of income, profit or gain: 
 
(i) derived from a Contracting State through a partnership, group of persons or other 
similar entity that is established in the other Contracting State; and  
(ii) treated as the income of that partnership, group of persons or other similar entity 
under the tax laws of that other Contracting State; 
 
shall be eligible for the benefits of the Convention that would be granted to a resident of that 
other Contracting State, without regard to whether the income is treated as the income of 
that partnership, group of persons or other similar entity under the tax laws of the first-
mentioned State, if such partnership, group of persons or other similar entity is a resident of 
that other Contracting State and satisfies any other conditions specified in the Convention”.    
 
This approach is consistent again with the Partnership Report: see Example 5. The characterisation of 
the partnership in the source state is ignored, and treaty relief made available in the source state to 
the partnership, provided that it is taxable in the other state and regarded as resident there for treaty 
purposes (which it should be on the basis that it is a “body of persons”, and hence a “person”, 
“established” in the other state, thereby satisfying Article 4(1)).  
 
This is a sensible answer because, again, there is no risk of untended double non-taxation if the 
source state’s characterisation of the partnership is set aside in this way.   
 
These rules again do not clarify the meaning of “established”. If the UK is the source state, a French 
partnership should satisfy Article 4(5)(b) because French domestic tax law treats it as “translucent”, 
not “transparent” and it should be a “resident of France” under Article 4(4) so long as its “place of 
effective management” is there.  On the basis of Kingroup713, third-country partners in the French 
partnership should be subject to French tax on their shares of the partnership’s income, whether or 
                                                          
711 17 ITLR 582.  
712 Such an approach would resemble to some extent Diebold 2 ITLR 365, although that case did not address 
whether shares could be “held” through the Dutch CV. Of course this approach would probably not work if the 
UK partnership were a Scottish partnership, which has legal personality even though it is not a body corporate. 
This highlights the flaw in the French approach of attaching such importance to whether or not a partnership 
has legal personality under its governing law: the presence or absence of legal personality has limited practical 
impact on the way in which English and Scottish partnerships conduct business. See fn 590 regarding the 
(greater) scope for tracing corporate affiliation through a “transparent” partnership for the purposes of relieving 
double taxation on distributed profits under the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive.  






not it has a French “permanent establishment”.  This reduces the risk of the UK effectively giving 
treaty benefits to third-country residents via the French partnership.  
 
What if France is the source state?  French domestic rules on entity classification lack clarity. 
However, unlimited liability of members tends to be an important criterion when deciding that an 
entity is a partnership.  Suppose that French-source income is paid to a UK-resident unlimited 
company.  The latter is clearly taxable as a body corporate in the UK; it is not a partnership for UK tax 
purposes; and should be regarded as a “resident of the UK” for treaty purposes.  Does this mean that 
it is not a “partnership, group of persons or other similar entity” at all so that Article 4(5)(b) does not 
apply?  If that is correct, the unlimited company can rely on all other relevant treaty protections; and, 
if it receives dividends on a 10% or greater shareholding in a French company, it can claim the Article 
11(1)(c) nil withholding tax rate because, on UK principles, it is a “company subject to corporation 
tax”.  This is the best answer from the unlimited company’s perspective, especially as the dividend 
income is likely to be exempt under UK domestic law714. However, it is not clear which state’s 
definition of “partnership” should determine what “partnership” means in Article 4(5)(b)715.   
Arguably, France’s should prevail because the relevant income is French-source.  However, even if it 
does, there is nothing in the treaty to prevent the unlimited company from also being a “company” 
for Article 11(1)(c) purposes.  In particular, the treaty definition of “company” in Article 3(1)(f) does 
not carve out “partnerships” as such, and covers a UK unlimited company.  
 
Article 4(5)(b) does not address the situation where, for example, UK-source passive income is paid to 
a French partnership (regarded by the UK, if not by France, as “tax transparent”) whose partners are 
resident in a third country, which has a double tax treaty with the UK and which also regards the 
French partnership as “tax transparent”.  However, as the UK generally has no domestic withholding 
tax on dividends, and the 2008 treaty provides for nil withholding on interest and royalties, it is less 
likely that the members of the French partnership would want to invoke the treaty between the UK 
and the third country.  It would of course be different if the third-country treaty provided better 
reliefs from UK tax than the UK-France treaty716.   
 
6.5.4.3  Article 4(5)(c) 
 
This provides that “an item of income, profit or gain: 
 
(i) derived from a Contracting State through a partnership, group of persons or any 
other similar entity that is established in that Contracting State; 
(ii) treated as the income of the beneficiaries, members or participants of that 
partnership, group of persons or other similar entity under the tax laws of the other 
Contracting State; and 
                                                          
714 See Part 9A Chapters 2-4 CTA 2009. 
715 The phrase “group of persons or other similar entity” in Article 4(5)(b) seems inadequate anyway to describe 
an unlimited company which has full corporate personality, with a clear distinction between the rights of the 
entity and those of its members. 
716 In that situation, the Partnership Report indicates that both the UK-France treaty and the UK-third country 
treaty would apply. Consequently, the source state should grant the more generous of the two relief packages 
available under these treaties.  Not all countries accept this approach because of concerns about possible claims 






(iii) treated as the income of that partnership, group of persons or other similar entity 
under the tax laws of the first-mentioned State; 
 
can be taxed under the tax laws of the first-mentioned State without any restriction”.   
 
This scenario recognises, in particular, the fact that France regards a partnership as a taxable person.  
Hence, if French-source income is paid to a French partnership, that is perceived as an entirely 
domestic matter which should not give rise to treaty relief in France717. This is so even if the other 
contracting state regards the partnership as transparent, some of the partners are resident in that 
other state and are currently taxable there on their shares of partnership income. The issue is not one 
of double non-taxation but of fiscal sovereignty: France is not willing to accept the UK transparency 
analysis if that would render cross-border a situation which France regards as purely domestic.   
 
A UK-resident partner in the partnership will therefore be taxed in France without restriction, even in 
respect of purely passive income of the partnership. This is consistent with Kingroup718. Paragraph 5 
of the Protocol preserves the concurrent right of the UK to tax the UK-resident in respect of his 
partnership share.  It also confirms that this income will be treated as having a French source for UK 
foreign tax credit purposes.  
 
The scenario can also apply in theory in the converse situation where UK-source income is paid to a 
UK entity regarded as non-“transparent” by the UK but “transparent” by France.  However, this is 
harder to envisage because the French concept of “translucency” means that France will typically not 
regard Article 4(5)(c)(ii) as being satisfied in respect of the UK entity.  (ii) might however be satisfied if, 
under a CFC-type regime, France treated its residents as entitled to the actual underlying income of 
the UK entity, which was treated as non-“transparent” in the UK.  In that case, the UK tax charge 
would be fully preserved.  
 
As noted elsewhere719, this scenario seems to be based on example 17 in the Partnerships Report.  
However, that example presupposes an entity in the state of source which is fully non-“transparent”, 
whereas Article 4(5)(b) envisages, if France is the state of source, a French entity which is instead 
“translucent”, rather than non-“transparent”.  Because of this, some commentators have taken issue 
with the solution in Article 4(5)(c)720.  In particular, they regard this situation as cross-border, not 
purely domestic, because the French partnership pays no tax but its partners do, whether or not they 
are French-resident. This criticism is partly justified because, under French law, the computation of 
the partnership’s tax liability in a “translucent” situation fully reflects the tax characteristics of the 
partners themselves721.  Furthermore, partners are taxed on their allocated share of partnership 
                                                          
717 There is no comprehensive “saving” clause in the UK-France treaty akin to Article 1(4) of the UK-US treaty, 
Article 1(3) of the OECD Model or Article 11 of the MLI. In the Article 4(5)(c) scenario, the broad effect of such a 
“saving” clause is replicated, but there is no equivalent of, say, Article 1(5) of the UK-US treaty, or the carve-outs 
in Article 11(1) of the MLI which preserve some treaty provisions protecting a resident taxpayer.   
718 See 6.5.1. 
719 See “Treatment of Partnerships in the 2008 France-U.K. Tax Treaty” op. cit. at 406.  
720 See “Treatment of Partnerships in the 2008 France-U.K. Tax Treaty” op. cit. at 406. 
721 In particular, this is the case (i) when the partner is a corporation subject to French corporate income tax; or 
(ii) when the partner is an individual conducting a business activity who has booked his partnership share as an 
asset on the balance sheet of that person’s enterprise: Article 238 bis K of the French Tax Code – see the 






profit whether or not it is distributed. In short, the French tax law outcome does not treat the 
partnership as an entirely separate taxpayer from its partners.  On the other hand, Kingroup means 
that the French tax liability of the non-French-resident partner arises whether or not there is a French 
“permanent establishment” so to that extent the partnership is “opaque”. Therefore, Article 4(5)(c) is 
consistent with the fact that “translucency” falls short of full “transparency”.  
 
Once again, the words “established” and “partnership” are not defined in this scenario.  
  
6.5.4.4  Article 4(5)(d)  
 
This provides that “an item of income, profit or gain: 
 
(i) derived from a Contracting State through a partnership, group of persons or other similar 
entity that is established in that Contracting State; and  
(ii) treated as the income of that partnership, group of persons or other similar entity under 
the tax laws of the other Contracting State; 
 
shall not be eligible for the benefits of the Convention.” 
 
This scenario is based on example 6 in the Partnerships Report.  The thinking is that treaty relief 
should be denied in cases which would otherwise trigger unintended double non-taxation, not least 
where income derived through a partnership, etc “established” in the source state is not currently 
taxed at the level of partners resident in the other state, because the latter does not perceive it to be 
“transparent”.  
 
While the basic principle is understandable722, Article 4(5)(d) is excessively wide.  In particular, if the 
partnership is a general partnership established in the UK but some or all of the partners are 
individuals723 resident in France, France will in fact tax such a partner on its share of the partnership 
income because the partner is taxable on a worldwide basis.  In such a case, there is no risk of double 
non-taxation724, yet treaty benefits are still denied, creating possible double taxation. It is also 
doubtful whether France will grant the French partner relief for UK tax on the income of the UK 
partnership, unless the UK partnership has a UK permanent establishment.  If it is a UK limited 
partnership deriving only investment income from the UK, there may well be no UK permanent 
                                                          
taxable entities and treaty protection” Volume 99b (2014) page 335 at 336. See also the discussion of 
“translucency” in 6.5.1.  
722 Apparently, before this provision was introduced, there was potential double non-taxation where a French-
resident was a member of a UK LLP, which was seen as a partnership for UK tax purposes but as a company in 
France because of its members’ limited liability.  Article 4(5)(d) now entitles the UK to deny treaty relief in such 
cases and France will give the French-resident LLP member no credit for that UK tax where there is a 
distribution from the LLP. To complicate matters further (!), France has apparently chosen to tax French-
resident members of a UK LLP which is a law firm on the basis that the LLP is a partnership, not a company for 
French tax purposes.  For further detail, see “Treatment of Partnerships in the 2008 France-U.K. Tax Treaty” op. 
cit. at pages 407.    
723 Where the partners are French companies subject to corporate income tax, then income from the UK 
partnership is not taxed under the French “territoriality” principle.    
724 See “Treatment of Partnerships in the 2008 France-U.K. Tax Treaty” op. cit. at 407-8. This situation is the 
converse of Kingroup, where France taxes the share of profits of a non-French-resident partner in a French 






establishment.  If there is one, paragraph 3 of the Protocol treats the French partners themselves 
(rather than the partnership) as having that permanent establishment, any income from which will 
then be exempt in France.    
 
Article 4(5)(d)(ii) does not cater well for the situation where the partnership, etc is regarded as non-
“transparent” in the other contracting state (so that (ii) is satisfied) but nevertheless its income can be 
currently taxed at partner level under a CFC-type regime.  Where this is the case, there is no double 
non-taxation and it is not clear why treaty benefits should be denied.    
  
Once again, “established” is not defined.   
 
6.5.4.5  Article 4(5)(e) 
 
This provides that “an item of income, profit or gain: 
 
(i) derived from a Contracting State through a partnership, group of persons or any other 
similar entity that is established in a State other than the Contracting States; and 
(ii) treated as the income of the beneficiaries, members or participants of that partnership, 
group of persons or other similar entity under the tax laws of the other Contracting State 
and under the tax laws of the State where the entity is established [emphasis added];  
 
shall be eligible for the benefits of the Convention that would be granted if it were directly 
derived by a beneficiary, member or participant of that partnership, group of persons or other 
similar entity who is a resident of that other Contracting State, to the extent that such 
beneficiaries, members or participants are residents of that other Contracting State and satisfy 
any other conditions specified in the Convention, without regard to whether the income is 
treated as the income of such beneficiaries, members or participants under the tax laws of the 
first-mentioned State provided that the State where the partnership, group of persons or other 
similar entity is established has concluded with the first-mentioned State an agreement 
containing a provision for the exchange of information with a view to the prevention of fiscal 
evasion.”  
 
This scenario covers certain cases where the partnership is “established” in a third country.  Treaty 
benefits remain available in the source state so long as both the state of the partnership’s 
“establishment” and the other contracting state regard the partnership as “transparent”.  
Furthermore, there must be an effective exchange of information agreement between the source 
state and the third state where the “partnership” is “established”.  It is not clear why it is necessary 
for both the third state and the other contracting state to regard the partnership as “transparent”725.  
Surely the views of the third state on “transparency” should be irrelevant? Indeed, if it is a tax haven 
(which is common) it may not have any views on this issue. The EU law implications of Article 4(5)(e) 
are discussed in 6.8.7.5.1 below.  
 
The word “established” is not defined.  Furthermore, similar comments to those made in relation to 
Article 4(5)(a) apply.  In particular, is Article 4(5)(e)(ii) satisfied if the partners, etc are subject in the 
                                                          
725 Apparently, the January 2009 protocol to the tax treaty between France and the USA does not require the 






other contracting state to a CFC-type regime in respect of the partnership income? Is the effect of 
Article 4(5)(e) to treat partners as owning the partnership’s underlying assets (e.g. in order to invoke 
Article 11(1)(c))?  It is doubtful if the effect of Article 4(5)(e) is that far-reaching.  
 
6.5.4.6  Article 4(5)(f) 
 
This provides that “an item of income, profit or gain: 
 
(i) derived from a Contracting State through a partnership, group of persons or any other 
similar entity that is established in a State other than the Contracting States; and  
(ii) treated as the income of that partnership, group of persons or other similar entity under 
the tax laws of the other Contracting State; 
 
shall not be eligible for the benefits of the Convention.” 
 
Therefore if the partnership is “established” in a third state, there is no treaty relief if it is not 
“transparent” from the perspective of the contracting state which is not the source state.   
 
This scenario resembles example 7 in the Partnerships Report (at paragraphs 68-9). It is a logical 
extension of Article 4(5)(d).  It should not be possible to sidestep the latter by setting up a partnership 
in a third state.  As in all the other cases, “established” is not defined. 
 
As in Article 4(5)(d), the phrasing of (ii) does not deal clearly with the situation where the third-
country partnership, etc is regarded as non-“transparent” in the other contracting state but its 
income can be currently taxed at partner level under a CFC-type regime in that other contracting 
state.  Where this is the case, it is not clear why treaty benefits should be denied by the source state.    
 
6.5.5 Conclusion on UK-France treaty 
 
The 2008 UK-France treaty is a notable example of a fairly recent UK double tax treaty which 
regulates in some detail the availability of treaty relief where the two contracting states have 
different views on the classification of entities and their tax “transparency” or otherwise.  The treaty 
reflects in particular the special position of France regarding the taxation of partnerships, which led to 
France’s reservation in the Partnerships Report and which it has maintained ever since.  However, 
Article 4(5) is unsatisfactory in a number of respects. Specific criticisms aside, its approach to granting 
treaty relief at source is restrictive bearing in mind the slender distinction between the French 
concept of “translucency”, and what many other jurisdictions regard as “transparency”, when taxing 
entity income at member level. Now that the approach of the Partnerships Report has been made 
more explicit and extended via Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3(1) of the MLI, Article 4(5) 
of the UK-France treaty looks even more restrictive.       
 
6.6 The approach of the 2009 UK-Netherlands tax treaty726 to “tax transparent” entities 
 
6.6.1  This treaty took effect in the United Kingdom from April 2011. It defines a “person” and a 
“company” in the same way as the OECD Model. 
                                                          







Similarly, Article 4(1) defines a “resident of a Contracting State” as “any person who, under the laws 
of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management, place 
of incorporation or any other criterion of a similar nature, and also includes that State and any 
political subdivision or local authority thereof”.   
 
6.6.2 Article 22  
 
 
However, Article 22(2) to (4) contain a number of explicit provisions regarding partnerships and 
“fiscally transparent” entities, no doubt reflecting the Dutch reservation in the Partnerships Report 
about not applying the approach of that Report without explicit treaty language727: 
 
“(2) Where a resident of a Contracting State is a member of a partnership established under the 
laws of the other Contracting State, nothing in this Convention shall prevent the first-mentioned 
Contracting State from taxing that resident on his share of any income, profits or gains of that 
partnership. 
 
(3) In the case of an item of income, profit or gain derived through a person that is fiscally 
transparent under the laws of either State, such item shall be considered to be derived by a 
resident of a State to the extent that the item is treated for the purposes of the taxation law of 
such State as the income, profit or gain of a resident. 
 
(4) Where, by virtue of paragraph (3)…., an item of income, profit or gain is considered by a State 
to be derived by a person who is a resident of that State and the same item is considered by the 
other State to be derived by a person who is a resident of that other State, that paragraph shall 
not prevent either State from taxing the item as the income, profit or gain of the person 
considered by that State to have derived the item of income. 
 
(5) The competent authority of a State may grant the benefits of the Convention to a resident of 
the other State with respect to an item of income, profit or gain, even though it is not treated as 
income, profit or gain of the resident under the laws of that other State, in cases where such 
income would have been exempt from tax if it had been treated as the income of that resident.” 
 
While both the UK and the Netherlands are parties to the MLI, the Netherlands in particular has made 
a reservation under Article 3(5)(d) of the MLI, which preserves Articles 22(3) to (5).  They therefore 
continue to apply as per Article 3(6) of the MLI, notwithstanding the general “transparent entity” 
                                                          
727 Apparently, less than ten of the ninety or so Dutch tax treaties have language similar to Article 22, although 
this includes the Dutch treaties with the USA, Japan, Germany and Belgium as well as the treaty with the UK. 
The 2001 Netherlands treaty with Belgium is regarded as providing the most comprehensive resolution of 
double taxation/non-taxation issues in relation to hybrids.  Its language differs somewhat from Article 22. For 
further detail, see Verhoog & Breuer: “Hybrid Entity Issues in a Tax Treaty Context: OECD Approach versus 
Actual Tax Treaties” op. cit.; and Molenaars, Michael L.: “The Tax Significance of Legal Personality: a Dutch 
View” – Tax Review No 316 (December 2014), at 4.2.  The Netherlands-Belgian treaty is also discussed in Avery 






clause in Article 3(1).  The Netherlands has also reserved the right not to apply the “saving” clause in 
Article 11 of the MLI to its tax treaties728.  
 
Article 22(2) is of course the reversal of Padmore which is now a standard feature of UK double tax 
treaties.  It does not define a “partnership” so, “unless the context otherwise requires”, Article 3(2) 
presumably requires that concept to be defined by reference to the domestic law of the state which 
wishes to tax its resident’s partnership share.  As Article 22(2) aims to fully uphold that state’s right to 
tax its resident, it would be strange if the context did otherwise require729.  There is considerable 
overlap anyway between Article 22(2) and the partial “saving” clause in Article 22(4).  
 
Articles 22(3) and (4) are similar to Article 1(8) of the 2001 UK-US treaty730, and to Article 1(2) of the 
OECD Model. However there is no equivalent of the Exchange of Notes in the UK-US treaty which 
develops the scope of Article 1(8), interprets it and clarifies (in part) how the elimination of double 
taxation provisions should work where each contracting state taxes the same item of income in the 
hands of the same or a different person. Therefore, the issues already discussed in relation to the 
2001 UK-US treaty are at least as pertinent in relation to the 2008 UK-Netherlands treaty, but 
resolving them is less straightforward. 
 
The extent of the “look through” permitted by Article 22(3) is also limited.  Hence it is not clear 
whether, if shares in a Dutch company are owned by a UK partnership whose two partners are UK-
resident companies, those partners can claim the nil dividend withholding rate in Article 10(2)(b)(i).  
This would require, in particular, each corporate partner to “control, directly or indirectly, at least 10 
per cent of the voting power in the company paying the dividends”.   
That may not be the case under the partnership arrangements and Article 22(3) does not provide for 
the “fiscally transparent” entity to be disregarded altogether. It also does not provide for a 
“permanent establishment” of that entity to be attributed to its members.  
 
There is no equivalent in the UK-Netherlands treaty of the general “saving” clause in Article 1(4) of 
the UK-US treaty, or in Article 1(3) of the OECD Model and Article 11 of the MLI.  However, Article 
22(4) fulfils a similar function in relation to a fiscally-transparent entity.  Indeed, it goes further 
because, in particular, Article 1(4) of the UK-US treaty is qualified by Article 1(5) which allows a 
resident a limited number of treaty protections.  Article 1(3) of the OECD Model and Article 11 of the 
MLI offer a resident similar protections. There is no equivalent limitation on the scope of Article 22(4).    
 
Article 22(5) is unusual in UK double tax treaties.  It provides a route to treaty relief, via the 
competent authority procedure, where, for example, income is derived via an entity (a “reverse 
                                                          
728 See www.oecd.org/tax/tax treaties/ Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to 
Prevent BEPS/Signatories and Parties (MLI Positions)/ the Netherlands – beps-mli-position-netherlands-
instrument-deposit.pdf. (accessed 7 January 2020).  
729 For a recent case where the context did otherwise require, but in the different context of the UK’s right to 
tax employment income of non-UK-residents, see the Supreme Court decision in Fowler v HMRC [2020] UKSC 22 
regarding the interaction between the “Business Profits” and the “Employment Income” Articles of the 2002 
UK-South Africa treaty. For a discussion of the implications, see Nigel Doran: “Analysis – Fowler: employment or 
treaty deemed trade?” Tax Journal, Issue 1490, 8 (5 June 2020).  
730 Article 22(3) is identical to Article 24(4) of the US-Netherlands treaty: see page 229 of “Hybrid Entities and 
the EU Direct Tax Directives” ed. G.K. Fibbe and A.J.A Stevens. Wolters Kluwer.  Article 22(3) does not address 
the situation where the relevant entity is not “transparent” but its members are still currently taxed on its 






hybrid”) which is regarded as “transparent” in the source state but non-“transparent” in the state 
where the entity’s members are resident.  Such a situation would normally be regarded as creating a 
risk of unintended double non-taxation, in which case the source state would look to deny treaty 
relief at source731.   However, Article 22(5) recognises that this risk falls away if the income would 
have been exempt anyway in the member’s hands, even if the entity had been “transparent” in the 
state where its members are resident732.  Article 22(5) could apply for example where a UK-registered 
tax-exempt pension fund derives Dutch dividend income via an entity which the Netherlands regards 
as “transparent” but the UK does not.  Interestingly, the UK tax authorities have now said they are 
willing to include an equivalent relaxation to Article 22(5) in the UK domestic anti-hybrid mismatch 
rules in Part 6A TIOPA.733 
 
The UK and the Netherlands have in fact used the competent authority procedure to agree that 
certain fund vehicles should be regarded as “transparent” for treaty purposes.  For example, an 
August 2010 agreement relates to a Dutch form of mutual account called a “closed” FGR (‘fondsen 
voor gemene rekening’)734. That agreement states that “since a closed FGR is fiscally transparent, all 
income and gain derived by the fund from the fund assets are allocated to the investors in the closed 
FGR in proportion to their participations in the fund.”  The agreement envisages that, in some cases 
and subject to safeguards against duplicate claims, the fund manager or depositary should be able to 
make treaty relief claims on behalf of the investors. The Netherlands has a policy of seeking such 
agreements with its treaty partners.  
 
A similar agreement dated September 2014 gives a similar result in relation to certain UK Common 
Investment Funds deriving income and gains from the Netherlands735.  
 
6.7 The approach of the 2006 UK-Japan tax treaty to “tax transparent” entities    
 
6.7.1   The UK-Japan treaty (SI 2006/1970 as amended by a 2013 Protocol) took effect from April 2007 
for UK tax purposes.  It originally had bespoke wording in Article 4(5) addressing a number of the 
issues addressed in the UK-US treaty, the UK-France treaty and the UK-Netherlands treaty.  However, 
that wording differed in its approach, compared to those other treaties. In any case, both the UK and 
Japan have agreed to apply Article 3(1) and (3) of the MLI in lieu of Article 4(5). Article 3(1) closely 
reflects Article 1(2) of the OECD Model.  Article 3(3) is the truncated “saving” clause which permits 
                                                          
731 Unless of course the entity was a taxable resident, in its own right, of the contracting state which was not the 
state of source.   
732 In “Some Reflections”, op. cit. at pages 324-6, the authors note, and regret, the lack of a provision like Article 
22(5) in the OECD proposals leading to Article 1(2) of the OECD Model. They also suggest, more controversially, 
that such a provision should extend to an item of income which would not be recognised anyway in the state of 
a member’s residence (e.g. a deemed dividend in the source state), even if one ignored entirely the “fiscally 
transparent” entity. It is less clear that the Article 22(5) approach should apply to a situation like this, which is an 
income classification mismatch.  Such mismatches have been a fertile source of tax planning.     
733 Part 6A was also adopted in response to BEPS Action 2 and the proposed relaxation is discussed in a 19 
March 2020 Consultation Document: “Hybrid and other Mismatches” at page 13: see 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/873562/Co
nsultation_Hybrid_and_other_mismatches.pdf. (accessed 30 June 2020). If adopted, this relaxation would apply 
where non-tax exempts (notably, pension funds) are members of a “reverse hybrid” entity, although the UK may 
wish to deny this benefit to some non-UK tax exempts.  Which ones remains to be seen.    
734 See fn 632 and 7.3.2 for further detail on the nature of a FGR. 
735 Such Funds typically act as a pooled investment vehicle for the assets of UK registered pension schemes or 






each contracting state to tax its own residents without regard to the “transparent entity” clause. 
Japan (unlike the UK) has chosen not to apply to its treaties Article 11 of the MLI736 This contains a 
more elaborate “saving” clause which still permits residents of a contracting state to claim treaty 
relief from residence-based taxation in limited cases.  
 
6.7.2   Article 3(1): “person” and “company” 
 
These concepts are defined along OECD Model lines.  The UK-Japan treaty does not define a 
partnership. 
 
6.7.3   Article 4(1): “resident of a Contracting State” 
 
Here again, the OECD Model is broadly followed. In particular, “the term ‘resident of a Contracting 
State’ means any person who, under the laws of that Contracting State, is liable to tax therein by 
reason of his domicile, residence, place of head office or main office, place of management, place of 
incorporation or any other criterion of a similar nature”.  It also includes national and subnational 
governments of the UK and Japan; pension funds; and certain tax-exempt charitable organisations.   
 
6.7.4   Article 4(5): hybrid entities 
 
The former Article 4(5) read: 
 
“For the purposes of applying this Convention: 
 
(a) an item of income, profit or gain: 
 
(i) derived from a Contracting State through an entity that is organised in the other 
Contracting State; and  
(ii) treated as an item of income, profit or gain of the beneficiaries, members or 
participants of that entity under the tax laws of that other Contracting State; 
 
shall be eligible for the benefits of the Convention that would be granted if it were directly 
derived by a beneficiary, member or participant of that entity who is a resident of that other 
Contracting State, to the extent that such beneficiaries, members or participants are 
residents of that other Contracting State and satisfy any other conditions specified in the 
Convention, without regard to whether an item of income, profit or gain is treated as an item 
of income, profit or gain of such beneficiaries, members or participants under the tax laws of 
the first-mentioned Contracting State. 
 
(b) An item of income, profit or gain: 
 
                                                          
736 For further details of the MLI positions of the UK and Japan, see www.oecd.org/tax/tax treaties/ Multilateral 
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS/Signatories and Parties (MLI Positions)/ 
Japan – beps-mli-position-japan-instrument-deposit.pdf and the United Kingdom – beps-mli-position-united 
kingdom-instrument-deposit.pdf. (accessed 7 January 2020). See also the synthesised text of the UK-Japan 
treaty reflecting the MLI-related changes and published by HMRC at 






(i) derived from a Contracting State through an entity that is organised in the other 
Contracting State; and  
(ii) treated as an item of income, profit or gain of that entity under the tax laws of that 
other Contracting State; 
 
shall be eligible for the benefits of the Convention that would be granted to a resident of that 
other Contracting State, without regard to whether an item of income, profit or gain is 
treated as an item of income, profit or gain of the entity under the tax laws of the first-
mentioned Contracting State, if such entity is a resident of that other Contracting State and 
satisfies any other conditions specified in the Convention. 
 
(c) An item of income, profit or gain: 
 
(i) derived from a Contracting State through an entity that is organised in that 
Contracting State; and  
(ii) treated as an item of income, profit or gain of that entity under the tax laws of the 
other Contracting State: 
 
shall not be eligible for the benefits of the Convention.”  
 
 
Article 4(5) focussed on the contracting state where an entity was “organised” (cf the word 
“established” in the UK-France treaty).  “Organised” seemed to refer to the jurisdiction whose law 
governed the entity, rather than the place where it was managed.  Following the changes per the MLI, 
it is no longer relevant where an entity or arrangement is “organised”. Indeed it does not matter if it 
is “organised” in a third state. To this extent, the replacement of Article 4(5) is helpful to taxpayers. 
 
The words “fiscally transparent” were not used in the old Article 4(5), as compared to Article 1(8) of 
the 2001 UK-US treaty and of course the UK-Japan treaty as amended by Article 3(1) of the MLI.  This 
meant that, in the situation described in Article 4(5)(a), even if the entity organised in the other 
Contracting State was not “transparent”, treaty relief in the source state was still available if the 
members of that entity were subject to a CFC-style regime which treated the income of that entity as 
theirs737.  This was a sensible outcome which is less easy to reach now that Article 3(1) of the MLI has 
displaced Article 4(5)(a).  
 
Article 4(5)(a) applied a “look through” approach to the intermediate entity by treating the entity’s 
members as deriving directly their shares of the entity’s underlying income.  However, as with Article 
3(1) of the MLI, it was unclear whether an affiliation by shareholding could be traced through that 
intermediate entity, in order to apply the nil dividend withholding tax rate.  This rate applies738 when a 
corporate shareholder resident in one state “has owned, directly or indirectly, shares representing at 
least 10 per cent of the voting power of” a company resident in the other state, for the six-month 
period ending when the entitlement to dividends is determined.   
 
                                                          
737 Although treaty relief would not be available if the CFC-style regime, like the UK one, did not directly tax the 
income of that entity but instead used that income as a yardstick for quantifying a “sui generis” tax charge on  
notional income of that entity.    






In Article 4(5)(a) and (b), the source state’s analysis of who was entitled to the income of the 
intermediate entity was ignored. In Article 4(5)(b), that entity was treated as a resident of the 
contracting state in which it was “organised”, if that state treated income derived through that entity 
as belonging to the entity itself and also treated it as a resident. Presumably, if the members of that 
entity were resident in a third country which (i) had a treaty with the UK or Japan; and (ii) regarded 
those members as entitled to the entity’s income as it arose, then those members could have also 
claimed the benefit of the treaty between the UK/Japan and that third country, alongside any claim by 
the entity itself under the UK-Japan treaty.    
 
Article 4(5)(c)  provided for the analysis in the source state to prevail, and for treaty benefits to be 
denied, where the intermediate entity was “organised” in the source state.  This was regarded as a 
purely domestic situation which should fall outside the treaty, even though the entity was not 
required to be “resident” or “established” in the source state.  However, Article 4(5)(c) also required 
that the other contracting state must regard the relevant income as belonging to the intermediate 
entity too.  Hence, treaty benefits remained available if that other contracting state regarded the 
entity as “transparent”.  This was unlike Article 4(5)(c) of the UK-France treaty, where the buy-in of 
the non-source state is not required for this situation to be treated as purely “domestic” and hence 
ineligible for treaty benefits.  
 
Article 4(5)(c) of the UK-Japan treaty has now been displaced by Article 3(1) and (3) of the MLI, which 
entitles each contracting state to tax its residents without regard to the “transparent entity” clause in 
Article 3(1) of the MLI. This is a simpler approach, although both the intermediate entity itself, and its 
members may be taxable in respect of the same underlying income, in their respective states of 
residence.  Unlike the UK-US treaty, the UK-Japan treaty gives no additional guidance on how to 
alleviate such residence-based double taxation.  This is unfortunate given the ambiguities of Article 
20: see 6.7.5.  
 
6.7.5    Article 20 
 
This bespoke provision is unaffected by the adoption of the MLI by the UK and Japan. It states that, 
notwithstanding anything else in the treaty, income, profits or gains derived “by a sleeping partner in 
respect of a sleeping partnership (Tokumai Kumiai) contract or other similar contract” may be taxed in 
the contracting state where such income, profits or gains “arise” and according to the laws of that 
state.   
 
This appears to mean that a limited partner or equivalent739 may be taxed both in its contracting state 
of residence, as well as (potentially) in the contracting state which is the source of the underlying 
income of the partnership.  The source state may for example impose withholding tax. It is not clear 
what the word “arises” means in this context.  Article 20 seems largely to reflect Japanese concerns.  
Hence Japan may regard the income, profits or gains of a Tokumai Kumiai as “arising” where that 
                                                          
739 “Sleeping partner” is not defined but a Tokumai Kumiai is apparently an arrangement very similar to the 
“stille Gesellschaft” or “silent partnership” considered in Memec v IRC [1998] STC 754. The closest English law 
equivalent is a limited partnership under the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 where the limited partner is 
effectively prohibited from taking part in firm management, on pain of losing its limited liability.  Unlike a “stille 
Gesellschaft”, a Tokumai Kumiai is apparently regarded by HMRC as ”transparent” when taxing a UK-resident in 
respect of its participation in such an arrangement.  The HMRC view was formed in 2005 i.e. after Memec, 






entity is formed and managed (i.e. Japan). The limited partner will want relief for any tax on the 
entity’s income wherever it is regarded as ”arising”.  If the limited partner is UK-resident, and HMRC 
adhere to their stated position on the “transparency” of a Tokumai Kumiai, then presumably such 
relief will be easier to secure.   
 
6.7.6  Paragraph 2 of the Protocol 
 
This makes clear that a UK-resident partner in a Japanese partnership remains taxable in the UK in 
respect of his/her partnership share.  This is standard wording in UK tax treaties in the post-
Padmore740.  It has not been removed from the UK-Japan treaty in the light of the MLI-driven changes.  
However, it is largely superfluous given the adoption of the “saving” clause in Article 3(3) of the MLI, 
which preserves each contracting state’s right to tax its own residents as if the treaty were not in 
existence.  That right is not restricted by the “transparent entity” clause in Article 3(1) of the MLI.      
 
6.8 Conclusion on UK tax treaties and “tax transparent” entities 
 
6.8.1  Introduction 
 
Unlike France and the Netherlands741, the UK did not register any reservations regarding the 
Partnership Report742.  Therefore, the UK appears to have broadly acquiesced in that Report’s 
conclusions and its approach to implementing them743: by supplementing the Commentary on the 
OECD Model rather than significantly changing the Model itself744.  
 
However, even before the 2017 changes to the OECD Model and the MLI, UK treaty making post-2000 
suggests a greater willingness to address concerns regarding “transparent” entities more explicitly in 
the treaties themselves745.  Yet what was achieved pre-2017 often reflected the more vocal concerns 
of relevant UK treaty partners.  In the case of the US, the 2001 treaty dealt with these issues in detail 
because of US policy on tax treaties and hybrid entities, as reflected in post-1996 versions of the US 
Model, plus the 1997 Treasury Regulations promulgated under Section 894(c) Internal Revenue Code. 
                                                          
740 [1989] STC 493. 
741 The Netherlands expressed doubts about whether the OECD Model could be interpreted in the way the 
Partnership Report suggested so as to lead to the Report’s conclusions.  
742 For a discussion of interpretational concerns which the UK might have had with that Report’s conclusions, 
see Murray Clayson: “OECD Partnerships Report: Reshaping Treaty Interpretation?” [2000] BTR 71.  This article 
predates a number of UK treaties discussed here which have explicitly addressed issues dealt with in that 
Report.  It obviously predates the post-BEPS changes now reflected in the OECD Model and the associated 
Commentary. 
743 See Murray Clayson op. cit. at page 71.  Part 2 of the UK report in Volume 99b (2014) of the IFA Cahiers de 
Droit Fiscal International offers answers to a number of problem questions sent to all country reporters 
contributing to that volume. Those questions related to treaty entitlement where one contracting state regards 
an entity as “transparent” while another does not.  A number of the answers in Part 2 of the UK Report suggest 
that the UK position is out of line with the Partnership Report, emphasising the tax analysis in the source state 
and not that of the state of residence of the entity’s members.  No further explanation or authority is given for 
these answers, which were not authored by HMRC.  They are surprising given the lack of a UK reservation in the 
Partnership Report. In any case, that Report predated the post-BEPS changes to the OECD Model and the MLI. 
744 The Partnership Report proposed one change to the OECD Model: namely Article 23A(4), which requires the 
state of residence to give double taxation relief by credit, not exemption, where the state of source/situs relies 
on a treaty to exempt income or capital from tax or to reduce the rate of withholding.   






The detailed provisions in the current treaty with France reflect France’s strong reservations, 
expressed in the Partnership Report, about the “flow through” nature of partnerships and how 
treaties should address these issues. The UK-Dutch treaty reflects the Dutch view that such issues can 
only be effectively tackled by explicit language in a treaty.  Furthermore, the bespoke provisions on 
“transparent” entities in the UK’s treaties with the US, France and the Netherlands have not been 
displaced by Article 3(1) of the MLI.  This suggests that these three UK treaty partners are not satisfied 
that the revised OECD Model and Article 3 of the MLI address their concerns in full746.  
 
Despite the changes ushered in by Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3(1) of the MLI, a 
number of other UK treaties with major trading partners remain relatively silent on these issues. For 
example, the UK-Italy treaty of 1988747 simply carves out from the OECD Model-style definition of 
“person”748 “partnerships which are not treated as bodies corporate for tax purposes in either 
Contracting State”.  It says nothing about how either state should treat residents of one state deriving 
income from the other state via an intermediate entity (which could also be a trust rather than a 
partnership).  The much more recent 2010 UK treaty with Germany749 also says very little750.   
 
The UK’s treaties with Australia and New Zealand751have, by contrast, been amended by the MLI. In 
both cases the “transparent entity” clause in Article 3(1) of the MLI has been adopted, as has Article 
11 of the MLI which preserves the right of each contracting state to tax its own residents while 
allowing such residents to invoke a limited number of treaty protections. In the case of the UK treaty 
with Australia, Article 11 of the MLI displaces the old Article 24 which was a variant of the usual UK 
treaty override of Padmore. The old Article 24 made clear that tax imposed in the state of residence 
                                                          
746 The US is not a signatory to the MLI anyway and the relevant provisions in the 2001 UK-US treaty largely 
mirror Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3(1) of the MLI, while dealing more comprehensively via the 
Exchange of Notes with a number of related issues. 
747 SI 1990/2590. Although this treaty is regarded by the UK as a “covered tax agreement” for MLI purposes, 
Italy has not, as at 19 December 2019, deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the 
MLI: see www.oecd.org/tax/tax treaties/ Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to 
Prevent BEPS/Signatories and Parties (MLI Positions)/Italy (accessed 8 January 2020).  
748 In Article 3(1)(d). 
749 SI 2010/2975. The UK-Germany treaty is a not a “covered tax agreement” for MLI purposes: see 
www.oecd.org/tax/tax treaties/ Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent 
BEPS/Signatories and Parties (MLI Positions)/the United Kingdom – beps-mli-position-united kingdom-
instrument-deposit.pdf. (accessed 8 January 2020). 
750 Article 21(2) (“Other Income”) provides for “looking through” a trust or estate to its underlying income 
sources where the trustees or personal representatives are UK-resident and the beneficiary is German-resident.  
This is consistent with ESC B18 (see 4.3.5). Article 23(1)(e) also requires Germany to give double taxation relief 
by credit (not exemption) in certain cases where the two contracting states classify items of income differently 
or attribute them to different persons (cf the Columbus Containers case discussed in 6.8.7.3).  The aim is to 
ensure that this conflict of classification or attribution does not lead to an artificial reduction in taxation. 
Incidentally, the German treaty is a very rare example of a UK treaty with a “Dividend” Article (here Article 
10(2)(a)) where the lowest rate of dividend withholding is only available if “the beneficial owner is a company 
(other than a partnership) which holds directly at least 10 per cent of the capital of the company paying the 
dividends”.  The words in italics no longer appear in the OECD Model.  Their logic was unclear. 
751 SI 2003/3199 and SI 1984/365 respectively.  In the UK-Australia treaty, partnerships are excluded from the 
meaning of “person” unless they are Australian limited partnerships, which are typically taxable entities in 
Australia (although there is some scope for a non-Australian limited partnership to irrevocably elect for 
“transparent” status as a “foreign hybrid limited partnership”).  For more on the latter point and its impact on 
the 2010 Australia-New Zealand tax treaty, see Craig Elliffe and Jun Yin: “Hybrid Entity Double Taxation: A Case 







of a partner on its share of partnership income would be treated, for the purposes of double taxation 
relief, as sourced in the other contracting state.  This helpful clarification has not been replicated in 
the treaty, as modified by the MLI. Another useful provision which is unaffected by the MLI is 
paragraph 3(b) of the Exchange of Notes.  Where a trust is carrying on a business in a contracting 
state through a permanent establishment, paragraph 3(b) attributes that permanent establishment to 
a beneficiary resident in the other contracting state.  This is a standard feature of Australian treaties ( 
see fn 704). It partly clarifies one of the uncertainties surrounding Article 3(1) of the MLI (and Article 
1(2) of the OECD Model).  
 
The UK treaty with Canada752 has been less heavily amended by the MLI, not least because Canada 
has reserved the right not to apply Articles 3 and 11 of the MLI to its “covered tax agreements”753. A 
number of existing provisions therefore remain in place. In particular, the treaty explicitly includes 
“trusts” and “partnerships” in the definition of “person” (and in so doing seems to regard a trust as an 
entity rather than just a series of obligations from trustee to beneficiary).  Article 27(3) endorses the 
right of each state to tax its residents on their share of the profits of a “partnership, trust or 
controlled foreign affiliate in which that resident has an interest”.  Paragraph 1 of the Interpretative 
Protocol requires Canada to treat as fully “transparent” a UK LLP which is “effectively managed” and 
tax-“transparent” in the UK.  However, Canada is only obliged to do this to the extent that the LLP’s 
income is treated as the income of a UK-resident for UK tax purposes754.  Nor does this obligation 
restrict the right of either contracting state to tax its own residents.  
 
A final example of an important UK treaty which has not been significantly amended by the MLI to 
deal with “transparent” entities is the 1993 UK treaty with India755, as amended by a Protocol756.  
Partnerships were explicitly carved out of the definition of “person”, unless treated as a “taxable unit” 
in India, but this is no longer true.  “Person”757 now “includes an individual, a company, a body of 
persons and any other entity which is treated as a taxable unit under the taxation laws in force in the 
respective Contracting States”.  However, this does not mean that “a body of persons” must be a 
taxable unit in order to be a “person”, not least because Article 4(1) now reads: 
 
 “…..the term ‘resident of a Contracting State’ means any person who, under the laws of that  
 State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management, place 
 of incorporation or any other criterion of a similar nature, provided, however, that: 
(a) this term does not include any person who is liable to tax in that State in respect only of 
income from sources in that State; and 
(b) in the case of income derived or paid by a partnership, estate or trust, this term applies 
only to the extent that the income derived by such partnership, estate or trust is subject to 
                                                          
752 SI 1980/709, as amended by various later Protocols.  
753 See www.oecd.org/tax/tax treaties/ Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to 
Prevent BEPS/Signatories and Parties (MLI Positions)/Canada – beps-mli-position-canada-instrument-
deposit.pdf. (accessed 8 January 2020). 
754 This approach goes beyond that of Article 4(1)(b) of the 1975 UK-US treaty (supra) (see 6.3.2) and indeed of 
the Canadian courts in TD Securities (USA) LLC v Her Majesty the Queen (2010) 12 ITLR 783 (see 6.3.1). In 
particular, it treats the income of the UK LLP as being the income of its UK-resident members, rather than just 
treating the UK LLP itself as a UK treaty-resident to the extent of its UK-resident membership.  
755 SI 1993/1801. 
756 SI 2013/3147, which takes effect in the UK from April 2014. 






tax in that State as the income of a resident, either in its hands or in the hands of its 
partners or beneficiaries  [emphasis added]”.  
 
The wording in the revised Article 4(1)(b) is similar to the “partial residence” approach of Article 
4(1)(b)  of the 1975 UK-US treaty758, whose strengths and weaknesses have already been discussed in 
6.3.2. It is also consistent with the approach of the Indian courts.759 India seems more comfortable 
with this older approach to “transparent” entities: while acceding to the MLI, it has chosen not to 
apply Article 3 to its covered tax agreements, unlike the UK760.  
 
6.8.2  Other treaty issues on entity classification: the Income from Employment Article 
 
There are further areas where the classification of entities, and their “transparency” or otherwise, 
impinges on the interpretation of UK double tax treaties.  These areas remain largely untouched by 
recent UK treaties and case law and indeed, by Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3(1) of the 
MLI. 
 
In particular, the “Income from Employment” Article raises a difficult entity classification issue in 
relation to exempting from tax short-stay employees resident in one contracting state who perform 
work in the other state.  Ordinarily, that other state (“the Work State”) would have the right to tax but 
this is subject to Article 15(2) of the OECD Model, whose material parts read: 
 
“..remuneration derived by a resident of a Contracting State in respect of an employment 
exercised in the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in the first-mentioned State if: 
(a) the recipient is present in the other State for a period or periods not exceeding in the 
aggregate 183 days in any twelve month period commencing or ending in the fiscal year 
concerned; and 
(b) the remuneration is paid by, or on behalf of, an employer who is not a resident of the other 
State……[emphasis added], and 
(c) the remuneration is not borne by a permanent establishment which the employer has 
[emphasis added] in the other State.” 
 
This language is the same, for example, as Article 14(2) of the UK-Netherlands treaty. 
 
In Article 15(2)(b), how does one determine that employer’s “residence” if the employer is apparently 
a partnership which is not itself an entity liable to tax as such?  It cannot be a “resident of a 
contracting state” within the normal Article 4 meaning so how does one apply Article 15(2)? Should 
one look instead at the residence of the partners and, indeed, should the partners, not the 
partnership, be treated as the “employer(s)”?  Treating the partners as the “employer” seems 
                                                          
758 Article 25 of the UK-India treaty has now been removed, because both the UK and India have adopted the 
general “saving” clause in Article 11 of the MLI.  Article 25 used to provide, in particular, that the UK could tax 
the partnership share of a UK-resident in an Indian partnership even if the latter was exempt from UK tax 
because of the treaty.  This simply restated the UK statutory reversal of Padmore [1989] STC 493.  
759 See Linklaters LLP v Income Tax Officer, International Taxation Ward 1(1)(2), Mumbai (2010) 13 ITLR 245 and 
more recently, ING Bewaar Maatschappij I BV – as trustees of ING Emerging Markets Equity Fund v Deputy 
Commissioner of Income Tax International Taxation Circle 2(2)(1), Mumbai ITA No. 7119/Mum/2014. 
760 See www.oecd.org/tax/tax treaties/ Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to 
Prevent BEPS/Signatories and Parties (MLI Positions/India – beps-mli-position-India-instrument-deposit.pdf. 






problematic because the partnership is not a “nothing”, whether or not it has legal personality. There 
is no direct authority for disregarding it in Article 15(2) or indeed in Article 1(2) of the OECD Model. If 
one assumes the partnership entity is the employer, determining its residence by reference to that of 
its partners also creates difficulties, especially if they are resident in more than one jurisdiction761.  
Furthermore, changes in the partnership membership could mean recurring changes to the 
employer’s residence, which would create an unstable tax position regarding relief under Article 
15(2).  Besides, what if one contracting state regards the partnership as “transparent” and the other 
does not?  A compromise approach is needed762. The OECD Commentary hints at one in the tenth 
paragraph of the Commentary on Article 15(2): “While [an interpretation which focusses solely on the 
residence of the partners/members] could create difficulties where the partners or members reside in 
different States, such difficulties could be addressed through the mutual agreement procedure by 
determining, for example, the State in which the partners or members who own the majority of the 
interests in the entity or arrangement reside (i.e. the State in which the greatest part of the deduction 
[for employment income] will be claimed)”. 
 
In an age when major international partnerships are significant employers of internationally mobile 
staff, it would be much better if this approach could be embedded, for consistency, in Article 15(2) of 
the relevant treaty and the OECD Model, and not left to the mutual agreement procedure.  Such 
partnerships typically have a fluctuating group of partners resident in a variety of jurisdictions. There 
may be no one state in which the holders of a majority of partnership interests reside. Hence a better 
approach would treat the partnership as not resident in the Work State, provided that no more than a 
specified percentage of interests in it (by value) are held by residents of that state. The precise 
percentage threshold should be fairly low.  It makes little practical sense to disapply Article 15(2) 
entirely simply because a smallish percentage of interests in the partnership are held by residents of 
the Work State. It would also make sense to permit that percentage threshold to be accidentally 
exceeded by small amounts for a grace period without forfeiting relief under Article 15(2).  Otherwise 
transitory, non-tax-motivated changes in the make-up of the partnership could prevent Article 15(2) 
applying763.     
                                                          
761 Although this was the approach recommended in paragraphs 88-92 of the Partnership Report and which 
continues to be recommended in the OECD Commentary on Article 15(2) of the OECD Model.  The OECD 
Commentary states that its approach is consistent with Article 1(2).  While true, this overlooks the rather 
different issues which Article 15(2) must address. In particular, Article 15(2) requires the residence of the 
partnership entity to be determined on an all-or-nothing basis, in order to decide whether the Work State has 
the right to tax, at source, an employee of the partnership, not a member of the partnership. Article 1(2) 
focusses instead on whether the source state can tax income derived by a particular member of an entity (e.g. a 
member of a partnership) through that entity.   
762 See also Loengard op.cit. at 60-61.  
763 Interestingly, Germany has added an observation to the OECD Commentary regarding Article 15(2) of the 
OECD Model. It considers that a partnership, and not the partners, should be regarded as an “employer” for 
these purposes, even if it is not a taxable entity. The partnership’s “residence” would then be determined 
hypothetically as if it were liable to tax on the basis of at least one of the criteria in Article 4 of the OECD Model. 
It is not clear how this approach works if the partnership is “transparent” and a significant percentage of the 
partnership interests are held by residents of the Work State, even though the partnership is not “resident” in 
that state using the German approach. For further discussion of Article 15(2) and, in particular, criticism of the 
German approach, see F. Pötgens, - “Income from International Private Employment”, Books IBFD, Chapter VII 
Sections 3.5.3, 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.3.2 (accessed 1 July 2020). It appears that Germany’s approach has been 
reflected in some of its tax treaties, even though it is hard to justify on the wording of Article 15(2). Until 2014, 
Germany also included a more radical reservation on Article 4 of the OECD Model.  This stated that a 







Article 15(2) should also make clearer that, if the Work State regards the employer as being a resident 
taxpayer there764, the protection of Article 15(2) should fall away anyway because the entity will then 
presumably be claiming a deduction in the Work State for the short-term employment income.  Such 
an approach is consistent with the “saving” clause in Article 1(3) of the OECD Model.  
 
If the partnership owns a “permanent establishment” in the Work State, Article 15(2) should also fall 
away because Article 15(2)(c) will not be satisfied. In particular, a local tax deduction is likely to be 
claimed in that state for the short-term employment cost, when computing the profits of that 
“permanent establishment”, whether the partnership itself or its partners are taxable on those 
profits. If the partnership is the “employer” but is not a taxable entity, one can argue that it has no 
“permanent establishment” in the Work State for Article 15(2)(c) purposes, because a “permanent 
establishment” (see Article 5 of the OECD Model) must belong to an “enterprise”, which (see Article 
3(c)) requires the “carrying on of any business”.  Furthermore, in Article 7 (where the “permanent 
establishment” concept has greatest significance), that “enterprise” must be carried on by a “resident 
of a contracting state” (see Article 3(d)). The non-taxable partnership is not such a “resident” and 
therefore employment costs are not “borne by” it.   
 
However, unlike Article 7, Article 15(2)(c) strictly does not require the “permanent establishment” to 
be owned by a “resident of a contracting state”. It is enough that it is owned by the “employer”.  
Therefore, if employment costs are attributed to (“borne by”) the non-taxable partnership’s 
“permanent establishment” in the Work State, Article 15(2) should not provide relief because Article 
15(2)(c) is not satisfied. This interpretation makes better sense as a matter of treaty policy: the 
alternative interpretation based on Article 7 means that a non-taxable partnership employer can 
never have a Work State “permanent establishment” within Article 15(2)(c), in which case the Article 
15(2)(c) condition can never be failed. This weakens the taxing rights of the Work State because of a 
technicality.  
 
6.8.4 Other treaty issues on entity classification: the Capital Gains Article 
 
Another good illustration of a treaty article which raises entity classification issues which are not fully 
addressed in recent UK treaties or in Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3(1) of the MLI is the 
Capital Gains Article. This will typically preserve the taxing rights of the contracting state in which 
immovable property is situated, whether that property is alienated directly or indirectly (e.g. by 
disposing of interests in an intermediate property-owning entity).  It is in relation to such indirect 
disposals that entity classification issues arise.   
 
The relevant paragraph of Article 13 (Capital Gains) of the OECD Model reads: 
 
“Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of shares or comparable 
interests [emphasis added], such as interests in a partnership or trust, may be taxed in the other 
Contracting State if, at any time during the 365 days preceding the alienation, those shares or 
                                                          
management is located. This went well beyond a bespoke definition of “residence” for the limited purposes of 
Article 15(2) and was reflected in the old 1959 Netherlands-Germany treaty. 
764 Even if, for example, the other contracting state perceives it to be “transparent” and therefore incapable of 






comparable interests derived more than 50 per cent of their value directly or indirectly from 
immovable property, as defined in Article 6, situated in that other State”.  
 
However, as paragraph 4 of the OECD Commentary on Article 13(4) anticipates, specific treaties are 
likely to introduce refinements, for example by broadening or narrowing the scope of Article 13 of the 
OECD Model. So Article 14(2) of the UK-France treaty reads: 
 
“Gains derived from the alienation of: 
(a) shares, other than those regularly traded on an approved Stock Exchange, or rights deriving 
their value or the greater part of their value directly or indirectly from immovable property …. 
situated in a Contracting State; or 
(b) an interest in a partnership or trust the assets of which consist principally of immovable 
property….situated in a Contracting State, or of shares or rights referred to in subparagraph 
(a) of this paragraph; 
may be taxed in the State in which the immovable property is situated.” 
 
The reference to “shares” in Article 14(2)(a) implies that subparagraph (a) is directed at interests in a 
“company”, especially given the reference in Article 14(2)(b) to “an interest in a partnership or trust”.  
There is no suggestion that the company, partnership or trust need be established in a contracting 
state.  However, the underlying immovable property must be situated in such a state. 
 
The two limbs of Article 14(2) are similar but not identical e.g. only the first limb contains a carve-out 
for stock exchange-traded members’ rights.  Therefore, quite a lot depends in the UK-France treaty 
on whether gains arise from “shares” or from “an interest in a partnership or trust”765.  Article 13 of 
the OECD Model seeks to avoid these classification issues by treating “shares or comparable 
interests” in the same way.  This is sensible, not least because there is often little real commercial 
difference between a company and a partnership.  
 
The entire focus of Article 14(2) is on preserving the taxing rights of the state in which the immovable 
property is situated. It is consistent with that focus for that state to have the last word on whether the 
rights disposed of are “shares” or “interests in a partnership or trust”766, even if its view differs from 
the state where the alienator of those shares or interests is resident.    
                                                          
765 The UK has created an equivalent issue in its new extended rules (effective 6 April 2019) for taxing certain 
capital gains of non-UK-residents disposing of interests in UK real property.  This issue arises independently of 
any UK tax treaty. A partnership is usually “transparent” for UK capital gains tax purposes under Sections 59-59A 
TCGA (see Appendix A) and a “bare” trust may be “transparent” under Section 60 TCGA (see 4.3.2).  Hence a 
disposal of an interest in a partnership or “bare” trust by a non-UK-resident typically equates to a proportionate 
disposal of any underlying real estate held within that partnership or trust. The same is not true where there is a 
disposal of a share in a company holding UK real estate by a non-UK-resident.  In outline, a non-UK-resident will 
only be taxable under the new rules on disposing of an interest in a “company” if at least 75% of the value of 
that interest derives directly or indirectly from UK land.  Furthermore, if the “company” is not a collective 
investment fund, the non-UK-resident must have had at least a 25% voting entitlement or economic equity 
interest in that “company” at some time in the two years leading up to the relevant disposal.  For further detail, 
see Sections 1A, 1C, 1D, 2B and Schedule 1A TCGA. There is therefore an incentive for non-UK-residents to avoid 
UK tax on capital gains by holding interests in UK real property through “companies” (as defined for UK tax 
purposes) and not through partnerships or “bare” trusts.  
766 This seems consistent with the Partnership Report and the General Report in Volume 99b Cahiers de Droit 
Fiscal International: Qualification of Taxable Entities and Treaty Protection p 19 et seq.  Again this issue should 







6.8.5 Other treaty issues on entity classification: the Directors’ Fees Article 
 
Similar points to those in 6.8.4 arise in relation to the Directors’ Fees Article. Article 15 of the OECD 
Model reads: 
 
“Directors’ fees and other similar payments derived by a resident of a Contracting State in his 
capacity as a member of the board of directors of a company which is a resident of the other 
Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.” 
 
Article 16 of the UK-France treaty is identically worded. 
 
This Article also preserves the taxing rights of the source state.  The relevant concepts (“company” 
and “a resident of the other Contracting State”) are defined in the treaty itself. Hence it should be 
easier to identify whether the entity in question is a “company” “resident in the other Contracting 
State” without needing to resolve a classification conflict between the treaty partners.  The reference 
to membership of the “board of directors” may also indicate that entities of a non-corporate nature 
are not covered by this Article.   
 
What if a corporate entity is regarded as “transparent” in the state where it is established e.g. a EEIG, 
which (see 2.7) can in some EU Member States (including the UK) be a body corporate? Is that 
enough to displace the taxing rights of the source state?  On one view, yes given the relevant treaty 
definitions.  However, others apparently think that the source state should continue to tax the 
management fees if the entity has enough connecting factors with that jurisdiction to be resident 
there (ignoring the fact that it is not a taxable entity)767.  This alternative approach has the merit of 
treating management fees in the same way, whether the paying entity is “transparent” or not.  
However, if the entity is “transparent” because it is a partnership, fees paid to its management should 
more logically be dealt with under the “Business Profits” Article anyway because they are effectively 
partnership distributions of business profits which have already been taxed.  
 
6.8.6  Other treaty issues: some further comments regarding trusts 
 
Much of the focus of this Chapter has been on “transparent” entities which are partnerships.  
However, treaties impact on other potentially “transparent” arrangements and in particular, trusts768.  
Depending on the nature of their beneficial interests, trusts may not be entirely “transparent” at any 
given time. This will be the case, for example, where part of the income of a trust is held for a fully-
vested income beneficiary but the remainder of that income is held on discretionary and 
accumulation trusts, where no appointment of that income to beneficiaries has yet been made.  
 
The treatment of trusts has already been discussed in relation to Article 4(1) of the OECD Model (see 
6.3) and Article 1(8) of the 2001 UK-US treaty (see 6.4). The UK-US treaty makes clear that a trust is a 
“person”.  That “person” can in principle be “resident” in a contracting state because there are 
situations where trustees can be liable to tax by reason of domicile, residence, place of management, 
                                                          
767 See the General Report in Volume 99b Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International op. cit. This echoes Germany’s 
observations on Article 15(2) of the OECD Model: see 6.8.4.  






etc.  Of course, if and to the extent that a trust is “transparent”, the trust beneficiaries may be able to 
claim treaty benefits directly in respect of the underlying trust income by relying on the “transparent 
entity” clause in Article 1(8)769.  Article 1(8) will not prevent a contracting state taxing a trust which it 
regards as a resident of that state: see Article 1(4). This creates a risk of double taxation, at both trust 
and beneficiary level. The approach of the UK-US treaty is now largely reflected in Article 1(2) and (3) 
of the OECD Model, and will be increasingly reflected in UK tax treaties, mainly via Article 3 and Article 
11 of the MLI.   
 
There is limited focus on trusts in other UK treaties whose “bespoke” provisions on “transparent” 
entities are unaffected by the MLI.  It is not clear, for example, whether “partnerships, groups of 
persons or any other similar entity” in Article 4(5) of the UK-France treaty covers trusts, although 
there seems no reason why not, at least if a trust has more than one trustee: see 6.5.3.     
 
Article 22(3) of the UK-Netherlands treaty (see 6.6) focusses on “a person that is fiscally transparent”.  
This more closely resembles Article 1(8) of the UK-US treaty, Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and 
Article 3(1) of the MLI. It is readily applicable to partnerships but may not cover all trusts770.  In 
particular, it does not readily cover an accumulation or discretionary trust where income has not been 
appointed to a beneficiary or (?) a life interest trust where the beneficiary’s income entitlement lacks 
the same character as the underlying income of the trust.   
 
Article 4(1)(b) of the UK-India treaty will treat a trust as a “resident” of a contracting state if the 
relevant income is taxable in the hands of the trust itself or its beneficiaries resident in the relevant 
contracting state. As discussed, this language is similar to the “partial residence” approach to 
“transparent” entities of the 1980 UK-US treaty (see 6.3.2).  Significantly, India has not adopted 
Article 1(2) of the OECD Model or Article 3(1) of the MLI. Indian trust law apparently follows the rule 
in Garland v Archer-Shee: see 4.3.3.2.  Presumably, India will therefore argue that while an Indian-
resident income beneficiary of an Indian trust is not taxable on the underlying trust income as it 
arises, any Indian-resident trustees will be entitled to that income and taxable on it.  Therefore, 
Article 4(1)(b) of the UK-India treaty will be satisfied, provided that there are Indian-resident trustees.  
 
None of these treaties settles explicitly whether trustees can be “beneficial owners” of income for 
treaty purposes (and especially for the purposes of Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model dealing 
                                                          
769 A question arises here whether a trust with a vested income beneficiary is for these purposes “transparent” 
if its governing law makes it subject to the rule in Garland v Archer-Shee 15 TC 693. Suppose the non-UK-
resident income beneficiary of a trust seeks to rely on the equivalent of Article 1(2) of the OECD Model in the 
treaty between that person’s home state and the UK (where the underlying trust income is sourced).  Suppose 
also that the trust’s governing law (which is respected in the beneficiary’s home state) treats the beneficiary as 
having no right to the underlying income as it arises but only a right to have the trust performed, so as to make 
net trust income available for the beneficiary.  The UK may well take the position (see fn 775 for more details) 
that the trust is not “transparent” for the purposes of the “transparent entity” clause in the treaty because the 
governing law treats the beneficiary as having an income source which is not the underlying trust income. This is 
similar to arguing (see 6.1.3) that a member of an entity who is taxable in respect of its income under 
“controlled foreign company” legislation cannot invoke the equivalent of Article 1(2) of the OECD Model in 
cases where that legislation does not tax the member directly on its share of the entity’s underlying income but 
only on a surrogate amount computed by reference to that income. For reasons given in 6.4.2, that argument 
seems weak.  






with dividends, interest and royalties771).  On a narrow common law reading of the “beneficial 
ownership” concept, trustees cannot have “beneficial ownership”.  However, this concept was only 
introduced into the OECD Model in 1977 and is not intended to bear the common law meaning but 
instead an “international fiscal meaning”772.  The better view is now that a trustee can be a “beneficial 
owner” for treaty purposes where that trustee is “liable to tax” on trust income in more than a 
“purely representative” capacity (see 6.3) and the trust is a discretionary and accumulation trust773.  
Where the trust is a pure discretionary trust (i.e. the trustees must distribute all income even if they 
have discretion about which beneficiaries get paid and how much), then it is harder to see how the 
trustees have “beneficial ownership”, given their fiduciary obligation to pass on all trust income774. It 
is unlikely in practice that a discretionary trust will lack powers of accumulation. 
 
Where the trust is a discretionary and accumulation trust, what if the trust claims treaty relief on its 
income on the basis that it is a “resident” and “beneficial owner” but then makes a distribution 
enabling the relevant beneficiary to recover tax paid by the trustees on the income funding that 
distribution?  This can arise, for example, in respect of non-UK-source income distributed by UK 
discretionary trustees to a non-UK-resident beneficiary: see the discussion of ESC B18 in 4.3.5. Surely 
the jurisdiction in which the underlying income is sourced should be able to restrict the UK trustees 
from claiming treaty benefits, where that income can effectively pass tax-free to a third-country 
resident because of the way in which the UK taxes subsequent distributions by UK discretionary 
trustees?  
 
                                                          
771 Increasingly, the “Other Income” Article in UK treaties is importing the “beneficial ownership” condition, 
although not the “Capital Gains” Article.   
772 Certainly this is the view of HMRC, and is likely to be the view of the UK courts following Indofood 
International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2006] STC 1195. This view better respects the use, in the 
French version of the OECD Model, of the term “beneficiaire effectif”, rather than “beneficial owner”.  The 
French and English versions have equal weight.  
773 See also Prebble: “Accumulation Trusts and Double Tax Conventions” op. cit. Prebble (whose article predates 
Indofood) notes that New Zealand has, in several treaties, made clear that dividends, interests and royalties on 
which a trustee is subject to tax should be treated as being beneficially owned by that trustee, although New 
Zealand may have insisted on this language to resolve doubt: see Avery Jones: Trusts op. cit. at page 391.  There 
is an equivalent New Zealand reservation to Article 3 of the OECD Model.  For a recent discussion to the same 
effect, see Brabazon op. cit. at pages 236-240.  
774 However, in the past, HMRC has accepted that a Massachusetts business trust (a form of regulated US 
investment fund) can be the “beneficial owner” of UK-source dividend income for treaty purposes, even though 
the US rules on “regulated investment companies” (“RICs”) will effectively require the US entity to distribute 
most of its income to investors on a current year  basis. The HMRC International Manual indicates, at 
INTM339550 (accessed 14 January 2020), that HMRC will take a more relaxed stance regarding treaty claims by 
the trustees of a non-UK discretionary trust if all the beneficiaries are resident in the same country as the 
trustees, and the settlor cannot benefit from the trust.  In that case, no “treaty shopping” concern should arise 
and an unwelcome conclusion that there is no “beneficial owner” is avoided. Recently, the Italian Supreme 
Court ruled that a UK trust (apparently, an “authorised unit trust”) was a “person” for the purposes of claiming 
benefits under the “Dividend” Article in the 1990 UK-Italy treaty. It would also be regarded as a “beneficial 
owner” of the dividend if it is was not “fiscally transparent” and not subject to an obligation to pass on the 
relevant item of income: see Tax Treaty Alert 2020/01 6 May 2020 https://www.maisto.it/en/newletter/tax-
treaty-alert--87.html. As an “authorised unit trust” is not a discretionary trust, in fact it is probably subject to 






If the charge on the trustee is purely “representative”, then the “beneficial ownership” question 
should be addressed instead at the level of the beneficiary775.  
 
Of course if a trustee or beneficiary has entered into other arrangements (apart from the trust) which 
make it an agent, nominee or other conduit in respect of an item of income, then it will probably lack 
“beneficial ownership” for treaty purposes. 
 
Trusts of course have particular relevance in relation to wealth and succession planning. The UK has a 
limited number of double taxation treaties which deal with estate and gift taxes. These too can raise 
entity classification and transparency issues.  They are discussed further in Appendix C.   
 
6.8.7 EU law and entity classification issues 
 
6.8.7.1 EU law 
 
No discussion of entity classification and “tax transparency” would be complete without considering 
the impact of EU law and in particular the ever-evolving case law of the CJEU regarding the four 
“fundamental freedoms”: namely, the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services, the 
free movement of workers and the free movement of capital 776. 
 
6.8.7.2 Lack of harmonisation re entity classification, etc 
 
To date, EU law has not sought to impose on Member States uniform criteria for classifying entities 
for direct tax purposes.  Furthermore, it has not sought to dictate when and how specific entities 
should be treated as “transparent” or not for tax purposes777.  These are matters left to the domestic 
tax law of Member States.   
                                                          
775 In the International Manual at INTM339540 (accessed 14 January 2020), HMRC confirm that this is the case 
where a treaty claim is made in respect of a trust subject to the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee, which is logical. 
However, they also state that where the governing law of a trust is such that Garland v Archer-Shee [1931] AC 
212 applies instead, the trustees themselves are treated as beneficial owners of the trust income “because we 
consider that the beneficiary’s right to income from the trust is against the trustees, rather than in the 
underlying assets held in the trust”. This approach could facilitate “treaty shopping” by third-country residents 
with a vested income interest in a Garland trust if the trustees are resident in a jurisdiction with a favourable 
treaty with the UK. Besides, strictly, the HMRC statement about “beneficial ownership” seems incorrect.  Even 
under a Garland trust (see 4.3.3.2), the trustees have an absolute obligation to pay net trust income to, or for 
the benefit of, the vested income beneficiary.  That is very hard to equate with the trustees being “beneficial 
owners” of that income for treaty purposes, post-Indofood. This HMRC statement is in effect concessionary. 
They already regard (see 6.3.1) the trustees of a Garland trust as being “resident” for treaty purposes, because 
they are not taxed in a purely “representative” capacity. If HMRC were unwilling to treat such trustees (rather 
than the beneficiary) as “beneficial owners”, they would still be unable to claim treaty relief at source, despite 
being treaty-“resident”, while relief would also be denied to the beneficiary of a Garland trust. Further proof (if 
proof were needed) of the flaws in the rule in Garland v Archer-Shee! 
776 See Articles 45-66 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This section is drafted on the 
assumption that the UK law will remain aligned with EU law, despite the result of the 23 June 2016 referendum. 
At the time of writing, it is not clear to what extent this assumption is correct.  
777 If one leaves aside EEIGs (discussed in 2.7) and VAT groups (discussed in 5.4.5), as well as Article 9a of the 
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (discussed below). Article 10 of the original proposed draft of the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive required Member States to adopt the same entity classification in a case which would 







However, several Directives regulate certain consequences of entities being treated as “tax 
transparent” in a Member State.  This is true of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive778, the Mergers, etc 
Directive779 and the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive780. As already discussed781, these Directives adopt 
different approaches to defining an entity as “fiscally transparent” for their purposes.  In particular, 
the approach of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Mergers, etc Directive seems rather narrow, 
because it assumes that “fiscal transparency” is driven by an entity’s legal characteristics.  This is not 
always so, because in some jurisdictions (e.g. France), “transparent” tax treatment depends on 
whether or not an election has been made782.   
 
Article 9a of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive imposes a limited non-transparency rule in order to 
avoid mismatches arising in respect of a “reverse hybrid” entity within the EU. Directly addressing the 
entity classification mismatch in this way departs from the general approach of that Directive which 
(consistently with the outcome of BEPS Action 2) usually counteracts any double non-taxation risk 
from an entity classification mismatch, but does not eliminate that mismatch altogether by imposing 
on Member States a uniform entity classification.  Article 9a applies, in particular, where one or more 
                                                          
income inclusion in another Member State. However, this provision did not make it into the final text.  For 
further discussion of the draft Article 10, see Parada: Article 1(2) op. cit. at pages 372-3.  
778 2011/96/EU as amended. 
779 2009/133/EC as amended. 
780 2016/1164/EU, as amended by 2017/952/EU. 
781 See fn 167. 
782 A wider question arises especially in relation to Articles 9-9b of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive.  These 
counteract certain tax mismatches arising, in particular, from an entity being classified differently in separate 
jurisdictions or being regarded as dual-resident.  Article 9 in particular applies quite mechanically if certain 
objective conditions are met, including certain affiliation tests.  Hence do these Articles restrict the “four 
freedoms” (and in particular the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital) without 
justification?  This Directive was enacted pursuant to the procedure in Article 115 of the TFEU, which contains 
the “four freedoms” and is the highest source of EU law.  A Directive is a lesser source of EU law and must in 
principle respect the “four freedoms”: see the comments of Advocate-General Alber at paragraph 58 of his 
opinion in Bosal Holding BV v Staatssecretaris van Financien Case C-168/01, [2003] ECR I-9409. The CJEU has to 
date defined quite narrowly the grounds on which a Member State can invoke the avoidance of tax as a 
justification for restricting the exercise of the “four freedoms”: see paragraphs 65-69 of the judgment of the 
CJEU in Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd and Cadbury Schweppes plc v HMRC C-196/04, [2006] STC 1908, which 
stress the need for the relevant arrangement to be “wholly artificial”.  That case related to the (then) UK 
“controlled foreign company” rules and the “freedom of establishment”. It is not clear that Articles 9-9b of the 
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive fully respect this CJEU reasoning, although in a 2019 case relating to the free 
movement of capital, the CJEU seemed willing to admit tax avoidance as a justification in a wider range of cases: 
see paragraph 84 of the judgment in X GmbH v Finanzamt Stuttgart – Koerperschaften Case C-135/17. At a 
practical level, the author doubts whether the CJEU will prove a major obstacle to implementing the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive. For further discussion of Cadbury Schweppes and the tensions between it and the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive, see Christiana HJI Panayi: “Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas (2006) - 
CFC Rules under EU Tax Law”. Ch 19 “Landmark Cases in Revenue Law” ed: John Snape and Dominic de Cogan. 
Hart Publishing 2019. In “Advanced Issues in International and European Tax Law” Hart Publishing (2015) at 
pages 203-8, the same commentator sketches out arguments for the compatibility with EU law of Articles 9-9b 
of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, taking into account CJEU thinking on the four freedoms in general, and on 
tax treaties in particular (see also 6.8.7.4).  See also Alexander Rust: “BEPS Action 2: 2014 Deliverable – 
Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements and its compatibility with the Non-discrimination 
Provisions in Tax Treaties and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union”[2015] BTR 308, where the 







“associated” (i.e. related) non-resident “entities” hold in aggregate, directly or indirectly, at least 50% 
of the voting rights, capital interests or profit-distribution rights in a “hybrid entity”783 which is 
incorporated or “established” in a Member State. In that case, if those “associated” holders are 
“located” in a jurisdiction(s) which regard(s) the “hybrid entity” as a taxable person, the Member 
State in which that entity is incorporated, etc must tax it as a resident of that State, to the extent that 
its income is not already being taxed either in that Member State “or any other jurisdiction”.  These 
quoted words should mean that Article 9a will apply only if a payment to the “reverse hybrid” can be 
deducted by the payer. Hence Article 9a ensures that the entity’s income does not escape taxation at 
either entity level (on the basis that it would otherwise be “transparent”) or at member level (on the 
basis that the entity is opaque in the members’ home jurisdictions, so that they are not taxed on its 
undistributed income)784.  
 
The question of whether entities are “fiscally transparent” is also addressed in the October 2016 draft 
Directives on a Common Corporate Tax Base (“CCTB”) and a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (“CCCTB”). Both deal with tax mismatches arising from differences in entity classification 
between jurisdictions, but do not impose uniform entity classification norms nor uniform criteria for 
deciding whether and how an entity is “transparent”.  Article 62(1) of the CCTB states that where an 
“entity” (undefined) is treated as “transparent” in the Member State where it is “established”, a 
taxpayer holding an interest in that entity must include in its tax base its share of the income of that 
entity.  Article 62(2) treats transactions between such a taxpayer and that entity as, in effect, 
transactions between the taxpayer and third-party owners of that entity. “Transparent” and 
“established” are not defined for these purposes. Article 63 then provides that whether a non-EU 
“entity” is “transparent” is to be determined according to the law of the Member State of the 
taxpayer subject to CCTB.    
 
Under Article 27 of the CCCTB, the classification of a non-EU entity in which at least two group 
members hold an interest is to be agreed between the relevant Member States.  Classification is to be 
decided by the so-called “principal tax authority” if there is no agreement.  Article 31 then provides 
how income of a ”transparent” entity is to be apportioned to a member of the group (for CCCTB 
purposes) which holds an interest in that entity.   
 
6.8.7.3 The “Columbus Containers” case: CJEU decisions in the context of a “hybrid mismatch” 
 
The CJEU has to date only looked in detail at an entity classification mismatch in Columbus Container 
Services BVBA & Co v FInanzamt Bielefeld-Innenstadt (Case C-298/05) [2008] STC 2554.  That case 
involved a Belgian limited partnership which was taxed as a separate entity in Belgium, but at a low 
rate because it carried on business as a so-called “co-ordination centre”.  The interests in the Belgian 
limited partnership were held directly or indirectly by German-resident members of a family. Under 
                                                          
783 A “hybrid entity” is an entity or arrangement treated as a taxable entity in one jurisdiction but whose income 
or expenditure is treated as that of one or more other persons (i.e. it is “transparent”) in another jurisdiction.   
784 There is a carve-out for widely-owned, regulated “collective investment vehicles” which hold a diversified 
portfolio of securities (but not real estate assets). Article 9a can be a particular problem for those holding 
minority interests in the entity: their tax treatment may change unexpectedly, and adversely, because of a 
change in the make-up of other “associated” holders of interests in that entity.  By changing the tax 
classification of an entity because of a change in the holders of interests in that entity, Article 9a may also give 
rise to discrimination issues, under EU law or a double tax treaty: see Leopoldo Parada: “Hybrid Entity 
Mismatches and the International Trend of Matching Tax Outcomes: A Critical Approach” Intertax, Volume 46, 






the Belgium-Germany tax treaty, as it then stood, there was a German exemption for income of a 
German resident (in this case, its share of partnership profits) which were derived and taxed in 
Belgium.  This exemption gave rise to effective double non-taxation because of the very low rate of 
Belgian tax. To counteract this, Germany unilaterally overrode the tax treaty so that it only granted 
the German-resident partners a credit for the (low) Belgian tax on their share of partnership profits.  
The aim was to produce a German tax outcome similar to the outcome where a German-resident had 
a share in a low-taxed “controlled foreign company”. The German override was challenged on the 
basis that it was an unjustifiable restriction on the German partners’ freedom to establish in Belgium.  
Alternatively, it was an unjustifiable restriction on the free movement of capital.  
 
Advocate-General Mengozzi stressed that the entity classification mismatch between Germany and 
Belgium was not an issue in and of itself: Member States were not required to recognise for their own 
tax purposes the legal and tax status conferred by other Member States on entities carrying on 
business in those other States785.  However, he took the view786 that the German treaty override was 
a restriction on the “freedom of establishment” of a German-resident which could only be upheld if 
the underlying arrangements satisfied the “wholly artificial” standard required to justify a restriction 
on “freedom of establishment” based on tax avoidance. The Advocate-General referred in particular 
to the Cadbury Schweppes decision787 and was clearly unpersuaded that this standard could be met 
on the facts of this case. A particular concern was that the German override applied only to the extent 
that the income of the Belgian partnership was low-taxed passive income. Because the override was 
targeted in this way, the case was not simply one where an unfavourable outcome arose because of 
the co-existence of different tax legislation in two sovereign Member States.   
 
The CJEU also had no issue with the underlying entity classification mismatch.  However, perhaps 
surprisingly, it did not adopt788 the Advocate-General’s position on the four freedoms. The German 
override imposing double taxation relief by credit only, for low-taxed income of a non-German 
partnership, was not a restriction on either the freedom of establishment or the free movement of 
capital. All that mattered was that the profits of a German-resident from a non-German partnership 
were being taxed no less favourably than those of a German-resident from a (“transparent”) German 
partnership. That condition was met.  It was not relevant that Germany would not have taxed in the 
same way an investment by a German-resident in an entity which (by German standards) was not 
“transparent” (e.g. a Belgian company).  Member States were free to determine how to tax different 
                                                          
785 See [2008] STC at page 2563. The CJEU has also refused to apply the EU “abuse of law” doctrine to a 
deliberately created VAT mismatch: see HMRC v RBS Deutschland Holdings GmbH (Case C-277/09) [2010] ECR I-
13805. In that case, UK “input” VAT on car purchases was refundable to the German leasing subsidiary of a 
major UK bank, even though no “output” VAT was chargeable in Germany or the UK when that subsidiary leased 
those cars to a UK customer of the bank.  This VAT mismatch did not exploit entity classification differences but, 
rather, differences between the way in which the UK and Germany had transposed into domestic law the Sixth 
Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 (in particular, Article 5). The result was that the UK regarded the 
car lease as a “supply” of “services” outside the UK, while Germany regarded it as a “supply” of “goods” outside 
Germany. The CJEU focussed in particular on the fact that lessor and lessee were unaffiliated and that the 
transaction, even though structured to be tax-efficient, was not “an artificial arrangement that does not reflect 
economic reality and the sole aim of which is to obtain a tax advantage”.   
786 See [2008] STC at pages 2573-2585. 
787 [2006] STC 1908.  
788 See [2008] STC at pages 2590-2593. The CJEU’s stance has prompted at least one commentator to propose 
an EU Directive on Mutual Recognition of Entities within the EU. This would require mutual recognition, within 
the EU, of the classification of an entity in its “host” country: see Parada: Hybrid Entity Mismatches op. cit. at 






types of foreign “establishment” set up by their residents (including subsidiaries or branches) so long 
as such taxation was no less favourable than the taxation applying to an equivalent domestic 
“establishment”.    
 
The CJEU stressed789 that there was little harmonisation at EU level regarding methods of eliminating 
double taxation e.g. the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 2011/96/EU and the 1990 Arbitration Convention, 
with the latter now being largely overshadowed by the Directive on Tax Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms in the European Union 2017/1852/EU.  Outside these limited areas of harmonisation, 
Member States were free to conclude bilateral double tax treaties.  Generally, the CJEU had no 
jurisdiction to interpret those treaties or to rule on whether Member States had infringed the terms 
of those treaties (e.g. via a treaty override)790. 
                                                          
789 See [2008] STC at page 2591.  
790 The CJEU has, however, taken into account the OECD Model and Commentary when interpreting the Interest 
and Royalties Directive 2003/49/EC and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 2011/96/EC. Generally, the CJEU has 
regarded the four freedoms as not affecting how Member States relieve double taxation on their 
residents provided that a Member State taxes cross-border situations no less favourably than purely 
domestic situations. Whether such double taxation is relieved in whole or in part will then basically 
depend on the interaction between the separate domestic taxing rules of the relevant Member 
States. It is possible that a disparity between the rules of two sovereign Member States will lead to unrelieved double 
taxation. For example, in Kerckhaert and Morres v Belgian State (Case C-513/04) [2007] STC 1349, the 
CJEU did not object to Belgian taxation of its residents in respect of all dividends at a (lower) flat rate, 
with (usually) no credit for any non-Belgian tax on cross-border dividends. This approach, which led to 
unrelieved double taxation, was confirmed in Damseaux v Belgium (Case C-128/08) [2009] STC 2689, 
even though in that case, Belgium had overridden its own treaty-based obligation to give a foreign tax 
credit.  The approach was also confirmed in 2009 in Margarete Block v Finanzamt Kaufbeuren (Case C-
67/08), a German inheritance tax case where only a deduction, and not a credit was given for an 
equivalent tax in another Member State. More recently, the approach was confirmed in Daniel Levy, 
Carine Sebbag v Etat Belge (Case C-540/11), where it was held that there was no duty of EU loyalty to 
give double taxation relief. The CJEU in Gilly v Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin (Case C-
336/96) [1998] STC 1014 recognised that under Article 293 EC Treaty (repealed in 2009), Member 
States merely had an obligation to negotiate to remove double taxation. They were not required to 
guarantee such an outcome. Gilly also endorsed the allocation of taxing rights in respect of 
employment income in the then France-Germany tax treaty.  It even accepted as non-discriminatory a 
rule which preserved source state taxation of public sector employment income but only where the 
employee was a national of both contracting states, and not just a national of the non-source state. 
For a critique of the CJEU’s “hands off” approach regarding double taxation relief and the four 
freedoms, see Sandra Eden: “The Obstacles Faced by the European Court of Justice in Removing the 
‘Obstacles’ Faced by the Taxpayer: the Difficult Case of Double Taxation” [2010] BTR 610. Another 
commentator has suggested (!) that, because Article 293’s mere duty to negotiate has now been 
repealed, the CJEU should be able to apply internal market principles more vigorously to combat 
double taxation: see Eric C.C.M. Kemmeren: “Double Tax Conventions on Income and Capital and the 
EU: Past, Present and Future”. EC Tax Review 2012, Volume 21, Issue 3. In reality, this seems unlikely. 
By contrast, where non-residents are being taxed differently from residents of a given Member State, 
the four freedoms may well be relevant e.g. in relation to dividend withholding taxes.  It will then be 
important to take into account the effect of a relevant tax treaty when deciding if the non-resident is 







6.8.7.4 Other issues regarding the four freedoms and bilateral double tax treaties 
 
The CJEU has considered other issues regarding the impact of the four freedoms on bilateral double 
tax treaties between Member States.  Of particular importance in this regard is D v Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingen buitenland re Heerlen791 where the CJEU ruled that the 
EU freedoms do not prevent Member States from entering into bilateral tax treaties allocating tax 
jurisdiction on the basis of nationality and residence: such treaties are a legitimate method of 
achieving a balanced allocation of taxing power between states792. Because such treaties create an 
overall balance of reciprocal rights and obligations between the two states in relation to their 
respective residents, those rights cannot simply be invoked by a third-country EU-resident on the 
basis of the four freedoms. To do so would amount to cherry-picking parts of the overall treaty 
package in a manner which would undermine the bargain between the contracting states. In short, 
the four freedoms do not create a form of “most favoured nation” clause in tax treaties between 
Member States793.  D is a pragmatic response to long-expressed questions about whether double 
taxation treaties were inherently discriminatory against residents of Member States which were not 
party to the relevant treaty794.  Hence “bespoke” provisions regarding “transparent” entities such as 
Article 4(5) of the UK-France treaty cannot be invoked by a national of another Member State who is 
not resident in the UK or France for the purposes of that treaty.  Of course, with Article 3(1) of the 
MLI modifying many other UK treaties, this issue is likely to be less significant.  
                                                          
Bouanich v Skatteverket (Case C-265/04) [2008] STC 2020 and Denkavit Internationaal BV and another 
v Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie (Case C-170/05) [2007] STC 452. Quite 
exceptionally, in the tax treaty between Germany and Austria, the CJEU is designated as arbitrator: 
see Austria v. Germany (Case C-684/15).  
791 Case C-376/03 [2006] All ER (EC) 554. 
792 The CJEU noted in particular, that as per Gilly [1998] STC 1014, a difference in treatment between nationals 
of two contracting states because of a treaty-based allocation of taxing rights cannot amount to prohibited 
discrimination.  
793 In D, a German-resident subject to Dutch wealth tax claimed an exemption from that tax which the 
Netherlands granted to Belgian-residents in its treaty with Belgium, because of the broad definition of “personal 
allowances” in that treaty’s Non-Discrimination Article. There was no equivalent provision in the Dutch treaty 
with Germany. The CJEU rejected the claim, which was based on the free movement of capital.  
794 D has been followed by the CJEU in Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners (Case C-374/04)[2007] STC 404. That case raised issues regarding the freedom of establishment 
and the free movement of capital, in respect of UK-source dividends paid to non-UK-residents. The CJEU ruled 
that the freedoms were not infringed simply because the UK granted a refundable “tax credit” in respect of 
dividends paid to residents of Member State A with which it had concluded a treaty allowing such refunds, but 
made no equivalent provision for refunds to residents of Member State B with which it had agreed a different 
treaty. Residents of Member States A were not in the same position as residents of Member State B. 
Furthermore, the freedoms were not infringed where the UK treaty with Member State A contained a 
“limitation of benefits” clause.  This denied a refund to a corporate resident of Member State A which was 
controlled by residents of other jurisdictions whose treaties with the UK did not offer such refunds. The CJEU’s 
approach to a “limitation of benefits” clause in Test Claimants has been queried, not least because of an earlier 
conflicting decision of the CJEU in relation to a “limitation of benefits” clause in international aviation treaties. 
However, that earlier case did not relate to double tax treaties: it appears to be CJEU policy to encourage 
Member States to make such treaties without being excessively tied down by EU law in doing so. Test Claimants 
ensures that the tax treaty package cannot be indirectly exploited by persons resident in other jurisdictions 
whose treaties with the UK are less beneficial.  Hence it is a logical development of the thinking in D. For further 
discussion, see F. Debelva, D. Scornos, J. Van den Berghen and P. Van Braband: “LOB Clauses and EU-Law 







Despite the decision in D, residents of Member State C may sometimes be able to invoke the 
protection of a tax treaty between Member State A and another jurisdiction, B, in particular if the 
resident of Member State C has a “permanent establishment” in A.  In Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, 
Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt795, the German branch of a French 
company successfully relied on the “freedom of establishment” to invoke German double taxation 
relief under two treaties concluded by Germany with non-EU Member States. The CJEU stressed that, 
in neither case was the non-EU Member State being asked to give treaty relief to the French 
company.  The latter simply claimed double taxation relief in Germany on the basis that it had 
exercised its EU right of establishment there by setting up a German branch, rather than a subsidiary, 
and that under EU law, the form of its German establishment should not negatively affect its German 
tax treatment. German domestic law had in fact already been changed to reflect the outcome 
reached by the CJEU796.   
 
Had the relevant treaties in Saint-Gobain been between Germany and other Member States, the 
German “permanent establishment” of the French company should also have been entitled (despite 
D) to the same treaty benefits from the source state as that state would have granted to a German-
resident.  Otherwise the source state would be restricting the claimant’s freedom to establish in 
Germany through a branch rather than a subsidiary797.  Hence, in theory, the German “permanent 
establishment” could claim the benefit of any “bespoke” “transparent” entity clause in the relevant 
Germany treaty, even though there was no such clause in France’s treaty with the source jurisdiction.  
One commentator has suggested that source state treaty benefits in a Member State should only be 
available to a “permanent establishment” under Saint Gobain if that establishment’s profits are 
relieved from double taxation by exemption, not credit, in the residence jurisdiction of the company 
to which the establishment belongs798. The author is unconvinced.  The CJEU has not drawn such a 
distinction and in many cases (depending on relative tax rates), the exemption and credit methods 
produce an equivalent outcome. Moreover, if the residence jurisdiction of the company taxes its 
otherwise-exempt “permanent establishment” under a “controlled foreign company” regime (as 
permitted by the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive), that in effect replaces the exemption method with 
the credit method.  
 
6.8.7.5  Unjustified UK restrictions of the four freedoms in relation to “transparent” entities? 
 
6.8.7.5.1 Article 4(5)(e) of the UK-France treaty? 
 
                                                          
795 Case C-307/97 [2000] STC 854.  
796 On the strength of Saint Gobain, the UK enacted what is now Section 30 TIOPA which allows a UK branch or  
permanent establishment to claim UK double tax relief by way of foreign tax credit.  It does not matter whether 
the branch or permanent establishment belongs to a national of a Member State, so in that sense the UK went 
beyond the strict requirements of EU law.  
797 Suppose a treaty contains a “limitation of benefits” clause denying source state benefits to a resident of the 
other contracting state which is controlled by one or more third entities (whether or not within the EU). 
Presumably those benefits should also be denied to a “permanent establishment” in that other contracting 
state which belongs to such a third-country entity?  This seems consistent with Test Claimants in Class IV of the 
ACT Group Litigation discussed above, and maintains tax parity between a third-country-controlled branch and a 
third-country-controlled subsidiary. 






Article 4(5)(e) of the UK-France treaty may restrict freedom of establishment without justification: 
where a partnership is “established” in a third country, source state treaty benefits are only available 
under Article 4(5)(e) if both the state of the partnership’s establishment and the non-source 
contracting state regard it as “transparent”.  If the partnership happens to be established in another 
Member State which does not regard it as “transparent”, the effect of Article 4(5)(e) is to render 
investment via that State less attractive because treaty relief is denied under Article 4(5)(e).  There is 
no obvious justification for this, especially as the US-France treaty does not require the third state in 
this triangular scenario to regard the partnership as “transparent”.  Furthermore, ignoring this 
restrictive aspect of Article 4(5)(e) under EU law is proportionate because it does not upset the overall 
balance of the UK-France treaty. This situation is not simply one where two sovereign Member States 
happen to have differing views on whether an entity is “transparent”. So Columbus Container Services 
(see 6.8.7.3) is not relevant. Instead, the UK and France have negotiated an additional condition 
which expressly restricts treaty relief by reference to the entity classification rules of a third state.   
 
6.8.7.5.2 The UK tax treatment of a UK LLP? 
 
As already discussed in 2.7, a UK limited liability partnership is in fact a form of company which is 
normally treated for UK direct tax purposes as a partnership. In particular members of the UK LLP 
within the UK tax charge can claim a share of its losses which they may be able to set against other 
non-LLP-related income and gains. While there are major preconditions to claiming and using LLP 
losses in this way, the basic principle holds799. Suppose that X and Y are German-residents who wish 
to set up a joint venture to carry on a trade solely in the UK.  X and Y each have other UK income 
sources outside the joint venture.  If their joint venture takes the form of a UK LLP and it produces 
losses, then each may be able to set its share of those losses against its other UK income and at the 
same time enjoy the benefit of limited liability.  This ability to use losses while enjoying limited liability 
would not be available if X and Y chose to conduct their UK trade through a purpose-formed German 
GmbH with no other activity. The fiction which treats a UK LLP as a partnership for UK tax purposes 
does not apply to any other form of company, and in particular it does not apply to non-UK 
companies, whether or not formed within the EU.  The UK rules on loss utilisation may therefore 
make it more favourable to establish a UK joint venture through a UK LLP rather than through, say, a 
German GmbH, even though both are forms of private limited company and even though both are 
conducting business solely in the UK. This appears to be a restriction on the freedom of X and Y to 
establish in the UK which is very difficult to justify800.  
 
6.7.8.5.3 Imprecise nature of UK rules for classifying non-UK entities (but not UK entities) for tax 
purposes? 
 
                                                          
799 See fn 288 and the accompanying main text. 
800 A separate question is whether the special UK tax treatment of a UK LLP could be challenged as unlawful 
“state aid” within Article 107 of the TFEU. This question goes well beyond the scope of this thesis but the 
European Commission has considered state aid issues in relation to hybrid entities. Recently it enquired into 
Luxembourg rulings granted in favour of McDonald’s Europe, under which allocating income to a US branch of a 
Luxembourg company led to effective double non-taxation under the US-Luxembourg treaty. Ultimately, the 
Commission concluded that there was no misapplication of that treaty and hence no state aid: see Commission 
decision of 19 September 2018 on tax rulings SA 38945 (2015/C)(ex 2015/NN)(ex 2014/CP) granted by 







As already discussed (e.g. at 3.9), there is a major divergence in the UK approach to classifying UK and 
non-UK entities for tax purposes.  While the approach in relation to UK entities is fairly prescriptive, 
the “resemblance” approach in relation to non-UK entities is much more fluid, fact-sensitive and 
indeed confused.  
 
A UK taxpayer investing “outbound” in a non-UK entity may therefore have considerable problems, 
and a considerable administrative burden, working out its UK tax position accurately. This lack of 
clear, binding guidance and entity classification criteria can seriously impede UK-residents exercising 
their “freedom of establishment” or their right to the free movement of capital. The same is true in 
“inbound” situations e.g. if residents of other Member States seek to establish in the UK using non-UK 
entities. Not least with EU law in mind (see, for example, Futura Participations SA v Administration des 
Contributions (Case C-250/95) [1997] STC 1301) , there is surely a case for creating clearer, binding 
and less unnecessarily burdensome entity classification rules which apply to both UK and non-UK 
entities.   
 
6.8.7.6 Mechanics of claiming treaty relief  
 
Even if the members of an entity can claim treaty benefits from the jurisdiction where that entity’s 
income is sourced via a “transparent entity” provision, the question remains how to go about this.  
The jurisdiction of source may well prefer to give such relief only by refunding tax initially withheld, 
rather than by giving upfront relief from such withholding. This will have cashflow implications for 
members of that entity, which are less likely to arise where an entity is “opaque.” The issue is well 
explained in HMRC’s International Manual at INTM335530801: 
 
“…although HMRC is willing to entertain any application for relief at source from partnerships, it 
should be understood that we will be likely to give relief in this way chiefly where: 
 
 We are able to obtain satisfactory assurances about the membership of the partnership. 
 The number and type of partners is not such as to cause concern in the first place – for 
example, a small and fixed number of participators…… 
 
Where [we] conclude that relief at source cannot be authorised802, the partnership will only be 
able to obtain treaty benefits on behalf of its members by making a series of repayment claims and 
by providing supporting evidence about the identity of its partners with each claim.”  
   
6.8.8 Final thoughts 
 
It is not the purpose of a double tax treaty to impose on the two contracting states comprehensive 
rules on entity classification and related questions of tax “transparency”.  These concerns and 
questions are key structural issues at the heart of the domestic tax law of each state.  The thinking of 
judges and policy makers on these issues within each jurisdiction is likely to evolve over the life of a 
tax treaty, which makes it even harder for these issues to be effectively addressed in a treaty and for 
potential classification tensions between the two states to be eliminated.  The treaty merely aims to 
                                                          
801 https//:www.gov.uk/INTM335530. Accessed 13 January 2020.  
802 Upfront relief at source is given at HMRC’s discretion under Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) 






ensure that these issues, and the resulting mismatches between jurisdictions, do not give rise to 
double taxation or unintended double non-taxation, where income flows between the two states via 
an entity whose classification is not the same in each state. Despite their limitations, treaty provisions 
such as Article 1(8) of the 2001 UK-US treaty and Article 4(5) of the 2008 UK-France treaty have 
helped to refocus the UK treaty network more effectively on such questions since the Partnerships 
Report, although the impetus for such measures has not come mainly from the UK.   
 
Article 1(2) of the OECD Model, together with Article 3(1) of the MLI, should henceforth make that 
increased focus more widespread throughout the UK treaty network, even if Article 1(2) has its own 
weaknesses (see 6.1).  Further work is needed to spell out sensible answers to rather different entity 
classification/”transparency” challenges thrown up by the distributive articles in a treaty (such as 
Article 13 (Capital Gains) and Article 15(2) (Employment Income) of the OECD Model). 
 
Last but not least, ongoing developments in EU law (such as the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive) may yet 
have a greater impact on questions of entity classification and tax “transparency” than they have 
done to date. There are good grounds for thinking that aspects of the UK entity classification “rules” 













7. Entity classification issues in the USA and the Netherlands 
 
7.1    Introduction 
 
Other jurisdictions besides the UK have of course wrestled with how best to classify domestic and 
non-domestic entities for local tax purposes.  While no tow domestic tax systems are the same, it is 
instructive to see how other jurisdictions have addressed such questions.  In particular, such 
questions have been closely considered for US Federal tax purposes.  The first part of this Chapter 
therefore focusses on the USA and the distinctive approach to these questions which it has adopted, 
and which the UK tax authorities (among others) are known to dislike.  The second part of the Chapter 
looks at the contrasting approach of the Netherlands.  Here civil law thinking colours the classification 
of Dutch and non-Dutch entities for Dutch tax purposes, although the Dutch approach has a certain 
amount in common with the UK approach.  Neither the USA nor the Netherlands takes account of the 
tax treatment of a non-domestic entity in its home jurisdiction when classifying it for its own tax 
purposes.  
 







7.2.1  The US Federal tax rules803 on entity classification were significantly overhauled with effect from 
the start of 1997, including the introduction of the (in)famous “check-the-box” feature.  However, 
that feature is one aspect of a much greater whole. 
 
7.2.2  Trust or business entity? 
 
The first question to ask for US tax purposes is whether an organisation or arrangement is a 
standalone entity separate from its owners for Federal income tax purposes (rather than just being 
one which is disregarded).  Some arrangements (e.g. based on contract such as a Luxembourg “fonds 
commun de placement”) may be regarded as a separate entity for US tax purposes if the parties carry 
on a business and share profits (which they often do). This is so even though that arrangement would 
not otherwise give rise to a separate legal person for non-tax purposes or indeed for non-US tax 
purposes.  Other arrangements (e.g. cost sharing arrangements, the relationship of lessor and lessee) 
may be “nothings” for US tax purposes, although the courts fight shy of treating arrangements as a 
“nothing”, rather than a standalone entity.  Apparently, joint decision making is enough to find that a 
co-ownership arrangement is a business entity (and probably a partnership) for US tax purposes804.   
 
The question whether there is a separate entity, and if so, how many such entities, is determined 
under Federal tax law for Federal tax purposes, and not by reference to state law805.  There has been 
some dispute about the ongoing relevance of pre-1997 court decisions on whether a separate entity 
exists for US tax purposes806.  
 
If there is a separate entity, the next question is whether it is a trust or a “business entity”. The 
borderline between the two is not always easy to pin down.  In particular, a trust is for these purposes 
an arrangement created by will or “inter vivos” whereby trustees take title to property so as to 
protect or conserve it for beneficiaries.  Nevertheless, an arrangement which is a trust from a formal 
legal perspective can be treated807 instead as a separate business entity for Federal tax purposes. This 
is true in particular of business or commercial “trusts”, where the trustee’s role involves more than 
                                                          
803 Most states have adapted their rules, for state income tax purposes, to follow the Federal approach.  
804 See Blanchard: “The Tax Significance of Legal Personality: A US View”, New York University School of Law 
Spring 2015 Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance at pages 18-20. The commentator suggests that the US 
bias in favour of recognising entities, not “nothings”, ensures that more arrangements can be brought within 
the rules in Subchapter K (partnerships) of the Internal Revenue Code, which prevent artificial income shifting 
among entity members. In the UK, co-ownership arrangements can, and often do, fall short of partnership 
status, and are not regarded as an entity.  Rather, each participant is separately taxed on its share of income 
and gains.  There is therefore a mismatch here between the UK and US entity classification rules, with the UK 
concept of partnership for tax purposes being somewhat narrower than its US equivalent, although it extends to 
limited partnerships which are used for passive investment (notably in the area of venture capital).  Moreover, 
this mismatch between the UK and US rules does not stem from a “check-the-box” election.   
805 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-1(a)(1).  
806 For more detail, see the United States country report (authored by Anthony C. Infanti and Bernard Moens) in 
Volume 99b (2014) of the International Fiscal Association Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International, page 859 at 
pages 861-2.  In particular, there is dispute about the relative importance of two decisions of the US Supreme 
Court in the 1940’s: Moline Properties, Inc. v Commissioner 319 US 436 and Commissioner v Culbertson 337 US 
733. Moline set an especially low threshold for deciding that an entity or arrangement formed under state law 
was a separate entity for Federal tax purposes. In particular, all it required was a business purpose or activity.  






simply protecting or conserving a more or less static pool of trust assets808. A good example is the 
Massachusetts Business Trust, which is a popular vehicle for the type of US collective fund known as a 
“Regulated Investment Company” (see also 7.2.4.1).  It is usually regarded as a “business entity” 
(indeed a corporation) for US tax purposes. 
 
This Chapter will not discuss in detail the US tax treatment of trusts which are not “business entities”.  
However, the following paragraphs summarise the US Federal income tax treatment of trusts.  Under 
the “grantor trust” rules in Internal Revenue Code Part 1, Subpart E, the income and activities of such 
a trust can be attributed to the “grantor”. In short, such a trust is “looked through” in its entirety and 
the trust income and capital are regarded for Federal tax purposes as owned by the “grantor”.  This 
also applies for US estate and gift tax purposes. The “grantor” is a person having a specified degree of 
power over the trustee or the trust property (broadly, the equivalent of the “settlor” for UK tax 
purposes).  However, there are limits on the attribution of income and capital to the “grantor”, not 
least to ensure in most cases that items are attributed directly or indirectly to a US taxpayer809.   
 
The Internal Revenue Code also has a “simple trust” concept810. This is a trust other than a “grantor 
trust” where the trustee is required under the trust instrument to make current distributions of 
income and/or capital.  The trust is a separate taxable unit. However, the trust income which must be 
currently distributed retains its character, timing and source in the hands of the beneficiaries, 
whether or not distributed.  Therefore, there is a considerable degree of “tax transparency”, although 
less so than in relation to a “grantor trust”, because this type of trust is not “looked through” in the 
same way.  
 
The Internal Revenue Code recognises a third type of trust, the “complex trust”.  This too is a taxable 
unit but the trustee has significant discretion regarding trust distributions.  This type of trust is the 
least “transparent” of the three.  However, it can deduct income distributed to beneficiaries.  That 
distributed income retains its underlying character and source for US tax purposes in the hands of 
beneficiaries, although not always its timing. In particular, it is only attributed to beneficiaries in the 
tax year when the distribution is made (or required to be made).  To the extent that the income of 
such a trust is not distributed in a timely manner, it is taxed in the hands of the trustees.   
 
7.2.3 What kind of “business entity”? 
 
                                                          
808 The UK also treats certain trusts (“unit trusts”) as business entities (namely, companies) for the purposes of 
both corporation tax and capital gains tax, as discussed in 4.3.6.2.  However, whether a trust is a “unit trust” 
depends on the regulatory definition of a “unit trust scheme”.  This concept does not distinguish between those 
trusts which are more dynamically managed and those which are purely asset protection mechanisms: a trust 
which conducts a trade remains a trust for UK tax purposes, unless it is a “unit trust scheme”, which is not 
always the case.    
809 For further details on this and other forms of US trust, see fn 73 of “Some Reflections” op. cit. See also 
Brabazon op. cit. at pages 32-4, 39-40 and 43-8, in relation to “grantor trusts”. As is pointed out in Brabazon op. 
cit, at page 39, there are important exceptions (e.g. a simple revocable trust) where income can be attributed to 
a non-US grantor under the “grantor trust” rules. These exceptions provide tax planning opportunities. See fn 7 
for similar issues under the equivalent UK rules.  
810 See Brabazon op. cit. at pages 296-300 for further discussion of the US taxation of beneficiaries of non-
“grantor trusts”.  In some situations, time limits for making distributions need to be met if “transparent” 






Having identified a separate entity which is a “business entity” rather than a trust, one must decide 
whether it is created or organised “in the United States, or under the law of the United States or of 
any State” or in the District of Columbia811.  If so, that “business entity” will be “domestic”. In some 
cases, certain “non-domestic” entities may elect to be treated, or must be treated as “domestic” 
entities for Federal tax purposes812.  
 
As discussed below, “domestic” or “non-domestic” status has important consequences. However, an 
important general point to note is that the entity classification rules for Federal tax purposes apply to 
both “domestic” and “non-domestic” entities, even if the way in which they apply to each category 
may differ. The United States is therefore unusual (unlike, say, the UK and the Netherlands) in having 
a single, largely harmonised set of tax rules for classifying all entities and not just those which are 
“foreign”.  Part of the reason for this is that the United States itself is a Federal jurisdiction. It 
therefore requires overarching tax classification rules which can apply consistently to the various 
entities created under the separate commercial laws of each of the States.  
 
7.2.4  Classifying a “domestic” “business entity” 
 
7.2.4.1   “Domestic” “per se” corporations 
 
The US legislation provides an exhaustive list of “domestic” business entities which are always 
regarded as corporations (and hence tax-“opaque”) for Federal tax purposes. Such entities are often 
referred to as corporations “per se”.  In particular, this category includes any entity organised under a 
statute of one of the States which “describes or refers to the entity as incorporated or as a 
corporation, body corporate or body politic” or “as a joint-stock company or joint-stock 
association”813.   
 
Also regarded invariably as corporations for Federal tax purposes are insurance companies, state-
chartered banks and entities wholly owned by a state or non-US government814.  The same applies to 
other business entities which are specifically treated as corporations under the Internal Revenue 
Code, such as certain “publicly-traded partnerships”815.    
 
                                                          
811 But not created or organised in a US possession (e.g. Guam) or Puerto Rico.   
812 E.g. “stapled entities” (Section 269B(a)(1) Internal Revenue Code) and some “inverted corporations” created 
by transactions whereby a non-US corporation acquires a US corporation (Section 7874(b) Internal Revenue 
Code).   
813 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-(2)(b)(1),(3).  
814 Treas. Reg. 301-7701-2(b)(4)-(6).  State-chartered banks for this purpose are those whose deposits are 
insured by the Federal Government.   
815 Section 7704 Internal Revenue Code. These must have interests which are traded on an established 
securities market or are readily tradeable on a secondary market. Section 7704 does not impose corporate 
status where the publicly-traded partnership receives predominantly passive income (e.g. interest, dividends or 
royalties). This has enabled certain private equity funds to list interests in entities qualifying as partnerships for 
US tax purposes without being caught by Section 7704. The logic of Section 7704 is open to question: why 
should a partnership always be treated as a corporation simply and solely because it sources capital in public 






The basis for a number of these categories of “per se” corporation is the Internal Revenue Code itself, 
so they cannot readily be altered by Treasury Regulations.  Nevertheless it is not easy to justify such 
blanket exclusions from the elective part of the US entity classification regime816. 
 
It should be added that the Internal Revenue Code, in Subchapter S, has long permitted certain small, 
privately-held US corporations to elect for “tax-transparent” treatment as so-called “S Corporations”.  
A number of detailed conditions must be met before a corporation is eligible to make such an 
election. With limited exceptions, a S Corporation pays no US tax on its income817. 
 
The Internal Revenue Code also contains bespoke and largely “pass-through” taxation regimes for 
certain corporations engaged in specified activities e.g. Regulated Investment Companies (“RICs”) and 
Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (“REMICs”).  These special regimes are unaffected by the 
general rules on elective entity classification818.  In essence, they are bespoke tax regimes for 
collective investment vehicles, whose economic rationale would be undermined if the entity itself 
were subject to significant taxation on its profits.   
 
7.2.4.2   “Domestic” “eligible entities” 
 
If a “business entity” is domestic and not a “per se” corporation, then it will be an “eligible entity”. In 
particular, this gives it scope (discussed below) to elect its US tax classification. The most important 
type of “domestic” “eligible entity” is the “limited liability company” or “LLC”.  Almost all states of the 
US (starting with Wyoming in 1977) have enacted legislation permitting the creation of these hybrid 
limited liability entities which combine the legal personality and limited liability characteristics of a 
corporation with the internal organisational flexibility of a partnership. The closest analogue to a 
limited liability company in UK law is the UK LLP (which is of course an incorporated entity without 
share capital which is deemed to be a partnership for certain tax purposes)819.  In particular, LLC 
members’ interests usually do not take the form of share capital820.  
 
“Domestic” “eligible entities” also include limited partnerships (“LPs”), limited liability partnerships 
(“LLPs”) and limited liability limited partnerships (“LLLPs”) formed under the laws of the various 
states.  LPs, LLPs, LLLPs and LLCs are now largely interchangeable for US tax and non-tax purposes, 
although none of a LLC’s members has to have unlimited liability, even nominally.  Classically, a LP had 
to have at least one general partner with unlimited liability for the obligations of that partnership, 
                                                          
816 For a detailed discussion of this, see Heather M. Field “Checking in on Check–the-Box” 42 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 451 
(2009) http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol42/iss2/4 (hereafter “Field”) at pages 505-520. 
817 Questions have been asked about the ongoing need for S Corporation status now that limited liability 
companies (see 7.2.4.2) can readily be set up as “tax-transparent” partnerships or disregarded entities for US 
tax purposes.  However, S Corporations remain quite widespread. The US tax treatment of a S Corporation is 
similar, but not identical, to a partnership or a disregarded entity.   
818 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-1(b) and – 2(a).  
819 The author has been told in the past by leading US tax advisers that the LLC concept is also similar to the 
entity known as a “limitada” in, for example, Spain and Latin America. 
820 This was true for example of the LLC in Anson v HMRC [2015] STC 1777: see 2.14. HMRC consider that it is 
possible for interests in a Delaware LLC in particular to be structured as “ordinary share capital” for UK tax 
purposes: see 2.14.6. When tracing a UK group (e.g. for corporation tax, stamp duty and SDLT purposes) via an 
intermediate LLC, it will be very important to demonstrate that the LLC has “ordinary share capital” for UK tax 
purposes.  Otherwise tracing will not be possible. Nevertheless, the idea of members’ interests taking the form 






although in practice that partner’s exposure could be contained. However, under the 2001 Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act, limited liability is apparently extended to all partners of a LP, whether or not 
they take part in management821.   
 
LLPs and LLLPs bear an even closer resemblance to LLCs, not least because all members benefit from 
limited liability even if they take part in firm management.  What limited liability means in this regard 
will vary from state to state. For example, so-called “first generation” LLPs only protect innocent 
partners from liability for malpractice of their fellow partners.  This is true of New York and California, 
which also limit LLP structures to professional firms. However, “second generation” LLPs go further 
and provide partners with a “full shield”, not only from the malpractice of other partners but also 
from debts arising in the ordinary course of business.  Delaware is such a “full shield” state although a 
Delaware LLP does not limit a member’s liability for negligence, unlike a Delaware LLC.  
 
A LLLP is a form of limited partnership which provides all partners with limited liability, not only for 
each other other’s wrongdoing but also for debts arising in the ordinary course of business. Like the 
LLP, it continues the trend of limiting the liability of partners who take part in firm management822.  
 
 A “domestic” “eligible entity” with more than one member can elect to be treated as a partnership or 
a corporation for US tax purposes823.  If no election is made, then that entity is classified as a 
partnership824, which means that it remains an entity for US tax purposes and is subject to Subchapter 
K of the Internal Revenue Code.  A “domestic” “eligible entity” with a single member can elect to be 
treated as a corporation or to be disregarded for US tax purposes825.  If no election is made, then the 
entity is simply disregarded826.  Such disregarded entities are treated as a sole proprietorship (if the 
single member is an individual) or as a mere branch or division of the member (if the latter is an 
entity)827.  This capacity to disregard altogether a single-member entity is a highly distinctive feature 
of the US entity classification rules. It has been heavily used to create classification mismatches with 
the tax laws of other jurisdictions. Where it applies, that entity’s income and assets are treated as 
those of its member, and transactions between the entity and the member are ignored. 
 
Entity classification elections are made on IRS Form 8832.  This is effective on the date filed unless a 
different effective date is specified. In any case, the effective date cannot be more than 75 days’ prior 
to the filing date nor more than twelve months after it828.  An entity which files an election to change 
its existing classification cannot normally file another election changing its tax classification for sixty 
months following the effective date of that earlier election829.  
                                                          
821 See Blanchard, “The Tax Significance of Legal Personality: A US View” op. cit. at page 9.  
822 For further detail, see Blanchard, “The Tax Significance of Legal Personality: A US View” op. cit. at pages 9-11. 
New York and California prohibit the LLLP form.  
823 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(a).  
824 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i).  
825 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(a). 
826 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-3(b)(1)(iii).  
827 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(a).  
828 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iii). 
829 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iv). This 60-month rule does not apply to an election which is effective from the 
date of an entity’s formation.  Nor does it apply where the election is to change the entity’s default 
classification. Equally, it does not apply to a transferee entity to which the business of another entity is 
transferred.  The IRS also has discretion, which it has exercised by private letter ruling, to relax the 60-month 







7.2.5   Classifying a “non-domestic” “business entity” 
 
7.2.5.1   “Non-domestic” “per se” corporations 
 
There is a list which specifies by country a number of types of non-US legal entity which are invariably 
corporations for US Federal tax purposes830.  These tend to be corporate entities in major non-US 
jurisdictions which can (although not necessarily do) offer their securities to the public e.g. the UK 
public limited company, the French societe anonyme, the German Aktiengesellschaft and the Dutch 
NV. Canada enjoys a slightly special status: although Canadian corporations are listed as “per se” 
corporations, this does not apply to any Canadian company all of whose members have unlimited 
liability (e.g. a Nova Scotia unlimited liability corporation831).  In all cases, the non-US tax treatment of 
the entity is irrelevant when classifying it. 
 
Importantly, this “per se” list for non-US entities leaves out a large number of corporate bodies 
(notably, many corporate bodies formed in tax havens), unlike the corresponding “per se” rules for 
“domestic” entities: see 7.2.4.1.    
 
On the other hand, it is strange that this list includes non-US corporate entities which could offer their 
securities to the public, whether or not they actually do. This differs from the way in which the 
“publicly-traded partnership” rule operates: see 7.2.4.1. 
 
7.2.5.2 “Non-domestic” “eligible entities” 
 
Non-domestic business entities which are not “per se” corporations are “eligible entities” which can 
elect their US tax classification in much the same way as “domestic” “eligible entities”: see 7.2.4.2.  
The default classifications of “non-domestic” entities are, however, different.  If an entity with more 
than one member does not elect its classification, then it will be a corporation if all its members have 
limited liability and a partnership if at least one member lacks limited liability832.   If a single-member 
entity does not elect its classification, then it will be a corporation if the single member has limited 
liability and disregarded if it does not833.  For these purposes, “a member of a foreign eligible entity 
has limited liability if the member has no personal liability for the debts of or claims against the entity 
by reason of being a member”834.  
 
There is some evidence of non-US entities electing in large numbers to be disregarded for US tax 
purposes835.  This may be explained in part by the different default entity classification rules which 
                                                          
830 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(b)(8).  
831 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(b)(8)(ii)(A)(1).  Of course the UK also has a form of unlimited liability company.  
However, this is not a “per se” corporation because only a UK public limited company is a “per se” corporation 
and a UK unlimited company cannot, by definition, be a public limited company.   
832 Treas. Reg. 301-7701-3(b)(2)(i)(A)-(B).  
833 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii).  
834 Treas. Reg. 301.701-3(b)(2)(ii). This rule determines whether there is unlimited liability purely by reference to 
the governing law and constitutional documents under which the entity is organised.  It does not take account 
of the actual economic capacity of an entity member to make good that entity’s loss.  So the “unlimited liability” 
condition can be met even if the entity with unlimited liability is, say, a purpose-formed company with very low 
net worth (so that in substance, its unlimited liability does not amount to much).  






apply to non-US entities. Under these, there are more cases where an actual election is needed to 
secure disregarded entity status. 
 
The US tax classification of a “non-domestic” entity is only relevant when it affects the liability of any 
person for US Federal tax or information-reporting purposes836.  However, this limitation is not that 
generous given the breath of US information reporting obligations (e.g. under FATCA – see fn 650).  
 
7.2.6  Implications of the US entity classification rules 
 
7.2.6.1  Building on the effective choice available under the pre-1997 rules 
 
There is a misconception that the US Federal tax rules for entity classification are entirely elective. 
This is not so: the automatic “opaque” status of domestically-incorporated US business entities is 
similar to the way in which the UK characterises entities incorporated under UK domestic law (except 
UK EEIGs and the misleadingly-named UK LLP).  Furthermore, the US rules mandate “opaque” status 
for a wide range of non-US entities.  It is striking that the US rules do not mandate “opaque” status for 
many more non-US incorporated entities.  This includes, for example, UK private limited companies, 
the French Sarl, the Dutch BV, the German GmbH and a number of entities incorporated in well-
known tax havens.  All US-incorporated entities are invariably “opaque”, assuming that they are not S 
corporations.  Hence there is an asymmetry in the treatment of US and non-US incorporated entities.  
To some extent, this asymmetry may be offset by the widespread availability within the US of LLCs.  
These are not regarded as “incorporated” under state law.  Hence they are not automatically treated 
as “opaque”.  
 
The US is unusual in allowing taxpayers an administratively simple choice whether other “eligible 
entities” (US and non-US) should be treated as transparent for Federal tax purposes. The practical 
benefits of this choice are magnified by the widespread availability within the US of the limited 
liability company.  This form of “eligible entity” offers an attractive combination of full legal 
personality, perpetual succession and member limited liability as well as great constitutional 
flexibility.  Commercially, it is a halfway house between a “classic” partnership (including a Scottish 
partnership) and a corporation. Taxwise, it can decide whether it should be taxed as a corporation, a 
partnership or (if it has a single member) a disregarded entity.  It is no surprise that so many entity 
classification elections relate to LLCs.  
 
The most novel substantive effect of this elective regime is the ability to “disregard” single-member 
“eligible entities”.  Whereas a partnership is not a “nothing” for Federal tax purposes837, a disregarded 
                                                          
836 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-3(d)(1)(i).   
837 In some cases Federal tax law will treat a partnership simply as an aggregate of its members’ interests and 
activities, while in other situations, it will regard it as an entity.  For example, a US partnership which holds 
shares in a non-US corporation can itself be a “10% US shareholder” in that corporation when deciding if the 
latter is within the US controlled foreign corporation rules (“Subpart F”).  That partnership can still be a “10% US 
shareholder” even if its partners are not US persons at all or they include US persons with less than a 10% 
partnership share on a “lookthrough” basis.  However, the entity theory only goes so far: the US partnership 
itself is not subject to US tax on a Subpart F inclusion.  Only its US-taxpaying partners are. This approach does 
not apply to non-US partnerships.  This gives scope for sidestepping Subpart F by using a non-US partnership. 
The rules in this area are being modified in a manner which may assist US taxpayers, not least because of 






single-member entity basically is: the single member is regarded, for most tax purposes, as directly 
owning the assets, and assuming the liabilities of that entity838. This is quite radical structural “tax 
transparency”.  It does not just provide839 that the entity’s profits are to be taxed solely at member 
level, as they arise and by reference to that member’s fiscal characteristics.  In particular, the 
“disregard” can affect parties other than the single member and the “disregarded” entity.  For 
example, if the single member of a disregarded non-US entity is a US corporation and the disregarded 
entity owns another US corporation, the two US corporations can form a “consolidated group” for US 
tax purposes……precisely because the intermediate non-US entity is disregarded.      
 
The 1997 rules often build on features existing pre-1997.  The elective regime for “eligible entities” 
was a deliberate decision to make more readily accessible the benefit of similar rules which were 
already giving taxpayers considerable choice over US tax classification.  
 
Pre-1997, there were also business entities which were corporations per se, although there was no 
equivalent of the current “per se” list for non-US entities. Pre-1997, it was also increasingly possible 
for many other business entities (US ones, such as LLCs, and non-US ones) to secure partnership 
treatment for US tax purposes if they failed to meet two out of four prescribed corporate 
characteristics. The four characteristics were fairly formalistic and each had equal weight.  They were, 
famously, (i) limited liability (i.e. no member was liable without limit for the debts of the entity); (ii) 
free transferability of members' interests (i.e. substantially all of the ownership interests – meaning all 
legal rights in the entity of the owner - were transferable without the consent of the other members); 
(iii) centralised management (i.e. the entity was managed by one or more persons similar to a board 
of directors, and not by the members themselves) and (iv) continuity of life (i.e. the entity’s existence 
did not end because of the resignation, bankruptcy, etc of any member) . The four factors were set 
out in the then Treasury Regulations840 which distilled several decisions in which the US courts had 
                                                          
Proposed Regulations on the GILTI and Subpart F Treatment of Domestic Partnerships”. 24 June 2019. 
www.sullcrom.com. GILTI is discussed in 7.2.6.2.3. 
838 The single-member entity may not be a “nothing” as regards obligations to collect third-party tax liabilities 
e.g. it must operate employee payroll withholding.  
839 As is the case with a partnership. 
840 The so-called “Kintner Regulations”: Treasury Decision 6503: Treas. Reg. 301.7701-1 to -11 (1960).  These 
were a legislative response to Morrissey v Commissioner (1935) 296 US 344 and especially United States v 
Kintner 216 F. 2d 418 (9th Circuit 1954). Technically, the “Kintner Regulations” set out six factors but the first 
two (“associates” and “an objective to carry on a business and divide the gains therefrom”) were common to all 
“business entities”. These two factors were mainly relevant in deciding whether an entity was a “business 
entity” or a trust.  Furthermore, the “Kintner Regulations” did not adopt a further factor mentioned in Morrissey 
v Commissioner: namely, the ability of the entity to hold title to property, no doubt because almost all entities 
(including partnerships) in the US can own property in their own name i.e. they have legal personality.  For a 
recent UK discussion of the pre-1997 US entity classification regime (and especially the “continuity of life” 
factor), see Montagu: Anson and Entity Classification Revisited op. cit., in particular at pages 471-6.  
Interestingly, the factors set out in the “Kintner Regulations” live on elsewhere.  In particular, Germany has 
adopted these factors for the purposes of classifying non-German entities only and has added four further 
factors of its own: whether a formal resolution by the entity’s members is needed to distribute profits; whether 
entity members must make capital contributions; whether profit allocation is based strictly on member’s capital 
contributions; and whether creating the entity requires a formal registration process. In Germany, “continuity of 
life” is a lesser factor and is (sensibly) applied on the basis of whether an entity can in practice (rather than 
theory) be dissolved when a specified contingency occurs.  For further detail on the German rules, see Dr Wolf 
Wassermeyer: “Tax Classification of Foreign Legal Entities (‘Comparability Test’)” at page 1 of “Flick Gocke 
Schaumburg: Cross-Border Investments with Germany - Tax, Legal and Accounting – In honour of Detlev J. Piltz”. 






developed the four factors. No one factor was decisive, not even continuity of life841. Separate legal 
personality was not a factor at all: almost all US partnership vehicles have legal personality anyway so 
the presence or absence of legal personality could not sensibly be a differentiating factor. For historic 
reasons, three out of four factors had to be present to achieve corporation status842. An entity seeking 
partnership status therefore had to lack at least two factors. For example, a UK unlimited liability 
company achieved partnership status for US tax purposes by limiting the transferability of its shares. 
In short, it lacked limited liability and free transferability of its members' interests.  
 
Well-advised and well-resourced taxpayers could therefore structure entities so as to give themselves 
effective choice pre-1997 over the US tax characterisation of those entities. This gave them an unfair 
advantage, especially in relation to non-US “eligible entities”843.  The simpler, more explicitly elective 
rules adopted in 1997 made such choice available to the many, not the few, even though that choice 
had existed for some pre-1997.  It also created simplicity and certainty for taxpayers, as well as being 
simpler and less resource-intensive for the IRS to administer.   
 
Furthermore, when introducing the new regime in 1997, the US Treasury highlighted another reason 
for turning its back on the “four factor” test which focussed on structural features of business entities 
and whether they “resembled” a partnership or a corporation. As it noted, “many states have revised 
their statutes to provide that partnerships and other unincorporated organisations may possess 
characteristics that traditionally have been associated with corporations, thereby narrowing 
considerably the traditional distinctions between corporations and partnerships under local law 
[emphasis added]”844.  This narrowing has not been confined to the USA.  By introducing the UK LLP, 
the UK has travelled the same route, although in a slightly different way.  
 
The new rules of course made clear that a single-member entity could be disregarded, and treated for 
US tax purposes as a branch/sole proprietorship of the single member.  Even this more radical change 
was based to some extent on pre-1997 authority845.  
                                                          
841 The decision to avoid a single conclusive criterion was sensible, given the wide range of legal systems 
regulating business entities, both within and outside the US. In any case, as one commentator has pointed out: 
“continuity of life had long since been reduced to a formalism, as most state laws allow the remaining partners 
to reconstitute the partnership and continue in existence as though nothing had happened”: Kimberly 
Blanchard: “The Significance of Legal Personality for US Tax Purposes”: Business Entities March/April 2016 page 
5 at page 11 (hereafter “Blanchard: Significance”).  
842 It was made harder to achieve corporation status because, inter alia, in 1960, corporations enjoyed certain 
tax advantages, such as lower tax rates than individuals and the opportunity to set up a qualified pension plan.  
843 In relation to such entities, a detailed understanding of the relevant non-US law governing the entity would 
be necessary. In order to achieve that, detailed local law advice would of course be required and often a 
language barrier had to be dealt with.  
844 US Treasury, 26 CFR Pt 301 [PS-43-95] RIN 1545-AT91 “Simplification of Entity Classification Rules”, cited in 
Montagu op. cit. at page 475. As one recent commentator has put it: “US tax law, having seen the writing on the 
wall, has abandoned any conceit that limited liability matters to entity classification for tax purposes, given the 
reality that almost any type of US entity can today afford almost complete protection from liability”: Blanchard: 
Significance op. cit. at page 8.  Blanchard goes on to describe how, under current US partnership law (in 
particular, Section 303 of the 2001 Uniform Limited Partnership Act), all partners in a US limited liability 
partnership or a limited liability limited partnership “benefit from a full, status-based liability shield….” This is 
not confined to liability arising from the bad acts of other partners.  It also applies to debts arising in the 
ordinary course of partnership business. Delaware is a prime example of a state providing such a full-shield 
limitation, other than for liability arising from a partner’s own negligence.     
845 See Michael L. Schler. “Initial Thoughts on the Proposed ‘Check The Box’ Regulations’. May 1996 unpublished 







7.2.6.2 Lessons from the US experiment 
 
7.2.6.2.1 How much US tax has been avoided? 
 
As anticipated very early on, the elective regime for “eligible entities” has been widely used in US tax 
planning, especially cross-border planning. The US Treasury has from time to time introduced rule 
changes to combat less welcome side-effects of increased planning based on entity classification.  
 
It has been heavily debated846 to what extent the new regime has led in practice to significant 
additional US tax avoidance, given the ability to “de facto” choose entity classification under the pre-
1997 rules.  Of course one effect of the new rules is to enable a wider variety of taxpayers to take 
advantage of the entity classification choices which were previously available in practice only to well-
advised and well-resourced taxpayers.  So for that reason alone, the revised rules have probably 
facilitated avoidance.  Furthermore, the post-1996 regime clearly allows a single-member “eligible 
entity” to be disregarded.  Hence the use of disregarded entities in US tax planning has proliferated, 
especially where planning relates to the US “controlled foreign corporation” rules in Subpart F and to 
the foreign tax credit rules.   
 
It is useful to consider for these purposes the US Federal tax treatment of a non-US person investing 
in the US via a partnership rather than a corporation (although for reasons given below, investment in 
the US directly via a partnership is in practice unlikely).   
 
An inbound investor into the US which elects to invest via a US LLC, treated as a partnership, rather 
than a US corporation, will be fully taxable in the US on the net “effectively connected income” 
(distributed or undistributed) which it derives by carrying on a US trade or business via the LLC. So 
investing via the LLC, rather than a US corporation, does not remove the investor's US tax liability. If 
the investor is a corporation by US standards, it will be taxed at regular US corporate income tax rates 
on the net income from its US trade or business. If it is an individual, it will be taxed at progressive US 
personal income tax rates on that net income. Furthermore, in certain cases involving non-US 
corporate investors, the US branch tax will apply847. Where it applies, it will offset (at least in part) any 
saving of US dividend withholding tax which a non-US corporate investor might otherwise achieve by 
investing in the US through a branch or a transparent entity, rather than through a US corporation.  
However, if treaty relief is taken into account, the rate of any branch tax on an investment in a LLC 
may well be lower than the rate of US dividend withholding tax on a shareholding of equivalent 
relative size in a US corporation. This is especially true if the investor is a partner with a minority 
interest in a LLC (rather than being an equivalent minority shareholder in a US corporation)848. 
                                                          
846 See Field op. cit. at pages 486-495. 
847 This is an additional tax charge of up to 30% under Section 884 Internal Revenue Code, where a non-US 
person invests in the US via a branch. It taxes a so-called “dividend equivalent amount” i.e. the after-tax amount 
of certain US-taxable income of the branch which is not treated as reinvested in a US trade or business. There 
are of course no actual dividends because a branch, unlike a subsidiary, does not pay dividends. It is US tax 
policy to amend the “Non-Discrimination” Article in its treaties so as to protect its right to impose the branch 
tax: see for example Article 25(6) of the 2001 UK-US treaty. 
848 US dividend withholding tax on, say, a less-than-10% shareholding in a US corporation will probably not be 
less than 15%, even with the benefit of treaty relief. By contrast, if the investor has a less-than-10% interest in a 
US partnership, that interest by itself will be regarded as the separate US branch of that particular investor.  







A sale of shares by a non-US investor in a US corporation will not normally give rise to US tax on any 
gain849.  The same is not true of a sale by a non-US partner of an interest in a US LLC taxed as a 
partnership.  In 2017, the United States Tax Court in Grecian Magnesite Mining850 decided that a sale 
by a non-US investor of an interest in a US LLC (taxed as a partnership) did not automatically amount 
to a disposal of a corresponding share of each of the underlying assets of the LLC.  The same result 
would not have been reached if the investor had been the sole member of a US LLC which was simply 
disregarded, rather than treated as a partnership. This decision highlights how for US tax purposes, a 
partnership (unlike a disregarded entity) is not a tax “nothing”. Indeed, in some situations, it will be 
treated as an entity, while in others, it will be regarded as an aggregate of its members. 
 
The IRS unsuccessfully appealed the Tax Court’s decision851. However, the US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
2017 has reversed the effect of Grecian Magnesite Mining for future years852.  An equivalent effect 
can still be secured if the non-US investor indirectly invests in the US LLC through a US “blocker” 
corporation.  This is typically a purpose-formed corporation (by US standards) whose sole asset would 
be the LLC interest. The non-US investor would then exit by selling an interest in the “blocker”, rather 
than selling directly the underlying LLC interest. There are other benefits anyway from using a US 
“blocker” in this way. In particular, the non-US investor need not file a US tax return and branch tax is 
avoided853.  
 
Hence, one should not overstate the tax difference between investing in the US via a US LLC treated 
as a partnership, rather than via a US corporation. Aside from the fact that direct investment into the 
US via a partnership is rare, each case will be fact-sensitive. In this regard, an important recent 
                                                          
correspond to the lower rates of US dividend withholding tax which would be permitted under a treaty if that 
corporate investor had a substantial non-portfolio shareholding, rather than a less-than-10% shareholding, in a 
US corporation.     
849 Unless the US corporation is US real estate-“rich”: a US Real Property Holding Corporation. 
850 See fn 487.  
851 See fn 487. 
852 The 2017 Act in effect codifies Revenue Ruling 91-32 (which the Tax Court and the US Court of Appeals 
(Washington, D.C. Circuit) declined to follow) in a new Section 864(c)(8) Internal Revenue Code 1986 (as 
amended). Proposed Treasury Regulations were issued in December 2018 to flesh out Section 864(c)(8). A new 
Section 1446(f) Internal Revenue Code 1986 (as amended) imposes a 10% withholding obligation on a 
transferee of a partnership interest, reinforcing Section 864(c)(8). Gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a 
partnership interest by a non-US partner will henceforth be US-taxable “effectively connected income”, to the 
extent that the non-US investor would have had effectively connected income or loss if the partnership had sold 
all of its underlying assets for cash at fair market value when the sale or exchange of the partnership interest 
took place. In short, Section 864(c)(8) does not treat the partnership interest as a separate “indivisible capital 
asset” but looks through to the underlying partnership assets. Where applicable, these new rules supersede 
existing rules which treat a sale or exchange of a partnership interest as triggering “effectively connected” 
income to the extent of the partnership’s underlying US real property assets.  For a discussion of Section 
864(c)(8) and the Proposed Regulations, see “Treasury adds color to Grecian Repeal – Proposed Regulations 
implement new Section 864(c)(8) for Sale of Partnership Interests by Foreign Partners”: Legal Update dated 8 
January 2019 at www.mayerbrown.com. (accessed 6 July 2020). A further set of Proposed Regulations was 
published in 2019 clarifying how withholding under the new Section 1446(f) will apply. This will depend on 
whether or not an interest in a “publicly-traded” partnership is being transferred: see “IRS Issues Proposed 
Regulations regarding Withholding under Section 1446(f)”: Legal Update dated 6 June 2019 at 
www.mayerbrown.com. (accessed 6 July 2020).  
853 See Kimberly S. Blanchard: “What is the Government’s Appeal in ‘Grecian’ About?” Tax Management 






development is the reduction to 21% (from 35%) of the headline Federal corporate income tax rate 
for US corporations in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 2017854. For a US individual investing in a US 
corporation, the new rate means that the effective tax rate on distributed corporate profits is 36.8% 
(21% at the level of the corporation with a further 20%, in most cases, on the after-tax profits of the 
corporation, but only if they are distributed)855.  This compares with a maximum 37%856 if the same 
underlying income is earned through a US partnership (in which case it will be taxed at that rate 
whether or not distributed)857.  
 
If the US corporation or partnership in turn owns an interest in an entity which is a controlled foreign 
corporation for US tax purposes, then the individual would be well-advised to invest in a US 
corporation rather than a US partnership, in order to avoid penal tax effects described in 7.2.6.2.3-4.  
 
7.2.6.2.2 Use of “check-the-box” elections as part of cross-border tax planning by multinationals 
 
Much "check-the-box" tax planning has historically occurred when US taxpayers invest outside the US. 
A key objective has been to minimise the extent to which profits from the US taxpayer's non-US 
operations were subject to US tax before being physically repatriated to the US, under the various US 
anti-deferral regimes (and especially "Subpart F", the US controlled foreign corporation rules).  Where 
applicable, Subpart F taxes undistributed profit of a “controlled foreign corporation” at regular US 
corporate income tax rates in the hands of certain US persons with an interest in that corporation 
(“10% US shareholders)858. Taxpayers often made elections to disregard single-member non-US 
affiliates which were directly owned by a single non-US subholding entity, while a separate election 
was made to treat the latter as a corporation for US tax purposes. This structure effectively treated 
those disregarded affiliates as branches of the non-US subholding entity.  Hence income flows 
(especially interest, dividends and royalties) from those lower-tier affiliates, to that subholding entity, 
would be disregarded for Subpart F purposes.  
 
There was de facto acceptance of this avoidance of Subpart F by the US tax authorities. Before the 
2017 Act, US multinationals long complained that the high headline US corporate income tax rate 
(35%), coupled with Subpart F, eroded their ability to compete with more favourably taxed non-US 
competitors. "Check-the-box" planning of the kind described above reduced the impact of Subpart F 
on non-repatriated earnings from outside the US. Hence it was a self-help solution to the concerns 
                                                          
854 The formal title of this Act is “An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to Titles II and V of the concurrent 
resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018, H.R. 1, 115th Congress (2017)”. The reduction in the headline 
corporate income tax rate is accompanied by important tax base-widening measures: in particular, a cap on the 
overall amount of deductible interest, and extensions to the controlled foreign corporation rules (notably GILTI 
– see 7.2.6.2.3 below). These base-widening measures can also apply to individual taxpayers.  Overall they may 
well push the effective tax rate above the new headline rate.   
855 If the investor were non-US, that 20% tax rate on distributions would rise to 30%, subject to treaty relief.  
There could also be tax on that distribution in the investor’s home jurisdiction.   
856 In some cases, the rate in respect of distributed and undistributed income earned through a partnership can 
be reduced to 29.6% because of the Pass-Thru Deduction.  However, this is not available in respect of income 
from partnerships providing law or accounting services, or engaging in investing or financial trading.  
Furthermore, the Pass-Thru Deduction is scheduled to end after 2025.   
857 If the investor were non-US, one would also have to take into account “branch tax” (up to 30%, subject to 
treaty relief) as well as any tax in the investor’s home jurisdiction, presumably with some relief for US tax. 
858 Subpart F applies in particular to “passive” income of a controlled foreign corporation (or, to give it its more 






raised by US multinationals. It led to them accumulating low-taxed cash in offshore subsidiaries which 
were “controlled foreign corporations”. 
 
Furthermore, this structuring created significant opportunities for eroding the non-US tax liabilities of 
the lower-tier non-US affiliates which were directly owned by the non-US subholding entity. This 
would be achieved by those affiliates making deductible interest and royalty payments to low-taxed 
affiliates not resident in the home jurisdiction of the payer. Those payments would likely be 
disregarded for US purposes for the reasons given above. However, they would usually be respected 
as deductible payments in the home jurisdictions of the payers, where those affiliates would be 
taxable entities. Hence, a valuable tax mismatch would be created with expense being deducted for 
non-US tax purposes without giving rise to a corresponding US income inclusion as long as no cash 
was repatriated to the US.  This mismatch relied on the difference between the US “disregarded” 
entity analysis and the way in which the same intra-group transaction was analysed in the home 
jurisdictions of the lower-tier affiliates.  
 
“Check-the-box” planning has also been used extensively in structures for inbound investment into 
the US.  For example, in the early 2000’s, UK multinational parent companies used “deferred share 
subscription” structures to fund their US subsidiaries in return for periodic capital contributions into a 
special-purpose UK subsidiary of the UK parent company.  Economically, these structures were 
amortising loans to the US subsidiary.  However, no interest income was recognised by the UK parent 
because the periodic capital contribution payments by the US subsidiary were regarded as deferred 
subscriptions for share capital in the special-purpose UK subsidiary.  These were not subject to UK tax 
in the UK subsidiary.  In particular, they were not treated as interest and principal repayments on a 
loan.  From a US tax perspective, the structure was treated as a loan to the US subsidiary by the UK 
parent because an election would be made to disregard the special-purpose UK subsidiary for US tax 
purposes.  Hence the periodic payments were treated as direct interest payments and principal 
repayments by the US subsidiary to the UK parent. The interest component of those payments was 
deductible for US tax purposes859, even though it was not recognised as income for UK tax purposes.  
 
This last example illustrates a most important point.  The divergence between the approach of the 
post-1996 US entity classification rules and those of other jurisdictions is key.  In particular, it gives 
extra scope for generating cross-border tax mismatches860. A taxpayer which wants to create an 
“eligible entity” classification mismatch between the US and another jurisdiction can readily do so by 
(i) altering structural features of the relevant entity to achieve the desired non-US classification; while 
                                                          
859 The UK legislated to ensure that the interest element of these structures became taxable in the UK: see 
Section 91A Finance Act 1996, re-enacted as Section 524 CTA 2009 and now replaced by the “disguised 
interest” rules in Part 6 Chapter 2A CTA 2009.  See also Sections 249 to 254 (now repealed) TIOPA.  
860 For an alternative viewpoint, see Blanchard: Significance op. cit. at page 53. That commentator states that 
the BEPS project and others have exaggerated the extent to which the “check-the-box” rules have created 
hybrid mismatches and have underestimated “the larger cause of entity hybridity, which is a natural feature of 
the divergence of law in different countries. One source of hybridity is the tendency of many countries to apply 
per se rules or comparability tests to classify foreign entities, and to use concepts, like legal personality, that are 
essentially meaningless in the other country. If countries are going to insist on this relatively arid exercise, the 
rule should at least take into account substance rather than empty legal forms”. This author certainly agrees 
that, when considering hybrid mismatches, treating the “check-the-box” rules as the root of all evil is an 
oversimplification.  Not least it ignores the deficiencies of other countries’ entity classification rules, notably 







(ii) simply electing to achieve the desired (and contrasting) US classification.  In the US, classification 
no longer hinges significantly on an entity having the “right” structural features. Hence a taxpayer can 
structure an entity to achieve the desired non-US tax classification, without worrying whether its 
structural features achieve the desired US tax classification861.   
 
7.2.6.2.3 Further effects of the 2017 US tax reforms 
 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 2017 is the most significant US tax reform since 1986 and has a significant 
impact on US tax planning, both as regards investment into and out of the US862.  The comments 
below focus on investment out of the US. In addition to reducing the corporate income tax rate to 
21%, hitherto unrepatriated non-US earnings of non-US subsidiaries were taxed on a “one-off” basis 
in the hands of US shareholders holding (or treated as holding) at least 10% of the relevant 
subsidiary863.  There is a new exemption, in Section 245A Internal Revenue Code, for non-US dividends 
received by US corporate shareholders864 with actual or deemed equity interests of at least 10% in the 
distributing non-US corporation (“10% US shareholders”)865.  However, the ability to use this 
exemption to repatriate otherwise untaxed profit from, in particular, a “controlled foreign 
corporation” is not the end of the story.  There is also a new charge on such 10% US shareholders in 
respect of “global intangible low tax income” (or “GILTI”) of that “controlled foreign corporation”866.  
                                                          
861 Reconciling US and non-US rules pre-1997 would have been harder because the then US entity classification 
rules also focussed on structural features of the relevant entity, as discussed at 7.2.6.1.   
862 This Act is quite recent and passed very rapidly through Congress.  The result was a large number of 
legislative loose ends and uncertainties, which are gradually being resolved with the benefit of administrative 
guidance and, possibly, further legislation.  The discussion of the Act in this Chapter is largely based on (i) 
www.davispolk.com/Resources/Blogs/Tax Reform and Transition/In-Depth Analysis of TCJA (accessed 6 July 
2020); and (ii) www.clearygottlieb.com/News & Insights/Publications/ Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: Our Insights 
February 21, 2018. (seemingly no longer readily accessible).  
863 The tax charge was levied before the end of 2018 at rates ranging between 8% and 15.5%. This rate 
increased dramatically if the US shareholder taxpayer later engaged in an “inversion” transaction.  The “one-off” 
tax could be paid in eight equal annual interest-free instalments. Furthermore, if the US shareholder was a S 
Corporation (but not a partnership), it could defer this tax charge further on generous terms.  
864 S Corporations and partnerships cannot claim the benefit of this exemption, nor can Regulated Investment 
Companies nor Real Estate Investment Trusts. However, there is a “look-through” rule permitting a regular US 
corporation, which is a partner in a partnership, to claim the exemption in respect of its share of a non-US 
dividend paid to the partnership (cf the French decision in Artemis – see 6.5.1). The Section 245A exemption 
does not apply to Subpart F inclusions nor to any dividend which gives rise to a deduction or other tax benefit 
outside the US. The company paying the dividend must also not be a “passive foreign investment corporation” 
(“PFIC”).  Last but not least, this exemption only applies to dividends and not to capital gains on disposing of the 
relevant shares, unless that gain is treated, in limited cases, as a dividend under Section 1248 Internal Revenue 
Code. 
865 The US corporate shareholder must meet a minimum one-year holding period to qualify for the exemption. 
In October 2018, Proposed Regulations were issued which, if finalised, will create a parallel exemption from the 
US tax charge under Section 956 Internal Revenue Code, which otherwise applies when income of a “controlled 
foreign corporation” is invested in “US property” (e.g. debt or equity of a US person affiliated with the 
“controlled foreign corporation”). For more information, see Sullivan & Cromwell LLP: “IRS Issues Proposed 
Regulations on Section 956”. 31 October 2018. www.sullcrom.com. (accessed 6 July 2020).  
866 The GILTI charge does not just apply to 10% US Shareholders which are corporations.  It also applies to any 
such shareholders who are individuals, in which case the GILTI rules are much harsher.  The individual 10% US 
shareholder is subject to the GILTI charge at regular progressive tax rates for individuals (now up to 37%).  
Unlike corporate shareholders, it does not benefit from a special deduction which reduces the effective GILTI 
tax rate to 10.25% until 2025 (and thereafter to 13.125%).  Furthermore, only corporate 10% US shareholders 






This GILTI charge applies to distributed or undistributed income.  It is not confined to intangibles 
income, despite its name, and is in fact imposed on the “controlled foreign corporation”’s total net 
income in excess of 10% of its aggregate tax basis in its tangible, depreciable property (less any 
relevant net interest expense)867.  In short, GILTI is a new, wide-ranging US tax charge on outbound 
investment.  
 
It is unlikely that the GILTI charge can be avoided by making the “disregarded entity” elections which 
have been used in the past to accumulate low-taxed income outside the US without triggering 
Subpart F.  Indeed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 2017 seeks to get away from a situation where US 
companies accumulate low-taxed cash outside the USA, as a self-help solution to excessively high 
domestic rates of corporate income tax. Nevertheless, the GILTI charge is in addition to, not a 
replacement for, the existing Subpart F rules. Managing existing Subpart F exposure in a manner 
which minimises relevant non-US taxes will therefore remain important, especially as the tax rate on 
GILTI for corporate taxpayers is significantly less than for Subpart F inclusions (which are taxed at 
regular US corporate income tax rates…..now 21%).  Hence “disregarded entity” planning may have 
enduring relevance in managing Subpart F exposure apart from GILTI868.  
 
Generally, managing non-US taxes of a US multinational group will become even more important for 
two reasons.  The new dividend exemption in respect of non-US dividends means that any non-US tax 
on non-US distributed profits (e.g. withholding tax) is an absolute cost.  Besides, at most 80% of any 
non-US tax on GILTI income can be credited in the US and in practice it may well be difficult to credit 
even that much869.  Therefore there is an extra incentive to reduce that non-US tax burden.  
 
7.2.6.2.4 Entity classification decisions in the light of the 2017 changes 
 
Features of the 2017 Act itself are likely to drive other tax-planning responses, which may require 
specific decisions on US entity classification.   
                                                          
at 80% of the relevant non-US tax and there is a separate GILTI “basket” when applying the US foreign tax credit 
limitation.  That separate “basket” in particular makes it harder to use excess foreign tax credits relating to 
GILTI.   
867 That tax basis will be computed on US tax principles.  As it relates only to tangible depreciable property, it is 
likely to exclude real estate.  It is also easy for large amounts of GILTI to arise if the controlled foreign 
corporation has valuable intangibles and/or fully-depreciated tangibles. This is often the case in the kind of 
outbound investment structures which have been deployed by the US technology companies: valuable  
intangibles will be localised in low-taxed non-US subsidiaries.  They then licence those intangibles (for tax-
deductible royalties) to related operating subsidiaries in other high-tax jurisdictions.  The rules for deducting 
interest when computing GILTI are complex and may well reduce the benefit of the 10% offset relating to 
tangible depreciable property: see Sullivan & Cromwell LLP: “Treasury and IRS Release Final Regulations on 
Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income Regime” 8 July 2019. www.sullcrom.com. (accessed 6 July 2020).  
868 The GILTI rules differ in important respects from Subpart F. Broadly speaking, Congress intended the tax 
burden in respect of GILTI to be less than that in respect of Subpart F income, at least in relation to 10% US 
shareholders which are corporations. However, there may be situations where it makes sense to structure so 
that income falls within Subpart F or the “high tax” exclusion from Subpart F, rather than GILTI, thereby 
achieving a lower tax burden: see Libin Zhang “To the Frying Pan: New Virtues of Subpart F Income over GILTI”, 
Tax Notes, 2nd July 2018 at page 73.  See also Sullivan & Cromwell LLP: “Treasury and IRS Release Regulations on 
the GILTI High Tax Exclusion”: 1 July 2019. www.sullcrom.com. (accessed 6 July 2020). 
869 For the complexities of computing the revised US foreign tax credit in respect of GILTI, see Sullivan & 
Cromwell LLP: “Proposed Foreign Tax Credit Regulations”. 11 February 2019. www.sullcrom.com. (accessed 6 







In particular, the GILTI charge on a non-corporate US shareholder in a controlled foreign corporation 
is very high (although there is some scope for an individual US shareholder to elect to be taxed at 
corporate rates under Section 962 Internal Revenue Code). Hence, a non-corporate US shareholder 
shareholder may want its interest in the controlled foreign corporation to be held through an entity 
which is a domestic corporation for US tax purposes.  
 
If, on the other hand, that shareholder is determined to own directly its interest in a non-US business, 
then it may want to reclassify any controlled foreign corporation in which it invests as a partnership or 
disregarded entity for US tax purposes.  Any tax costs of that reclassification must of course be 
evaluated870.  Assuming they are acceptable, owning through a partnership or disregarded entity will 
give that US person greater scope for using losses, claiming capital gains treatment and obtaining 
foreign tax credit relief.  It will avoid GILTI (and Subpart F in general) although it will be currently 
taxable in the US on its share of the income and capital gains of the partnership or disregarded entity, 
whether or not distributed.   
  
While the US has created a dividend exemption for certain non-US dividends paid to a US corporation, 
it has not been decided whether a controlled foreign corporation can also rely on this exemption 
when computing its own Subpart F income or GILTI, if it receives a dividend from a lower-tier non-US 
subsidiary871. Hence, it may make sense to elect to disregard that lower-tier subsidiary. In that case, 
the question whether the dividend exemption is available for the purposes of the Subpart F or GILTI 
computation does not arise.     
 
The 2017 Act offers accelerated depreciation rates for certain new and used tangibles until 2026.  
With this in mind, US purchasers of companies during this period may wish to turn them into 
partnerships or disregarded entities so as to access accelerated depreciation in respect of the 
underlying assets872.  
 
Whether an entity is a partnership or a disregarded entity may also be relevant in relation to the new 
Section 163(j) Internal Revenue Code. This introduces an overall cap on deductible interest expense 
for all US taxpayers.  This is set at 30% of “adjusted taxable income”, which is initially defined as 
EBITDA but in later years as EBIT873.  Either way, the US taxpayer will be able to take into account its 
interest in the income of a non-US partnership or disregarded entity when computing “adjusted 
taxable income”.  That increases its “adjusted taxable income” and thereby limits the impact of 
Section 163(j).  
                                                          
870 E.g. tax on any deemed liquidation of the “controlled foreign corporation”.  
871 See Sullivan & Cromwell LLP: “Treasury and IRS Release Temporary Regulations Limiting Section 245A 
Dividends Received Deduction”, page 6 at fn 8. 28 June 2019. www.sullcrom.com. (accessed 6 July 2020). 
872 This will of course need to be agreed with the seller although if the latter is non-US, there may well be no 
adverse consequences for the seller.  The same depreciation result could be achieved by making a Section 
338(h)(10) or 338(g) election in the US.  These elections are not part of the US entity classification rules but in 
some cases, permit a share sale to be treated as a sale of the relevant company’s underlying assets.  
873 This is less generous than the equivalent UK rules introduced in 2017 in response to the conclusions of BEPS 
Action 4. The US rules also do not give the option of applying a separate interest cap based on worldwide 
leverage of the US taxpayer’s group. In other respects, the US rules are more generous than those in the UK e.g. 
there is a narrower definition of “interest” and a more generous exclusion for smaller businesses. For more 
information, see Mark Saunderson and Miles Humphrey: “Analysis – US Tax Reform: practical aspects”. Tax 







7.2.6.2.5 Final thoughts on the US entity classification rules 
 
While significant tax planning has been based on the US entity classification rules introduced in 1997, 
not all of that planning should be seen as abusive.  In any case, those rules illustrate some broader 
points.  In particular, the US has recognised that classifying entities for tax purposes by reference to 
non-tax structural features is an increasingly flawed and arbitrary approach, especially when the 
structural and other substantive differences between a corporation and a partnership have been so 
greatly eroded.  The old approach is also a poor use of both taxpayer and IRS time and resources.   
 
A key underlying issue is that, although the non-tax differences between corporations and 
partnerships are increasingly insignificant, the Internal Revenue Code nevertheless distinguishes 
between them and taxes them very differently. US corporations and their members are subject to two 
levels of taxation under Subchapter C874 of the Internal Revenue Code: once at entity level on all their 
profits and then again at member level, on distributed profits.  There is very limited relief against the 
tax at member level for US or non-US tax borne at entity level.  By contrast, under Subchapter K, 
partnerships are subject to a single US tax charge on their profits (whether or not distributed) but 
calculated by reference to the tax position of the members of the partnership. Relief for non-US tax 
on those profits is more readily available. In short, the partnership is tax-“transparent”.   
 
The contrast between Subchapter C and Subchapter K is an old and largely immutable feature of the 
US tax system.  Any mandatory line drawn between entities to determine which Subchapter governs 
is likely to be arbitrary875.  The ability to elect classification gives the taxpayer some simple leeway to 
avoid an arbitrary outcome being imposed on it.  That leeway is not total, because of those rules 
which make certain US and non-US entities corporations “per se”.  The rules on “per se” corporations 
are often hard to justify but are likely to endure.  Otherwise the scope of Subchapter C taxation would 
shrink to an unacceptable degree politically and would thereby undermine taxpayers’ limited right to 
elect entity classification. In short, for US taxpayers, the status quo is a case of half a loaf being much 
better than no bread. 
 
From the perspective of the US Government, any avoidance issues raised by elective entity 
classification are probably better dealt with by tackling those specific issues (e.g. erosion of Subpart F) 
rather than by denying taxpayers their limited right to elect. The fact that an entity falls within 
Subchapter K (or is disregarded) does not prevent the US from limiting consequences which might 
otherwise flow automatically from a “transparent” approach.  Indeed, given the minimal non-tax 
differences between corporations and partnerships, this may be the better policy response. Of course 
counteracting specific avoidance issues will further complicate the US tax code, which to some extent 
nullifies the simplification benefits of the 1997 changes.  However, even before those changes, 
Subchapter K and the Subpart F rules were very complex.   
   
7.3 The Dutch entity classification rules 
 
7.3.1 Introduction 
                                                          
874 There is of course an exception for those smaller US corporations which elect for “pass-through” taxation 
under Subchapter S. 
875 This is true, for example, of the US default classification rules in respect of “eligible entities” e.g. their focus 







As a civil law jurisdiction with its own distinct views on aspects of entity classification and its impact 
on double tax treaties876, the Netherlands offers an interesting contrast to both the UK and the US 
approach to entity classification.  
 
7.3.2 Classification of domestic Dutch entities 
 
Article 2(1) of the Netherlands Corporate Income Tax Act 1969877 lists the entities that are taxable on 
their worldwide income if resident in the Netherlands.  This list includes in particular Dutch corporate 
entities878 such as public limited liability companies (‘naamloze vennootschap’ or NVs), private limited 
liability companies (‘besloten vennootschap’ or BVs), co-operative associations, mutual insurance 
organisations, as well as foundations (“Stichtingen”) and other associations (“Verenigingen”)879.    
 
However, the list of Dutch entities taxable on their worldwide income under CITA runs wider and in 
particular includes an “open” limited partnership (‘commanditaire vennootschap” or ‘CV’)880.  This is 
one in which limited partners can be admitted without the prior consent of all other partners881.  An 
                                                          
876 See in particular the Dutch observations in Articles 1, 23A and 23B of the OECD Model Tax Convention.  
These are cited by De Graaf and Gooijer in their country report on the Netherlands in Volume 99b Cahiers de 
Droit Fiscal International (2014), at pages 566-7.   
877 Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 1969 (hereafter “CITA”). 
878 Being a civil law jurisdiction, Dutch domestic law recognises both “formal” and “informal” partnerships, a 
distinction not known in common law jurisdictions. It turns largely on the extent to which, under civil law 
concepts of agency, the members of the partnership are sufficiently disclosed to third parties that they can 
incur obligations to them because of the activities of the partnership. The Dutch “formal” partnership is the 
“Vennootschap onder firma” or “VOF”.  The “informal” Dutch partnership is the “maatschap” whose members 
may or may not be fully disclosed to third parties.  If not fully disclosed, the “maatschap” will be a form of 
“silent” partnership, where the “silent” partners will not incur obligations to third parties.  For a more extensive 
discussion of the “formal”/”informal” partnership distinction, see Part II of Avery Jones: Partnerships op.cit. 
[2002] BTR 375. The UK Court of Appeal has in fact considered the nature of a VOF in a non-tax case, Rowan 
Companies Incorporated v Lambert Eggink Offshore Transport Consultants VOF [1998] CLC 1574. Expert 
evidence was taken regarding Dutch law. The court concluded that, in essence, a VOF was quite similar to a 
Scottish, rather than an English general partnership. In particular, while it was not a “complete” legal person like 
a body corporate, it could nevertheless contract, sue and be sued in its own name because it represented the 
partners “taken as a whole” and was not just an aggregation of individual partners. Those individual partners 
were jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the VOF under Article 18 of the Dutch Commercial Code.   
879 For a fuller list and general discussion, see De Graaf and Gooijer op. cit. at page 559. A co-operative does not 
normally have a capital divided into shares.  This means that, subject to anti-avoidance rules introduced in 2012, 
its distributions to members are not subject to Dutch dividend withholding tax although the entity itself remains 
subject to Dutch corporate income tax: Michael L. Molenaars: “The Tax Significance of Legal Personality: a Dutch 
View” Tax Review No. 316 (December 2014) at 2.2.3. “Stichtingen” are legal entities with no members, created 
for a defined purpose, often charitable. They may not distribute to their founder: see Molenaars op.cit. at 2.1(i). 
However, it is possible to get around the formal lack of members by the Stichting issuing depositary receipts (a 
so-called “Stichting administratiekantoor” or “STAK”).  Each such receipt confers a proprietary interest in the 
underlying assets of the Stichting and, in the words of one commentator, “achieves a result that is functionally 
equivalent to an interest in possession trust”. A STAK is therefore regarded as “transparent” for Dutch (and 
indeed UK) tax purposes. For further commentary on STAKs, see James Kessler QC: “Taxation of Non-Residents 
and Foreign Domiciliaries” op. cit. at page 4555.  
880 Apart from “open” CVs, Dutch general and limited partnerships are not regarded as separate taxable entities 
for CITA, although Dutch company law regards them as separate entities.   
881 For reasons other than inheritance: see Article 2(3) (c) of the 1959 Algemene wet inzake rijksbelastingen 






“open” limited partnership in fact enjoys a hybrid, “part-transparent” tax status. It is a separate 
taxpayer under CITA in respect of the share of its profits allocable to the limited partners, but its 
general partners are taxable directly on their (typically small) share of those profits882.  The general 
partner’s profit share is deductible in computing the taxable profits of the “open” CV.  Like an English 
limited partnership, a CV (whether “open” or “closed”) is merely an agreement between its members 
which has no legal personality. Hence one party to the agreement will usually act as general partner, 
and will hold the assets of the CV and incur its liabilities883.  
 
It is therefore possible to alter the classification of a CV for Dutch tax purposes by amending its rules 
on admitting limited partners.  This is controversial but is not dissimilar to the pre-1997 ability to 
change an entity’s US tax classification by dropping or retaining certain structural features (notably, 
free transferability of members’ interests). However, expert advice will be needed when altering the 
structural features of a CV so as to affect whether or not it is “open”884.  
 
Similar tax rules apply to Dutch mutual investment funds (“fondsen voor gemene rekening” or 
“FGRs”), even though such funds are typically contractual agreements, rather than legal entities or 
(perhaps) partnerships under Dutch company law.  Hence a FGR is a separate entity for CITA if 
participations in it can be disposed of without the consent of all investors885.  This is so even though 
legally, the assets of the FGR will be held by a separate depositary with legal personality (often a 
“stichting”) for the risk and account of the FGR members (i.e. the investors).  
 
If interests in a CV or a mutual fund are not freely transferable (as defined), it will be “transparent” for 
Dutch tax purposes. This is the usual situation and merely means that its profits will be taxable only at 
the level of its members, based on their specific fiscal characteristics.  It does not mean that the CV or 
mutual fund will be “disregarded” or a fiscal “nothing”.  
 
Dutch tax law permits certain Dutch-resident companies to form a tax consolidation, or “fiscal unity”, 
for corporate income tax purposes.  This also does not lead to the members of the fiscal unity being 
“disregarded” for corporate income tax purposes. They remain as theoretical taxpayers, which can, 
for example, invoke tax treaties. However, their transactions, assets and liabilities are attributed to 
the parent company of the “fiscal unity”, which is the sole taxpayer.  
  
7.3.3 Classification of non-domestic Dutch entities886 
 
                                                          
important features are described above - which applies to the CITA (and also to the personal income tax 
act/Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001/hereafter "ITA 2001").    
882 This hybrid “part-transparency” is a consequence of the decision of the Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) of 7 July 
1982, no. 20 655, BNB 1982/268.  
883 See Molenaars op. cit. at 2.1(ii). 
884 For a fuller discussion of these complexities, including the 2007 “CV Decree” of the Dutch Ministry of 
Finance, see Molenaars op. cit. at 2.2.1. 
885 This will not be the case if participations can only be transferred back to the fund itself or to certain close 
relatives of the relevant investor.  For further detail, including the 2007 “FGR Decree”, see Molenaars op. cit. at 
2.2.2. 
886 For a fuller decision, see Chapter 12 – the Netherlands, in “Hybrid Entities and the EU Direct Tax Directives” 






Dutch tax law adopts a “resemblance” approach akin to UK tax law when classifying, for Dutch tax 
purposes, those entities which are not formed under Dutch law887.  In particular, it classifies them by 
comparing them with Dutch entities888. Hence it focusses on the characteristics of the non-Dutch 
entity, as determined under its governing law889 and constitutional documents890.  The entity’s non-
Dutch tax classification is irrelevant891. 
 
As in the UK, there are no hard and fast classification criteria for non-Dutch entities and case law 
guidance is limited. The Dutch Ministry of Finance has nevertheless published a Decree setting out 
relevant criteria. This Decree892 seeks to distil relevant case law principles and is in practice very 
important.  While it is not binding on the courts as such, a taxpayer can invoke it as a matter of 
administrative law because it creates a legitimate expectation of particular tax treatment.  It does not 
apply to the classification of non-Dutch foundations, mutual funds, trusts and similar entities893.   
 
The Dutch Decree sets out four key factors: 
 
1. Can the non-Dutch entity legally own the assets with which it performs its activities i.e. does it 
have separate legal personality (“the ownership factor”)? 
                                                          
887 The basis for this is Article 2(1)(a) CITA  mentioned above providing that domestic taxpayers include inter 
alia, Dutch NVs, BVs and other entities that have a capital divided into shares. The last category i.e. "other 
entities that have a capital divided into shares", may encompass a limited company that is incorporated under 
the laws of another jurisdiction. See also J.L. van de Streek, Cursus Belastingrecht (Vennootschapsbelasting), 
(Kluwer, digital), Chapter I, para. 1.0.3.A.b3 (J.L. van der Streek & S.A.W.J. Strik eds.). 
888 It does not follow the Italian approach of treating all such entities as corporations.   
889 The governing law for these purposes will be the law of the place of the entity’s incorporation or formation, 
rather than the law of the place of its “seat”.  This is consistent with the overall approach of Dutch company law 
to an entity’s domicile.  
890 This approach is described by some scholars as the “corporate resemblance method”: see for example A.J.A. 
Stevens, Het nieuwe classificatiebesluit, NTFR-B 2010/12, p. 7-13; A.J.A. Stevens, Hybride entiteiten en 
belastingverdragen, MBB 2010, no. 4, p. 135-144. 
891 Unlike for example the Danish entity classification rules, which in some cases will take into account the tax 
classification of an entity in another jurisdiction, so as to avoid a classification mismatch: see Parada: Article 1(2) 
op. cit. at pages 370-1.  In a recent Report for the Dutch Association of Tax Science (Vereniging voor 
Belastingwetenschap), G.K. Fibbe and A.J.A. Stevens argued that the Dutch domestic law should apply the 
Danish approach in addition to the corporate resemblance approach. In case of a mismatch, the Netherlands 
would follow the other state’s entity classification. Fibbe had already argued in his PhD thesis that a symmetrical 
approach should be enshrined in a EU Directive. See. G.K. Fibbe and A.J.A. Stevens, Internationale fiscal 
aspecten, Chapter 6, in: Belastingheffing van personenvennootschappen, Rapport van de Commissie 
Personenvennootschappen, 2020, p. 151 et seq. 
892 Decree of the State Secretary of Finance of 11 December 2009, CPP2009/519M BNB 2010/58 (Kwalificatie 
buitenlandse samenwerkingsverbanden). There is no formal English translation of this Decree. It supersedes and 
amends earlier Decrees of 1997 and 2004. In particular, the factors listed in the 2009 Decree no longer include 
the question whether a resolution is needed to distribute the entity’s profits. This factor would be a highly 
relevant factor for UK entity classification purposes. Indeed it was a key point of contention in Anson v HMRC 
[2015] STC 1777 (see 2.14) and also in Dreyfus v IRC 14 TC 560, where the Court of Appeal (see 2.10) concluded 
(wrongly in the view of HMRC) that such a resolution was needed in relation to a French SNC. There is a more 
detailed discussion of the 1997 Decree in Avery Jones: Partnerships op. cit. at pages 415-9.  In fn 200 of that 
article, a 1995 decision of the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam of 4 February 1995, no. 93/1466, Infobulletin 
1995/315, in which the Dutch court concluded that a French SNC was transparent for Dutch tax purposes i.e. 
the opposite conclusion to the English courts in Dreyfus but in line with what HMRC now regard as the correct 
answer.  






2. Do all members of the entity enjoy limited liability for its obligations to third parties (“the 
liability factor”)?    
3. Does the entity have the equivalent of share capital (“the share factor”)?; and  
4. Can new members be admitted without the consent of all other members (ignoring cases 
where a member’s interest passes by inheritance) (“the free transferability factor”)? 
 
Echoing the pre-1997 US entity classification rules, the Decree considers the non-Dutch entity to be 
non-transparent only if the answer to at last three of the four questions is “yes”.  This at-least-three-
out-of-four approach is also more mechanistic than the approach adopted by HMRC following 
Memec894.  Unlike the pre-1997 US rules, the Dutch rules places some emphasis on whether there is 
legal personality895. They do not place any emphasis on whether management is centralised nor on 
whether the entity has a limited life.  
 
The Decree also states that a non-Dutch entity is non-“transparent” if members’ liability is limited to 
their agreed capital contributions; the entity itself own its business operation; and that business is not 
otherwise operated at the risk of, or on behalf of the entity members896.  This separate rule 
apparently cuts across the four-factor approach mentioned above897. However, on the basis of the 
2009 Decree, a US LLC can still in theory be “transparent” for Dutch tax purposes if its members’ 
interests do not take the form of share capital (as in Anson – see 2.14); and can only be transferred 
with the consent of the other members.   
 
The Decree also provides that an entity which would prima facie be “transparent” (on the basis of the 
four factor test) is nevertheless non-“transparent” if it is comparable to a Dutch “open” CV or if its 
capital is divided into freely transferable shares.  As discussed at 7.3.2, what makes an “open” CV non-
“transparent” for Dutch tax purposes is the free transferability of members’ interests. Where that 
feature is present, then the non-Dutch entity will be comparable to a Dutch “open” CV if it carries on 
business; there is at least one general partner with unlimited liability, as well as at least one limited 
                                                          
894[1998] STC 754. The list of entity classification criteria produced by HMRC following Memec does not 
mandate a particular classification outcome if certain criteria are satisfied. All listed criteria are potentially 
relevant although some are more important than others. See 2.13 and 3.7.  
895 This is a point of similarity with the UK approach.  However, as pointed out in Blanchard op. cit., legal 
personality is not a relevant criterion for US entity classification purposes.  Hence any focus on it by the UK or 
the Netherlands in relation to US entities raises the risk of a classification mismatch. Strictly speaking, the Dutch 
emphasis is on whether a non-Dutch entity is a capital company or a partnership. Hence, a general partnership 
with legal personality formed under the law of one of the States of the US can be regarded as transparent, 
because it resembles a Dutch general partnership (a VOF). In particular, its partnership characteristics are more 
relevant than its legal personality. The distinction between partnerships and capital companies is not always 
clear as is demonstrated by some Dutch court decisions on a UK LLP, which does not have a capital divided into 
shares. Hence from a Dutch perspective, it has characteristics in almost equal measure of a partnership and a 
capital company. The District Court of The Hague, 26 February 2019, no. 18/1972 and 18/1974, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2019:1565 regarded a UK LLP as transparent because it had more characteristics of a 
partnership. The Court of Appeal of Amsterdam 11 April 2017, no. 16/00225, ECLI:GHAMS:2017:2577 ruled that 
it was not in dispute that the UK LLP was to be considered as a transparent entity.   
896 This part of the Decree reflects a decision of the Dutch Supreme Court of 2 June 2006, no 40,919. BNB 
2006/288, in which it confirmed that a US LLC was opaque. The Dutch tax authorities have apparently ruled that 
LLCs formed in a number of US states are non-“transparent” for Dutch tax purposes. However, as indicated 
below, the four-factor test in the Decree does not necessarily mean that every US LLC is opaque for Dutch tax 
purposes.    






partner; the latter cannot bind the partnership by making management decisions; and there is no 
share capital.   
 
Finally, the Decree is not decisive where the non-Dutch entity is directly comparable with a Dutch co-
operative or mutual insurance association.  
 
The Ministry of Finance has published on its website a list of non-Dutch entities whose status has 
been ruled on by the Dutch tax authorities898.  This list is merely indicative, like its UK counterpart: see 
2.13. However, it is lengthier than the UK list. It also explains, in outline by reference to the four 
factors mentioned above, why an entity has been classified in a particular way for Dutch tax purposes, 
which makes it more useful than the UK equivalent. It has been regularly updated and the Dutch tax 
authorities will provide advance rulings on the classification of entities.   
 
A couple of interesting points emerge from the Dutch list. The fact that an entity can own its own 
assets clearly does not prevent the Netherlands regarding it as transparent. However, the 
Netherlands generally regards LLCs formed in various US states as non-transparent, along with some 
limited liability partnerships (e,g, in Delaware but not in the UK) and all US limited liability limited 
partnerships. 
 
Non-Dutch foundations, mutual funds, trusts and comparable entities fall outside the scope of the 
Decree. Such entities are to be classified on the basis of which domestic Dutch entity they most 
closely resemble.  Non-resident non-Dutch mutual funds, trusts and similar entities could be regarded 
as special purpose funds, or “doelvermogens”, for Dutch tax purposes.  
 
The Dutch rules on classifying entities do not deal in the same way with those which are, and those 
which are not formed under Dutch company law.  This could give rise to questions about whether 
these Dutch rules are compatible with EU law: see 6.7.8.3.  
 
7.3.4 Lessons from the Dutch experience 
 
The Netherlands has adopted a method of classifying non-Dutch entities which is similar to the UK 
method, focussing on structural features of the relevant entity (especially non-Dutch entities) under 
its governing law and constitutional documents. It then uses these factors to identify the closest 
equivalent Dutch domestic entity.  The factors chosen are not the same as those which are relevant in 
the UK and inevitably the choice of factors is somewhat arbitrary.  
 
The Netherlands approach is simpler, and more mechanistic than that of the UK when applying the 
four classification factors which it usually regards as key.  No one factor is conclusive under Dutch tax 
law and it is possible for an entity to be tax-“transparent” in the Netherlands by failing to satisfy at 
least two factors.  An example would be an entity which own its own assets and whose members have 
limited liability but which lacks share capital and where members’ interests cannot be transferred 
without the consent of other members.   
 
                                                          
898 Clarification of 4 May 2016 (Lijst van gekwalificeerde buitenlandse samenwerkingsverbanden); 
https://www.belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/connect/bldcontentnl/themaoverstijgend/brochures_en_publicaties/l
ijst_van_gekwalificeerde_buitenlandse_samenwerkingsverbanden. For an unofficial English translation of this 






The UK and Dutch approaches are not symmetrical.  This alone could lead to entity classification 
mismatches, even though the approaches are broadly similar.  
 
This more mechanistic Dutch approach provides taxpayers with more certainty about which factors 
count. In that sense, it is superior to the UK approach. The factors which count for Dutch tax 
purposes, together with a more mechanistic approach, affect how easily taxpayers can structure so as 
to achieve a desired tax outcome (e.g. a tax mismatch) in another jurisdiction. 
 
The Dutch Decree on entity classification no longer places any emphasis on whether members are 
entitled to profits as they arise without an intervening resolution by a third party. It is also interesting 
that the Dutch Decree still attaches importance to legal personality, because this is a highly formalistic 
criterion and there are Dutch entities (notably, the “open” CV) which lack legal personality but are still 
subject to Dutch corporate income tax.  The enduring significance of legal personality may be 
influenced by the rules applying to Dutch entities. In particular, there are no Dutch entities which 
have legal personality (i.e. the ability to own assets in their own right) but are fully “transparent” for 
Dutch tax purposes899.     
 
Limited liability and the free transferability of members’ interests remain relevant factors for Dutch 
tax purposes.  They can be quite readily manipulated by well-advised taxpayers, as in the US pre-
1997.  By contrast, centralised management of an entity is not a relevant factor yet is less easy to 
manipulate. Hence the Dutch rules offer significant de facto scope to pick a desired entity 
classification900.  This is especially true when creating cross-border hybrid mismatches, and above all 
when the counterpart jurisdiction is the US.  In that case, there is often no need to consider whether 
manipulating one or more factors for Dutch tax purposes adversely affects the desired US entity 
classification because the latter simply depends on a “check-the-box” election.  For example, a Dutch 
“transparent” entity can be created by forming a “closed” CV, with significant limitations on 
transferring members’ interests.  This can, however, elect to be treated as a corporation for US tax 
purposes.  
 
”Transparency” for Dutch tax purposes means that the profits of the entity are taxable at the level of 
its members, reflecting each member’s tax circumstances. There is nothing akin to disregarded entity 
status in the US.  On the other hand, the Netherlands does not subscribe to the concept of 
“translucency” applied to partnerships in France and discussed at 6.5.1 above: France is an outlier in 
this regard.    
 
Historically, the Netherlands has not had controlled foreign company rules, apart from Section 13a 
CITA which can require marking-to-market of shareholdings of at least 25% in non-Dutch companies 
which are taxed at an effective rate below 10% and which hold mainly portfolio investments. 
Therefore, optimal classification of non-Dutch entities to avoid exposure under controlled foreign 
company rules has not been a major issue.  That may change now that the Netherlands has enacted 
                                                          
899 In this sense, the Dutch entity classification rules may be similar to the UK rules.  The latter have historically 
attached great importance to the presence or absence of legal personality, not least because an English 
partnership is only a contract between partners based on mutual agency. There is in fact draft legislation to 
change the Dutch Civil Law Code so that all Dutch partnerships will have legal personality. This is not expected 
to affect the tax transparency of such partnerships, nor the Dutch tax classification of non-Dutch entities. 
900 The Dutch authorities do not seem concerned that this creates an unlevel playing field between well-






such rules to satisfy Article 7 of the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 2016901.  However, the 
Netherlands does not appear to have enacted very stringent controlled foreign company rules. In 
particular, in an International Tax Policy Letter dated 23 February 2018, the Dutch government 
announced902, inter alia, that there will be no controlled foreign company liability if the non-Dutch 
company in question demonstrates adequate substance by incurring at least Euro 100,000 per annum 
in payroll expenses; and has office space generally available for its use.    
 
The Netherlands is in any case taking steps to limit its attractiveness as a location for hybrid 
structures, in the wake of BEPS and the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive.  In particular, anti-“reverse 
hybrid” rules take effect from 1 January 2020, in line with Article 9a of that Directive.  These will 
target the hitherto popular CV/BV structures much used by US multinationals.  Therefore, there are 
likely to be reduced opportunities for taxpayers to create profitable mismatches by exploiting the 
Dutch entity classification rules.   
 
The Netherlands is concurrently broadening its exemption from dividend withholding tax (based on 
the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive) so that it also applies to certain corporate shareholders resident in 
Dutch treaty partner jurisdictions outside the EU.  When applying this widened exemption to 
dividends paid to hybrid entities, the Netherlands will not simply classify the hybrid according to its  
own domestic entity classification rules.  Instead, it will apply the exemption in a manner similar to 
Article 1(2) of the OECD Model.  Hence it will give priority to the classification of that hybrid entity in 
the jurisdiction where its members are resident903. Hence the exemption will not apply to hitherto 




8.1   How does the UK classify entities for tax purposes and when and how does it regard an entity as 
being tax “transparent”?  Is its approach to entity classification satisfactory, especially taking into 
account its double taxation treaties and EU law? Is an alternative approach to be preferred?   
 
The preceding Chapters have broken this larger question down into a number of sub-questions. It is 
helpful to summarise the answers to those before setting out some more general conclusions on the 
UK approach to entity classification and tax “transparency”. 
 
8.1.2 Why is it important to classify entities for UK tax purposes? 
 
The UK tax system cannot delineate its own boundaries effectively without having rules defining what 
entities and arrangements are potentially taxable or are otherwise tax-significant (rather than tax 
“nothings”). For further discussion of this, see 1.1 and 8.2.  
 
                                                          
901 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 19 July 2016, as amended by Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 
2017.   
902 For much of what follows, see www.debrauw.com/expertise/tax/8 March 2018 - “Dutch Government 
announces corporate tax avoidance plans, responds to ECJ decision”.   
903 Article 4(9) and (10) of the Wet op de dividendbelasting 1965 (Dividend Withholding Tax Act 1965/hereafter 
'DWTA'.  
904 See www.debrauw.com/expertise/tax/22 September 2017 - Dutch Tax Bill 2018: what will change? (accessed  






8.1.3 How does the UK do this, especially in relation to companies, partnerships and trusts? 
 
The UK entity classification rules (especially in relation to companies, partnerships and trusts) are 
summarised in 3.9, 4.3.7 and 8.6.1. 
 
8.1.4 What is the connection between classifying entities and “tax transparency”? 
 
This is summarised in 1.2 and in 8.3.  
 
 
8.1.5    What does “tax transparency” mean in UK tax law?  Does it have more than one meaning? 
 
“Tax transparency” means a number of different things in UK tax law, in relation to different entities 
and different contexts (and especially different taxes). These separate strands of meaning have 
evolved largely independently and somewhat piecemeal. The result is often a certain amount of 
confusion in applying these concepts. The meaning of “transparency” in relation to trusts depends on 
the tax and the type of trust. In particular, it is summarised in 4.3.7 for the purposes of income tax 
and capital gains tax. The special meaning of “transparency” in relation to partnerships for the 
purposes of taxing capital gains is summarised in Appendix A.10. 
 
There is a more general summary of what “transparency” signifies, in relation to UK taxes other than 
those on income and gains, in 5.8. This includes whether a corporate affiliation relationship can be 
“traced” through “transparent” partnerships. This is also discussed in Appendix A.10.  
 
8.4 discusses to what extent “transparency” is a concept which differs from the (many) rules allowing 
income and gains of an entity to be attributed to other persons with an interest in it (e.g. 
shareholders of a company and settlors or beneficiaries of a trust).   
 
8.1.6 How do UK double tax treaties address entity classification and tax transparency issues, 
especially when the UK and its treaty partners classify an entity in different ways? 
 
The UK has addressed entity classification and “transparency” issues in its tax treaties broadly along 
the lines endorsed by the OECD since the 1999 Partnerships Report: see 6.8.1 and 6.8.6. The new 
Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3(1) of the MLI should reinforce this trend.  However, there 
are exceptions to this pattern e.g. the UK-France treaty, which reflects particular French issues in this 
area, and the UK-US treaty, which reflects longstanding US treaty negotiation priorities (some of 
which coincide with what is now mainstream OECD thinking). The UK’s estate and gift tax treaties are 
a neglected backwater, with a number of these treaties not reflecting OECD standards in this area: 
see Appendix C.2.7.  
 
8.1.7 Is the UK approach to entity classification affected by EU law? 
 
In a number of respects, the UK rules regarding the classification of entities and their “transparency” 
seem inconsistent with the EU “fundamental freedoms”: see 6.8.7.5.  
 
8.1.8 Is the approach of other jurisdictions (in particular, the United States and the Netherlands) to 







The Netherlands operates (see 7.3) a “resemblance” test (not dissimilar to the UK’s) for classifying 
non-Dutch entities. It exhibits many of the weaknesses of such tests but is more clearly articulated 
and easy to administer than the UK equivalent.  Hence it is more user-friendly.  
 
The US abandoned (see 7.2) its old “four factor” resemblance test in 1997 and moved to the 
(in)famous “check-the-box” system.  Descriptions of that system have tended to exaggerate some of 
its features but there is no doubt that it is a fertile source of entity classification mismatches.  
However, with modifications, it could provide a basis for reforming the UK entity classification rules so 
that they are more user-friendly, without ushering in a new era of mismatch-based avoidance activity.  
 
8.1.9 What are the weaknesses in current UK thinking on “tax transparency” and entity 
classification?  How can it be improved? 
 
Existing weaknesses in this area and possible improvements are discussed in more detail in 8.3 and 
8.6. 
 
8.2   The relevance of “entity classification” 
 
Entity classification is at the core of defining the boundaries of a tax system.  
  
A tax system cannot delineate its own boundaries without defining those persons which (i) are liable 
for the relevant tax or (ii) even if they are not (e.g. partnerships and trusts), are still treated for tax 
purposes as separate entities whose status as such can influence the tax liability of others (e.g. the 
members of a partnership or, in the case of a trust, the settlor and beneficiaries).   
 
Defining natural persons (i.e. individuals) as taxpayers is relatively straightforward, although they may 
have different (in)capacities from time to time e.g. when individuals are minors, mentally ill or act as 
trustees.  It is harder to pin down those arrangements which should be treated as legal persons, not 
“nothings”, for relevant tax purposes.  Some such legal persons may pay direct taxes in their own right 
(e.g. companies, UK “authorised unit trusts” or discretionary trusts with UK-resident trustees), if they 
have the necessary territorial link to the taxing jurisdiction.  Other legal persons or arrangements may 
still not be direct taxpayers themselves (e.g. partnerships or trusts falling within Section 60 TCGA), 
even if they have that territorial link.  Nevertheless, their very existence may influence the liability of 
others, especially those with an economic interest in them.  In short, these other non-taxable legal 
persons or arrangements may not be tax “nothings”.  An example is where two companies are 
regarded as “related” or “connected” because they are under the common ownership or control of a 
third entity (e.g. a partnership) which itself has no substantive tax liability.  Yet the role of the 
partnership, which is not a tax “nothing”, creates a connection between the two companies.  That 
connection may then affect, for example, the value placed, for tax purposes, on transactions between 
those companies.   
 
A tax system will in particular need to define whether arrangements outside its territorial jurisdiction  
constitute legal persons and if so, what sort.  This will be essential when taxing investment into that 
jurisdiction, as well as investment by its residents in other jurisdictions.  A good example is when 
taxpayers resident in one jurisdiction, A, have economic interests in an entity or arrangement which is 






entity or arrangement will affect how A’s own residents are taxed and, in particular, their right to any 
double taxation relief in A for non-A tax on that entity or arrangement.  Double taxation relief may 
well be restricted if A treats that non-A entity or arrangement as a company, rather than a 
partnership or a trust.     
 
8.3  The multifaceted concept of “tax transparency” 
 
The fact that an entity is classified in its home jurisdiction as having no tax liability of its own, ushers in 
the related and chameleon-like concept of “tax transparency”.  Entity classification rules are often key 
in deciding whether, and how, such an entity or arrangement is “tax transparent”, not least because 
the usual starting point is that “companies” are not “transparent” but “partnerships” are.   
 
“Tax transparency” is shorthand for those situations where persons with an interest in an entity or 
arrangement are taxed as if they were directly, not indirectly, carrying on the underlying activities of 
that entity or arrangement and/or owning its assets.  Hence the tax liability on those activities and 
assets is essentially determined at the level of those with an interest in the entity, and taking full 
account of their tax profile.  In such cases, the entity itself will have no substantive liability of its own.  
It may have a “representative” liability (e.g. the UK-resident trustees of an English law trust which has 
a vested income beneficiary). If so, tax can be provisionally collected from it on behalf of those with 
an interest in it, but the tax circumstances of those interest holders will decide the ultimate tax 
liability in respect of the activities of that entity905.  So if those with an interest in that entity are tax-
exempt, that may trigger a refund of any tax provisionally collected at the level of the entity.   
 
“Tax transparency” classically means that the profits of the entity are taxed in the hands of those with 
an interest in it, whether or not they are distributed.  In other words, there is no scope for deferral.  
Unless those persons can ensure that funds are released to them by the entity on time, they may 
have to fund from other sources the tax on any undistributed income and gain.  “Tax transparency” 
can therefore be problematic where an entity has a large and fluctuating body of members, especially 
if each member has limited influence over its affairs.  Such members may have liquidity issues when 
paying tax on their share of undistributed profits, unless (as is common) the entity commits 
contractually to distribute enough money to enable members to pay such tax. Tax authorities will also 
want to avoid pursuing a large and fluctuating body of members of a “transparent” entity for fairly 
small amounts of tax on fairly small profit entitlements.  This collection problem can be resolved by 
imposing on the entity a representative liability on behalf of its members which is set high enough to 
collect most, if not all, of their ultimate tax liability.  Members can then seek refunds if, in their 
specific circumstances, that representative liability turns out to be too high.   
 
The classical conception of “tax transparency” does not work well in relation to trusts with 
discretionary beneficiaries, whose interest in trust profits is highly contingent.  Taxing them on 
undistributed profit would make little sense.  
 
“Tax transparency” is the converse of the way in which companies are normally taxed.  With limited 
exceptions (such as UK LLPs and EEIGs), the UK, like most jurisdictions, treats companies as taxable 
entities in their own right, notably in respect of their income and gains.  The company’s tax liability is 
not a representative liability on behalf of, and ultimately determined by reference to the tax profile 
                                                          






of, its members906. Hence the nature, extent and timing of that liability is not normally affected by the 
tax characteristics of the company’s members e.g. where they are resident and what reliefs and 
exemptions they are entitled to.   
 
This raises concerns about whether members of a company are exposed to economic double taxation 
of income and gain: once at the level of the company itself and then again if and when income and 
gain (net of company-level tax) is distributed to members, or value is otherwise realised by them (e.g. 
when they sell shares in the company).  There has long been a debate about whether, when and how 
to alleviate such economic double taxation.  Some jurisdictions (e.g. the USA) do relatively little to 
alleviate the economic double taxation of distributed profit907. Their systems of taxing corporate 
profits are often referred to as “classical systems”. 
  
The UK began with such a system in 1965 when corporation tax was first introduced.  For the 
purposes of taxing non-corporate shareholders, it largely reverted to such a system in 2016 but UK 
corporate shareholders typically benefit from an exemption on distributed profit.  From 1973 until 
2016, the UK experimented with various devices to give non-corporate members some relief, against 
their own tax liability on distributed profits, for tax already borne at company level.  The full story of 
how these devices ) known as “partial imputation systems”) evolved (and were adversely affected by 
EU law) is beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, they never gave members of a company full 
relief (including a refund) for company-level tax.  While members were not usually taxed on 
undistributed corporate profits, the company was taxed on them anyway. Its liability on undistributed 
profits did not reflect the particular tax profile of its members. However, that company liability was 
typically imposed at rates well below marginal income tax rates for individual members.  Hence if 
company profit was not distributed, the lack of transparency in fact reduced the effective rate of 
taxation on those members908. 
 
“Tax transparency” is mainly encountered when taxing income and gains of an entity or arrangement.  
Here it also usually means that a person with an interest (an “interest holder”) in the entity or 
arrangement is treated as entitled to income or gain of the same character as the underlying income 
or gain of the entity or arrangement. However, for an entity or arrangement to be “tax transparent”, 
must the interest holder be taxable on a percentage of underlying income or gain exactly 
corresponding to its pro rata interest in the entity or arrangement?  Moreover, must it become 
entitled to that income or gain for tax purposes as soon as it arises to the entity or arrangement, even 
if it is not then distributed to the interest holder?    
 
As already mentioned the classic answer to both these questions is “yes”.  However, “tax 
transparency” is a number of variations on a theme.  One form of UK tax transparency exists where a 
life interest holder in an English law trust is regarded as entitled to distributed or undistributed 
income of the same character as that arising to the trustees from their activities, even if the quantum 
of that entitlement is reduced by taxes and other trust expenses which the trustees may deduct when 
                                                          
906 In purely economic, not legal, terms, the company is of course being taxed as a proxy for its members. 
907 But see the new US corporate shareholder exemption for non-US dividends discussed in 7.2.6.2.3.  For a 
summary of the competing arguments about how best to deal with economic double taxation of corporate 
profit, see “Tiley’s Revenue Law” (9th edition), Loutzenhiser at pages 1095-1100.  
908 Of course a low headline rate of corporation tax is but one factor in determining whether there is a low 






calculating the life interest holder’s precise entitlement909.  It can also be argued that, so long as trust 
beneficiaries are treated as entitled to income and gain of the same character as that arising to the 
trustees, it matters less whether that entitlement arises precisely when the income or gain arises to 
the trustees.  Hence another, modified form of “tax transparency” arguably exists where the 
beneficiaries of a discretionary trust are treated as entitled to a blended mix of the underlying income 
arising to the trustees, but only if and when that income is subsequently distributed to them910.    
 
More radical variants of “tax transparency” exist compared to those described above. It is not a single 
concept, as tax planners know, and its precise form will depend on the specific rules which are being 
applied.  Hence, in UK income tax law, partners in a partnership are regarded as carrying on the 
underlying business of the partnership collectively so that they are entitled to the distributed and 
undistributed profits of that business, and incur its losses, in direct proportion to their profit-sharing 
entitlements.  This goes beyond merely saying that the source and character of their income is 
unaffected by interposing the partnership911.   When taxing partnership capital gains, UK tax law goes 
even further (in Sections 59 and 59A TCGA, amplified by Statement of Practice D12): it treats each 
partner as having a fractional interest in each and every underlying partnership asset. The size of 
these deemed co-ownership interests of partners corresponds to the partnership’s profit–sharing 
arrangements. They are a tax fiction because a partner cannot usually say that it is entitled to a 
specific undivided interest in any partnership asset912.  Sections 59 and 59A TCGA are burdensome 
because each partner must keep track of its fractional interests in the underlying partnership assets, 
its base cost in each of those interests as well as any relevant increases or reductions.  Increases and 
reductions in fractional interests can sometimes be taxable disposals, in which an unfunded tax 
liability may arise913.     
 
Occasionally, UK tax law adopts a less radical transparency analysis when taxing partnership capital 
gains: see Schedule 7AD TCGA, where an insurance company is a limited partner in a “venture capital 
investment partnership”914.  In that case Section 59 TCGA 1992 is largely disapplied.  
 
Whatever form it takes, “tax transparency” rarely means that one can disregard altogether for UK tax 
purposes an entity or arrangement i.e. treat it as a tax “nothing” so that, for example, one can trace 
degrees of affiliation between other taxable persons via that entity or arrangement as if it simply did 
not exist.  A rare non-UK example of such a tax “nothing” can arise under the US “check-the-box” 
regulations where a single-member “eligible entity” (e.g. a single-member LLC) is “disregarded” for 
Federal tax purposes.  In that case, the entity is simply treated as a branch of the single member915.  
Hence transactions between the entity and the single member are in principle ignored, because the 
entity has ceased to have a separate tax existence.   
 
                                                          
909 See Baker v Archer-Shee 11 TC 749 and related cases in 4.3.3 above. 
910 See Drummond v Collins 8 TC 525. 
911 See, for income tax purposes, Sections 846 et seq. ITTOIA. 
912 This is true in relation to both English and Scottish partnerships.  For a discussion of this issue, see Bayonet 
Ventures LLP and another v HMRC [2018] UKFTT 262 (TC) and Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1993] 
STC 293 at 297-8.  
913 Statement of Practice D12 (as revised) seeks to mitigate some of this tax exposure, especially when 
partnership sharing ratios change e.g. on the departure of a partner or the admission of a new partner.  
914 As defined in paragraph 2 Schedule 7AD. 
915 See 7.2.4.2.  The US “grantor trust” rules can have a similar effect, although the same cannot be said of their 






Another rare example of an entity being disregarded for tax purposes arises in relation to VAT.  If two 
companies elect to be treated as a “group”, the VAT legislation in principle treats the group members 
for most purposes as being one person only i.e. whichever group member is chosen to be the so-
called “representative member”.  In most cases, transactions between the group members are 
therefore disregarded916.   
 
The VAT example also shows that the “tax transparency” concept is not confined to taxes on income 
and gains, but that is where it is mainly encountered.  By contrast, single entities are not usually 
regarded as “transparent” for VAT purposes and this is increasingly true in relation to Inheritance Tax, 
since the 2006 changes to the taxation of “settlements”. Even in relation to the tax on income and 
gains, some entities (notably trusts) which one might expect to be “transparent” may in fact be 
“opaque” or, at least, only partly “transparent”, depending on the tax in question and the nature of 
the beneficial interests in the trust.  
 
8.4  “Tax transparency” versus anti-avoidance attribution rules: what is the difference and when does 
it matter? 
 
Whether there is transparency, and what form it takes, are policy choices to tax certain persons or 
arrangements in a particular way.  The “tax transparency” concept is not self-evident917.  Where this 
concept treats the holder of an interest in an entity as entitled to underlying income or gain, whether 
or not distributed, then it fulfils a function quite similar to the many tax rules (e.g. the UK “controlled 
foreign company” rules918 and the income tax “settlement” rules919) which combat tax deferral or 
avoidance by imposing current-basis taxation on accrued but undistributed income or gain of an 
entity or arrangement.   
 
However, the effect of “tax transparency” is not quite the same as those other rules (“attribution 
rules”) and overall, it is helpful to distinguish between the two.  Such attribution rules tend to contain 
quite carefully designed exceptions to the general attribution rule, including defences based on the 
taxpayer lacking an avoidance motive920. Such rules only attribute income to a non-UK-resident 
taxpayer in limited situations: see fn7.  Where an arrangement is treated as “tax transparent”, such 
exceptions are less likely to exist.  Tax on distributed or undistributed income and gain will simply be 
charged by reference to the pro rata interest of the taxpayer in the “transparent” entity or 
arrangement. That will be true whether or not the taxpayer is UK-resident. 
 
Conversely, where such attribution rules bite, they may be quite sweeping, even draconian. This is 
because they have an explicit or implicit921 goal of counteracting avoidance. For example, where the 
“settlement” rules in Chapter 5 Part 5 ITTOIA bite, the “settlor” can be taxed on attributed income 
from the “settlement” even if as a matter of contract or property law, the “settlor” has no meaningful 
                                                          
916 For further discussion, see 5.4.5. 
917 Even though it is very long-established in some areas e.g. the income taxation of partnerships, where it goes 
back to the very origins of UK income tax at the start of the nineteenth century.   
918 Part 9A TIOPA. 
919 Part 5 Chapter 5 ITTOIA.  
920 E.g. Part 9A Chapters 9 and 11 TIOPA, in relation to the “controlled foreign company” rules; and Section 742A 
ITA in relation to the “transfer of assets abroad” rules.  
921 Such rules do not always explicitly articulate an anti-avoidance purpose.  The “settlement” rules in Part 5 
Chapter 5 ITTOIA do not (unlike the “transfer of assets abroad” rules in Part 13 Chapter 2 ITA), although they do 






claim on that income922.  The “settlor” charge applies in essence because the “settlor” has instigated 
the arrangement, and is regarded as having ongoing influence over it, even if others (e.g. minor 
children) are its economic beneficiaries.  By contrast, where an arrangement is “tax transparent”, the 
tax liability of a person with an interest in that arrangement will be more tightly linked to their actual 
economic stake in the underlying activities.  This is because arrangements are not usually treated as 
“tax transparent” in order to combat avoidance. Hence the income tax liability of a partner in a 
partnership will be measured by reference to that partner’s profit-sharing entitlement923, whether or 
not the partner has significant influence within the partnership.  Under the rule in Baker v Archer-
Shee, the holder of the interest in possession in the trust is only entitled for tax purposes to those 
underlying income items which would also be income for trust law purposes.  In short, only those 
items which it could demand from the trustees in its capacity as income beneficiary924.  
Furthermore, attribution rules of the kind mentioned above do not always treat the taxpayer as 
entitled to the actual underlying income or gain of an entity or arrangement.  This is true, for 
example, of the UK “controlled foreign company” rules925, which impose a tax charge on a separate 
notional amount computed by reference to certain types of income, but not capital gains, of the 
“controlled foreign company”. Atypically, the UK rules for taxing “participators” on the chargeable 
gains of non-UK-resident “close companies” purport to tax the company’s actual gain, at least where 
the “participator” has a direct interest in that company: see Section 3 TCGA926.   
 
UK attribution rules do not usually disregard the entity or arrangement at which they are targeted927.  
Hence they do not go as far as the more radical variants of “tax transparency”.  They usually operate 
asymmetrically, attributing amounts in respect of income and gain, but not losses, to the taxpayers 
caught by them. This is consistent with their anti-avoidance rationale. By contrast, in cases of “tax 
transparency”, it is more common to treat the interest holder as entitled to relief for underlying 
losses of the entity, in proportion to its economic interest, as well as being taxable on its share of 
underlying profits.  This is certainly true in relation to partnerships and trusts with vested concurrent 
beneficial interests in both income and capital.  However, it is not the case in relation to vested 
income interests in trusts928. 
 
There is therefore a meaningful distinction in UK tax law between cases of “tax transparency” and, on 
the other hand, attribution rules.  However, there is one area where it makes sense to treat 
attribution rules as a form of “tax transparency”.  This area involves “fiscal transparency” clauses of 
the kind which are increasingly widespread in UK tax treaties, not least because of Article 1(2) of the 
OECD Model and Article 3(1) of the MLI).  Article 1(2) in particular applies to “income derived by or 
                                                          
922 Other than in highly contingent situations. 
923 See, for example, Section 850 ITTOIA, together with Section 12ABZB TMA. 
924 See 4.3.3.  
925 See Bricom Holdings Ltd v IRC [1997] STC 1179. A similar approach is now adopted by the “transfer of assets 
abroad” rules in Part 13 Chapter 2 ITA, following changes in 2013: see in particular Section 721(3B) and Section 
728(1A) ITA.  
926 This means that, in contrast to the “controlled foreign company” rules and “transfer of assets abroad” rules, 
double tax treaty protection may override the Section 3 charge where the non-UK-resident company is treaty-
protected, although this override is denied where the “participator” is a trust: see Section 79B TCGA.  In any 
case, such treaty protection is unlikely to survive as UK treaties increasingly include the kind of “saving” clause in 
Article 1(3) of the OECD Model and Article 11 of the MLI. 
927 Unlike, for example, the US “grantor trust” rules. 






through an entity or arrangement that is treated as wholly or partly fiscally transparent [emphasis 
added] under the tax law of either Contracting State”.   
 
Article 1(2) has been discussed at 5.2. The author considers (for the reasons given in 6.4.2) that, if one 
adopts a purposive interpretation of Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3(1) of the MLI929, 
such attribution rules do give rise to a form of “fiscal transparency”.  Otherwise the underlying 
purpose of Article 1(2) and Article 3(1) may well be frustrated.  Article 1(2) applies if the income in 
question is liable to current taxation in the hands of a resident of the non-source contracting state.  It 
should not matter how that liability is achieved mechanically, so long as it is achieved in substance.  
The words “fiscally transparent” should be read accordingly.  
 
Consequently, if an entity is regarded as “opaque” for tax purposes in the residence state of an entity 
member (e.g. a shareholder), but that member is currently taxable in that state on an attributed 
amount (e.g. under a “controlled foreign company” rule) reflecting some or all of that entity’s income 
from the other contracting state, then failing to apply Article 1(2) would largely frustrate its purpose. 
That situation does not differ materially from where the entity is regarded as a partnership by the 
residence state of the member, so that the latter is currently taxable on an allocated share of the 
entity’s underlying income.   
 
Concerns may be raised that if Article 1(2) is interpreted in this way, then this may limit, via treaty, the 
scope of a domestic anti-avoidance regime.  Such concerns can be addressed, not least by the type of 
“saving” clause long present in US treaties, and now much more widespread because of Article 1(3) of 
the OECD Model930.  “Saving” clauses ensure that the treaty does not remove the right of the state 
where the entity member is resident to tax that member (notably under attribution rules) as if the 
treaty did not exist931.  Nevertheless, a “saving” clause will usually preserve the right of a resident of 
that state to claim double taxation relief (by credit or exemption) under the “Elimination of Double 
Taxation” Article in that treaty.  This Article may give more generous relief against the residence state 
tax charge than would be available otherwise.  However, that does not justify denying relief in the 
source state (via Article 1(2) of the OECD Model or Article 3(1) of the MLI) where a resident of one 
state is currently taxed under attribution rules in respect of income of an “opaque” entity which is 
sourced in the other state.   
 
8.5 Entity classification and “tax transparency”: key aspects of tax sovereignty 
 
                                                          
929 See the dicta of Mummery J. (as he then was) in IRC v Commerzbank AG [1990] STC 285. Mummery J’s 
exposition of the purposive UK approach to interpreting tax treaties, based on Articles 31-2 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, has been frequently cited in subsequent cases as a classic summary of the 
general approach, although limited aspects of it are open to question.  For a fuller discussion, see Philip Baker: 
“The Commerzbank Litigation (1990) UK Law, Tax Treaty Law and EU Law” Chapter 15 “Landmark Cases in 
Revenue Law” ed. John Snape and Dominic de Cogan. Hart Publishing 2019 and especially at pages 335-341. As 
Philip Baker rightly points out, the interpretation of the 1945 UK-US treaty which Mummery J in fact adopted in 
that case was rather literal, despite his general comments on treaty interpretation. Furthermore, from a US 
perspective, it was excessively generous to the taxpayer.     
930 Also Article 11 of the MLI.  
931 Hence the taxpayer’s claim for treaty relief in a case like Padmore v IRC [1989] STC 493 would fail. As 
discussed in 6.2, the situation in Padmore has already been addressed via a retrospective treaty override, as 






If a jurisdiction is to preserve its own tax sovereignty and its tax base, then its laws must define those 
persons which are of relevance when imposing its taxes, especially those entities which it regards as 
taxpayers in their own right.  Ceding control of those definitions to other jurisdictions, or to 
supranational laws and courts, means losing control of the shape and structure of a jurisdiction’s tax 
system. For example, if the UK does not have the final say over what is a “company” for the purposes 
of its corporation tax, then it lacks control over the extent of that tax. Deciding what is and is not a 
“company” may also be relevant in determining other aspects of the UK tax base e.g. the extent of 
any double taxation relief where a UK-resident individual bears the economic burden of non-UK tax 
on the profits of a non-UK entity in which that person has invested.  
 
Some jurisdictions (e.g. South Africa in some cases932) have nevertheless been prepared to part-align 
their own rules on defining entities with those of other jurisdictions, when deciding the tax treatment 
of cross-border arrangements. The extent of such alignment varies. It can of course significantly 
reduce entity classification mismatches which can lead to tax avoidance.  However, this non-
autonomous classification approach is the exception rather than the rule. It erodes tax sovereignty by 
tying the boundaries of one jurisdiction’s tax system to the entity classification choices (present or 
future) of another jurisdiction. It may also give rise to further mismatches in situations involving third 
countries, unless it can be selectively overridden so as to prevent further avoidance. Even within the 
EU, this non-autonomous classification approach has not found much favour. When the EU Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive933 was first mooted in 2015/6, suggestions were made934 that it should impose on 
Member States uniform entity classification rules so as to avoid double non-taxation.  Article 10 of the 
original text therefore read: 
                                                          
932 In particular its rules regarding “foreign partnerships” in Section 1 of the South African Income Tax Act. This 
concept is designed to ensure that entities such as US LLCs and UK LLPs are treated as partnerships, not 
companies, for South African tax purposes, despite them having legal personality.  The definition in Section 1 
reads: “’foreign partnership’, in respect of any year of assessment, means any partnership, association, body of 
persons or entity formed or established under the laws of any country other than the Republic if— 
(a) for the purposes of the laws relating to tax on income of the country in which that partnership, association, 
body of persons or entity is formed or established—(i) each member of the partnership, association, body of 
persons or entity is required to take into account the member’s interest in any amount received by or accrued 
to that partnership, association, body of persons or entity when that amount is received by or accrued to the 
partnership, association, body of persons or entity; and (ii) the partnership, association, body of persons or 
entity is not liable for or subject to any tax on income, other than a tax levied by a municipality, local authority or 
a comparable authority, in that country; or 
 (b) where the country in which that partnership, association, body of persons or entity is formed or established 
does not have any applicable laws relating to tax on income—(i) any amount—(aa) that is received by or 
accrued to; or (bb) of expenditure that is incurred by, the partnership, association, body of persons or entity is 
allocated concurrently with the receipt, accrual or incurral to the members of that partnership, association, 
body of persons or entity in terms of an agreement between those members; and 
(ii) no amount distributed to a member of a partnership, association, body of persons or entity may exceed the 
allocation contemplated in subparagraph (i) after taking into account any prior distributions made by the 
partnership, association, body of persons or entity.” http://sars.mylexisnexis.co.za/# (accessed 14 July 2020). 
This definition is intended to incentivise foreign investment in South Africa.  The highlighted carve-out for 
municipal, etc taxes is designed to ensure, in particular, that German partnerships are “foreign partnerships,” 
even though such partnerships are subject as such to the German municipal trade tax (“Gewerbesteuer”). 
933 Directive 2016/1164 of 19 July 2016, as amended by Directive 2017/952 of 29 May 2017.  
934 See “Hybrid Mismatches under the ATAD I and II” G.K. Fibbe and A.J.A. Stevens. EC Tax Review 2017/3 page 







“Where two Member States give a different legal characterisation to the same taxpayer (hybrid 
entity), including its permanent establishments in one or more Member States, and this leads to a 
situation where a deduction of the same payment, expenses or losses occurs both in the Member 
State in which the payment has its source, the expenses are incurred or the losses are suffered and 
in another Member State or a situation where there is a deduction of a payment in the Member 
State in which the payment has its source without a corresponding inclusion of the same payment 
in the other Member State, the legal characterisation given to the hybrid entity by the Member 
State in which the payment has its source, the expenses are incurred or the losses are suffered 
shall be followed by the other Member State.”  
 
This draft Article only addressed mismatches giving rise to (i) a double deduction mismatches and (ii) 
mismatches where a payer deduction did not give rise to a payee income inclusion. It gave priority to 
the entity classification in the Member State where a payment was sourced. It would not have 
addressed classification mismatches involving transactions with non-EU jurisdictions (notably, the 
USA). The draft Article was abandoned, despite support from the European Parliament935.  Instead, 
Articles 9 and 9a of that Directive follow the BEPS Action 2 Recommendations more closely.  
Therefore, Article 9 simply counteracts some of the double non-taxation effects of classification 
mismatches, without altering entity classification. Article 9a (see 6.8.7.2) imposes non-“transparent” 
treatment on “reverse hybrids” in certain intra-EU situations. Where it applies, it takes priority over 
Article 9936. Therefore, the Directive in its final form (like BEPS Action 2) does not significantly 
challenge the right of Member States to formulate their own entity classification rules.  
 
Of course, if a jurisdiction retains full control of how to characterise legal persons and arrangements 
for tax purposes, classification differences may well arise with other jurisdictions. That creates scope 
for planning to achieve abnormally low rates of effective taxation.  It is those planning opportunities 
which are partly addressed in the first part of the OECD’s October 2015 recommendations regarding 
BEPS Action 2, and in Articles 9 and 9a of the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. 
 
Particular problems arise when classifying entities or arrangements formed outside the relevant 
jurisdiction, under other legal systems. In a global economy, such problems are far from rare.  It is 
likely to be hard to apply the relevant jurisdiction’s criteria for classifying its own domestic entities to 
entities or arrangements formed under another system of law.  The laws of other jurisdictions will 
often be based on a different underlying culture and legal tradition.  In Europe and the United States, 
it is important to distinguish between common law entities and those stemming from the civil law 
tradition.  In addition, within both common law and civil law traditions, different jurisdictions take 
different approaches about what entities can be formed and their nature and attributes.  To take the 
common law as an example, an English law general partnership is never regarded as an entity distinct 
from its partners but the same is not true of partnerships formed under the laws of the states of the 
USA, or indeed under the law of Scotland (which is a “mixed system” borrowing from both the 
common law and the civil law). 
 
                                                          
935 See Parada: Article 1(2) op. cit. at pages 372-3.  
936 Article 9a is not dissimilar to rules enacted previously in Denmark to counteract mismatches involving Danish 






As part of its tax sovereignty, and as well as classifying entities, a jurisdiction must also be entitled to 
decide whether and how to treat an entity or arrangement as “transparent”.  This is true whether it is 
formed under the laws of that jurisdiction or elsewhere.  The question whether and how an entity or 
arrangement is “transparent” need not always be the same as the question of how to classify it. For 
example, the Supreme Court in Anson v HMRC937 concluded that the nature of an interest in a 
particular Delaware LLC was such that it was “transparent” for foreign tax credit purposes.  The court 
did not definitively conclude938 whether that LLC was a “company” or a “partnership” for UK tax 
purposes, because the rules it was considering did not require it to.  However, that is not true of all 
rules and the way in which an entity is classified may well determine whether and how to treat it as 
“transparent”, because transparency is a key characteristic of some entities.  In particular, if an entity 
is a “partnership” for UK tax purposes, then it will be “transparent” for the purposes of taxing its 
income and gains.  That transparency will take the particular forms provided for in Section 850 ITTOIA 
and Section 59 TCGA.  
 
8.6  Weaknesses in the UK approach to entity classification and “tax transparency”, and suggested 
improvements 
 
8.6.1  Entity classification 
 
The existing UK entity classification rules are an amalgam of specific statutory rules (of fairly limited 
ambit939); judicial decisions regarding mainly non-UK entities (and usually narrowly focussed on case 
specifics); plus published HMRC guidance (much of which purports to interpret the few judicial 
decisions to date). There is a clear statutory requirement to distinguish, for corporation tax purposes 
between “companies” on the one hand, and partnerships and trusts on the other940.  “Companies” 
include “unincorporated associations” and there is controversy about what this category covers 
too941.  Non-UK entities with a sufficient UK tax presence (in particular, those carrying on a trade of 
dealing in or developing UK land; or carrying on any other trade through a UK “permanent 
establishment”942) can be subject to corporation tax, but only if they are “companies”.  Therefore, 
these classification categories potentially apply to entities formed outside the UK.   
 
The rules for classifying entities or arrangements formed under English (or Scottish) law are fairly 
prescriptive.  Hence there should be a high degree of certainty about whether such entities or 
arrangements are “companies”, partnerships or trusts for UK tax purposes943.  The same is not true of 
entities or arrangements formed outside the UK.  In such cases, the rules are vaguer, largely judge-
made and more fact-sensitive.  In essence, classification usually depends on deciding what English law 
entity most closely resembles the relevant non-UK entity or arrangement.  This may not be easy to 
answer, not least because non-UK entities or arrangements may have no clear English analogue.  A 
                                                          
937 [2015] STC 1777: see 2.14. 
938 The Supreme Court clearly did not want to delve too deeply into wider entity classification questions, such as 
the nature of a Scottish partnership versus a Delaware LLC. It was able to steer clear of such issues by focussing 
closely on the factual findings of the First-Tier Tribunal regarding Delaware law, together with the precise 
wording of the “Elimination of Double Taxation” Article in the UK-US double tax treaty.     
939 E.g. the rules deeming a UK LLP to be a partnership for direct tax purposes in most cases.  
940 Although some trusts e.g. “authorised” unit trusts and some “unauthorised” unit trusts, are explicitly subject 
to corporation tax.   
941 See 2.5.  
942 Section 5 CTA 2009.  






good example of this is the foundation, or “Stiftung”, which can be set up under the law of some civil 
law countries.  Is this a company or is it a trust or is it something else944?  If the question is being 
asked in the context of Inheritance Tax, does this entity still amount to a “settlement”945 even if it is 
not a trust? 
 
There is also no agreed hierarchy of key criteria for comparing a non-UK entity or arrangement with 
any UK counterparts.  In contrast with the Netherlands (see 7.3), there is a non-exhaustive list of 
administrative guidelines from HMRC.  With limited exceptions, there is no clear order of priority 
within these guidelines, which in any case purport to address the question of “transparency”, rather 
than entity classification as such. Their status after the Anson litigation is unclear. Besides, the UK’s 
more nebulous approach to classifying entities and arrangements not formed under English or 
Scottish law may well breach EU law. 
 
Existing classification criteria focus mainly on matters which are of significance from the perspective 
of UK corporate and partnership law946, without necessarily reflecting issues of importance under 
relevant non-UK legal systems.  For example, Dutch law also classifies non-Dutch entities by seeking 
analogies with Dutch entities.  In so doing, it places a much greater emphasis than the UK on whether 
entity members can freely transfer their interests in the entity.   
 
Analysing the governing law of the relevant non-UK entity and then seeking its closest UK analogue is 
also problematic at a practical level.  It depends heavily on the quality of expert evidence on pertinent 
aspects of the relevant non-UK governing law.  The lack of clear classification criteria for non-UK 
entities, and their focus on UK-centric preoccupations, may lead to non-UK experts being asked 
questions about non-UK legal rules which are especially hard for those experts to understand947, in 
addition to any language barrier.  
 
The result is an expensive, cumbersome and protracted process which may well produce 
unsatisfactory answers to questions which are fundamental for UK tax purposes.  The expert evidence 
can only ever be as good as the questions which the experts are asked.  Experts can, and frequently 
do, disagree.  The UK tribunal (which by definition is not expert in the relevant non-UK law) often has 
to adjudicate between expert opinions in order to make key findings of fact about the non-UK legal 
position.  Those findings may be hotly contested by the parties (yet, being findings of fact, they are 
that much harder to appeal).  For example, HMRC regard as wrong the key finding by the First-Tier 
Tribunal in the Anson litigation, that the LLC members in that case were contractually entitled, under 
Delaware law, to underlying LLC profits as they arose.   
 
Even if the evidence of non-UK law in a particular case is clear or uncontested, it has no real weight as 
precedent because it is a finding of fact and no two cases are the same.  Therefore, a decision in one 
                                                          
944 See in this regard the discussion of Sommerer in 4.1.2.   
945 Within Section 43(2) IHTA: see 5.3.2. Can an entity be both a “settlement” and a “company” for Inheritance 
Tax purposes?  Sommerer suggests that it can. 
946 For example, the intense focus on the presence or absence of legal personality as a key dividing line between 
companies and partnerships, although this focus should have lessened after Anson.  To a US audience, the 
presence or absence of legal personality has little relevance for classification purposes. 
947 Such questions may only make sense, if at all, to those versed in the ways of the UK e.g. the question 
whether, for the purposes of the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee, a life interest holder in a trust is entitled to (i) 
underlying trust income as it arises to the trustees; or (ii) is only entitled to require the trustees to pay it a 






entity classification case may well not avoid the same laborious procedure in a similar, later case. 
Well-resourced and well-advised taxpayers have a very clear advantage when navigating the UK rules 
on classifying non-UK entities. This is exactly the imbalance between taxpayers which the US sought 
to address by introducing the “check-the-box” rules in 1997.  Such an imbalance is hard to justify in a 
world where cross-border transactions are commonplace.  However, it creates a “benefit”, at least 
from HMRC’s perspective: the ability of taxpayers to choose their preferred entity classification with 
certainty is limited because the current rules are cumbersome, uncertain and expensive to apply.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, the UK approach to classifying non-UK entities risks basing important 
distinctions on esoteric points with little real-world relevance.  The Anson litigation is a good example.  
The Supreme Court ruled in favour of “transparency” for UK foreign tax credit purposes because the 
LLC members were entitled to the underlying LLC profits as they arose (at least as a matter of 
contract), and were therefore not in the same position as the shareholders of a corporation, whose 
entitlement to profits requires a prior decision of that company to distribute profits948, which in the 
first instance belong to the corporation itself.  Yet in practice the LLC members in Anson were not 
much better placed than shareholders of a company in terms of their entitlement to receive 
distributions of profit.  They may have had a theoretical profit entitlement in the LLC’s books.  
Whether that book entry entitlement would ever be satisfied by an actual distribution was a separate 
question.  In a world where the substantive difference between partnerships and companies is 
increasingly small, the UK entity classification rules seem to rely on criteria which have minimal 
business significance. 
 
In order to escape from these problems, and to protect the UK corporate tax base from erosion, the 
UK should be much slower to confer on business entities (UK or non-UK) a status (in particular, 
partnership status) which would lead to “transparency”. This would require reversing trends which 
have seen the UK treat large, centrally-managed UK and non-UK business entities (notably, UK and 
non-UK LLPs) as partnerships for most tax purposes. The result has been that, while such entities are 
quasi-private companies, that is not how they and their members are taxed.   
 
Instead “transparency” should be reserved for those business organisations which are much smaller 
and looser-knit aggregations of persons, and in particular which are not “centrally managed” to any 
significant degree. This approach would be more faithful to the concept of “partnership” which the 
draftsman probably had in mind when introducing the “partnership” carve-out from corporation tax 
in 1965949.  It would also greatly reduce the need for arcane legal analysis of non-UK entities to 
determine their UK tax classification.  All other entities or arrangements (including business trusts) 
not within this limited “transparency” category would be regarded as companies for tax purposes. 
“Unincorporated associations” would cease to be a relevant tax category in their own right.  
                                                          
948 Re Accrington Corporation Steam Tramways Company [1909] 2 Ch 40 and Re Buenos Ayres Great Southern 
Railway Co. Ltd, The Company v Preston [1947] 1 All ER 729, following Bond v Barrow Haematite Steel Co. [1902] 
1 Ch 353. In those cases, preference shareholders were only entitled to a dividend paid out of (any) profits 
remaining after reserving or carrying forward in the accounts such amounts as the directors thought 
appropriate. Hence the preference shareholders did not have an unqualified contractual right to a distribution 
of the positive balance on the company’s profit and loss account.   
949 A decision would also need to be taken about which “transparent” entities or arrangements were regarded 
as a partnership for tax purposes, because there are special taxing rules for partnerships and not all 
“transparent” arrangements (e.g. simple co-ownership) are partnerships.  In some cases, it may be appropriate 
to confer “transparency” on a business arrangement falling short of partnership under current standards e.g. a 







This approach would also protect the employment income tax and National Insurance base950. In 
particular, there would be far fewer opportunities for senior personnel in so-called “partnerships” to 
use their “partner” status951 to reduce income tax and National Insurance contributions on their 
remuneration. One can therefore expect opposition to any such proposed change952so an 
intermediate solution is set out below.  This “halfway house” mitigates some problems with 
classifying non-UK entities by analogy with UK entities. It also tackles some of the artificial tax 
planning arising from treating large business entities as “partnerships”, and hence “transparent”.   
 
This intermediate solution would involve switching to an entity classification regime which resembles 
the US “check-the-box” regime by being partly elective.  While it is well known that HMRC is opposed 
to this, this switch need not involve a wholesale adoption of the US system.  Like that system, there 
could be “per se” lists of UK and non-UK entities which would automatically be treated as companies 
for UK tax purposes and whose status could not therefore be modified by election. Those lists could 
be updated periodically to take account of new business entities. “Per se” categorisation is somewhat 
arbitrary but it ensures that the corporate tax base can only be modified by election within fairly tight 
boundaries.  
 
As discussed in 7.2.5.1, the scope of the US “per se” list for non-US entities is quite limited.  This need 
not be the case under a modified UK “check-the-box” approach.  A UK “per se” list could include, for 
example, all entities formed under both UK and non-UK incorporation procedures, whether or not 
such entities were capable of offering securities to the public.  Hence, a Dutch BV or a Luxembourg 
Sarl could be a “per se” company for UK tax purposes.  The same could be true of a US LLC, although 
this raises harder questions. In particular, there is little meaningful legal and commercial difference 
between a US LLC and US limited liability partnerships yet HMRC have historically treated the latter as 
partnerships for UK tax purposes.  Treating all US LLCs as “per se” companies would therefore create 
an arbitrary distinction between them and US limited liability partnerships, unless they too were 
treated as “per se” companies. That would probably be a step too far for an intermediate solution.  
                                                          
950 However, this approach may restrict the incidence of the new UK tax charge on the chargeable gains of non-
UK-residents which are derived directly or indirectly from UK real property.  That charge covers gains from 
direct disposals of interests in UK land (which would include an interest in a partnership to the extent that it 
held UK real property, because partnerships are “transparent”).  The new charge also covers indirect disposals 
of UK real property, such as certain disposals of interests in a “UK land-rich” company. To be “land-rich”, at least 
75% of that company’s gross assets must consist of interests in UK real property.  Hence this new charge on 
non-UK-residents is less likely to apply if they own UK real property via a non-“transparent” company, rather 
than via a partnership.  
951 Such arrangements are routinely used in respect of senior UK-based personnel working for hedge funds, and 
private equity funds, especially where those personnel are non-UK “domiciled” for tax purposes. These 
arrangements of course include “carried interest” arrangements which can entitle senior staff to remuneration 
in a form taxed at much lower rates as capital gain, and which does not trigger National Insurance liabilities.  
They also include special partnership allocations of non-UK-source income and gain where the partnership has 
non-UK income sources.  UK income tax on non-UK-domiciled staff in respect of such allocations can be 
deferred indefinitely, provided that they are not “remitted” to the UK. There are no National Insurance liabilities 
on such allocations if, in particular, they represent “profits of a trade, profession or vocation carried on wholly 
outside the United Kingdom”: see Section 15(1)(c) Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992.  
952 It may also be appropriate to offer a “transparency” regime, with safeguards, for some kinds of investment 
fund where professional investors value a fully “flow through” tax treatment. Any such regime would not extend 








There is also no need to replicate in full the US disregard of a single-member “eligible entity” in some 
cases.  That technique has been an especially fertile source of US mismatch planning. On the other 
hand, there is no need to replicate the US “publicly traded partnership” concept.  
 
Adopting a system more like the US system would provide a less costly, less time-consuming and 
more streamlined approach to entity classification issues, while reducing the existing advantage 
conferred on well-advised and well-resourced taxpayers.  It would also steer classification away from 
detailed analysis of non-UK law, plus esoteric classification criteria which are often based on an 
incomplete understanding of the relevant non-UK legal system.   
 
In response to the HMRC concerns mentioned above, several points can be made.  First, since 2016, 
the UK has radically revised and extended its rules for counteracting the tax avoidance effects of 
“hybrid mismatches”, including mismatches which can be more readily created because of an elective 
system for classifying entities.  The new rules are in Part 6A TIOPA and would continue to apply 
regardless.  Concerns have been raised about the new Part 6A (notably, its very broad scope, 
uncertainty about how parts of it operate and the fact that it applies automatically, even to 
commercially motivated structures). However, these concerns exist already. Moving to a more 
elective classification regime would not make this worse.  
 
Part 6A does not deal with all possible hybrid mismatches for UK tax purposes.  For example, it only 
applies for corporation tax, not income tax purposes.  However, a “targeted anti-avoidance rule” 
(“TAAR”) could also be introduced to restrict significantly tax-motivated entity classification elections, 
if a more elective system were adopted. That TAAR would need to be drafted so as to avoid making all 
entity classification elections ineffective for tax purposes953.  However, quite elaborate “regime 
TAARs” already exist in the tax legislation (e.g. the “loan relationship” rules in Parts 5 and 6 CTA 
2009954; the “derivative contract” rules in Part 7 CTA 2009955; and the Finance Act 2011 bank levy 
rules956).  These provide useful precedents which seek to ensure that the “main purpose” language of 
the TAAR does not prevent taxpayers making certain tax-efficient choices which are consistent with 
the policy of the relevant rules.  Something similar could be developed in relation to entity 
classification. It could for example disallow (in whole or in part) an election where one of its “main 
purposes” was to create a mismatch resulting in unintended double non-taxation between 
jurisdictions and/or to share between taxpayers savings derived from a tax mismatch.  There would 
therefore be some parallels between the last part of such a rule and the “structured arrangement” 
concept which is already used several times in Part 6A TIOPA (e.g. Section 259CA(7) and Section 
259DA(7) TIOPA).   
 
The HMRC hostility to elective entity classification is less easy to understand, because well-informed 
taxpayers already have significant freedom under the current rules to choose the desired UK tax 
                                                          
953 There is a general problem with the way in which the UK courts have interpreted very expansively the “main 
purpose” form of words which is used in most TAARs: see Michael McGowan: “HMRC v Lloyds Bank Leasing (No 
1) Ltd: the troublesome increase in the scope of the ‘sole or main object’ test” [2015] British Tax Review 649. 
954 See, in particular, Sections 455B-D CTA 2009. 
955 See, in particular, Sections 698B-D CTA 2009. 
956 See, in particular, paragraph 47 Schedule 19 Finance Act 2011, where some care is taken to ensure that the 
breadth of the anti-avoidance rule does not undermine activities and structures which reduce bank credit risk, 






classification of their preferred entity, without altering its key commercial features.  In particular, 
there are few substantive differences between a UK LLP and a UK private limited company.  Both are 
quite easy for a taxpayer to set up.  Yet the former is taxed as a partnership in most situations957 while 
the latter is fully subject to corporation tax.   
 
In relation to non-UK entities, HMRC have consistently taken the position that a US LLC should be 
regarded as a company for UK tax purposes (despite Anson), while generally accepting that a US LLP is 
“tax transparent”, on the basis that it is a partnership.  Yet commercially, there is usually little 
substantive difference between US LLCs and US LLPs, not least in terms of the procedure for setting 
them up. Well-resourced and well-advised taxpayers can therefore already set up non-UK entities 
with a local law constitution, suitably tailored to achieve either an “opaque” or a “transparent” 
outcome under UK tax law958, without altering the essential business structure. Hence the current UK 
system is “de facto” largely elective, but mainly for the benefit of those with the resources to obtain 
sophisticated professional advice.  
 
Even if a modified elective classification system is a bridge too far, the existing rules could still be 
significantly improved.  In particular, a less parochial approach is needed when classifying entities as 
“companies” versus “partnerships”, bearing in mind that these concepts are meant to apply to 
entities formed under both UK and non-UK law.  There is no necessary reason why a non-UK legal 
system will define a “partnership” in exactly the same way as English or Scottish law, with its central 
concept of a “business in common with a view of profit”959.  Similarly, a non-UK legal system may well 
confer on a putative “partnership” a degree of legal personality which is more fully-fledged than the 
rather qualified concept of legal personality which applies to Scottish partnerships.  For the reasons 
stated in Ryall v The DuBois Company Limited960, the “partnership” concept needs to be interpreted 
more malleably.  It would be better to focus above all on the role a type of entity fulfils (compared to 
other entities) under the commercial law of the relevant non-UK jurisdiction, when deciding if it is a 
“partnership”, rather than trying to shoehorn it into UK concepts of “partnership” without reference 
to the local law context961. The fact that the entity has features (e.g. a more fully-fledged legal 
personality; creation of the entity by registration; and a need for a prior decision at entity level before 
distributing profits) which may be inconsistent with the English law “partnership” paradigm should 
not be the end of the story.  This is especially true where civil law jurisdictions are concerned.  Here 
narrower concepts of agency law have given rise to two different forms of arrangement with 
                                                          
957 In limited situations, a UK LLP ceases to be taxed as a partnership and becomes subject to corporation tax. 
There have been cases where taxpayers have deliberately engineered such a change for avoidance purposes. 
Yet the relevant legislation still contains no TAAR to counter such strategies.   
958 In the immediate aftermath of Anson, a number of taxpayers looked closely at the structure of their US LLCs 
to ensure that they would continue to be regarded as “opaque” for UK tax purposes.  This is of course HMRC’s 
preferred classification of a US LLC.  
959 See Section 1 Partnership Act 1890.   
960 16 TC 431. 
961 This alternative approach already applies in relation to “unilateral” foreign tax credit relief where, following 
Yates v GCA International [1991] STC 157, HMRC issued Statement of Practice SP7/91.  In particular, when 
deciding whether a non-UK tax is an “income tax” for “unilateral relief” purposes, the answer “will be 
determined by examining the tax within its legislative context in the foreign territory and deciding whether it 
serves the same function as income and corporation tax serve in the UK in relation to the profits of the business” 
[emphasis added]. In making this statement, the UK tax authorities abandoned an earlier approach under which 
“…..the proportion of the gross amount charged to [non-UK] tax prompted the view that the [non-UK] tax could 






legitimate claims to be regarded as “partnerships”: namely, formal and informal partnerships.  There 
is no precise analogue for either in English partnership law, where the law of agency applies 
differently to partnerships. Yet that alone should not mean that these arrangements cannot be 
“partnerships” for UK tax purposes.   
 
One area where UK tax legislation made moves in a less parochial direction some time ago relates to 
“settlements”: these include more than common law trusts for both inheritance tax purposes962 and 
for the purposes of the income tax and capital gains tax “settlement” rules963 (but not for all income 
tax and capital gains tax purposes).  Those broader definitions can therefore cover non-trust-based 
civil law arrangements such as foundations (“Stiftungen”) which can have broadly similar wealth 
preservation and distribution effects to a trust, despite their structural differences.  
 
More recently, there are limited signs of movement in terms of defining a “partnership” less narrowly 
for UK direct tax purposes.  In Finance Act 2015, the UK enacted the “diverted profits tax” (“DPT”).  
This is a standalone tax, akin to corporation tax, on certain transactions aimed at eroding the UK 
corporation tax base either by creating mismatches of one sort or another, or by structuring UK 
business activity so that it avoids being a taxable “permanent establishment”.  For DPT purposes, a 
company is defined in accordance with Section 1121 CTA 2010964. However, this is supplemented by a 
non-exhaustive definition of “partnership” which reads965:  
 
‘”Partnership” includes (a) a limited liability partnership to which section 1273 of CTA 2009 applies 
[i.e. a UK LLP], and (b) an entity established under the law of a territory outside the United Kingdom 
of a similar character to a partnership [emphasis added], and “member” of a partnership is to be 
read accordingly’.   
 
“Of a similar character” clearly invites a court, in a DPT context, to interpret “partnership” in a manner 
which does not cling too closely to the English law paradigm.  This makes complete sense because 
DPT is most likely to apply to cross-border arrangements. 
 
8.6.2 “Tax transparency”: how far should it apply to partnerships? 
 
The UK approach to classifying entities (and in particular non-UK entities) could therefore be 
simplified and improved, without triggering major avoidance.  It could also be modified so as to 
strengthen the UK tax base. However, that is not the end of the story.  In particular, the fact that an 
entity is classified so that it is prima facie “tax transparent” need not lead to such treatment in all 
situations. “Transparency” is a tax policy choice.  In the past, such choices have not always been made 
in a manner which reflects underlying economic reality, and the different strands of the 
“transparency” concept have evolved piecemeal. 
 
The “tax transparency” of partnerships is an especially good example of this.  The classic UK position is 
that if an entity is a “partnership”, then it enjoys a high degree of tax transparency, especially when 
taxing its income and gains.  In particular, these are taxed at partner level only, on the basis that each 
partner (however lowly and wherever located) has a direct entitlement for tax purposes to the 
                                                          
962 Section 43(2) IHTA. 
963 In Part 5 Chapter 5 ITTOIA, and especially Section 620(1) ITTOIA.  
964 Section 114(1) FA 2015. 






underlying assets and income sources of the partnership.  A similar approach applies in respect of 
partnership losses.  Furthermore, an individual partner in a partnership is regarded in all cases as self-
employed.  Hence that partner is subject to a significantly lower National Insurance liability than an 
employee or director of a company who enjoys similar status.    
 
This largely all-or-nothing transparency approach to “partnerships” again overlooks the increasingly 
strong commercial similarities between limited liability partnerships on the one hand and private 
limited companies on the other966.  LLPs are now of course commonplace, especially where the 
“partnership” is engaged in active business (notably professional and financial services).  General 
services partnerships where partners retain unlimited liability for the firm’s obligations are now the 
exception rather than the rule in these sectors967.  Is it appropriate that the tax treatment of a 
member of a LLP968 should always differ so radically from that of a senior shareholder-employee or 
director of a limited company, when there are few significant commercial distinctions between these 
two types of entity?  
 
Not least because of the UK approach to “transparency”, partnership structures are routinely used to 
remunerate UK-resident high-earning individuals969 at abnormally low effective tax rates, even where 
their role mainly involves providing services in the UK to clients of the partnership. Partners in a 
partnership pay National Insurance at lower rates than similarly-remunerated employees, and there is 
no equivalent for partners of the separate employer’s National Insurance liability970. Furthermore, 
where the partnership is managed outside the UK despite carrying on part of its business in the UK, 
the fact that it is “tax transparent” gives considerable scope to allocate non-UK-source partnership 
income to UK-resident, but non-UK-domiciled partners.  They are then typically taxed on those 
income allocations on the much more generous “remittance” basis (i.e. if and when those profits are 
directly or indirectly repatriated to the UK).  The “remittance” basis is available whether or not those 
profits have been subject to significant non-UK taxation. The result is often very low effective taxation 
on income which is technically “non-UK source” (because of the “transparency” fiction) but which, in 
                                                          
966 The UK courts have been slow to adjust their thinking to reflect evolving business realities in relation to so-
called “partnerships”. For example, in MacKinlay v Arthur Young McLelland Moores & Co [1989] STC 898, the 
House of Lords overturned the Court of Appeal’s decision in favour of the taxpayer. Lord Oliver said at pages 
903-4, “…I am unable to accept that the purpose of ‘the partnership’, considered as if it has a separate legal 
identity, and the purpose of the individual partners for whose benefit the payment [of business-related removal 
expenses] enured can be segregated in this way….[T]he Court of Appeal…..appear to have been influenced by 
the sheer size of the partnership [which was a large nationwide firm of accountants] ….and to have considered 
that a large partnership falls in some way to be treated differently from a small partnership….Partners are 
partners, however numerous; and mere numbers cannot in itself justify an attribution of a ‘collective purpose’ 
unjustified in the case of a small partnership.”  This case regarding the relationship between a large nationwide 
accounting partnership and its partners predated the advent of LLPs, but it was the emergence of such large, 
centrally-managed partnerships which was the catalyst for LLPs.  
967 The famous London law firm, Slaughter & May, appears to be a rare enduring example of a major English law 
general partnership.   
968 The introduction in 2000 of the UK LLP vehicle followed intensive lobbying by, in particular, the accounting 
profession for an entity where the liability of members involved in firm management could be limited but which 
nevertheless was “transparent”, not “opaque”, for UK direct tax and National Insurance purposes.   
969 Especially where the partnership is a non-UK-managed partnership with significant non-UK income and the 
partner is non-UK-domiciled. There is a separate question, beyond the scope of this thesis, about whether some 
of these partnerships really are managed outside the UK.   
970 This 13.8% liability on all employee remuneration is a very significant extra tax cost for employers, even 






reality, is usually being paid to UK-resident partners for rendering services in the UK to clients.  Were 
those individuals receiving that remuneration from a non-UK company (e.g. a bank) carrying on 
business in the UK, then they would probably be subject to UK employee income tax on an arising 
basis, as well as employer and employee National Insurance contributions, on the basis that they 
were employees performing UK services971. The latter analysis better reflects economic reality.  
Hence, it is hard to justify a radical difference in individual tax treatment because an individual is a 
partner in a “transparent” partnership, especially when the difference between partnerships and 
companies is increasingly hard to pin down.   
 
Some would argue that there is a fundamental difference between the status of partner and the 
status of employee, because the former, but not the latter, is an entrepreneur. Hence the difference 
in tax treatment described above.  However, this argument is not strong, especially when partners are 
being compared with senior employees.  LLPs are now very widespread. LLP status ensures that 
“partners” typically bear levels of liability for the LLP’s obligations which do not differ significantly 
from those which a senior employee, with a large holding of incentive shares in its employer, would 
bear in relation to that employer company.  Indeed in industries such as financial services, regulatory 
changes have significantly increased the risk to senior employees of various financial and other 
sanctions, including possible remuneration “clawback”.  It is also standard practice for such senior 
employees’ significant shareholdings in their employers to be “locked in” over an extended period, 
just as partners contribute long-term capital to a partnership.  Hence a partner in a LLP and a senior 
employee of a company performing similar roles may nowadays be exposed to very similar business 
and legal liability risks.  Both are typically remunerated mainly on a performance-related basis: while 
partners are technically remunerated with a share of profits, that share, like a senior employee’s 
remuneration, will usually be heavily tied to prescribed individual performance targets.  A centralised 
management committee of the LLP or the employing company is likely to have very wide discretion to 
fix that remuneration.  Indeed management centralisation is now the norm in major partnerships (e.g. 
law firms and accounting firms).  Such management is typically secretive and it is ever rarer for major 
decisions to be put to a meaningful partnership vote.   
 
Hence the effective status of most partners within major partnerships is akin to that of senior 
company employees on performance-related pay packages.  It is therefore highly anomalous that the 
tax classification of a business entity, as a “transparent” partnership rather than a company, should 
often lead to much more favourable tax treatment for relevant senior staff than if they were formally 
employees.  As a matter of tax policy, a more level playing field is appropriate, in order to reflect 
economic reality better, even if the basic principle that the partnership is “transparent” for tax 
purposes is respected.    
 
Recent legislation has tried to correct some distortions which can arise if the “tax transparency” 
which typically flows from classifying an entity as a partnership is applied too widely.  In particular, the 
“salaried member” legislation introduced in 2014972 treats certain members of a UK LLP on relatively 
                                                          
971 Being non-UK-domiciled is much less likely to change this materially, because the “remittance” basis is less 
readily available in respect of the income of employees. 
972 See now Sections 863A-G ITTOIA. Even before this legislation was introduced, there was debate about 
whether a member of a UK LLP could ever be its employee, but mainly in relation to employment law, not tax 
law.  This debate centred on the obscure Section 4(4) Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000. It may well be 
irrelevant for tax purposes because, subject to the “salaried member” rules, UK LLP members are deemed to 






fixed remuneration, and with a relatively small say in the running of the LLP, as if they were in fact 
employees, not partners, for income tax and National Insurance purposes.  This change (which better 
reflects the real economic and management status of many LLP members) was hotly contested when 
introduced but partially addresses the distortions described above.  However, its impact is limited.  It 
does not in particular apply to non-UK LLPs, a number of which are very active, and very successful, in 
the UK.  If the playing field is to be levelled in the manner suggested above, there is much more to be 
done.  
 
Very similar points can be made about the UK taxation of “carried interest”.  This is a complex topic 
which can only be discussed here in summary.  “Carried interest” is a method of paying what are in 
effect performance-related fees to fund managers (e.g. in the hedge fund and “private equity” 
industries).  The fee entitlement (if any) can be very large.  It is typically structured as a special 
partnership interest.  Because partnerships are “transparent” for income tax and capital gains tax 
purposes, it is therefore regarded as an interest in underlying investments of the fund which is being 
managed.  One aim has been to characterise as much as possible of the profits from that special 
partnership interest as capital gain from those underlying managed assets, so that the recipient can 
access much lower effective tax rates than if the profits were simply treated as fee income for 
management services. An alternative aim may be for “carry” to be treated as derived from underlying 
non-UK-source income of a partnership, so that a non-UK-domiciled recipient can pay UK tax only on 
the “remittance” basis.  
 
Yet the underlying economic reality is that “carry” is fee income for providing services.  Moreover, this 
is the basis on which it would probably be taxed if, instead, it were simply paid by a fund manager 
which was a company (e.g. an investment bank), to a fund manager which was an employee.  
Therefore, the use of “transparent” partnerships to create “carry” structures lies at the root of 
unequal (and highly favourable) taxation of such profits.  In 2015-6, the UK enacted legislation973 
cutting back significantly the tax privileges of “carried interest”, without denying the basic 
“transparency” of the partnerships in question.  That legislation is a step in the right direction, not 
least because it limits the entitlement to capital gains tax treatment on such profits. However, it is 
complex, not least because it does not fully reverse the unequal tax treatment referred to above.  
There is already evidence of considerable planning activity to circumvent the 2015-6 changes.974.   
 
                                                          
Peter Wilson v HMRC [2020] UKFTT 230 (TC). The judge in that case also ruled (obiter) that, because of Section 
4(4), a member of an English law UK LLP could not be its employee for any purpose, following dicta of Lady Hale 
in the Supreme Court in an employment law case, Clyde & Co v Bates van Winkelhof  [2014] 1 WLR 2047. Lady 
Hale disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s previous reading of Section 4(4) in Tiffin v Lester Aldridge LLP [2012] 
IRLR 391. It is odd that the Supreme Court’s reading of Section 4(4) now distinguishes between English and 
Scottish LLPs. The LLP is a new UK-wide corporate vehicle. Its legal treatment should, where possible, not be 
coloured by any historical differences between England and Scotland about whether a general partnership can 
employ one of its members (see also fn 51). The courts’ conclusion also leaves English partnerships and LLPs in a 
different position compared to non-UK LLPs operating in the UK. As the latter typically have legal personality 
and are unaffected by Section 4(4), it is far from clear why their members cannot in suitable cases be employees 
of the non-UK LLP. Such non-UK LLPs are of course unaffected by the tax fictions in Sections 863 or 863A-G 
ITTOIA.  
973 See Sections 103KA-KH TCGA and Sections 809EZA-FZZ ITA. 
974 Although the UK rules go further than the much more modest limits on “long-term capital gain” treatment of 






If changes are required to better reflect the increasingly narrow difference between a LLP and a 
company, the law should also make it clearer that an affiliation between two companies can be traced 
through a partnership or a LLP.  It should also make it clearer how this is to be achieved, given the 
nature of a partnership. In particular, rules  are needed similar to those permitting one company to 
establish its indirect “beneficial ownership” of ordinary share capital in another company, by tracing 
ownership through one or more intermediate companies975.   
 
8.6.3 “Tax transparency”: trusts  
 
In relation to partnerships, the concept of “tax transparency” has been applied rather too generously 
for UK tax purposes, especially as the commercial differences between companies and partnerships 
have been steadily eroded. It has also been applied somewhat inconsistently, because “transparency” 
does not mean the same thing in relation to income tax as compared to capital gains tax (see 
Appendix A). It has yet another different meaning in relation to SDLT: see 5.7.  
 
By contrast, “tax transparency” has been applied more restrictively to UK trusts, especially since the 
IHT changes in 2006. Hence more situations give rise to economic double taxation i.e. taxation at the 
level of UK-taxpaying beneficiaries or settlors on distributed or undistributed trust income, gains and 
assets, without a full offset or refund for tax borne at the level of the UK trust.  The reasons for this 
have not always been clearly articulated and it is unsatisfactory that holding assets via UK trusts often 
carries a significant extra tax cost when compared to owning those assets directly.  Trusts have of 
course been used in the past for tax planning. However the pendulum has now swung too far the 
other way, given the legitimate non-tax reasons for keeping assets in trusts (notably, to protect assets 
and/or vulnerable or minor beneficiaries).  
 
“Bare trusts” aside, the only clear situation in which a beneficiary of a trust enjoys clear “look 
through” treatment for income tax purposes is under the rule in Baker v Archer-Shee. The oddities of 
this rule have already been explored in 4.3.3.2.  It does of course mean that a beneficiary with a 
vested interest in possession can be taxed on both distributed and undistributed trust income.  By 
contrast, it is sensible that beneficiaries under a discretionary trust are not taxed on undistributed 
trust income on a fully “transparent” basis, because they may never be entitled to that income.  It is 
also sensible that the trust, if UK-resident, is taxable on that income because otherwise there would 
be significant scope for deferral by allowing income to build up in the trust.  However, when 
discretionary beneficiaries do receive income from a UK-resident trust, there is a flawed mechanism 
for linking that income to the underlying income sources of the trust.  This can lead to inefficiencies, 
including economic double taxation as well as the beneficiary being unable to access preferential tax 
rates on distributions of certain types of underlying income (e.g. dividends).  These weaknesses are 
alleviated, but only in part, by concession and statute976.  
 
For capital gains tax purposes, unless a UK-resident trust is a Section 60 TCGA “bare trust”, then it is a 
taxable entity in its own right, and not merely on a “representative” basis977.  Hence economic double 
taxation can arise, once at the level of the trust and again at the level of the beneficiaries.  To give an 
example, the disposal of a beneficial interest in a non-“bare” trust is not always exempt from tax on 
                                                          
975 See Part 24 Chapter 3 CTA 2010. 
976 ESC B18 and Section 111 TIOPA.  






chargeable gains978. This is harsh bearing in mind that a trust is a mechanism for segregating, 
safeguarding and managing assets on behalf of beneficiaries.  In particular, the tax result if assets are 
held in trust is not harsher compared to what it would be if beneficiaries owned those assets directly.  
Unsurprisingly, such rules are an incentive to set up trusts outside the UK in low-tax jurisdictions: this 
largely eliminates UK tax at the level of the trust, unless the non-UK-resident trustees dispose directly 
or indirectly of UK real property979.    
 
As for inheritance tax, changes in 2006 have ensured that far more “settlements” are taxable under 
the UK’s highly unusual “relevant property” regime980.  Inheritance tax is then computed and charged 
on the settlement on a largely standalone basis which takes very little account of the inheritance tax 
status of the trust beneficiaries and of any reliefs to which they may be entitled981.  The result is likely 
to be more onerous taxation than if the assets were held directly by the trust beneficiaries. In the 
latter case, headline inheritance tax rates would be higher but available reliefs would be more 
generous (notably the “potentially exempt transfer” and the exemption for transfer between 
spouses).    
 
There is one type of UK trust where these economic double taxation problems are less pronounced.  
This is the UK “authorised” unit trust, a standard collective investment vehicle, interests in which can 
be marketed to retail investors.  Economic double taxation must be eradicated for such a vehicle to 
be viable.  This is not achieved by making it “tax transparent” in the UK on a pure “look through” 
basis.  Instead the trust is treated as a company for UK tax purposes but enjoys certain entity-level 
exemptions from tax on income and gain, provided that it does not engage in trading activity (which is 
unlikely). Normally there is taxation only at investor level on distributions982and there is scope for 
these to be characterised, for UK tax purposes, in the same way as the fund’s underlying income.  
Investors’ holdings are treated as shares in a company.  Hence there is no “look through” to the 
underlying assets of the unit trust983.  Because there is no “look through”, investors cannot claim relief 
for any non-UK tax on the income and gains of the unit trust. Also the losses of the trust (if any) are 
not investors’ losses for tax purposes, although they will no doubt be reflected in the value of 
investors’ units. 
 
8.6.4 “Tax transparency”: conclusion 
   
Even if an entity is classified in a way which typically lends itself to “tax transparency”984, the precise 
consequences of that transparent treatment need careful consideration.  Judging how far the concept 
of “transparency” should be allowed to run, and the form it should take, is at least as important as 
deciding how to classify an entity or arrangement in the first place.  In the past, the classification 
question has absorbed much judicial and practitioner time and energy, not least because of the 
weaknesses of the UK entity classification rules.  Those rules need a thorough overhaul and some 
                                                          
978 Under Section 76 TCGA but see also Section 76A and Schedule 4A TCGA.  
979 One also needs to take account of the various anti-deferral rules for taxing UK-resident settlors and 
beneficiaries on the undistributed gains of a non-UK trust: see Sections 86-98A TCGA.  
980 Part III Chapter III IHTA.  
981 HMRC saw the 2006 changes as a means of addressing abuse of the potentially more generous rules in Part 
III Chapter II IHTA.  In the limited cases where they remain applicable, those rules still produce a tax outcome 
which is closer to what would apply if the beneficiaries owned the trust assets directly. 
982 Where income is undistributed, investors can be taxed on deemed distributions so as to avoid tax deferral.    
983 This simplifies investor tax compliance, when they dispose of interests in the trust.  






suggestions have been made about how best to achieve this e.g. along the lines of a restricted entity 
classification election.   
 
However, the tax policy consequences of classifying entities in certain ways need as much scrutiny, 
especially where “tax transparency” is the expected outcome of a particular classification.  Currently, 
well-advised taxpayers retain too much scope to use, in particular, partnerships to achieve very low 
effective taxation.  By contrast, the UK taxation of trusts and equivalent wealth protection 
mechanisms needs to move towards a more broadly applicable, but modified version of 
“transparency”.  In particular, this would ensure that trust income and gain is taxed in a way which 




Appendix A: UK capital gains tax “transparency” of partnerships and LLPs and its wider implications 
 
A.1  Introduction 
 
No discussion of “tax transparency” in UK law can ignore the capital gains tax rules applying to 
partnerships and UK LLPs.  These rules are mainly in Sections 59-59A TCGA. Their approach is broadly 
similar to the treatment of “bare trusts” in Section 60 TCGA, but their approach is not identical.  
 




“(1) Where 2 or more persons carry on a trade or business in partnership –  
(a) tax in respect of chargeable gains accruing to them on the disposal of any partnership assets 
shall, in Scotland as well as elsewhere in the United Kingdom, be assessed and charged on 
them separately, and 
(b) any partnership dealings [emphasis added] shall be treated as dealings by the partners and not 
by the firm as such… 
(c) … 
(2) Subsection (3) applies if – 
(a) a person resident in the United Kingdom (“the resident partner”) is a member of a partnership 
which resides outside the United Kingdom or which carries on any trade, profession or business 
the control and management of which is situated outside the United Kingdom, and 
(b) by virtue of any arrangements that have effect under section 2(1) of TIOPA, (‘the 
arrangements’) any of the chargeable gains of the partnership are relieved from capital gains tax 
or corporation tax in the United Kingdom.  
(3) The arrangements (so far as providing for that relief) do not affect any liability to capital gains 
tax (or corporation tax) in respect of the resident partner’s share of any chargeable gains of the 
partnership.  
(4) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3) the members of a partnership include any person 
entitled to a share of chargeable gains of the partnership.” 
 
Subsections (2) – (4) are the UK override, for the purposes of taxing capital gains, of Padmore v IRC, 






(including a Scottish partnership and a non-UK partnership) disposes of any of its assets, the partners 
are to be separately assessed in respect of gains “accruing to them”. No further detail is provided on 
how the gains accruing to each partner in this way are to be quantified.  Nor is “partnership” defined. 
 
The ambit of Section 59(1)(b) is debateable. Read narrowly, it simply says that if the partnership itself 
deals with its assets, then that dealing is treated as being carried out by the partners themselves and 
not by the firm (which may or may not be a separate legal person).  In short, the partnership is 
“looked through” but only where the partnership itself deals with its assets.  This narrow reading 
means that Section 59(1)(b) adds very little to Section 59(1)(a).  It also risks creating a “look through” 
rule under Section 59(1) whose effect is narrower than the equivalent rule for UK LLPs in Section 59A, 
which is discussed below. That would be a strange and unintended outcome.  Hence “partnership 
dealings” should be given a broader meaning so that it means “dealings in connection with the 
partnership”. Section 59(1)(b) would then cover (i) an asset acquisition or disposal by the partnership, 
and (ii) a partner’s acquisition or disposal of its partnership rights, even if there were no concurrent 
acquisition or disposal of underlying assets by the partnership. This reading would make clearer that, 
under Section 59, the partner’s interest in the partnership is not a separate and distinct asset for the 
purposes of taxing capital gains,  
 
Even if this broader reading is correct, Section 59(1) does not “look through” the partnership so as to 
treat partners as simple co-owners of the underlying assets. The phrase “dealings by the partners” 
indicates that the partnership is not simply disregarded and its members are treated as dealing with 
partnership assets as partnership property. A partner’s interest in partnership property is a special 
kind of proprietary interest even if the partnership lacks legal personality.  It should not be equated 
with simple co-ownership (see 5.2).  
 
A.3  Section 59A TCGA: UK limited liability partnerships 
 
This Section was inserted long after Section 59 to deal with the taxation of UK LLPs. It provides for 
when a UK LLP is to be “looked through” for the purposes of taxing chargeable gains. Where it 
operates, the UK tax authorities expect the outcome for UK LLPs to correspond to that for 
partnerships under Section 59. This is sensible but Section 59A is worded differently from Section 59.  
In particular, it states: 
 
“(1) Where a limited liability partnership carries on a trade or business with a view to profit –  
(a) assets held by the limited liability partnership are treated for the purposes of tax in respect of 
chargeable gains as held by its members as partners, and  
(b) any dealings by the limited liability partnership are treated for those purposes as dealings by its 
members in partnership (and not by the limited liability partnership as such) [emphasis 
added]; 
and tax in respect of any chargeable gains accruing to the members of the limited liability 
partnership on the disposal of any of its assets shall be assessed and charged on them separately.  
(2) For all purposes, except as otherwise provided, in the enactments relating to tax in respect of 
chargeable gains –  
(a) references to a partnership include a limited liability partnership in relation to which 
subsection (1) above applies, 







(c) references to a company do not include such a limited liability partnership, and  
(d) references to members of a company do not include members of such a limited liability 
partnership. 
(3) Subsection (1) above continues to apply in relation to a limited liability partnership which no 
longer carries on any trade or business with a view to profit – 
(a) if the cessation is only temporary, or  
(b) during a period of winding up following a permanent cessation, provided – 
(i) the winding up is not for reasons connected in whole or in part with the avoidance of tax, and  
(ii) the period of winding up is not unreasonably prolonged, but subject to subsection (4) below. 
(4) Subsection (1) above ceases to apply in relation to a limited liability partnership –  
(a) on the appointment of a liquidator or (if earlier) the making of a winding-up order by the court, 
or 
(b) on the occurrence of any event under the law of a country or territory outside the United 
Kingdom corresponding to an event specified in paragraph (a) above. 
(5) Where subsection (1) above ceases to apply in relation to a limited liability partnership with the 
effect that tax is assessed and charged –  
(a) on the limited liability partnership (as a company) in respect of chargeable gains accruing on 
the disposal of any of its assets, and  
(b) on the members in respect of chargeable gains accruing on the disposal of any of their capital 
interests in the limited liability partnership [emphasis added],  
it shall be assessed and charged on the limited liability partnership as if subsection (1) had never 
applied to it. 
(6) Neither the commencement of the application of subsection (1) above nor the cessation of its 
application in relation to a limited liability partnership shall be taken as giving rise to the disposal 
of any assets by it or any of its members”.  
 
The last two lines of Section 59A(1) are very similar to Section 59(1)(a) in relation to partnerships. 
Section 59A(1) does not use the concept of “partnership dealings” which appears in Section 59(1). 
Instead, Section 59A(1)(b) treats dealings by the limited partnership entity itself (e.g. the acquisition 
or disposal of assets by that entity) as if they had been carried out by the LLP members. It is not 
possible to give Section 59A(1)(b) the wider interpretation suggested above for “partnership dealings” 
in Section 59(1).   
 
Hence Section 59A(1)(b) does not cover the disposal of a member’s interest in the LLP. However, that 
leaves Section 59A(1)(a), which has no equivalent in Section 59. Section 59A(1)(a) applies a form of 
“look through”: the LLP’s members are treated as holding its assets directly, but as partners rather 
than simple co-owners. Hence, Section 59A(1)(a) treats the LLP’s members as having the special kind 
of proprietary interest (see 5.2) which partners in an English general partnership have in partnership 
property. Therefore, Section 59A(1) does not treat LLP members as part-owning particular LLP assets 
in simple percentage shares.  Both it and Section 59 differ from Section 60 TCGA, which does operate 
on the basis of co-ownership and where the nature of a partner’s interest in partnership property is 
irrelevant.  
 
Consequently, when taxing chargeable gains, a member’s interest in a UK LLP seems to be 
disregarded as a separate asset from the underlying assets of the LLP. The member is deemed to part-
own these as a partner under Section 59A(1)(a). This is obliquely confirmed by Section 59A(3)-(6) 






Section 59A(5)(b) indicates that, once Section 59A(1) ceases to apply, each member’s “capital 
interest” in the LLP (a concept not mentioned until then) becomes a separate capital asset for tax 
purposes. That is logical because once Section 59A(1)(a) ceases to apply, the tax fiction that it is a 
partnership, not a company, falls away retroactively. 
 
A.4  Statement of Practice D12 (“SP D12”) 
 
Therefore, Sections 59-59A apply a qualified form of “transparency” to partnerships and UK LLPs but 
fail to spell out in full what this entails.  In practice, much of the gap has been filled by a long-standing 
Statement of Practice, SP D12, which has been updated in recent years, not least to accomodate 
Section 59A. Important parts of SP D12 go beyond anything that Sections 59-59A can clearly justify.  
Usually, SP D12 has tended to benefit taxpayers but, at last in theory, a taxpayer could seek to be 
taxed on the strict letter of Sections 59-59A, ignoring SP D12985.   
 
SP D12 is too detailed to be analysed in its entirety here. However, it, and the associated HMRC 
guidance, operate much more explicitly on the basis that partners have fractional co-ownership 
interests in the assets of the partnership. Its second paragraph states: “[Section 59A(1) TCGA] 
complements [Section 59(1) TCGA] in treating any dealings in chargeable assets by a limited liability 
partnership as dealings by the individual members, as partners, for CGT purposes.  Each member of a 
limited liability partnership to which [Section 59A(1)] applies has therefore to be regarded, like a 
partner in any other (non-corporate) partnership, as owning a fractional share of each of the 
partnership assets and not an interest in the partnership itself”. This highlighted sentence significantly 
expands what Section 59(1) and Section 59A(1) actually say, as does the following sentence at 
CG27150 of the related HMRC guidance: “The effect of the rules [i.e. Sections 59-59A] is that there is 
a disposal for [capital gains tax] purposes when either (i) the partnership disposes of an asset or (ii) 
one or more of the partners’ fractional interests in a partnership asset is/are reduced”. 
 
Section 1 of SP D12 invents a special valuation rule for a partner’s fractional interest in a partnership 
asset. In particular, that value is a fraction of the value of the partnership’s entire interest in that 
asset, without any discount for the size of the partner’s interest. Furthermore, Section 2 of SP D12 
provides non-statutory guidance on how to measure a partner’s fractional interest in an asset. The 
first port of call is (any) explicit statement, at the relevant time, about the partner’s entitlement to 
share in asset surpluses. Failing that, one looks to the actual destination of such asset surpluses, as 
shown in the partnership accounts and any related agreement. If asset surpluses are not allocated as 
such among partners, one looks to the partnership’s ordinary profit-sharing ratio.  
 
Importantly, SP D12 sets out how the partners are to be taxed when there are adjustments in 
partnership sharing ratios. This will include when partners leave and join the partnership. The aim is 
to minimise the risk that such adjustments (which are usually entirely commercial) trigger unfunded 
tax charges because Sections 59-59A deem part-disposals of underlying partnership assets to arise 
because sharing ratios are being adjusted.  Paragraph 4.1 of SP D12 states: 
 
                                                          
985 It has been suggested that SP D12 should be enacted as legislation: see Simon Yates: “Partnerships and 
Capital Gains” [2008] BTR 587 at 610.  SP D12 has yet to be turned into legislation and if it were, it would need 
to be backstopped by a “targeted anti-avoidance rule” to discourage the kind of tax planning for which it has 
been used in the past. There is further extensive guidance, with examples, on SP D12 in HMRC’s Capital Gains 






“In these circumstances, a partner who reduces or gives up his share in asset surpluses will be 
treated as disposing of part or the whole of his share in each of the partnership assets and a 
partner who increases his share will be treated as making a similar acquisition.  Subject to [certain 
important exceptions, which are not considered further here], the disposal consideration will be a 
fraction (equal to the fractional share changing hands) of the current balance sheet value of each 
chargeable asset provided there is no direct payment of consideration outside the partnership”. 
 
Where that current balance sheet value equals the tax base cost in that underlying asset, there should 
therefore be no chargeable gain or allowable loss when sharing ratios change. A “dry” (i.e. unfunded) 
tax charge is thereby avoided: see paragraph 4.2 of SP D12, which sets out further situations where 
this “no gain no loss” approach will not apply.  
 
Where a new partner makes a capital contribution to the partnership which is credited to that 
partner’s current or capital account, that contribution is not treated under SP D12 as the acquisition 
cost of a fractional interest in partnership assets.  Nor is it treated as consideration received by 
existing partners for reducing their fractional interests in partnership assets, in favour of the new 
partner.   Similarly, merely repaying a retiring partner’s capital account is not automatically treated as 
direct consideration paid to that partner for disposing of its fractional interest in partnership assets. 
This treatment is effectively concessionary.  
 
Paragraph 4.2 focusses on the current balance sheet value of partnership assets.  Hence it does not 
prevent a “dry” tax charge where a partner contributes a chargeable asset (i.e. not Sterling) in return 
for a partnership share or an increased partnership share: see Section 5 of SP D12. In that case, the 
contributing partner has made a part-disposal of the contributed asset equal to the fraction of it that 
passes to the other partners. Depending on the circumstances, that fractional interest will be treated 
as disposed of (i) for its market value; or (ii) for the amount given in return by the other partners, in 
the form of fractional interests in the partnership’s other assets.  
 
Section 5 does not address whether, when partners contribute assets to a partnership and receive a 
proportionate partnership share in return, disposals on making those contribution can be avoided 
using the “pooling” analysis in Booth v Ellard986 and Jenkins v Brown987 (see 4.3.2.2). Equally, neither 
Section 3 nor Section 5 addresses whether those cases prevent a disposal by any partner when a 
partner withdraws assets “in specie” from the partnership in proportion to its partnership share.  
Indeed Section 3 (“Partnership assets divided in kind among the partners”) seems inconsistent with 
the courts’ approach in those cases988.  To date, the point has not been tested in litigation.  
 
The SP D12 approach to the “transparency” of a partnership is cumbersome and compliance-
intensive, not least because it entails a fairly radical “look through” to underlying partnership assets. It 
will require an adequate supply of information from the partnership to each partner about underlying 
assets, base costs and relevant balance sheet information. In particular, it requires each partner to 
identify and keep track of its fractional interests in each of the partnership’s capital assets, as well as 
its separate base costs in each of those fractional interests. These variables will change over time as 
                                                          
986 [1980] STC 555 upholding [1978] STC 487.  
987 [1989] STC 577. 
988 Section 3 assumes that each partner who is not receiving the asset in kind disposes of a fractional interest in 
that asset to the partner who is receiving it. If that analysis is correct, it may still be possible to postpone tax 






the partnership acquires and disposes of assets; and/or partners’ sharing ratios change. Under SP 
D12, a partner cannot assume that its base cost in a particular fractional interest is simply the amount 
given by the partnership for the underlying asset, multiplied by that partner’s percentage partnership 
share. Hence the SP D12 approach is best suited to partnerships with a limited and fairly static 
membership, as well as limited changes in sharing ratios. 
 
A.5  Schedule 7AD TCGA 
 
Because Sections 59-59A (coupled with SP D12) are cumbersome, UK tax law has in one area adopted 
a less radical transparency approach when taxing partnership capital gains. In summary, Schedule 7AD 
TCGA applies where, for the purposes of an insurance company’s “long-term” insurance business, it is 
a limited partner in a “venture capital investment partnership”989, which need not be a UK partnership 
but which must usually hold unquoted shares and securities. In that case, Section 59 TCGA is largely 
disapplied and the insurance company’s partnership interest “is treated as a single asset”990.  In other 
words, the partnership interest is not “looked through” and treated as a bundle of fractional interests 
in underlying partnership assets.  Moreover, the insurance company can acquire a tax base cost in 
that single asset991. The insurance company is treated as part-disposing of that single asset (and not 
the underlying partnership assets) each time it receives a distribution in respect of underlying 
securities disposed of by the partnership.  It can offset part of its base cost in the single asset when 
computing gain or loss on that part-disposal.  If the partnership does not actually make a distribution 
in respect of securities of which it disposes, within one year of their disposal, then the insurance 
company is treated as having received its pro rata share of the amount received by the partnership 
for those securities.  In this way, it is taxed on both distributed and undistributed gains of the 
partnership, with limited scope for deferral.  Schedule 7AD therefore achieves tax transparency in 
respect of the underlying gains of the limited partnership without fully “looking through” the limited 
partner’s interest to the underlying partnership assets.   
 
This tax transparency is partial.  In particular, if the insurance company sells its interest in the limited 
partnership to a third party, then it is treated as disposing only of its partnership interest, which is 
regarded as a separate asset under Schedule 7AD.  It is not treated as part-disposing of each of the 
underlying securities held by the partnership, which would be the approach of Sections 59 and 59A, in 
conjunction with SP D12. Equally, if the partnership disposes of assets at a loss, a share of those 
capital losses does not flow directly to the insurance company partner, although the loss may be 
reflected in the value of the partnership interest. 
 
A.6 “Authorised contractual schemes” and “offshore funds” 
 
A somewhat similar approach to Schedule 7AD has been adopted recently in relation to two types of 
investment fund (one UK, one non-UK) which are billed as “tax transparent” for UK tax purposes.  The 
first of these is an “authorised contractual scheme”992 where it takes the form of a contract-based 
                                                          
989 As defined in paragraph 2 Schedule 7AD. See also HMRC Life Insurance Manual at LAM03600 to LAM03650 
(accessed April 2020).  
990 Paragraph 3(2)(a) Schedule 7AD.   
991 Paragraph 4 Schedule 7AD.  This is what US tax advisers refer to as an “outside basis”, to distinguish it from 
the partnership’s own base cost (“inside basis”) in partnership assets. 






“co-ownership scheme”.993  “Authorised contractual schemes” were introduced in order to provide a 
tax-“transparent” competitor to entities such as the Luxembourg “fonds commun de placement”.  
They are expressly excluded, whatever form they take, from the definition of a “company” in Section 
1121 CTA 2010. The second type of investment fund referred to above is a so-called “offshore fund” 
(e.g. a non-UK-resident unit trust scheme) which is regarded as “transparent” for UK income tax 
purposes994.  
 
In either of these cases, the new Section 103D(3) TCGA spells out that “A unit in a tax transparent 
fund is treated as an asset for the purposes of [TCGA] and, accordingly, a participant’s interest in the 
fund property is disregarded for those purposes”. Section 103D(5)-(9) makes various adjustments to 
reflect the treatment of the fund unit as a separate asset under TCGA. In particular, amounts 
chargeable to income tax on the unit holder (because unit holders are entitled to underlying fund 
income as beneficial co-owners) can be added to that holder’s base cost in the unit when computing 
gains on disposing of the unit. This avoids economic double-taxation on the unit holder’s share of the 
fund’s undistributed income (whose retention is likely to boost the value of units)995.   
 
Where Section 103D applies to an “authorised” contractual co-ownership scheme which owns an 
interest in UK land, units in it will be treated not just as assets but as shares in a company996 for the 
purposes of taxing non-UK-resident investors on chargeable gains where they dispose of assets 
deriving at least 75% of their value from UK land997.    
 
Oddly, Section 103D does not replicate those features of Schedule 7AD which ensure that treating an 
interest in the fund as a separate asset does not lead to significant deferred tax on undistributed gains 
of the fund.  
 
A.7 Limits on the transparency of partnerships and LLPs when taxing chargeable gains 
 
While SP D12 provides practical clarification on how to apply Sections 59-59A, there are key issues 
which it does not address at all, or only obliquely.  In particular, to what extent can one use these 
                                                          
993 See Section 235A(2)-(4) FSMA. Scheme participants must beneficially co-own its assets as tenants in 
common, with the property being held on trust for them by a depositary. An “authorised contractual scheme” 
can be set up, alternatively, as a limited partnership (see Section 235A (5)-(7)), in which case UK taxation of 
partners’ chargeable gains will depend upon Sections 59-59A TCGA.  
994 See the definition of “transparent fund” in Regulation 11 Offshore Fund (Tax) Regulations 2009 SI 2009/3001. 
That definition turns on whether an interest in the fund would entitle its holder to underlying fund income as it 
arises, as per Baker v Archer –Shee 11 TC 749.  
995 Section 103D(3) in fact suggests that distributed, taxed fund income can also be added to the unit holder’s 
base cost. This is illogical because there should be no economic double taxation of such non-retained fund 
income, if its distribution is fairly prompt.  
996 See paragraph 5 Schedule 5AAA TCGA.  
997 For these purposes, an asset can only derive at least 75% of its value from UK land if “the asset consists of a 
right or an interest in a company [emphasis added]” and at least 75% of the value of specified assets of that 
company derives directly or indirectly from interests in UK land: see paragraph 3 Schedule 1A TCGA.  Hence 
 non-UK-residents investing in UK land via a “company” are only subject to tax on chargeable gains if this “75% 
of value” test is met.  By contrast, non-UK-residents investing in UK land via a partnership or UK LLP are subject 
to tax on gains even if less than 75% of the partnership’s asset value is derived from UK land, because of 
Sections 59-59A TCGA. This places investment by non-UK-residents in UK land via “companies” (including an 
“authorised” contractual co-ownership scheme) at a significant advantage over such investment via a 






sections to “look through” a partnership or a UK LLP, so that a group relationship can be established 
between a corporate member of the partnership/LLP and a company whose shares are held by that 
partnership/LLP?   
 
Suppose that Company A holds a 75% interest in a partnership or UK LLP which in turn holds directly 
all the ordinary shares of Company B. Are Company A and Company B “grouped” for the purposes of 
corporation tax on chargeable gains, according to Section 170 TCGA? 
 
The practical answer should be “yes” and this is what HMRC published guidance appears to confirm, 
in the Capital Gains Manual at CG45110. The legal basis for this guidance is not specified but 
presumably, is Sections 59-59A, coupled with the spirit of SP D12. In short, this HMRC statement is 
semi-concessionary because Sections 59-59A are not this clear-cut, and SP D12 is not explicit.  Firstly, 
the “look through” theory of both Sections (setting aside differences of drafting) is that 
partners/members of the entity are treated as owning or dealing in its underlying assets as partners, 
and not as simple co-owners.  As discussed, a partner’s interest in partnership property is not a simple 
percentage interest in that property. So one cannot simply say that a 75% interest in a partnership/UK 
LLP equates to owning 75% of its underlying assets, even if the partnership lacks legal personality.  
Secondly, even if Sections 59-59A did treat partners/members of the entity as co-owning its 
underlying assets, then that would leave each partner/member owning a fractional interest, but not 
all, of each underlying partnership asset (in the example above, part of each share of Company B). So 
technically, the partner/member would not own any of those partnership assets outright. Hence it 
would be hard to show that Company A owned 75% of the ordinary shares of Company B in order to 
establish a group relationship. This latter concern has apparently been raised by HMRC. It (though not 
the first concern) could be resolved more easily if, in the example, a direct subsidiary of A, Company 
C, held the remaining 25% interest in the partnership/ LLP.  In that case, C’s 25% part-interest in each 
of the B shares held by the partnership/LLP could be attributed to C’s parent company, A, via the 
separate attribution rule in Section 1156 CTA 2010. A would then be treated as owning 100% of the 
ordinary shares of B.  
 
A.8 Limits on the transparency of partnerships and LLPs for corporation tax “group relief” 
 
Interestingly, HMRC published guidance is more detailed for the purposes of corporation tax “group 
relief” (which is separate from “grouping” when taxing chargeable gains).  That guidance states that 
one can “look through” a partnership or a UK LLP to demonstrate a group relationship, as defined in 
Sections 131-133 CTA 2010: see the Corporation Tax Manual at CTM80152, which states that “A 
trading partnership In England, Wales or Northern Ireland has no legal personality and cannot own 
assets, so the assets of the partnership are treated as beneficially owned by the partners.  This will 
generally be in proportion to the members’ partnership shares, determined by the partnership 
agreement….”  This guidance makes practical sense but glosses over the legal nature of a partnership 
share, even where a partnership lacks legal personality.  It clearly cannot apply to a Scottish 
partnership998.    
 
For group relief purposes, there is no equivalent of Section 59 TCGA, which applies only in relation to 
partnerships and capital gains. For the same reasons, Section 59 does not apply in relation to the 
                                                          
998 This is a problem because, as already discussed in 2.9.6, the courts are reluctant to interpret UK-wide tax 






corporation tax “grouping” rules for “loan relationships” and “intangible fixed assets” in Parts 5,6 and 
8 CTA 2009. 
 
In relation to UK LLPs only, Section 1273 CTA 2009 operates in a very similar way to Section 59A 
TCGA999. In particular, Section 1273(1) says: 
 
“For corporation tax purposes, if a limited liability partnership carries on a trade or business with a 
view to profit –  
(a) all the activities of the limited liability partnership are treated as carried on in partnership by 
its members (and not by the limited liability partnership as such), 
(b) anything done by, to or in relation to the limited liability partnership for the purposes of, or in 
connection with, any of its activities is treated as done by, to or in relation to the members as 
partners, and  
(c) the property of the limited liability partnership is treated as held by the members as 
partnership property [emphasis added]. 
 
References in this subsection to the activities of the limited liability partnership are to anything 
that it does, whether or not in the course of carrying on a trade or business with a view to profit”.    
 
HMRC rely on the highlighted words to argue that “….for group relief purposes any ordinary share 
capital held by an LLP is treated as beneficially co-owned by the LLP members in accordance with 
each member’s share in the LLP, and thus an LLP can be ‘looked through’ to establish a group 
relationship”. One can see the practical merit of this statement, which seems inspired by SP D12. 
However, it is semi-concessionary because it is not legally accurate. Section 1273(1)(c) only says that 
the LLP members are treated as holding its assets as partnership property.  Given the nature of a 
partner’s interest in partnership property, a LLP member cannot simply be treated as owning a share 
of particular assets of the LLP corresponding to its LLP interest.  Hence the additional points made 
earlier about the legal effect of Section 59A are equally relevant here.  
 
Besides, as there is no Section 59 equivalent for the purposes of corporation tax group relief, it is 
much harder to “look through” a partnership other than a UK LLP, when defining a group relationship 
for group relief purposes. In this respect, HMRC guidance relies on the lack of legal personality of an 
English partnership as a basis for “looking through” it, without discussing the difficulties this raises, 
given the nature of a partnership interest.  That guidance also fails to address how one can “look 
through”, for these purposes, a partnership with legal personality, such as a Scottish partnership or a 
Delaware limited partnership.  This seems especially hard, where there is no equivalent of Section 59, 
or of Section 1156 CTA 2010 (which applies a “look through” approach for certain purposes, but only 
to a body corporate). In the case of a Scottish partnership, partners do not beneficially own the 
entity’s underlying assets, because Scottish property law has no concept of “beneficial”, as opposed 
to “legal” ownership. Instead, they have a non-proprietary claim (a “ius crediti”) against the 
partnership, which corresponds to their economic interest in it. 
 
                                                          
999 Section 1273(1)(c) is in fact the equivalent provision for corporation tax to Section 863 ITTOIA 2005 which 
was considered in Bayonet Ventures [2018] UKFTT 262 (TC). As the judge stressed in that case, Section 863 
merely assimilates the position of LLP members to that of partners in a non-LLP partnership.  It does not 






A.9  Limits on the transparency of partnerships and LLPs for the purposes of the “substantial 
shareholdings exemption” in Schedule 7AC TCGA 
 
A.9.1  A “substantial shareholding” 
 
A similar question to the “grouping” question is whether one company can own a “substantial 
shareholding”, via a partnership/UK LLP, in another company, for the purposes of the “substantial 
shareholdings exemption” (“SSE”) from corporation tax on chargeable gains, in Schedule 7AC TCGA.  
The main definition of a “substantial shareholding” is in paragraph 8 of Schedule 7AC. In particular, 
paragraph 8(1) provides that “….a company holds a ‘substantial shareholding’ in another company if it 
holds shares or interests in shares [meaning a “co-ownership” interest in shares] in that company by 
virtue of which (a) it holds not less than 10% of the company’s ordinary share capital…..” [emphasis 
added]. Strictly speaking, it is hard to see how a company can “hold” a specified number of shares in 
another company merely by being a partner/ member of a partnership/ UK LLP which itself holds 
those shares.  This is especially true if the entity is a separate legal person, such as a Scottish 
partnership or a UK LLP.  For the reasons discussed above, it is doubtful whether Sections 59-59A 
“look through” the partnership/LLP sufficiently to cure this problem. The UK tax authorities may take 
a more relaxed position on this issue in practice, arguably relying on the spirit of SP D121000.  This is 
certainly an issue of which they are aware.  Elsewhere in Schedule 7AC, for more limited purposes, 
language has been added quite recently to address this issue1001.  
 
A.9.2 SSE: groups, subgroups and joint ventures 
 
Elsewhere in Schedule 7AC, concerns have surfaced about whether shares or an “interest in shares” 
can be owned via a partnership (whether or not having legal personality). Before looking at those 
concerns, it should be noted that paragraph 29 Schedule 7AC defines “an interest in shares” as “an 
interest as a co-owner of shares”. Paragraph 29(2) then states that “It does not matter whether the 
shares are owned jointly or in common or whether the interests of the co-owners are equal”. 
Paragraph 29(2) (and especially the words “jointly or in common”) suggest that this definition of an 
“interest in shares” is quite narrow, being tied to the English law of co-ownership. This is odd because 
Schedule 7AC is not limited to shareholdings in UK-resident or UK-incorporated companies. By 
                                                          
1000 If Schedule 7AD TCGA (see A.5 above) applies to a life insurance company’s interest in a venture capital 
limited partnership, then the SSE cannot apply, even if the partnership itself holds a “substantial shareholding” 
in another company.  This is because the partner can only ever accrue gain on the separate asset consisting of 
its partnership interest, which is not “looked through” where Schedule 7AD applies.  That partnership interest is 
not itself a “substantial shareholding”, even if it derives its economic value from such a shareholding.   
1001 Paragraph 3B(6) states that: ”Where the assets of a partnership include ordinary share capital of a company, 
each partner is to be regarded as owning a proportion of that share capital equal to the partner’s proportionate 
interest in that ordinary share capital”. This deeming rule is not very clear about what a “proportionate interest” 
means.  However, it presumably treats a partner as owning underlying ordinary share capital to the extent of its 
partnership share, as described in Section 2 of SP D12. It goes further than Sections 59-59A by equating a 
partnership share with ownership of partnership assets. Paragraph 3B(6)’s scope is limited: it only applies for 
the purposes of paragraphs 3A and 8A(1). In both paragraphs, it helps to work out the percentage ownership 
(via a partnership) by certain institutional investors of a company which itself owns a “substantial shareholding” 
in a second company. Hence, paragraph 3B(6) has no bearing on the main definition of a “substantial 
shareholding” in paragraph 8. If those institutional investors comprise life insurance companies investing via a 
“venture capital limited partnership” within Schedule 7AD (see A.5 above), it would be sensible to treat 
paragraph 3B(6) as a very limited exception to the non-“look through” treatment of partnership interests falling 






contrast, in other parts of the tax legislation, “co-ownership” is expressly not restricted to its meaning 
under the law of any part of the UK: see, for example, the definition of an “offshore fund” in Section 
355(3) TIOPA.  
 
For SSE purposes, it can be very important to determine whether the company whose shares 
comprise the “substantial shareholding” is itself a member of a “trading group” or a “trading 
subgroup”.  Both these concepts are based on the Section 170 TCGA definition of a “group” for the 
purposes of corporation tax on capital gains (see paragraph 26 Schedule 7AC), but the required 
degree of affiliation is lowered to just over 50%. In the past, HMRC have argued that this level of 
affiliation can be traced through a partnership, but only if it lacks legal personality.  Hence tracing 
through a Scottish partnership or a UK LLP is not possible. This position is out of line with current 
HMRC published guidance in the Capital Gains Manual at CG45110 (see above). That guidance seems 
to be based on Sections 59-59A TCGA, plus (?) SP D12. While Sections 59-59A may not strictly support 
that guidance, it gives a sound practical answer which, importantly, applies whether or not a 
partnership has legal personality. That preserves consistency of treatment between, in particular, 
Scottish and English partnerships.  
 
The SSE also allows a corporate shareholder in certain joint venture companies to “look through” to 
the joint venture’s underlying activities: see paragraphs 23-4 Schedule 7AC. This can help to show that 
the corporate shareholder is itself either a “trading company” or a member of a “trading 
group/subgroup”, for SSE purposes. This “look through” is only possible where the corporate 
shareholder has a “qualifying shareholding”, as defined in paragraph 24(2). If the corporate 
shareholder is not itself a member of a group, it can have a “qualifying shareholding” in the joint 
venture company “if, and only if, it holds shares or an interest in shares [emphasis added] in the joint 
venture company”. If it is a member of a group, it can have a “qualifying shareholding” “if, and only if, 
it holds ordinary share capital [emphasis added] of the joint venture company”.  
 
There is no clear policy reason for the drafting difference highlighted above. Nevertheless, it appears 
that a corporate shareholder which is a group member can only have a “qualifying shareholding” if it 
directly “holds” ordinary share capital. “Looking through” a partnership of any kind is not possible for 
these purposes. If the corporate shareholder is not a member of a group, it has been argued that the 
reference to holding “an interest in shares” means that a “qualifying shareholding” can be traced 
through a partnership but only if it lacks legal personality. The author doubts if this is correct in 
practice, not least because of the “look through” in Sections 59-59A TCGA, which does not depend on 
whether or not a partnership has legal personality. However, a separate concern is the narrow 
definition (in paragraph 29) of an “interest in shares”. Even with the benefit of Sections 59-59A, does 
a partner own partnership property “jointly or in common”, given the unusual nature of a partnership 
share, even in a partnership which lacks legal personality? If the partnership has legal personality (e.g. 
a Scottish partnership) the problem becomes harder: in particular, a partner in a Scottish partnership 
has no property interest in the partnership’s assets at all. One might invoke the spirit of SP D12 to 
bypass this problem in practice, which may explain why HMRC have been known to take a more 
relaxed stance on this issue1002.   
                                                          
1002 See also the discussion by Dominic Foulkes and Jonathan Cooklin in “Analysis – Holding shares through 
partnerships: some observations” Tax Journal, Issue 1415 at page 7 (5 October 2018). The author has doubts 
about statements in this article that SP D12 is broadly consistent with the strict legal position regarding the 
nature of a partnership interest, especially as the article only addresses interests in English general partnerships 







A.10  Conclusion 
 
Partnerships are the quintessential example of a “transparent” entity. The UK rules on the 
transparency of partnerships and LLPs for the purposes of taxing chargeable gains take a fairly radical 
“look through” approach.  Nevertheless, they leave much to be desired.  Not only are they 
cumbersome to operate compliance-wise but the statutory rules underpinning this approach are 
limited and their effects unclear, not least when tracing affiliations between companies via 
intermediate partnerships and when applying the SSE. The void has been partly filled with non-
statutory guidance. While the guidance often strives to give sensible practical answers and much of it 
is well-established, it is largely concessionary. Furthermore, HMRC practice in this area has not always 
been consistent. For both taxpayers and tax authorities, this is unsatisfactory, especially given how 
common partnerships are in the commercial world.  A much more comprehensive legislative solution 
is needed.  
 
If one were starting from scratch, a better approach would be the less radical approach to 
“transparency” in Schedule 7AD TCGA. By treating partnership interests as a separate asset for the 
purposes of taxing capital gains, the complex compliance issues associated with Sections 59-59A 
TCGA are greatly reduced. Furthermore, this would deal comprehensively with tax planning where 
base cost has been “shifted” tax-free from one taxpayer to another in reliance on Section 4 of SP D12, 
even though that Section is largely concessionary. This planning effectively allows one taxpayer to 
access the asset base cost of another, when computing its own chargeable gain. It was often used to 
reduce the effective tax rate on “carried interest” paid by funds to fund managers. Sections 103KA-KH 
TCGA have since 2015 targeted such planning but only in relation to the investment management 
industry (where such planning was widespread).  
 
A Schedule 7AD-type approach alone would not be a complete solution. In particular, a separate “look 
through” rule would then be needed to trace relevant affiliations between companies via 
intermediate partnerships (although such a statutory rule is needed anyway). The non-“look through” 
Schedule 7AD-type approach would probably need to be overridden in particular cases e.g. to ensure 
that a non-UK-resident disposing of an interest in a non-UK partnership with a UK trading presence 
































Appendix B: corporation tax “transparency” where partnerships hold loan relationships, derivative 
contracts or intangible fixed assets.  
 
B.1 Partnerships and loan relationships, derivative contracts and intangible fixed assets 
 
The UK corporation tax code contains self-contained rules governing the corporation tax treatment of 
“loan relationships”, “derivative contracts” and “intangible fixed assets”.1003  These rules were 
intended to modernise key aspects of the corporation tax system and, in particular, to more closely 
align corporation tax treatment with the GAAP accounting treatment of the relevant assets and 
liabilities.  It is increasingly odd that these rules apply only for the purposes of corporation tax, given 
how similar many large partnerships are, in economic and functional terms, to companies.  
 
The structure of these rules has caused difficulties when dealing with “loan relationships”, “derivative 
contracts” and “intangible fixed assets” of entities which are “transparent” for corporation tax 
purposes1004, and, in particular, partnerships.  These problems are most marked when an interest in a 
partnership is transferred between corporation tax payers and that partnership holds intangible fixed 
assets.   
 
The root cause of the problem is that TCGA typically does not apply to any assets which fall within 
Parts 5-8 CTA 20091005, even if those assets would otherwise be capital assets on general principles.  
Hence if loan relationships, etc are held by a partnership or by a “bare trust”, the “look-through” rules 
in Sections 59, 59A and 60 TCGA are inoperative.   
                                                          
1003 See Parts 5 and 6 CTA 2009 (“loan relationships”); Part 7 CTA 2009 (“derivative contracts”) and Part 8 CTA 
2009 (“intangible fixed assets”).  Loan relationships cover in essence debts owed by and to corporation tax 
payers, although the rules have been significantly expanded to cover other instruments and arrangements with 
“debt-like” characteristics.  “Derivative contracts” cover a wide range of financial derivatives e.g. swaps, futures 
and options.  “Intangible fixed assets” cover a broad range of post-March 2002 intangible non-circulating assets 
(as defined by GAAP) as well as goodwill.    
1004 Meaning that the entity itself pays no corporation tax but its members are subject to corporation tax as if 
they took part directly in the underlying income-generating activities of the entity.  
1005 Parts 5-8 CTA 2009 ensure that profits and losses from “loan relationships”, “derivative contracts” and 
“Intangible fixed assets” are typically recognised as income profits and losses, not capital gains and losses, for 
corporation tax purposes.  There are exceptions for, in particular, certain “derivative contracts” and for 
intangibles in existence before April 2002, but these are immaterial for present purposes.  Parts 5-8 CTA 2009 
aim to cover exhaustively the tax treatment of “loan relationships”, “derivative contracts” and “intangible fixed 
assets”, unless expressly provided otherwise: see Sections 464, 699 and 906 CTA 2009.  This means that TCGA is 







B.2 Partnership “look through” for loan relationships and derivative contracts 
 
In the rules regarding  “loan relationships”, Sections 380-5 CTA 2009 (first enacted in 20041006) 
introduce a form of “look-through”, treating corporation tax-paying partners as if they were party to 
the underlying debts owed by or to the partnership.  There are similar rules regarding such partners in 
a partnership which enters into “derivative contracts”: see Sections 619-621 CTA 2009.  These rules 
aim to “look through” the partnership more directly than the normal UK rules determining how a 
partnership’s income (but not its capital gain) is to be taxed on a “transparent” basis.  Those normal 
rules, for corporation tax payers, are set out in particular in Sections 1259-60 CTA 2009 and do not 
treat partners as party to the underlying assets and liabilities of the partnership. In other words, there 
is no simple “look through”1007. Instead, a computation of income profit or loss is made on the 
assumption, for computational purposes only, that the partnership is a company. An appropriate 
amount of this profit or loss is then allocated to the corporate partner consistently with the 
partnership’s profit-sharing arrangements, under Section 1262 CTA 2009. That partner is liable for 
corporation tax on any profit allocated to it in this way.  
 
If there are both UK-resident and non-UK-resident partners, then two separate computations of profit 
or loss are made under Sections 1259-60. The first assumes that the partnership is itself a UK-resident 
company and the second that it is a non-UK-resident company. The first computation is used to 
allocate profit or loss to each UK-resident partner.  The second computation is used to allocate profit 
or loss to each non-UK-resident partner1008.  Those partners are then liable for corporation tax 
accordingly.  
 
B.3 Partnerships: limited “look through” for intangible fixed assets 
 
However, if a partnership owns intangible fixed assets, no rule treats a corporation tax-paying partner 
as owning a fractional interest in each of those underlying assets for the purposes of Part 8 CTA 2009.  
Furthermore, Section 807(1)(c) CTA 2009 provides that “the interest of a partner in a firm” cannot 
itself fall within the “intangible fixed asset” rules, unless under UK GAAP, it falls to be treated as 
representing an interest in partnership property which is an “intangible fixed asset” for Part 8 CTA 
2009 purposes1009.  Such treatment under UK GAAP is not a foregone conclusion1010.  
                                                          
1006 Prior to 2004, there had been a number of attempts to achieve tax advantages by exploiting the lack of a 
“look through”: see the (obsolete and withdrawn) Statement of Practice 4/98.   
1007 In particular, following Investec Asset Finance PLC, Investec Bank PLC v HMRC [2020] EWCA Civ 579, the 
effect of these rules seems to be that any trade carried on by the partnership is a separate trade for tax 
purposes from the business activities of the partners (including any separate trading activities) outside the 
confines of the partnership. Furthermore, income of the partnership trade computed at partnership level (and 
allocated to partners as described above) is ignored when computing any separate tax liability of the partners 
from their activities outside the partnership. Hence there can be no double taxation of partnership income.  
1008 Where partners in a partnership are not subject to corporation tax, there are equivalent rules (in particular, 
Sections 849-850 ITTOIA) for computing at partnership level the income profits and losses of the partnership for 
UK income tax purposes, and for allocating them to the partners. Again, these rules do not “look through” the 
partnership so as to treat partners as holding its underlying assets and liabilities. Their approach is therefore 
different to that of Sections 59-59A TCGA: see Appendix A.  
1009 Section 807(3) CTA 2009.  Section 807(2) is an equivalent exception for rights under a trust, which otherwise 
cannot be “intangible fixed assets” for Part 8 purposes.   
1010 For further discussion, see the First-Tier Tribunal in Armajaro Holdings Limited v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 571 







This potential lack of “transparency” can have important consequences if an interest in a partnership 
is sold from one corporation tax-payer to another.  Suppose that A Ltd and B Ltd are partners in a 
partnership whose assets comprise valuable intangibles. They share profits in the ratio 30:70. A Ltd 
sells its 30% interest to C Ltd.  C Ltd has “acquired” economically a large slice of the underlying 
intangibles.  However, the lack of “transparency” means that C Ltd is unable to claim depreciation for 
tax purposes1011 in respect of the underlying intangibles.   
 
The corporation tax treatment of A Ltd is also odd. The potential lack of “transparency” in Part 8 CTA 
2009 means that it may well not be treated as selling a slice of the underlying intangibles. Any profit it 
makes will therefore not be taxed as income under Part 8, even though that profit reflects growth in 
the value of “intangible fixed assets”.  Furthermore, that profit will not be taxed as capital gain either, 
because of the way in which TCGA analyses an interest in a partnership.  As discussed in Appendix A, 
Section 59 TCGA, together with SP D12, treats a partner, for the purposes of corporation tax on 
chargeable gains, as owning a proportionate share in each asset of the partnership.  Hence, one 
ignores the partnership interest as a separate asset and “looks through” it to the partnership’s 
underlying assets.  However, in this case, those assets consist of intangibles which ordinarily fall 
within Part 8 CTA 2009. To treat A Ltd as disposing, for TCGA purposes, of a 30% interest in the 
underlying intangibles would be at odds with Section 906 CTA 2009. In particular, subject to any 
contrary indication1012, “The amounts to be brought into account in accordance with [Part 8 CTA 
2009] in respect of any matter are the only [emphasis added] amounts to be brought into account for 
corporation tax purposes in respect of that matter”.  There does not seem to be “any contrary 
indication” to displace this rule. The fact that the amount “brought into account” under part 8 is in 
fact nil, rather than a tiny positive amount, should not prevent Section 906 from applying.  Otherwise, 
the goal of dealing with most intangible fixed assets exclusively under Part 8 CTA 2009 would be 
undermined.  
 
Part 8 CTA 2009 contains no “look through” rule similar to those which apply to the “loan 
relationships” and “derivative contracts” of partnerships.  Therefore, on the sale of a partnership 
interest, (i) gains of the corporate seller attributable to underlying intangible fixed assets of the 
partnership may not be taxed under Part 8; and (ii) the purchaser of that interest may not get 
effective amortisation relief for that part of the purchase price which is referable to those 
intangibles1013. This analysis is consistent with the way in which HMRC used to treat a disposal by a 
                                                          
intangible fixed assets. However, expert accounting evidence was presented that if a controlling interest in a 
general partnership was acquired, then UK GAAP would permit this to be presented as acquiring underlying 
goodwill of the partnership on the basis of “proportional consolidation”. The same accounting treatment was 
not possible when an interest in a UK LLP was acquired, because the latter is a separate legal person. This 
conclusion seems (?) to create an unfortunate distinction between Scottish and English general partnerships, 
because the former are also separate legal persons.     
1011 Either on an accounting basis under Section 729 CTA 2009 or by electing to write down at 4% per annum 
under Sections 730-1 CTA 2009.   
1012 Section 906(2) CTA 2009 
1013 There is limited, unsatisfactory discussion of this issue by the First-Tier Tribunal in Bloomberg Inc (UK 
permanent establishment), BLP Acquisition Holdings LLC (UK permanent establishment) v HMRC [2018] UKFTT 
205 (TC), in particular at paras 149-156.  Both HMRC and the judge did not explore in detail the implications of 
Section 59 TCGA not applying because of Section 906 CTA 2009, when an interest is sold in a partnership 
holding intangible fixed assets. Counsel for HMRC even suggested that a purchaser of a partnership interest 






corporate seller of an interest in a partnership holding “loan relationships” or “derivative contracts”: 
see paragraphs 13 and 21 of the old Statement of Practice 4/98. That treatment no longer applies 
because of the explicit “look through” rules (see B.2 above) regarding a partnership’s “loan 
relationships” and “derivative contracts”.  
 
If the partnership itself earns income (e.g. royalties) from dealing with its underlying intangible fixed 
assets, then, for the purposes of Part 8 CTA 2009, partnership profits from those dealings will be 
computed as income on the assumption that the partnership is itself a company subject to 
corporation tax1014 and which owns those assets.  Those profits (i.e. the overall result)  
will then be apportioned among partners subject to UK corporation tax according to the profit-sharing 
arrangements for the relevant period: see B.2.  There will be no tax on any such profits at the level of 
the partnership itself.  To that extent, the partnership is “transparent” for the purposes of Part 8 CTA 
2009.  However, this extends only to dealings of the partnership itself with its intangible fixed assets, 




It would be wise to include in Part 8 CTA 2009 a “look through” rule for partnerships holding 
“intangible fixed assets” which is similar to the “look through” rules which already apply to 
partnerships in respect of their “loan relationships” and “derivative contracts”. It is unsatisfactory that 


















                                                          
apply because of Section 807(1)(c) CTA 2009. This suggestion is hard to understand: Section 59 TCGA (unlike 
Schedule 7AD TCGA – see Appendix A) does not treat a partnership interest as an asset in its own right but looks 
through (with the assistance of SP D12) to the assets underlying that interest. If those assets would be 
“intangible fixed assets” for Part 8 CTA 2009 purposes, then taxing a transfer of the partnership interest under 
TCGA would involve “bringing into account an amount in respect of a matter” (i.e. those intangibles) contrary to 
Section 906 CTA 2009.  There does not seem to be any way to “switch off” Section 59, and to treat the 
partnership interest as a separate asset for TCGA purposes, simply because the underlying partnership assets 
are “intangible fixed assets” within Part 8 CTA 2009.   

















Appendix C: Entity classification issues in the UK’s estate and gift tax treaties 
 
The UK has a limited number of bilateral treaties aimed at avoiding or reducing the double taxation of 
gifts and inheritances.  Many of these agreements are quite old.  This section outlines the extent to 
which those les well-known agreements have addressed possible disagreements over entity 
classification.  
 
C.1  Older estate tax agreements 
 
The older agreements tend not to address entity classification mismatch issues at all.  Instead, they 
usually set out special rules for determining the “situs” of particular types of asset, for the purposes of 
allocating taxing rights between the contracting states.  It is common for a state to have taxing rights 
over assets whose “situs” is in that state.  The special rules in the older agreements can lead to a 
more favourable outcome for the taxpayer than if the “situs” of assets was left to be decided under 
the domestic law of each state. Those special “situs” rules can, however, cause entity classification 
mismatch issues.  For example, Article IV of the UK-Italy treaty of 19681015 provides, in Article IV(6), 
that shares, stock or debentures in a “company” (which is not defined) “shall be deemed to be 
situated at the place where the company was incorporated”, regardless of where it actually does 
business.  However, Article IV(7) then says that “An interest in a partnership shall be deemed to be 
situated at the place where the business was carried on; and if the business was carried on at more 
than one place an appropriate proportion of the interest shall be deemed to be situated at each of 
those places”.  “Partnership” is not defined either, yet the tax outcome, in terms of the “situs” of an 
interest in a business entity, may differ significantly depending on whether it is a “company” or a 
“partnership”. There is no guidance on how a partnership interest should be apportioned under 
Article IV(7).  
 
Article IV of the UK-France treaty of 19631016 takes a similar approach to the UK-Italy treaty but with 
some important differences. Shares (but not debentures) in a “company” are situated where the 
“company” is incorporated: see Article IV(e). However, under Article IV(g), “an interest in a 
partnership, which includes a societe en nom collectif, a societe en commandite simple and a societe 
civile under French law, shall be deemed to be situated at the place where the business is principally 
carried on [emphasis added] and in the case of a societe civile immobiliere, this shall be where the 
land developed in accordance with the objects of the societe is located”.  
                                                          
1015 SI 1968/304. 







Hence the UK-France treaty partially defines a “partnership” (the UK-Italy treaty does not) and 
includes in that definition a French entity (the “societe civile”) which the UK would not normally 
regard as akin to a partnership.  In particular, the HMRC list of non-UK entities in INTM 180030 
(produced long after 1963) states that a “societe civile” is not regarded as “transparent” for the 
purposes of UK taxation of income and gain.   
 
The UK-France treaty, unlike the UK-Italy treaty, does not envisage an interest in a partnership being 
situated in more than one place, although the place where it is situated is not where the partnership 
is formed but where its business is “principally carried on”.  This differs from the rule which makes the 
place of incorporation of a “company” (and where it carries on business) the “situs” of its shares.  
 
These older agreements leave “company” and “partnership” largely undefined.  “Unless the context 
otherwise requires”, otherwise undefined terms are to have the meaning they have under the law of 
the relevant treaty party “relating to the duties which are the subject of the Convention”: see, for 
example, Article 11(3) of the UK-Italy treaty. If the domestic tax rules of a treaty party are to 
determine the nature of an entity for the purposes of applying the treaty’s special situs rules, there is 
clearly considerable scope for disagreement. This can lead to either double taxation with no effective 
relief or to unintended double non-taxation.  
 
C.2  Newer estate tax agreements 
 
C.2.1  Introduction 
 
The UK has a number of estate and gift tax agreements which take a more modern approach, in broad 
conformity with the 1982 OECD Model Double Taxation Convention on Estates and Inheritances and 
Gifts (“the 1982 Model”)1017. Those more modern treaties include in particular those with the US1018, 
Switzerland1019 and the Netherlands1020. They also include a treaty with South Africa1021 and with 
Sweden1022, although it is understood that Sweden no longer imposes estate and gift taxation.  
 
Broadly, these more modern agreements allocate exclusive taxing rights to the jurisdiction in which 
the relevant person is “domiciled” (as defined by reference, initially, to the domestic law of the two 
jurisdictions but with recourse to a “tie-breaker” where dual domicile would otherwise result).  
However, these exclusive taxing rights are subject to the taxation rights of the jurisdiction where 
certain types of asset are situated.  Those assets include, in particular, “immovable property” as well 
as assets forming part of the business property of a “permanent establishment of an enterprise” or 
“assets pertaining to a fixed base used for the performance of independent personal services”. If 
                                                          
1017 https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/82/82.en.pdf (accessed 30 June 2020).  
1018 SI 1979/1454. 
1019 SI 1994/3214. The agreement with Switzerland in fact tracks the 1982 Model less closely than the other 
more modern treaties, especially where recourse to a tie-breaking rule is needed to avoid dual domicile. For a 
fuller discussion, see John F. Avery Jones: “The new inheritance tax double taxation agreement with 
Switzerland” [1995] BTR 1. 
1020 SI 1980/706 (as amended). 
1021 SI 1979/576. 






assets end up being taxed in both jurisdictions, then the agreement will provide for double taxation 
relief by way of credit (although the 1982 Model envisages such relief by either credit or exemption).  
 
C.2.2  “Immovable property” 
 
The treaties concerned contain a fairly limited definition of “immovable property”. In particular, this 
term is stated to have the meaning which it has under the law of the contracting state where the 
relevant property is situated.  It also includes various rights relating to landed property, such as the 
right to payments for working mineral deposits or other natural resources. Unlike the earlier estate 
tax treaties, there is no special definition of “situs”.  The definition of “immovable property” is also 
not expanded to include interests (e.g. shares) in a “property-rich entity”, in contrast to the OECD 
Model. However, this last situation may be covered by implication if the domestic law of the 
jurisdiction where the underlying real estate is situated, treats interests in the real estate-holding 
entity as “immovable property”.  
 
C.2.3  “Permanent establishment” 
 
All more modern treaties contain a definition of “permanent establishment” which resembles that in 
pre-2017 versions of the OECD Model. The OECD Model no longer has a separate article dealing with 
income from independent personal services, making the “fixed base” concept redundant in that 
Model.  
 
The UK agreements with the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland (but not with the US) explicitly 
expand the “permanent establishment” definition to deal with “partnerships” (which are not defined). 
For example, Article 6(7) of the UK-Netherlands agreement states that “The provisions of paragraphs 
1 and 6 of this Article shall apply to an interest in a partnership if an enterprise is carried on or 
independent professional services are performed, by the partnership”.  This somewhat obscure 
wording seems to have been inspired by paragraph 26 of the Commentary on Article 7 of the 1982 
Model1023. It presumably means that, if a partnership has a “permanent establishment” or fixed base 
in a jurisdiction, then that jurisdiction in particular can tax assets of that establishment or base when 
an event arises which triggers tax on an interest in the partnership. Hence, the holder of the 
partnership interest is treated as carrying on business in that jurisdiction through the “permanent 
establishment” or “fixed base”. Furthermore, the other jurisdiction will respect that analysis for its 
own tax purposes (in particular, granting a credit for tax in the jurisdiction where the establishment or 
base is located). This rule regarding interests in a partnership should limit unrelieved double taxation, 
or double non-taxation, when that partnership interest passes on death or by way of a lifetime gift.  
  
The agreements with the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland do not define a “partnership” for 
these purposes.  Therefore, “unless the context otherwise requires”, one must prima facie apply the 
meaning of that term under the inheritance and gift tax law of the jurisdiction which is seeking to 
apply this rule regarding partnerships: see, for example, Article 3(2) of the UK-Netherlands agreement 
and of the UK-Switzerland agreement. This clearly leaves scope for one jurisdiction to treat as a 
“partnership” an entity which would not be so regarded by the other jurisdiction.  Hence, while Article 
6(7) of the UK-Netherlands agreement is helpful, entity classification mismatches may still arise e.g.  
                                                          
1023 https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-double-taxation-convention-on-estates-and-inheritances-and-






relating to a Dutch limited partnership, known as a “commanditaire venootschap” or “CV”.  This 
entity1024 lacks legal personality and is therefore always regarded as “transparent” for UK tax 
purposes: see the HMRC guidance in the International Tax Manual at INTM 180030.  It is also likely to 
be regarded as a partnership for UK tax purposes. However, if interests in a CV can be transferred 
without the consent of the other CV members, it will be regarded as a company, and hence “opaque” 
in relation to its limited partners, for Dutch tax purposes: a so-called “open CV”. Suppose that a Dutch 
limited partner in an “open CV” transfers on death an interest in the CV at a time when it has a UK 
“permanent establishment”.  On the basis of the UK domestic law definition of “partnership”, the UK 
is likely to rely on Article 6(7) of the UK-Netherlands agreement so as to impose inheritance tax on a 
deemed transfer of the underlying assets of the UK “permanent establishment”. The amount of that 
deemed transfer will reflect the extent of the donor’s interest in the CV.  However, under Dutch 
domestic law, the interest in the “open CV” will not be regarded as an interest in a partnership.  So 
the Netherlands may not accept that Article 6(7) of the UK-Netherlands agreement applies. In that 
case, and subject to Article 9 (see C.2.6), the Netherlands may not be willing to give double taxation 
relief for any UK tax imposed on the transfer of the CV interest, on the basis of Article 6(7). 
 
It would also be helpful if Article 6(7) of the UK-Netherlands agreement, and equivalent provisions in 
other agreements, was not limited to partnerships. In particular, it would make sense for it to apply to 
a vested interest in a trust.  
 
C.2.4.  Other types of property 
 
Some of the more modern agreements contain allow ships and aircraft engaged in international 
traffic to be taxed in the jurisdiction where the “effective management” of the relevant enterprise is 
located: see the agreements with South Africa, Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands.  In the case 
of Sweden and the Netherlands (but, oddly, not Switzerland), this special rule also covers boats 
engaged in inland waterways transport.  
 
The South African agreement also allows the shares and debentures of a “company” (undefined) to 
be taxed in the contracting state where the company is incorporated. Similarly, units in a unit trust 
scheme may be taxed in the contracting state where the register of unitholders is kept. This special 
rule regarding shares and debentures of a company1025 could give rise to double taxation or 
unintended double non-taxation if there was disagreement about whether a particular entity was a 
“company”. However, this risk should be reduced by Article 9 of the South African agreement (see 
C.2.6).  
 
C.2.5  Settlements 
 
The Commentary to Article 1 of the 1982 Model recognises that bespoke treaty provisions may be 
needed to accommodate specific property holding arrangements such as trusts, foundations and 
usufructs.  The 1982 Model does not deal with these arrangements in detail, leaving these issues to 
bilateral negotiations. This is a significant gap given the widespread use of such arrangements for 
                                                          
1024 See also 7.3.2. 
1025 In the UK-Switzerland agreement, the UK has a secondary taxing right over shares in a UK-incorporated 
company, in cases where that agreement regards the deceased as “domiciled” in Switzerland without needing 






wealth planning purposes, and the very different estate and gift tax regimes used by states to tax such 
arrangements.  
 
Surprisingly, the various UK estate and gift tax agreements only deal to a limited degree with the 
taxation of “settlements”. In particular, the older treaties say little or nothing about them1026.  The 
newer treaties tend not to deal explicitly with “settlements” where the settlor was not “domiciled” in 
either contracting state, when the settlement was made.  
 
The UK agreements with the Netherlands and Switzerland purport to apply (see Article 1 in each case) 
to property comprised in “settlements” made by persons domiciled in either contracting state when 
the settlement was made. However, little more is then said in each agreement. If a settlement is 
created by a Dutch-domiciled settlor and contains UK property such as shares of a UK-incorporated 
company, the usual UK IHT charges on that settlement are largely excluded by Article 11(2).  
 
By contrast, if the settler was domiciled in a contracting state other than the UK when the settlement 
was created, the UK treaties with the US, South Africa and Sweden tend to exclude the settlement 
from UK taxation, subject to reserving UK taxing rights in respect of immovable property, etc1027. This 
is a generous open-ended carve-out, although there is nothing equivalent if, say, the settlor is not 
domiciled in that other contracting state but all the beneficiaries are. There is also no rule in these 
three treaties which excludes non-UK taxation of settled property where the settlor was domiciled in 
the UK when the settlement was created.  
 
“Settlement” is usually not expressly defined for these purposes.  Presumably, “unless the context 
otherwise requires”, the UK’s expanded definition of “settlement” (for inheritance tax purposes) is 
likely to apply, to the extent that the relevant treaty affects UK taxing rights. As discussed in 5.3.2, this 
definition of “settlement” is not limited to trusts.  This feature alone may give rise to disputes over 
interpretation and taxation mismatches, because the “settlement” definitions of the UK and the other 
state are unlikely to be symmetrical.  
  
C.2.6  Anti-mismatch rule 
 
To resolve classification mismatches regarding the nature of property, the UK agreements with the 
Netherlands, South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland (but not the agreement with the US) contain an 
additional rule. In the UK-Netherlands agreement, this is headed “Conflict as to the nature of 
property” (Article 9) and reads: 
 
“If, by the law of one of the States, any right or interest is regarded as property not falling within 
any of Articles 5 [immovable property], 6 [property of a permanent establishment or fixed base] 
and 7 [ships and aircraft], but by the law of the other State, that right or interest is regarded as 
property falling within those Articles, then that right or interest shall for the purposes of this 
Convention be regarded as property falling within those Articles”.  
                                                          
1026 See Article V(2) of the UK-Italy agreement for a limited reference to settlements in the context of fixing rates 
of taxation. Article V(1)(b) of the 1957 agreement with Pakistan (SI 1957/1522) preserves Pakistani taxing rights 
in respect of settled property containing a life interest, where the settlor was domiciled in Pakistan when the 
settlement was created.  
1027 See Article 5(4) of the UK-US agreement; Article 5(2) of the UK-South Africa agreement; and Article 5(4) of 







The equivalent rule in the UK-Switzerland agreement (Article 10(1)) is very similar although it does not 
apply to lifetime gifts (which are generally not covered by that agreement). In the agreements with 
Sweden and South Africa, the equivalent rule is Article 9, which only applies where the deceased or 
the transferor (as the case may be) is “domiciled” in one of the contracting states for the purposes of 
the agreement. If the deceased/transferor is “domiciled” in neither of those states, and both states 
would still seek to tax the same property on the basis of “situs”, then the competent authorities of 
the two states are to attempt to resolve that “situs” question.  
 
This kind of rule is likely to resolve the classification mismatch in a manner which increases the 
allocated taxing rights of the jurisdiction where the property is situated. 
 
This type of rule is inspired by, though not identical to wording suggested in paragraph 24 of the 
Commentary on Article 7 of the 1982 Model. If one applies Article 9 of the UK-Netherlands agreement 
to the earlier example of the “open CV”, then both the UK and the Netherlands must apply the UK 
analysis that the interest in the CV comprises property of a UK “permanent establishment”, relying in 
part on Article 6(7) of the UK-Netherlands agreement.  Hence the UK should get to tax a proportion of 
the property of that UK establishment and the Netherlands should give double taxation relief for that 
UK tax.  
 
The UK-Ireland agreement contains a modified version of this type of rule in Article 6(2).  Despite 
being a more modern agreement, this agreement differs significantly from the 1982 Model1028. It is an 
unusual agreement which is not considered in greater detail here.  
 
C.2.7  Conclusion on UK estate and gift tax agreements 
 
Although they can give rise to significant entity classification mismatch issues, the UK’s estate and gift 
tax agreements are a fairly neglected backwater.  There seem to be no plans to expand their number 
nor does overhaul of the existing agreements seem to be a priority, especially when contrasted with 
the work which has led to Article 1(2) of the OECD Model and Article 3 of the MLI. In particular, a 
number of these agreements are old and do not even conform to the 1982 Model and Commentary, 
which go some way towards addressing mismatch issues. The approach to taxing estates, gifts and 
settlements can vary a lot between jurisdictions, not least in relation to trusts and foundations.  This 
makes it harder to conclude such agreements. Nevertheless, it would make sense for the UK to bring 
its older agreements at least into line with, in particular, its agreement with the Netherlands.  The UK 
has a large population of high net worth expatriates (many of whom are French and Italian) and the 
yield from UK inheritance tax has been rising steadily. Furthermore, reform of the UK’s rules for taxing 
wealth transfers is moving up the political agenda. Therefore, it would make sense to upgrade its 
estate and gift tax agreements, so as to reduce double taxation or unintended double non-taxation. 
This would also be consistent with EU Commission Recommendation 2011/856/EU of 15 December 
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